PROCESO — WEEKLY NEWS BULLETINEL SALVADOR, C.A.

Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI)
E-mail: cidai@cidai.uca.edu.sv

Central American University (UCA)
Apdo. Postal 01-168, Boulevard Los Próceres
San Salvador, El Salvador, Centro América
Tel: +(503) 210-6600 ext. 407
Fax: +(503) 210-6655
 

     Proceso is published weekly in Spanish by the Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI) of the Central American University (UCA) of El Salvador. Portions are sent in English to the *reg.elsalvador* conference of PeaceNet in the USA and may be forwarded or copied to other networks and electronic mailing lists. Please make sure to mention Proceso when quoting from this publication.

     Subscriptions to Proceso in Spanish can be obtained by sending a check for US$50.00 (Americas) or $75.00 (Europe) made out to 'Universidad Centroamericana' and sent to the above address. Or read it partially on the UCA’s Web Page: http://www.uca.edu.sv
     For the ones who are interested in sending donations, these would be welcome at Proceso. Apdo. Postal 01-168, San Salvador, El Salvador.



Proceso 1047
May 7, 2003
ISSN 0259-9864
 
 

INDEX




Editorial: The stability is in danger

Regional: The borderline and its problems

Economy: The situation of the employment market and the paradox of the market

 
 
Editorial


The stability is in danger

 

The inaugural session of the Legislative Assembly is a clear announcement of what might be coming along in the future if the main actors do not change their attitude. However, in order that they act differently, they need to realize the political force that they have and put the national interests first. In other words, without a considerable amount of realism there cannot be a different attitude. None of the three largest parties can manage to complete their legislative agenda on their own. The three of them need the collaboration of at least one of the other parties. President Flores will not be able to complete his initiatives without the collaboration of at least two of those parties, and his successor will have to face the same situation. Therefore, the negotiations and the alliances -that is, to give in order to get- are indispensable for the main actors of the national politics. Otherwise, to administrate the country will be an almost impossible task, since both of the powers of the state will be paralyzed, and this situation will create an institutional crisis.

It is necessary to wonder how does President Flores think to administrate the country for the people during this last year without reaching an alliance with another party. And how does he calculate that he will be able to obtain the necessary two thirds to elect the magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice or that his vetoes will not be blocked by the Legislative Assembly. President Flores seems defiant and secure with the news media, but he does not have the power that he used to have, at least not to govern in a democratic institutional environment. It is also necessary to wonder how will the FMLN and the PCN block the presidential vetoes without the votes of the small political parties, which are excluded from the Directive Board. Or how do they think that they will be able to make their candidates occupy the open positions at the Supreme Court of Justice without the votes of the small parties.

The alliance that now makes both the FMLN and the PCN powerful is not guaranteed. Even if its leaders speak about honoring their compromises in front of the press, the politicians from all of the parties are well known for their detachment from the obligations established at the different negotiations. In other words, if the PCN returns to its natural position, which is on the side of ARENA, then the FMLN will occupy the place that ARENA presently has, and the votes of the PDC and the CDU will be useless. It is ironic to see how the discourses of those who became a minority are identical to the ones that their main adversaries pronounced three years ago. That is, the discourse of those who occupy a disadvantageous position. To angrily claim for an alliance between the FMLN and the PCN, comparing it with a marriage, and to hurl insults, as ARENA does, is irrelevant. Three years ago, this party did exactly the same thing that the FMLN did. Back then, the alliance between ARENA and the PCN made the FMLN turn into a minority. Now, it is the alliance between the FMLN and the PCN what has put ARENA on a disadvantageous position. Therefore, they cannot complain about the existence of negotiations and pacts, not even about the buying and selling of the will of some people, because that has been the way how ARENA, assisted by the PCN, has governed during the last years. The PCN is the party that has allowed ARENA to govern and, in that sense, it is the party that has somehow stabilized the country’s situation. However, it is also the party that can contribute to create instability, and paralyze both the Executive and the legislative party.

The FMLN should not have an arrogant attitude just because they took an initiative away from ARENA. Or because they have put ARENA at the side of the opposition, because the FMLN cannot predict how long its alliance with the PCN is going to last, and its power comes from that alliance. The trajectory of the latter shows that it is for sale and, in the political market, the party that has more purchasing power is ARENA. Although it is necessary to wonder if this party has anything else to offer to the PCN in exchange for its votes, because its leaders already have al they could wish for in economic and political terms. The FMLN, on the other hand, might represent an opportunity to satisfy a set of political ambitions that came back to life after the last elections. And it seems that ARENA would not be willing to fulfill those aspirations because they are too expensive. A different matter is if the FMLN will be willing to pay that price in order to achieve a larger amount of power. If this were the case, it is still not clear if its foundations would accept this change. The power derived from this alliance, for the FMLN, carries a dangerous seed: to become one of the products in the political market. It seems ironic to get closer to the PCN and get away from the CDU, but it does not come as a surprise because power is the factor that can make a party do that.

ARENA is confronted with the inevitable: times have changed. It is not powerful enough to administrate the country by itself. Its traditional partner has abandoned ARENA, at least momentarily. Therefore, the governmental party should build new alliances and look for new sources of social support. In this sense, the intransigent posture of the Executive power is irrational and counterproductive. To feel sorry for a loss leads to a dead - end. The only way out is to adopt a constructive and a positive posture, but in order to do that it is necessary to defeat the arrogant and the intolerant attitudes that have characterized this political party throughout its existence.

To adopt a defiant and an arrogant attitude will not contribute to overcome the weak features of the three largest political parties; to intend to isolate themselves will not help them to achieve the desired results either. There is no other way out but to act with prudence and good sense, and that means to put the people’s needs first and elaborate a common governmental agenda. Those who take the initiative have more probabilities to direct the process. On the contrary, the three of them will lose. The question is if the PCN is willing to play the role of a moderator between the two extremes, since this party has the key element for the country’s governance.

G

 

Regional


The borderline and its problems

 

A new chapter about the old territorial conflict between El Salvador and Honduras was written this week, when the Organization of American States started working on the demarcation of the Fonseca Gulf. The technician assigned by the Organization of American States to develop this task was John Gates, who arrived to San Salvador on May 5th, where he had a meeting with the governmental representatives of both nations. The presence of Gates obeys to a request made by the governmental representatives in order to resolve the dispute, which was brought to the International Court of Justice in Holland. As one of the Salvadoran morning papers explains “both countries seek to resolve the situation and eliminate the obstacles to carry on with the sentence dictated by the International Court of Justice. This means that it is necessary to place the necessary traffic signs throughout almost 180 kilometers of the frontier in six different areas. This process was frustrated during last October, when those in charge of the job noticed that the geodesic coordinates did not match with the geographic accidents described in the sentence”.

This does not mean that the demarcation will start soon, since this matter will be discussed during the next couple of months. Presently there is no official date for the beginning of the demarcation. This slow process contrasts with the exaggerated optimism that Honduras and El Salvador felt when they saw the solution of this problem in the past.

Both Central American nations have had disputes of this kind before, a few decades ago. Along with other factors, both nations fought a war in 1969 because of their territorial dispute. Their diplomatic relations were reestablished until 1980, with the General Treaty of Peace. The territorial disputes do not only include the area of the Fonseca Gulf, but the “borderline bolsones” located at several areas of the North and at the East sides of the frontier next to El Salvador. The bolsones are the areas in Honduras where Salvadoran people live, and where they face a territorial problem. The Nahuaterique and the Goascoran bolsones became part of Honduras, creating a series of juridical and human problems that have not been resolved yet.

Even if the dispute about these “bolsones” was resolved by international institutions, the conflict has not ended. The year 2002 was an example of this. The Honduran chancellor, Guillermo Perez Cadalso showed that his administration was not happy with the territorial demarcation process dictated in 1980. In January of 2002, the Honduran chancellery had denounced the government of El Salvador before the United Nations, because it was dealing with the delimitation of the frontiers in a very slow way. Several months after that, in August, the Salvadoran chancellor, Maria Eugenia Brizuela de Avila, met with the representatives of the Security Council of the United Nations to deny the accusations.

By September 5th, Honduras protested once again before the United Nations. On September 9th, the governments of both countries made a pact and established a new demarcation process. A day later, El Salvador appealed against the decisions connected with the frontier of the Goascoran River, in the East of the country. The Salvadoran President compromised himself –on the 16th- to demarcate ten kilometers per month. The process began on October 30th, with the placement of the first boundary stones at the locality of El Poy.

Three years before that, in 1999, the President of El Salvador, Francisco Flores, and the President of Honduras, Carlos Flores Facusse, had signed an agreement that contained three fundamental items. Those items were the demarcation of the borders; the respect for the property rights, the nationality, and the economic and the social development of the region. From that moment on, both governments had made a compromise: to perform an efficient demarcation process.

In the present dispute, both countries claim that they have colonial documents that support their respective intentions about the Gulf of Fonseca, which include lands and water. The bad apple has specifically been the small Conejo Island.


While the Honduran and the Salvadoran delegates polish their arguments, the presence of the members of the Honduran armed forces has been denounced. Allegedly, they are in several of the territories that they are intending to keep. The paper CoLatino informed in its edition of May 6th that “On April 26th, it was reported that a Honduran troop penetrated the Salvadoran territory in the area of Rancho Quemado, located at Perquin, and they were chasing a Salvadoran woodcutter. The violation of the national territory was described by a high rank official from the Ministry of Foreign affairs as a fault committed by the Honduran police”.

The aspirations of several people have not been satisfied. The bolsones that have not been demarcated are the following: Tecpanguisir, Las Pilas, Arcatao, , Nahuaterique, Poloros, and Goascoran. The sentence of 1992 granted 300 square kilometers to Honduras; that is 300 square kilometers out of the 450 that were part of the dispute. If the commercial disputes between both nations are added to this problem, the case demands an elaborated set of solutions with more depth than the juridical dispositions. This could be important because it helps to resolve the legal aspects. However, there is also a series of social problems that go beyond the diplomatic disputes.

The problems of the population from the border
Neither the juridical resolutions, nor the declarations of good will made by the governments have been enough to resolve the problems of the inhabitants from the former bolsones at the border. The borderlines between El Salvador and Honduras are mostly rural areas, and many of them are part of the territories that are in a disadvantageous economic situation, that is Chalatenengo and Morazan. The borderline areas are far away from their cities and definitively far away from San Salvador. This is a critical situation in a country that concentrates its social, its political, and its economic activities in the city capital.

The policy of the Honduran and the Salvadoran authorities about the bolsones located at the borderline can be summed up with the phrase used by the Human Rights Procurator, Beatrice de Carrillo: “The territorial interests seem to be more important than the human ones”. The Office for the Defense of the Human Rights has seen the difficult situation of the inhabitants, who are constantly threatened by the presence of the Honduran police and the army. This is a symptom of the abandonment that the people have to deal with. Living in an area, which has been considered as a part of El Salvador, but that according to the law it belongs to Honduras, these people are practically on a limbo. Neither of the governments has taken care of the inhabitants’ rights.

One of the most frequent activities to survive at the bolsones is cutting down the trees to work with the wood, especially at those territories located at the North of Morazan. On February 27, the paper CoLatino published a story about an incident between a group of Salvadoran farmers and a contingent of Honduran soldiers and policemen. Everything happened because the farmers were cutting down trees. The policemen and the soldiers tried to arrest them, but the farmers were the ones who ended up arresting them. The paper explained that “Over 2000 farmers arrested the Hondurans in a spontaneous way after the police and the soldiers had confiscated two motor jigsaw and other tools to cut down the trees. Santos Tulio Hernandez leaded the farmers. He declared that he had never been a member of the Salvadoran guerrillas, nor a member of the army. He said that he had always worked at the forest and that is why he fights to keep doing his job, since the area does not offer a different alternative. Martinez said that cutting down the trees –as a way to survive- is an agreement contemplated between El Salvador and Honduras, and that it was signed a few days after the sentence was dictated, and that is the reason why yesterday’s agreement was only verbal to resolve the situation of last Tuesday”.

The constantly tense relations with the police and the Honduran army are only a part of the difficulties that have to be resolved by the inhabitants of the bolsones. The legal uncertainty and its consequences are also critical. The inhabitants of the bolsones ignore what will their legal situation be once that the agreements are completely implemented. They think that the Honduran nationality might be granted to them, since the lands that they occupy will belong to Honduras.

The governmental abandonment is even more critical. One of the inhabitants interviewed by El Diario de Hoy declared that “we feel worried because the government of El Salvador did not do and will not do anything for us. The government abandoned us and now it is clear that we will not count with it, not even to speak about how bad the Hondurans have treated us. We have no choice but to learn to love another country”.

An important step
To resolve the situation of the Salvadorans who inhabit the bolsones is an important step to resolve the territorial problem, since the tensions between them and the Honduran authorities could get worse. This situation will not be resolved by granting a double nationality to the people, because the nationality issue is strongly connected with the structure of marginalization of our country. Far from being a nation of “opportunities”, El Salvador is characterized by excluding many of its citizens from the economy and the society. That explains the perverse logic according to which it is better to have the Salvadorans outside of the country sending dollars, and not inside their own land. Since those who inhabit the bolsones do not send remittances, there are no diplomatic actions to improve their situation. Only when the United States threatens to order a massive deportation process the diplomatic authorities pay attention to the situation of the Salvadorans, because that would be an obstacle for the flow of dollars and the national economy.

The development of the borderline regions is a strategic aspect for Honduras and El Salvador; the governments of both countries should make a serious compromise in order to reach that goal. At the moment, however, the only idea that occupies the minds of the governments and their advisors is to increase the perimeter of their respective territories.

G

 

Economy


The situation of the employment market and the paradox of the market

 

A brief radiography of the present situation of the labor market is enough to expose the plague of failures and negative qualities that come from the almost dogmatic practice of the Neoliberal economic model that inspires the Flores administration. The importance of this exercise is to point out that this kind of economic policies are based on the “stop doing, let it pass” of the market without any restrictions. The unrestricted use of this criteria in almost all of the fields of the economy through the privatization process, the free trade agreements, and the regressive fiscal policies, among other aspects, are actually an aggression against the lives of hundreds of thousands of people who are part of those groups who live under the line of poverty.

As far as the employment market of El Salvador is concerned, an approximation to the main variables that are part of it reproduces a delicate picture of the country’s economic situation. For example, almost 11,000 Salvadorans obtain a university degree each year; however, the job opportunities seem to be stagnated. This stagnation of the formal sector begins to show in 1997, and according to the Salvadoran Institute of Social Security (ISSS) only 600,000 job positions are occupied to the present date. This information is very different from the one of the Ministry of Work, since its records show that there are over one million people in that sector. The truth is that no matter what the real amount is, the creation of new job positions has been paralyzed.

Certainly, the prevailing economic model does not create enough job positions as to incorporate a growing Economically Active Population (PEA, in Spanish). On the other hand, the level of jobs that are created is precarious, since the objective is to maximize the capital. This means that the employment positions that are created are jobs that pay a low salary, the compensations of the social security are reduced and so are other benefits, the employment dynamic is degraded by the logic of the flexible schedules, and the purchasing power of the worker is deteriorated. The minimum salary is not enough to cover the cost of the basic food basket or the basic needs of the workers and their families.

The official statistics of the evolution of the economy in terms of the GNP, the employment level, and the income of the workers are critical aspects of the economy. An examination of the general dynamic of the Salvadoran economy shows the need to find a structural solution to the problems that worry a wide sector of the population. These problems seem to be the direct consequence of the Neoliberal economic model that has been implemented.

For instance, when the employment statistics are examined, it can be observed that the PEA has increased. In 1991, the PEA was 1,951,900. By 2002, this amount had increased by 4.3% (2,573,000 people). From that growing PEA, those who effectively acquire the possibility to satisfy the basic needs (or at least partially), are known as the occupied ones. That is, those who are economically active, have a job and receive a salary, or those who work without receiving a salary in a family business.

Therefore, those who have a job can be:
a) Fully employed. They work 40 hours or more per week, and receive a salary that is higher or equal to the established minimum wage.
b) Sub-employed. They can be measured over the base of the following criteria:
b.1.) Visible. They work involuntarily for less than 40 hours per week.
b.2.) Invisible. They work for 40 or more hours per week and receive an income smaller than the established minimum wage.

Once these criteria are defined, it would seem natural that, to at least guarantee the basic conditions of life, it is necessary to increase the number of those fully employed, who normally belong to the formal sector. The formal sector is formed by groups of five or more workers; workers who have an independent job; and employers that have five or less employees under them, and who are performing professional, technical, administrative, or managerial tasks.

As a corollary of the former idea, it can be inferred that those who are not fully employed do not make the necessary income to satisfy the basic needs for themselves and their families. What is the growth tendency of the unemployed and the sub-employed sector in El Salvador?

The sub-employment level in El Salvador is higher than the unemployment level, and this tendency can be observed along the last twelve years. According to the General Direction of Census and Statistics (DIGESTYC, in Spanish), we have that:

1. While in 1991, the unemployment level was 8.7%, the sub-employment level was four times higher, that is 34%. The same can be observed in 1995, with an unemployment level of 7.7% versus a sub-employment level of 32%. In 1999, the unemployment level was 7%, while the sub-employment level was 31.9%. And by 2002, the unemployment level was 6.2% against a sub-employment level almost five times higher: 29.8%. There is an inverse relation between unemployment and sub-employment. Despite the fact that the unemployment level seems to be decreasing, it is very distant from the sub-employment level, which seems to keep increasing.

2. If the sub-employment level is examined, the perspectives are even more critical. The invisible sub-employees had, between 1991 and 2002, an average growth rate of 8.2 times higher than the one of the visible sub-employees. The average growth rate for the visible and the invisible sub-employees during that period was 3.4% and 27.6%, respectively.

Evidently, none of the formerly mentioned kinds of sub-employment is desirable, because they are unstable and precarious jobs, just like those experimented in the informal sector. This is so because the income that an individual obtains through those economic activities can barely help someone -or a family- to survive. However, it is critical to see that the invisible sub-employment has the highest fraction of the sub-employment segment, and that the enormous effort made by the people who are part of it is not enough to earn the minimum wage.

What is then the relation between the economic growth and employment? There seems to be a paradox that cannot be founded on the endogenous logic of the economic model. It seems odd that the official statistics, based on the Poll of Homes and Multiple Purposes, show how the levels of unemployment and poverty have decreased in general terms ever since the arrival of the ARENA governments. How can it be possible to reduce the unemployment level with a decreasing GNP rate (1.8% for 2002) smaller than its average demographic growth, a minimum wage that has been frozen since 1998, and with regressive fiscal policies?

There is a basic explanation that deserves to be studied. In the first place, the statistic information that sustains the pulse of the economic model are calculated over a lax surface, and that is an obstacle to consider the multiple dimensions of poverty, the complexity of the labor market, and the relation between macroeconomics and microeconomics.

In the second place, an empirical or a theoretical connection cannot be established with the approaches of the Neoliberal model. The Neoliberal model explains that the less that the economy grows, the less employment there is and vice versa, a growing economy generates a growing level of employment, and the benefits of this growth fall over the rest of the social levels. The enormous escape valve, which shows the economic crisis of the country, is the fact that the informal sector of employment has reduced the amount of red numbers from the unemployment statistics.

In the third place, a considerable part of this phenomenon does not have a causal explanation as far as the dynamic structure of the model is concerned. There is an external reason that explains the economic activity. This reason is the enormous migratory flow, a decision made by those who are trying to deal with the economic crisis. The direct consequences of an unfair model make 72,000 Salvadorans leave the country each year. Most of these people are desperately looking for the opportunity to work. This means that the reduction of the unemployment and the poverty levels, rather than a causal condition of the Neoliberal economic policies of ARENA, have been the result of this party’s inadequate administration. This kind of administration has not been able to guarantee decent life standards or equal opportunities for most of the population.

In summary, it is important to say that the Salvadoran economic model is hanging from a fragile piece of thread like a marionette. Day after day it becomes an economy that works “thanks to God” and thanks to external factors such as the remittances. The Salvadoran families have to face an endless journey of difficulties in order to survive. The Salvadoran population are like the characters portrayed in the works of the poet Roque Dalton, “those who would eat anything, those who would do anything...” They are the ones who make this economy work with the little they have. It is still necessary to evaluate if the free trade agreements, the privatization of the health system, the reluctance to lower the cost of life, and the regressive tax policies such as the Value Added Tax (IVA, in Spanish) on the basic grains and the medicines altogether will not end with the few options of subsistence left for the most vulnerable sectors of the country.

G

 

 
 
 


Please, send us your comments and suggestions
More information:
Tel: +503-210-6600 ext. 407, Fax: +503-210-6655