The
national budget and the gangs
During the last days, the
Executive power has presented a project of law to the Legislative Assembly
aimed to eliminate the presence of the gangs in the country. Despite the
fact that such law has not been approved yet, the public security system is
organizing a series of operations, which involve the coordinated actions of
the National Civilian Police (PNC, in Spanish) and the Armed Forces, with
the objective to arrest the highest number of gang members that might be
found on the streets.
The reactions of the judicial experts about the project of law presented by
the Executive power express that such law contains a number of defects that
turn it unconstitutional. Among the considerations about the subject, no one
has mentioned the possible economic expenses that the state would make in
order to develop the judicial activities, the actions of the police, and the
apprehension of the gang members. In other words, in addition to the many
juridical digressions about this whole subject, it is important to make the
necessary economic considerations, since the resources of the state are the
ones that will activate such policy.
The expenses to develop and make the “Iron Fist” plan effective will
obviously increase the governmental expenses destined to three fundamental
areas: the police force, the judicial area, and the penitentiary facilities.
To examine these aspects, it is necessary to consider that the ideal of the
law is to dismantle the gangs of both the rural and the urban areas, and put
all of its members behind bars. To accomplish such task, the judicial system
must be used in order to judge, with the new law, the members of the gangs.
According to the official information, the number of gang members is
approximately of 20,000 people. This means that if the government wishes to
implement an effective measure, a considerable amount of resources will have
to be destined in order to arrest, judge, and incarcerate these young people.
In this sense, the question is how much money will the state have to spend
to carry on with such action? In order to get closer to an answer, it is
necessary to notice that the implementation of the “Iron Fist” plan will be
successful in general terms if they manage to arrest, judge, and incarcerate
all of the gang members of the country in a year. This will be hardly so,
but a calculation of the cost can reveal the approximate expenses that the
government will have to make in order to implement that public policy.
According to the Inter-American Bank of Development (BID, in Spanish), the
use of the financial resources to sponsor the actions of the police, and
both the judicial and the penitentiary system constitute the highest
expenses of the Salvadoran state in order to pay attention to the violence
problem in general. In 1995, around $280 million were destined for these
activities, which represented a 5.0% of the GNP for that year. To treat the
problem of the gangs, it is possible that the government will make an effort
in two directions: use the already existing economic resources in order to
“resolve” the problem, and use a larger number of resources to keep the plan
alive. This has a particular importance, since we are not only talking about
a rearrangement of the financial resources focused on the problem of the
social violence, but about the fact that these expenses will increase in
order to resolve the problem of the gangs. In this sense, if the plan
intends to be effective it is necessary to employ new police officers, new
lawyers, and make more expenses to improve the penitentiary system. And all
this is without considering the expenses of the armed forces. It is
necessary to remember that this institution is also part of the governmental
strategy, and that it has an individual budget.
As far as the public security is concerned, we can see that during the last
couple of years, between 2000 and 2001, the government has spent, according
to the nation’s budget, approximately $146.5 million only to provide
security services to the citizenry. For the same period, the PNC manage to
make 35,801 arrests on a national level. This means that each one of these
arrests costs approximately $4,000 for the state. This seems to be a
considerably high amount of money. However, a look at the state’s budget
tells us that the expenses of the government on the public security are the
highest. Obviously, it is necessary to consider that all of the expenses on
the different operations involve transportation, the salaries of the police
officers, their clothes, shoes and weapons, and obviously the meals that
they take during their working hours, among other expenses.
As for the judicial aspect, and for the case of the gangs, it is important
to consider the participation of three institutions of the state during the
process of identification, arrest, judgement, and incarceration, if it
proceeds. The Judicial Organ is the one that judges the individuals during
the process. The Attorney General’s Office will participate as the defender
of the interests of the society. Considering that the young members of the
gangs are people who do not count with many resources, the General
Procurator’s Office will have to provide these individuals with legal
assistance. An estimate reveals that the whole judicial process of a person
in the country can be of approximately $2,888. In this case, it is necessary
to consider the expenses on material resources and the fees of those who are
part of the penal process.
Finally, if the accused one is considered guilty, this person will be going
to jail. In the case of the gang members, that is the main purpose of the
anti-gang law. In order to make an estimate of the expenses that the state
makes to support the interns of the penal centers it is necessary to
consider the amount destined to the account of the Ministry of Governance.
This is connected with the confinement and the readjustment periods, and the
total amount of people that live inside the penal centers. Between 2001 and
2002, a total of $16.4 million was destined to that account, and the
population inside the penal centers increased to 10,476 interns. The
expenses made to support an intern are approximately $1,565 per year. This
amount might make a strong contrast with the formerly described ones,
especially if we consider how much the government spends in a person during
a year. However, the budget assigned to the penitentiary system is not high
if compared with the resources assigned to the public security area and the
judicial system. It is also necessary to consider that the conditions in
which the interns live are inadequate: they count with a deteriorated
infrastructure, and they have a deficient alimentary diet.
Considering all the expenses in public security, the judicial system, and
the penitentiary system as a whole, we have approximately $8,500 per capita.
In other words, this is what the state spends during one year to arrest,
judge, and incarcerate one person. To understand what this amount means it
is necessary to consider all of the efforts and the expenses made by the
government in order to accomplish this objective.
This means that to arrest, judge, and incarcerate 20,000 gang members for
one year will cost approximately $170 million. In macroeconomic terms, if
the law against the gangs would have been approved by the end of 2001, and
become effective in 2002, it would have represented 6.79% of the state’s
budget for 2002. In terms of the GNP, it would have represented 1.19% in
that same year. This flow of resources, if the government gets away with his
plan, will affect the budget of the nation during the following year. As the
war against the gangs goes on, the cost of that measure will increase, and
the citizenry will pay again for the mistakes of the government.
The society of fear
If this is all about wining the next presidential elections –and following
the line of a communiqué that was recently sent to the mayors that represent
ARENA- both of the main political parties have presented their respective
“winning issues”. In his battle to keep the presidency and with the fear of
losing power, President Flores and ARENA have found their own theme: the
combat against the gangs.
With that purpose, during the last weeks and before the end of his
administration, Flores has implemented the “Iron Fist” plan, through which
the authorities have already arrested hundreds of gang members in the
Metropolitan Area of San Salvador, with the approval of a considerable part
of the population. The plan proposed by President Flores, similar to the one
employed in Honduras, is based on a law against the gangs. The initial
project was presented a few weeks ago to the Legislative Assembly. It has
been complemented with a series of penal reforms that, among other things,
will allow the system to judge minors as if they were adults.
ARENA has used its anti-gangs discourse against the attempt of the political
opposition (and several organizations of the civil society) to provide the
municipalities with higher financial and administrative capacities. The
opposition, especially the FMLN, has organized, even before the presidential
plan was presented, a dauntless juridical fight to increase the budget of
the 262 City Halls nationwide. This is how the official party, as one of its
last attempts to keep the office at the Presidential House, has created in
the public opinion a confrontation between the combat against the gangs –their
“winning issue”- and the increase on the budget of the City Halls.
Following this logic –a perverse logic under any perspective-, whoever
favors the fair increase to the budget of the country’s City Halls would not
only be tolerating the criminal operations of the gangs, but would also be
considered an accomplice of the crimes committed by the members of the gangs.
That is the intention of the dirty and the biased campaign of President
Flores and those who, behind him, hold on to their power.
Now it seems that the money requested by the municipalities will not allow
the government to declare the war against the gangs. Flores, therefore, ends
his administration playing a dirty game. On the one hand, his administration
has set a trap to the FMLN: this party will appear before the eyes of the
public opinion as the institution that puts the obstacles to eliminate one
of the most feared social “tumors”.
On the other hand, it uses the fear of the society to increase the number of
voters. To defend the allocation of 8% of the nation’s budget to the City
Halls could become a serious political risk for the opposition if the
governmental campaign turns out as effective as its creators intend it to
be.
What is then the winning issue of the campaign? It is necessary to say that
both parties have reduced their strategies to “campaign issues”, just like
the slogan that ARENA uses. More than a governmental offer, they are using
slogans as if they were managing an advertising campaign: “The combat
against gangs”, “The combat against corruption”. The priority in these
slogans is not rationality, but force.
The crusade of ARENA against the gangs seems to find a fertile ground: the
authoritarian longing. This feeling has always flourished during the
transcendental moments of the national life. Ever since the late 19th
Century, when coffee was brought to El Salvador, until the days when the
Peace Accords were signed, the political, the racial, and the ideological
persecution has flourished. It hides itself behind an apparent social
control. There is also the repression caused by the armed forces and the
police; and, more recently, the persecution that rests behind the
reinforcement of the law and the insistence to establish of the death
penalty.
There is a similar style behind the anti-gang law proposed by Flores, a
follower of the authoritarian tradition. The repression of the state against
the tattooed members of the gangs, those who are not properly dressed, or
any suspect according to the criteria of the authorities is evident ever
since the presidential plan was announced, despite that it has not been
approved yet. The plan also nourishes itself with the fear of the
Salvadorans. The combat of the government against the gangs –a desperate and
an opportunistic measure- threatens to win the game before the eyes of the
opposition.
It is not necessary to use the fear that the juvenile gangs have spread,
when their crimes have taken away the lives of hundreds of innocent people
and even their own members. Without a doubt, the right-wing press has
contributed to create a phenomenon of enormous dimensions that it is nothing
but a piece of a complex problem connected with delinquency and violence. To
reduce the complexity of the problem says plenty about the governmental
myopia and about its political opportunism. The existence of the “winning
issues” instead of integral programs impoverishes the weak democratic
culture of the country. ARENA shows its legitimacy crisis by offering more
of the same. Its creativity is stagnated. It seems as if the actual leaders
of the party flew away a long time ago, and that a brute force now leads the
party to strengthen its authoritarian and its excluding vocation. The self-analysis
that followed the elections has not been enough to throw away the old
schemes.
The left wing has not been at the height of the circumstances either. The
opposition has not revealed its discourse, and its promises are ambiguous.
The FMLN should overcome the “winning issues” of the schemes used by ARENA,
and present a clear, a serious, and a responsible governmental plan.
Otherwise, the opposition might fall into the trap that has been settled for
them.
Several questions remain unanswered: Is it possible to find an integral
solution for a complex problem such as the juvenile marginality and the
gangs? Does it make sense at this point to talk about structural problems
and sustainable solutions in the long term?
The governmental discourse and the perspectives of the most conservative
sectors reject any integral solutions. That is why they have chosen to chase
the gang members for 180 days, and make arrests based on what the
authorities consider the potential look of a criminal. In the end, this is
the same authoritarian scheme that claims what the dominant circles have
held for years, especially when their privileges are about to collapse
before the possibility of a political change. Those who end up losing with
the “Iron Fist” plan are the poorest sectors of the country, and several
middle-class young people.
The fear that the dominant circles have of losing their privileges and the
fear that the poorest sectors of the Salvadoran population have, increase
the longing for an authoritarian scheme. For the decent people who have
“good manners”, the law is an opportunity to get rid of those “annoying”
elements. The gang members do not paint graffiti in the houses that are
behind the high murals; they do not assault the children who live in these
houses because they do not usually go to the populous neighborhoods where
the gangs operate. The poorest families, who many times coexist with the
gang members, fear leads them to sacrifice their own children, the children
of fear.
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