Mothers and women

ARENA burns with doubts

Not too long ago, ARENA moved with a relative comfort among the rest of the political parties of the country. That was a time of certainties. It could be said that the official party was sure of the almost unconditional support of the Salvadorans. These were also the times to predicate with freedom the word of the purest Neoliberalism. The leaders of ARENA constantly repeated that the privatization and the absence of any kind of regulations for the recently privatized companies were the only way to save El Salvador. They would not skimp on anathemas against those who dared to talk about a raise on the minimum salary. They also interpreted their good electoral results as an evidence of how faithful the Salvadorans were to their market dogmas.

The context of the end of the war was appropriate for the interests of the leaders from ARENA. The FMLN had recently descended from the mountains. The very few electoral and collaborative experiences of the leaders from the FMLN became an advantage for the right wing when it came to enter the democratic race. That is how it can be understood that the first electoral results after the Peace Agreements were signed seemed to reveal that the right wing was not going to need the left wing to reconstruct the country.

On the other hand, the FMLN had to face its own internal contradictions. In the fight between the “open” leaders, amazed by the recently discovered advantages of Capitalism, and those who wanted to keep being faithful to the struggle to defeat bourgeoisie, their energy was consumed. In these conditions, the contradiction became stronger inside the left-wing party, which was torn apart. ARENA was happy about these events, and its members constantly incited the internal divisions, and offered economic and political advantages to the dissidents. A considerable number of those who took care of the propaganda of the right wing introduced the dissidents as the “moderate” or the “renovators”, who had been called to replace the left-wing ideology with the purpose to intensify the divisions inside the FMLN.

Along with a strategy to promote the moral and the political discredit of its main adversary, ARENA launched a discredit campaign about the alleged plagues that would come upon the country with a left-wing government. This campaign of fear contains apocalyptic predictions, such as the following: “the proximity of a government from the FMLN alone would cause the paralysis of the national and the foreign investments, a drastic reduction of the consumption, a conflict with the United States, tension inside the armed forces, and a general fear to wake up the rivalries of the past. Many people would be affected by these events, many would loose their jobs, the government would reduce the revenue and the public investment, the quality of the health and the education services would be reduced, the cost of living would increase, and we would live five years under a hectic state, permanently fighting on the street”.

Without considering the reasons for the visceral hostility between Joaquin Villalobos and his former comrades, or even his frustration about not being able to control the FMLN, it would be convenient to mention how his catastrophic predictions resemble the ones made by ARENA about the possible perverse effects of a left-wing government. This can be compared with the well-known fear campaign that other left-wing political leaders of Latin America have had to face in their countries. With that kind of campaigns, the right wing tries to prevent the opposition from becoming more powerful because the left wing does not necessarily agree with a present dogma: “all for the market”.

March 16th breaks some taboos
After the electoral results of March 16th were made public, some certainties were finally questioned. ARENA seemed to understand that the strategy of fear and the public discredit is not enough to keep a powerful position. They seemed to understand that the FMLN has a real possibility to win next year’s presidential elections. After that date, the fear campaign has not only been strengthened, as it is shown by the ridiculous Anti-Socialist Force Movement, that a certain citizen is promoting, with the idea to fight against the Communist menace. The right-wing leaders also seem to have their doubts about the best way to control the “red tide”.

Before the electoral results, ARENA finds itself on a crossroad. On the one hand, it is tempted to close its ranks, appealing to the Anti-Communist mobilization of its members, and incite the aversion to discuss the social and the economic problems, which presumably would bring along a left-wing government. On the other hand, a sector from the right-wing party seems to understand that a strategy has to moderate the discourse, and offer several social alternatives before the insensibility of Neoliberalism. The anxiety of the leaders from ARENA is reflected on the contradictory declarations of its leading public figures. Two different interpretations of the reality of the party have been made. Some blame President Flores for his orthodox implementation of the most severe Capitalist recipes. Others, instead, do not stop berating the ideas about Communism, inviting the members of ARENA to close their ranks in order to defend what they call “their system of freedoms”.

Both of these interpretations have created a couple of images. For some – for people as Mauricio Sandoval, the former director of the National Civilian Police, considered as the pre-candidate for the presidency-, the solution would be to consolidate the hardest artery of the right wing. Sandoval is known by his sad role in 1989, when he conducted the radio broadcasting system that promoted the assassination of the Jesuit priests of the UCA, and the elimination of several members of the political opposition. The former policeman does not have a clean background when it comes to examine his performance inside the Intelligence Organism of the State, or his role at the head of the National Civilian Police. This character symbolizes, without a doubt, the darkest aspect of the right wing’s past.

In addition to his primal Anti-Communism and his controversial role as the director of the OIE, he made a political trench out of his position as a director inside the National Civilian Police. When the news media show about the arrest of the Congressman Arevalo
–who was accused of alleged terrorist acts and deprivation of freedom for supporting a street demonstration- comes to mind, it is easy to understand the origin of Sandoval’s presidential ambition. There is no doubt that he wanted to take advantage of the discredited image of the Legislative Assembly in order to win the sympathy of the Salvadorans. The same thing happened when the Congressman Francisco Merino was arrested. He was drunk when this happened, and he had shot a police car.

The temptation to go back to an orthodox ARENA is as strong as to the unpleasant uncertainty of not knowing what are the strategies of the political adversary. In the meantime, there is the spectacular comeback of one of the former presidents from ARENA, who is expected to help and contain the hemorrhage of the party. The idea of ARENA is to convince everyone that what is important is to keep the “nationalist” proposal alive. If this strategy is confirmed, there is no doubt that the campaign would take quite a conservative turn, and they will be far from taking a step ahead.

Armando Calderon Sol and Alfredo Cristiani still are the figures of the transition inaugurated by the Peace Agreements. In the case of a possible electoral campaign they would not only have to go back to their relations with the FMLN, but they would also have to explain to the Salvadorans what were the reasons for some of their decisions. It would also be necessary to examine how do the Salvadoran population feel about the decisions that both of these former presidents made in the past. Alfredo Cristiani would have to respond to the question about his alleged connection with the assassination of the Jesuit priests. He would also have to explain what is the origin of the large sums of money and the properties that many people say that he has. Calderon Sol, on the other hand, would have to explain why the privatization process has not brought the benefits that he offered.

The other possibility that ARENA has is to go on with the less orthodox candidacies, as when they tried to experiment with Evelyn Jacir de Lovo, who ran for mayoress for the City Hall of San Salvador. Without a doubt, it will be more difficult for this party to find competitive figures with a certain public recognition after Roberto Murray Meza declined the invitation to be a part of the ARENA formula. ARENA has to decide if it will close its eyes to the up coming storm or if it will give a proof of an open attitude to face the most critical problems of the country.

In any case, if the last political decisions of President Flores are considered, no one knows exactly what to expect. While the President speaks about how he understands the needs of the population, he decides to veto a legislative decree that intended to put an end to the strike of the public health system. In addition, instead of giving signs of moderation he decides to face, in an unequal combat, the Legislative Assembly, an area where he does not count anymore with a right-wing majority.

It is possible that all of this is due to the characteristic arrogance of Flores. His advisors have not taken the critics very well. For Flores and his team, to accept that the doctors on strike could go back and occupy again their positions is an unacceptable political defeat. In this sense, it might be probable to expect from the COENA a sign of flexibility or even pressure. However, once again it all will depend on how the members of the official party interpret the political situation of the country. In the meantime, inside ARENA there still are doubts and fear about losing the next elections.

Guns and violence

Recently, the Development Program of the United Nations (PNUD, in Spanish) presented the document called Guns and violence, with the objective to “examine, understand, and consider the options to intervene over the problem of guns, as a way to reduce the impact of violence” in El Salvador. The study counts with the participation of some members of the University Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP, in Spanish), and the Foundation of Studies for the Application of the Law (FESPAD). The following contents are part of this initiative:
1. Guns play an important role in the configuration of criminality and violence in El Salvador.
2. Guns are the “main instrument to use violence against the others and against those who are violent”.
3. The possession of guns should be regulated in order to respond to the different economic, cultural, and institutional needs.


This article intends to examine the different components of the study by briefly exploring each area or factor that has an influence on the use of guns and violence. In the first chapter (Theory and Method) a Theoretical and a Methodological Frame are included, and this part describes the general structure that guided the investigation. The second chapter (Analysis of the regulations for the use of guns) examines the laws and the codes connected with guns by analyzing the implications of the measures to control this problem. The third chapter (The circulation of guns) tries to respond to the following questions: How many guns are in this country? How do these guns get in the hands of the civilians? Who are the people that put guns in the market?

The fourth chapter (The Institutional capacity to deal with the problem of guns and munitions) intends to explain the performance of the different institutions of the State that have the responsibility to control and regulate the possession of guns. The fifth chapter (Guns and the culture of violence) examines the reasons that lead a considerable amount of Salvadorans to have guns, and it pays close attention to the culture of violence. In this chapter, the investigators conclude that one of the most determinant factors for the possession of guns (one out of every four people has one) is the subjective construction of the culture of violence. The investigative team points out that “the existence of a system of regulations that promotes and justifies violence as the privileged way of resolving conflicts and protect people denies the possibility to build a society based on participation and respect”.

Chapter six (The impact that guns have on violence) points out the relation between the available types of guns in this country and the violent acts associated with that factor.

The seventh chapter (The guns in the national political agenda: the actors of the debate) examines the main actors who participate in the debate about guns, and it makes an emphasis on the responsibilities of each institution. Finally, the following parts (Conclusions and Recommendations) sum up the most important discoveries of the study, and the recommendations aimed to the articulation of policies to control the distribution and the use of guns.

Framework
The study needs a framework to examine the relation between culture and the institutions in an objective level, and the socializing process in a subjective level, in order to explain the conditions of the violent behavior. Therefore, it is necessary to define a set of key concepts.

For instance, the concept “guns” is used in reference to the notion employed by The International Conference of the United Nations about the trading of weapons (2001). This concept includes the small personal guns (such as revolvers, automatic pistols, rifles, and machine guns), and the light guns (heavy machine guns, grenade throwers, antiaircraft barrels, and portable anti-tanks).

With the concept of “violence”, the researchers use the notion adopted by the Panamerican Organization of Health, according to which violence is “the intentional use of physical strength or power, whether it is the actual use of violence or just a threat against a person or a group of people, with the probability of injuries, death, psychological damage, development problems or deprivation of freedom”.

In general terms, the authors of the study summarize the interaction of both factors (guns and violence) in the following way: “the national history of the societies with cultures that particularly value the use of force and violence in the resolution of conflicts are usually characterized by an excessive institutional violence, caused by an internal war or by the right to practice violence that the State grants to certain groups of the society”. These situations are part of the recent history of El Salvador. The study also explains that “these episodes help to create regulations and values in which the possession of guns becomes important for a sector of the population or for all of it”.

The document also reveals that “this national story is parallel to the individual stories, in which the specific process of socialization, the resolution of conflicts, the social positions, and the stories of the victims stimulate the attitudes that generate the perception of the need to have a fire gun”. In summary, to carry a gun in El Salvador as a way to “defend” oneself is a created need that is socially transmitted in response to the personal histories and the particular social mechanisms of a country.

Regulations, circulation, and institutional capacity
The 450,000 guns –legal and illegal ones- in the hands of the civilians, including more than 173,000 that do have a license (according to the statistics of the research team) should be regulated by the present national standards. In reference to this aspect, even if the Constitution of the Republic explains (Article 216) that the control over the manufacture, importation, exportation, commerce, possession of guns, munitions, explosives, and similar artifacts is the duty of the Ministry of the National Defense. Most of the actors that discuss this issue who were consulted for this investigation consider that this should be the responsibility of the public security area, that is, the exclusive duty of the National Civilian Police.

In summary, the present regulation has the following legal dispositions approved in El Salvador or ratified by the country because it is a member of the international institutions: The Law of Control and Regulation of Guns, Munitions, Explosives, and Similar Articles of 1999; the Legislative Decree 545, from September 2001, articles 346,348,378,147-A, and 184 of the Penal Code; and articles 444 and 446 from the Penal Proceedings Code.

In the international perspective there is the Conference of the United Nations about the Illegal Traffic of Small and Light Weapons in all of its aspects (New York, July 9th through 20th of 2001); the Inter-American Convention against the manufacturing and the illegal traffic of guns, munitions, explosives, and other materials, ratified in 1998; and, finally, the regulations for the control of the illegal weapons in the process of the Central American Integration, such as in the Tegucigalpa Protocol and the Democratic Security Treaty.

In reference to the Institutional Capacity in the control and the regulation of guns and munitions, the researchers explain that, technically, the Ministry of Defense does not regulate or supervise the exportation of guns; the Direction of Logistic of the Ministry of Defense, the Division of Arms and Explosives and the division of Finances and Frontiers (both from the National Civilian Police), the Attorney General’s Office, and the General Direction of the Internal Revenue Service also intervene in the importation of guns. The researchers explained that “the institutional capacity to control and regulate guns is still weak. Although it is possible to notice a certain improvement in the control mechanisms and in the role of the institutions, it is also clear that there is still a lot to do in that field, especially in certain areas”.

Some conclusions and recommendations
The researchers reached the following conclusions:
1. Fire guns are a very serious problem in El Salvador, since most of the guns in the hands of the civilians are illegal and the institutional control is weak.
2. The use of guns would be related to cultural dispositions that favor violence in general, as a way to relate with the environment.
3. The armed conflict had a direct influence on the creation of the conditions in which many Salvadorans got strongly related with the use of guns.
4. The legal regulation in force is too permissive, and it leaves the doors open to use guns in a massive way.
5. The institutions that should control this problem “do not have the capacity to prevent most people from getting guns and harming others”.
6. The problem of the information, its amount, its accessibility, and its quality is an obstacle to make an efficient study about guns, munitions and its relation with violence.
7. The empiric evidences indicate that the firearms, far from protecting a person, are actually a risk for those who carry them and those who use them.

Because of all of the former ideas, the report recommends in general terms:
1. “Reduce the circulation of guns, both the legal and the illegal ones, because of the high social cost in terms of violence”.
2. Increase the control over the legal and the illegal guns”.