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Proceso 1098
May 19, 2004
ISSN 0259-9864
 
 

INDEX




Editorial:  The problems of the institutional performance

Politics:  The FMLN: the reformists versus the orthodox

Economy:  The fragility of democracy: the social and the economic injustice

 
 
Editorial


 The problems of the institutional performance

 

If the last presidential elections were illegal and illegitimate and, therefore, the government is also all of these things combined, then how do the members the FMLN explain the fact that their party participated in those elections? Because if they were not a legitimate process and if their protests against the Supreme Electoral Tribunal were not taken into consideration, the FMLN should have denounced these facts and retire from the elections, even a protest would have meant something. However, nothing happened. The FMLN did not give much importance to these irregular events because it was convinced that these elections belonged to them. Therefore, their last minute reaction about the illegitimacy and the illegality of the elections is not politically valid. It is true that there were many irregularities, but the FMLN itself was also responsible for some of them. Their behavior was not really attached to the law, and it seems that now they intend to appear as the innocent victims of what happened. For the same reason, the request they presented before the Supreme Court of Justice, a couple of months after the elections, is not a serious event. If they had won, they would not try to contest the elections.

The disposition of the party’s directive board to force a vote during the last convention to prevent its public officials from going to the President’s inauguration is an impotent move and a political whim. The former candidate stated that he would have preferred that the representative of the FMLN in the TSE had not signed the credential of the new president. Despite the irregularities, the amount of votes in favor of ARENA was overwhelming. In fact, 70% of those who voted had made up their minds before the beginning of the campaign. However, we cannot go to far when it comes to make the conclusions, because it is almost certain that ARENA would have done something similar if the FMLN had won the elections. It is very probable that, if this were the case, ARENA would have contested the legality and the legitimacy of delivering the power to a Communist party. Both parties are very much alike when it comes to consider these aspects.

They are also very much alike because of the confusion that they usually make out of the system of parties and its relation with the State. The congressmen and the mayors of the FMLN, just like the ones from the other parties, are public officials, that is, they are part of the government. The members of the FMLN are part of that government that now the party rejects because it is illegal and illegitimate. The FMLN and the other parties as well should be more careful with their judgments and their opinions, because it is necessary to distinguish between the lines of the parties and the national government. Any public official, even if he is still a member of a political party, he is part of a government with a certain number of duties to fulfill, and the parties should not interfere with that. That is why it is politically healthy to separate the officials from the party. And that is also why the scolding that the Mayor of San Salvador had to take for having acknowledged the triumph of Saca is inadmissible. The Mayor did the right thing as one of the representatives of the city’s municipality, because his priorities should be connected with the community and not with his party. It is not right to prevent the congressmen and the mayors from attending to the President’s inauguration. The fact that the Mayor of Soyapango boasted about why he had rejected the invitation only goes to show that he has a poor understanding of the responsibilities of his position. They have been invited because they are public officials and not because they are part of a certain political party. Or is it that if the FMLN had won the elections this party would have not invited the public officials from ARENA?

The congressmen from the FMLN are in the same situation, those who have to attend to the extraordinary legislative session in which Saca will be inaugurated as President. If to fulfill this obligation goes against their principles, they should not have accepted to be part of the directive board of the Congress. Because of their role as members of the directive board they have to be present at the inauguration. If the government is so repugnant to them, then they should not create commissions together with ARENA to travel around the world, just as they do it now allegedly because of the national interests. In fact, no one has to go that far and jump into conclusions because ARENA does almost the same thing with its public officials, who are placed at the service of the lines of the party. A considerable proportion of the public opinion tends to believe that the FMLN is not ready to administrate the country, and a behavior such as this one confirms this sort of beliefs. Their intention to stay away from the contamination that ARENA represents for them is pointless if the FMLN is already part of the political and the governmental system. To be isolated in order to avoid the “contamination” is to leave the doors open for ARENA to do whatever they please. This is the same position that the Flores administration adopted towards the FMLN and the rest of the opposition, but in different sense.

The FMLN thinks that the national policy lacks democracy; however, their political organization and their internal decisions lack democracy as well. It is not a democratic choice to eliminate from the lists those who think differently from the leadership of the party, especially when this is a line that has been imposed without a consensus. It is not democratic either to prevent the critics from speaking by screaming at them or by booing them at the conventions and the assemblies. A democratic party is expected to have a respectful behavior, in order to analyze and discuss the performance of the leadership. It seems that they are only able to listen to the spokespeople of a certain line. They are used to applaud the actions of the official line, and reject those voices that speak differently. If this is so, the conventions and the assemblies of the FMLN are not the proper place to make the important decisions. It is important to notice, however, the coincidence of the postures. The FMLN does not respect its own institutional status. In the best of cases, their democracy is more of a formal matter than a real aspect of their organization. Just like ARENA, it uses formality to impose the line of thought of the party’s leadership. This is the very same thing that the FMLN rejects from ARENA, a party that, in private, behaves in a very similar manner. Both parties have serious problems to understand the actual sense of their institutional status and the sense of the State.

G

 

Politics


 The FMLN: the reformists versus the orthodox

 

The internal situation of the FMLN, just a few days away from the President’s inauguration, deserves some comments, even if it is only to point at the short-sightedness of the leaders that represent that political party. Since the night of the elections, the “orthodox” and the “renovators” have been involved in a battlefield to take control of the party. This article will analyze the relation between the forces of the FMLN and the possible repercussions of that relationship for the country’s political life.


The orthodox perspective
The reaction of the leaders of the left-wing party about the electoral results cannot be understood outside of the context of the relation between the different political forces. On the one hand, the leaders of the FMLN interpret the results of the elections in the light of the electoral campaign, a campaign they have called illegal and illegitimate. In their opinion, the incapacity of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE, in Spanish) to make others respect the rules of the game determined the end of the electoral battle. On the other hand, the context in which this behavior takes place is one in which the small parties tend to disappear, especially the one represented by the coalition. The most visible figure of the coalition is a former member of the FMLN, who could have overshadowed the presence of this party if he had had a better electoral performance. In other words, this is a context in which the only adversary of the FMLN is precisely its usual contender: ARENA.

It is from this conjunction that we have to read the radicalization of the FMLN’s leadership, which has been denounced by the different actors of the national political life. There is, without a doubt, a considerable amount of personal frustrations involved in this case that does not allow them to accept the electoral defeat. Those are elements that, without a doubt are at the foundations of the pulse kept by the followers of Schafik Handal, and the renovators, leaded by Oscar Ortiz. However, there is no doubt that those uncontrolled egos are looking to get a hold on reality in order to either become stronger or just drift away. That is why the analysis about the behavior of the orthodox leaders of the FMLN has to give more importance to the thesis about the environment before dedicating themselves to study the character and the personality of the different actors involved in this case.

The proposals made by Handal, approved by most of the people who participated in a convention that took place on May 16th, have to do with the context formerly described in this article. The leaders of the FMLN keep thinking that the present reality demands from them a frontal collision against ARENA. According to the orthodox, the leaders of ARENA took away from them an election that they could have won. That is why they are inviting the members of their party to boycott the ceremony in which Antonio Saca will be inaugurated as President. They also presented a demand before the Supreme Court of Justice against the TSE, intending to attract the attention of the maximum authority of the election process.

There might be different opinions about that analysis; however, what does not admit any discussions is that the behavior of the leaders of the left-wing party responds to this particular perspective about the electoral results. In this sense, the internal sympathizers of Handal approve of his interpretation of reality. They are trying to question the legitimacy of the Saca administration. As long as they are able to get the people’s attention about this subject, according to them, they will obtain three important results.


1. To play their role of an aggressive opposition in a scenery where the moderate options have disappeared. From that perspective, those responsible for the FMLN think that they can become stronger and respect the will of the 800,000 people who voted for them.


2. The strategy to question the legitimacy of the triumph obtained by Saca intends to increase the political importance of his organization during the future negotiations that the new government will have to make with them if he intends to achieve at least an acceptable level of governance until the 2006 legislative and municipal elections take place. In this context, according to the hard line of the FMLN, as long as they have an intransigent attitude they will be able to take more advantage of their up-coming battles with the leaders of ARENA. It is important to remember that ARENA has not seemed willing to negotiate with the FMLN either.

3. The orthodox strategy of confrontation, the discussion of their proposals, and their actions also intend to rebuild the hurting ego of the FMLN leaders after Saca’s electoral victory. This attitude was predictable, especially because the leadership of the FMLN was sure that its party would win the elections. This reversal of the elections questions its former approaches, and this is how it can be understood that they are not willing to accept any critiques at all or to evaluate their own actions. From this perspective, they see any observation as attacks. That is why they are willing to do anything to keep the structure of their party under control. Their strategy is to give more importance to the external elements that explain the defeat, that is, the low blows of the sectors that were close to ARENA during the campaign, and not those elements that are under their responsibility.

Consequences
The different comments that have been made about the behavior of the orthodox members of the FMLN underline the dangers for the democratic stability of the country. They speak about the possibility of a lack of governance and about the lack of loyalty of the FMLN leaders towards the political system. In this sense, the democratic stability would be threatened by soulless and orthodox leaders who defend a hard Communist line, and that do not offer any options to clear out the political traps. The last opinion poll, apparently financed by sectors that are already known for their hostility towards the FMLN, explores this clue. It explains that over 80% of the Salvadoran population would have good expectations about Saca, while only 5% would support Handal as the leader of his party.

Those who inside of the party are against the orthodox line, following the tradition of the ones that are unhappy with the performance of the FMLN, have taken advantage of the negative image that their fellow members have in order to begin with the battle against the leaders of the party. The press has become the scenery to denunciate a retrograde sense of direction, a little capacity to analyze their own image, and a fundamentally anti-democratic leadership.

The argument according to which the attitude of the leaders of the FMLN does not contribute to the consolidation of democracy in the country is not totally wrong. However, it is still necessary to remember that governance is not the responsibility of just one political actor. This concept includes different sectors of the political life, the parties, the public institutions, and the organizations of the civil society. In the same way that it is unavoidable to criticize the radical position of the leaders of the FMLN, no one can overlook the little contribution of those sectors that adopt a hostile attitude when it comes to establish a consensus with the left-wing party.

On the other hand, it would also be necessary to take a close look at the strategy designed by the rest of the militants of the FMLN, who are not happy about the behavior of the leaders of their party. Beyond the strategy that consists on denouncing to the press the authoritarian control tactic of the Communist party in the FMLN, what happened during the internal elections that intended to designate the group of candidates for the TSE could be a good parameter to evaluate the possibilities of failure or triumph that those who oppose to the party’s hard line have.

Among other decisions, those who attended to the convention that took place on May 16th chose to nominate the candidate of the orthodox, Eugenio Chicas, (as their first option) to run for magistrate of the electoral tribunal. Julio Hernandez, a representative of the FMLN in that institution also struggled to occupy that position for a second period, did not manage to gain the trust of the voters. The result of this internal consultation shows that far from what the renovators have proclaimed through the press, they do not count with the majority of the party. Even if ever since then more people have spoken about their inconformity, this does not have an effect over the internal mechanisms or over the decisions that are made inside the party.

Before the convention, the press announced that the leaders of the party were secretly trying to prevent a considerable number of people to participate in that meeting, that is, those who apparently had hostile feelings against the hard line of the party. Now it is known that, independently from the positions of the delegates that were set aside, a disposition taken from the statutes of the party was applied to them. This disposition stipulates the mechanisms that have to be followed in order to participate in the conventions. According to Article 80, literal “o” of the statutes of the FMLN, the members could be suspended or separated from the direction organisms of the party when they do not attend to two sessions in a row in their respective conventions and are not able to justify why they were absent. It seems that those who were excluded from the Convention had not followed this legal disposition. The reformists denounced this measure, but they were not able to prevent their orthodox fellows from making that legal decision.

It is important to notice the internal abilities of the groups that remain in conflict in order to have an idea about the possibilities of success. According to a strict analysis of the last results, the movement of the reformists has not seemed to be able to handle the internal rules of the FMLN. From this perspective, without underestimating the laudable objective of their movement, the declarations that have been made to the press have not brought many important results for the internal confrontation in the left-wing party. The press, instead of making the reformists stronger, has weakened them.

If the reformists of today intend to make the desired changes inside the FMLN they should check their strategy. There is nothing wrong with speaking publicly about their differences with the orthodox members of the party that do not allow a positive evolution for the left-wing party. However, they should be careful enough not to offer a weak flank to their adversaries. In the FMLN, as it generally happens in all of the organizations, those who know the regulations and control the rules of the game are those that in the end are able to prevail. And all of this happens independently from the good or the bad intentions that encourage the actors in conflict.

G

 

Economy


 The fragility of democracy: the social and the economic injustice

 

On April 21st, in Lima, Peru, the Development Program of the United Nations (PNUD, in Spanish) presented a report titled “Democracy in Latin America: a democracy for the citizenry”. This report has come out in a very significant context, particularly for El Salvador and for Latin America in General. To place the debate about democracy in Latin America at the center of the stage has a controversial connotation nowadays since the region has dramatically changed its political configuration. A quarter of a century ago, only three countries (out of the 18 that form the region) were involved in the democratic game (Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela). Today, all of the countries reviewed through the report meet the necessary requirements to be called, if not “democracies”, at least “electoral democracies”. However, the nature of the democracy of each one of the countries is different and it has different levels, since most of them are standing on an extremely fragile foundation that could turn a democratic State into a dictatorial one.

The report brandishes a critical study of democracy in Latin America. There is an interesting correlation between the results of the report and the reality of El Salvador. The political parties in Latin America are at the lowest level of the public esteem, just as it was reported by the public opinion polls in El Salvador. According to the information collected by the Latinobarometro 2002 (mentioned in the report of the PNUD), only 14% of the Latin American population trusts in the traditional political organizations. In fact, 54.7% would be willing to accept an authoritarian government if it were able to resolve the economic situation. The importance of the economic structure is therefore an outstanding factor of the political puzzle of the region.

And that is so because, for the PNUD, the construction process of democracy in Latin America has stood by the struggle for the reconstruction of a fairer and a more equitable society, even with its reversals and its shortcomings. The fact that people intend to reach a democratic state is an incendiary precedent, since, as the report intends to indicate, a true democracy should at least look for four key features:
1. “Democracy envelopes a certain conception about what a human being is and about the construction of the citizenry: this indicates that a human being is a holder of rights, and that is why a person has independence and the responsibility to be a political citizen”.
2. “Democracy is a way of organized power in society, and it includes the existence and the qualified performance of a State”.
3. “The electoral regime is a basic and a fundamental component of democracy; however, the elections do not wear out the meaning and the possibilities of democracy”.
4. “The Latin American democracy is a distinctive and a singular historical experience that should be acknowledged as such, as well as valuated, evaluated, and developed as such”.

The Salvadoran and the Latin American triangle: democracy, poverty, and inequality
The conception of democracy included in the study of the PNUD seems to claim the attention of the hegemonic sector of the country, a sector that not only has the economic control of the country, but the political one as well. It is evident that when it comes to measure the Salvadoran democracy with the parameter of the PNUD, that democracy remains small and sadly misshapen. El Diario de Hoy used its editorial of April 26th to attack the arguments of the report. In this paper’s own words “democracy is a political system to choose and watch the government and the legislators, who have to fulfill the demands of the law and the Order of Rights. But that is all. It is not valid to talk about democracy as a system to provide services, to reduce the levels of poverty, to grant bank loans, or to share the ‘income’, something that the report of the PNUD indicates”.

The PNUD puts some salt on the deepest wounds of the Salvadoran reality: its economic and its political structure is shaped in favor of the interests of an elite that concentrates the power in just a few hands and excludes the less fortunate: most of the population is poor and it is extremely difficult for them to have a decent life. What kind of democracy is there in a country or in an economic system where a minority gets wealthy on the account of the population, where the capacity of decision of this population is practically annulled by the status quo? What kind of democracy is there in a country where the economic system helps to create a higher level of poverty, an economic system that does not give any kind of support to the victims of this order?

At present it is necessary to analyze and get into the depths of a debate about democracy and the economic organization that sustains it. After all, it has been precisely because of an unfair economic and political structure that the armed conflict exploded in the eighties. Now in the new millennium and after a decade and a half of an administration with Neoliberal policies, and three failed intentions of the left wing to win the country’s presidency, it is necessary to establish a serious debate about the face of democracy, that is, if it can be called so, in El Salvador.

It is also necessary to observe another aspect of the present conjunction: the refusal of the FMLN to participate in the President’s inauguration. Independently from the assessments about the measures of the left wing, the truth is that there is a problem of social and economic justice in the bottom of it all, which questions the democratic face that has been shown as the real “thing” before the eyes of the public opinion.

The bottom line of all this has to do with the same political campaign of ARENA, which was a campaign of fear and coercion, a totally anti-democratic campaign, since it used the fear to lose remittances, employment, and salaries as the weapons to yield the free will of the population. The evidences connected with this issue are many, and they go from the influence of the news media, owned by the oligarchy, on the public opinion to the interference of the United States when it made an emphasis on the idea that the remittances would be in danger if the FMLN were to win the elections. Ironically, the American Embassy waited for the results of those elections to say that it was not true that the remittances were going to disappear if the FMLN were to win the elections. Economic terrorism presents itself, therefore, as a legitimate weapon to obtain the political power.
The cross of the victims: “Hail Caesar, those who will die salute you”


When life is at stake, in an economic terrorism the victim is the people and not exactly the governments; however, this same tactic is the one that is now being used by the United States as a political weapon against Cuba. Recently, the Bush administration launched a series of measures aimed to make pressure against the Cuban government leaded by Fidel Castro. Those measures were gathered and called “Transition Program”. In summary, the inhuman American blockage is being intensified with a twist: now it includes a limit for the remittances that the Cubans who live abroad send to their relatives.

It turns out that in the name of democracy, the Bush administration has destined $59 million for investments, for the next couple of years, on a counterattack of the media able to encourage the dissidents of the country to promote “activities to build democracy”. Out of these $59 million, $36 will be destined to the dissident groups that live in Cuba so that they can promote their “activities in favor of democracy”, $18 million will be destined for the use of a C-130 plane able to circulate in the perimeter of the international waters parallel to Cuba in order to broadcast a series of programs through the Marti Radio and Television Stations. These media companies are part of the work of the dissident groups. Another $4 million will be destined for the propaganda against Castro, and for the information about the situation of the human rights in the country.

At the same time, the Bush administration has reduced the yearly amount of $1200 that the Cubans who live in the United States were allowed to send to their relatives. These dispositions have also restricted the amount of visits that can be made to Cuba, now the Cubans who live in the United States will only be able to visit their native country every three years.

The questions easily emerge when the concept of democracy of the PNUD is compared with the unfair and unequal reality of the Latin American countries nationally dominated by an oligarchy that concentrates both the power and the media, and internationally dominated by the United States and the financial organizations such as the World’s Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These institutions supported the Consensus of Washington through the Structural Adjustment Programs, and later turned out to be a total failure in all of Latin America.

Is it not evident that the economic democracy has not much to do with the political democracy in countries such as El Salvador? What are the possibilities to survive for the Salvadoran population if suddenly the United States were to reduce the flow of remittances in the name of democracy? What kind of moral standards do the national hegemonic groups and the United States have to speak about democracy and justice? The intervention and the tortures in Iraq are the evidence of all this. The economic terrorism is a silent weapon and that is why it is necessary to denounce it, because it corrupts the fragile democracy achieved so far. As Father Jon Sobrino, the Director of the Monsignor Romero Center, puts it in his article “To choose the cause of the poor”: to give and to receive. He explains that in El Salvador “there is freedom of expression, so they say, but there is no will to tell the truth, and that is why there are thousands of ways to stop poverty from speaking, there are a thousand ways to shut the voice of the victims”.

The conception of democracy is a polemic issue here as well as abroad. If, according to the report, the most powerful sectors are leaded by the economic groups, the businessmen, the financial sector (79.7% of 231 Latin American leaders who participated in an opinion poll said this), and the media (65.2%) over the executive power (36.4%) (and probably over all of the others there are the United States, the World’s Bank, and the International Monetary Fund), then the misery of democracy in the region is evident.

That is why the title of the historical discourse of the Cuban President “Hail Caesar, those who will die salute you”, pronounced before the presence of over one million people that gathered themselves to express their rejection against these measures was more than stimulating. This discourse was pronounced on Friday May 14th at the Breakwater in Havana, where the Section of Affairs of the United States is located. When the life of the people is in danger, the name of democracy cannot be prostituted to justify death and the protection of the human rights.

G

 

 
 
 


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