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Proceso 1160
December 21 2005
ISSN 0259-9864
Editorial: El Salvador during 2005: Citizen insecurity and vulnerability
Politics: Political balance
El Salvador during 2005: Citizen insecurity and vulnerability
When Salvadoran society is viewed as a whole during
2005, what stands out the most is the permanent risk under which most of its
members live. And, if there is something that has been manifested during 2005 is
that the Salvadoran society —and within it the poorer sectors— is trapped
between vulnerability and insecurity. The heavy rainy season, as well as the
Santa Ana volcano eruption —both phenomena happened during the first week of
October— let show the precarious conditions of life of the people from the
communities that inhabit the damaged areas. But not only that: the phenomena
also brought to light the impotence of the authorities to offer a solution that
would not only allow to handle the impact of this kind of phenomena, but also to
confront the conditions of marginality of the families that inhabit the risk
areas.
The eruption of the Santa Ana volcano, as well as the impact caused by the rain
over the poorer sectors of the Salvadoran society, left evidence of its
vulnerability. It also left evidence of the complete lack of government
disposition to assist the needs of the affected people in an integral way,
starting up by assuring them the access to a safe and adequate household where
they can live with a minimum of dignity. The estate of disaster made impossible
to hide the very thing the government and the groups of economical power would
like to obviate, which is the precarious conditions of life of important groups
of Salvadoran men and women. Those conditions are the ones that make them
vulnerable to the impact of natural phenomena such as floods or earthquakes.
What is found at the root of vulnerability is poverty. The data related to that
fact handled by members of the different spheres of the government suffers of
serious inconsistency, something that could be explained in some cases due to
methodological weaknesses, but also to their eagerness of underestimating the
problem. The most rigorous thing that has been done by a government of ARENA
—specifically by the one under Francisco Flores— was the estimated data
collected in the Human Development Report. El Salvador 2003, by the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), according to which the total poverty
affected 43% of the population, meanwhile the absolute poverty affected 19% of
it. Likewise, the report contained the suggestion that rates could be higher,
since “the dimension of the problem in El Salvador is being underestimated,
because the methodology utilized for its calculation uses assumptions which are
no longer valid”.
Even so, from the UNDP data, it can be affirmed that the problem of poverty is
not only a serious one, but also that none of the social policies being promoted
by Elías Antonio Saca’s administration points to attack its structural roots.
The “Opportunities Plan” and “Solidarity Network” are all about providing some
kind of palliatives for a problem that won’t be resolved until drastic reforms
are introduced into the actual economic model. An economic model that excludes
and marginalizes, not only impoverishing most of Salvadoran men and women, but
also expelling them from their country.
Therefore, El Salvador is a country of exclusions and disparities. To begin
with, there is an enormous distance –in consumption, opportunities, healthcare,
household, education, etc.— between the richest rich and the poorest poor.
That’s the enormous fissure that splits Salvadoran society. But, next to it and
from it, derive other fissures not less important. Without a doubt, one of the
most dramatic is the one that divides men from women, being the last ones the
group that carries worst part within the unequal gender relationship that
prevails. The same way poverty strikes more on the rural inhabitants than on the
urban ones, it does on the women more than on the men, but in a greater scale.
Among the poor social sectors, the women work more than men, but receive a lower
income and get fewer labor rights. This fact makes them poorer than men: that’s
why there is a concept that has been discussed about which is feminization of
poverty.
Women are not only poorer than men. They also have become addressees of
violence, just as it is confirmed by the systematic following of the problematic
situation that has been made by institutions such as Las Dignas and CEMUJER. And
violence against women is a part of a broader and more complex problematic
situation, which is violence in a more general sense –denominated as social
violence— which has shaken the country along the last decade. Studies about
violence have stood out that such violence has multiple dimensions, which have
to be assisted if the intention is to confront it effectively. Nevertheless, in
spite of the above, in 2005, the government under Antonio Saca has followed the
steps of his predecessor in the office, Francisco Flores. And President Saca, as
well as Flores, has underestimated the analyses and most consistent data about
the violence that strikes on the country at the present time.
Gross data on violence collected till mid 2005 reveals, better than anything
else, the governmental failure to fight against it. The signs of how bad things
would go on 2005 could be foreseen at the end of 2004. For instance, between
December 23rd,, 2004 and December 31st,,2004 the National Civil Police (PNC, in
Spanish) recorded eighty five assassinations along the whole country. And
between 1 p.m. of December 31st, 2004 and 6 p.m. of January 1st, 2005, 15
homicides were recorded. During the Holy Week, the violence kept on ascending at
a very fast pace: The National Emergency Committee of El Salvador (COEN, in
Spanish) assisted 2,168 emergencies, from which 166 corresponded to deceased
(15% more than the previous year at the same time) and 1,013 injured (322 by
cutting weapon, forty one by firearm, 117 fractures and 192 politraumatisms).
August Holidays were as violent as the Holy Week’s ones. The COEN reported 103
fatal victims, one more than during year 2004. From the 103 deceased, seventy
were killed by firearm, while twenty one died in traffic accidents. About the
rest, 12 people, the COEN didn’t offer any information whatsoever. In the
edition of November 17th of the newspaper El Mundo, some data about violence was
made available: during October 2005 there had been 140 homicides; from January
to October 2,913 assassinations were committed; 295 of them were women; and 85%
of the crimes were committed by firearm.
The last survey of the Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP, in Spanish) of the
UCA, confirms, from the perspective of the citizen’s opinion, how serious is the
situation of violence and insecurity. Thus, more than half of the respondents
(57.2%) considered that criminality would have risen up during 2005. And, just
as the IUDOP indicates, “this opinion about an increment of violence during 2005
represents the highest recorded by the opinion surveys in the last four years”.
This perception, however, didn’t lead the respondent citizens to question the
failure of the government in this matter of security and fight against crime,
but rather to approve, with an 89%, the implementation of “Plan Super Heavy
Hand” as well as to show their support —at a similar rate— to the “Plan Friendly
Hand”.
Summing up, the crudest expression of the violence that has whipped the country
in 2005 is homicide, whose daily average until June was of nine, reaching eleven
in October. Other violent manifestations are added to it, such as violence
against women, traffic accidents, thefts, assaults, quarrels, etc. All these
expressions of violence had made of social coexistence something really hard for
most of the population. The Salvadoran men and women have lived in an
environment of permanent insecurity, practically since the beginning of the
year. The governmental authorities failed to guarantee the security for the
citizens, which is their constitutional obligation. And the failure can only be
a consequence of their bet on a concept of citizen security with a punitive
character. And in addition to that there are two things that contribute to the
problem: the weakness of institutions such as the PNC and the Office of the
Attorney General, as well as the more than presumable advantages that powerful
business and political personalities get from violence, such as firearm traders
and the owners of private security agencies.
The institutional failure has provoked a serious impunity crisis, from which
every particular citizen has ended up not only being the warrant of his or her
own security, but the executioner of the ones who, for real or not, threaten
that security. Justice in private hands has generated multiple kinds of abuse
from those who have better resources available; it has eroded the social
coexistence and has risen up the levels of violence to chilling ciphers. El
Salvador has been turned —mainly by those who control its economy and by the
ones who run it politically, but also by its own inhabitants in general— into a
not very cozy country. It has been turned into a country where the distrust and
the fear are the golden rule for the relations between their members. The worst
of all is that as every day passes by it is harder to turn back and change its
course. That change of course is the greatest challenge that Salvadoran society
has to confront in 2006.
Political balance
2005 started with a moderated optimism for the ruling party. Besides Elías Antonio Saca won the presidential elections in 2004, the ARENA party did not feel secure. Its triumph was due to a dirty campaign, not to the merits of its candidate. The ruling party won the elections in which, as never seen before, it felt that its power was threatened.
Anyway, in the beginning of the year, the public opinion favored president Saca.
A survey of the Public Opinion Institute of the UCA (IUDOP), found that around
the 55% approved the fourth administration of ARENA. "Salvadoran citizens —said
the poll— rated the government with 6.76, in a scale ranging from 0 to 10. That
rate is higher than the rate of approval that the administration of the former
president Francisco Flores got in the last months of 2003". According to the
poll, many Salvadorans thought that president Saca was reliable, because the 45%
of them believe that he was fulfilling his campaign promises.
In December, IUDOP publicized another poll, in which the 43% of Salvadorans
approved the Saca administration. According to the poll, the candidates of the
ruling party had good chances to win the elections to the mayor's offices and
the Salvadoran Congress.
Apparently, the approval of the Saca administration probes that the ARENA party
hegemony was consolidated. The fact that president Saca recovered the lost
popularity of his party, would support this statement.
According to the survey that IUDOP publicized in December, the Acchilles' heel
of ARENA party was always the same: the economical situation. Most of the public
opinion survey agreed on this point: most of Salvadorans feel pessimistic about
the immediate future of the country. Then, how it can be explained the apparent
contradiction between the popular approval of ARENA's administration, and the
pessimism for the economic situation and public security?
Petty heresies against Neoliberal orthodoxy
The key of this limited popularity is based in an accurate combination that
allows mixing certain flexibility with ideological inflexibility. The current
government has committed some minor heresies against Neoliberal orthodoxy,
proper of ARENA administrations. The current administration maintains a populist
and assistencialist profile with economic measures that attempt against domestic
economy, while a terciarised economic model is consolidated.
One has to recognize that the current government has been clever to realize
which are the more unpopular features of the ruling party. For instance, its
entrepreneurial profile. Some people think that ARENA is a party ruled by group
of privileged entrepreneurs that live far away from the reality of common
people. Though president Saca is an entrepreneur himself, maintains the look of
the hard-working Salvadoran, who thrives due to his own efforts, not for his
lineage or for the legacy of his family. Therefore, the most popular features of
the president are praised, and the politics of his administration is shown as
politics "with human sense". His image of an approachable president is
contrasted with the image of his predecessors, with whom the average Salvadoran
can not feel identified with. So, besides his politics did not achieve economic
stability for the country, president Saca can maintain a good public profile.
However, the president keeps certain dose of the politic intolerance of his
predecessors. He does not have no scruples about attacking the political
opposition, accusing it of keeping links with gangs, besides there are no proofs
of this.
There is an interesting turn in the ARENA administrations. The populist style of
president Saca shows that ARENA has a big capability of reinventing itself.
Saca's populism (ARENA hated the populism of the former president Napoleón
Duarte in the 80's, but it seems that it is the formula for running the country
without problems) maintains the key Neoliberal lines.
A concertative government?
President Saca entered in office with a concertative profile. After the unrest
that the doubtful way that ARENA won the elections, the new president promised
political concertation with the opposition. Beyond the picture in which
president Saca and the leader of the FMLN, Schafik Handal, were shown smiling
while they left the presidential home, the new president created a political
concertation table, that would maintain a permanent politic dialogue.
The will for concertation of the government was put to the test during 2005,
when it faced social conflicts. For instance, in June, a group of employees of
the Interior Ministry went on hunger strike, in protest for the dismissals in
the Ministry. On June 16th, the hunger strike finished and the president did not
show any interest in the situation of the workers.
Other example was the discussion about the National Budget. The confrontation
between the president and the left wing party begun with the fiscal reform plan
proposed by ARENA. The FMLN had some objections about these reforms. In the
first days of January, the tensions started with ARENA and the FMLN accusing
each other. President Saca said that the left party was refusing to approve the
National Budget without having any argument. This denial, said the president,
would affect the social investment plans. In the other hand, the FMLN asked to
negotiate this point with the president himself.
The government answered with a propagandistic campaign in which the FMLN was
shown as insensible to the hardship of the people. Facing this, the FMLN took a
rigid position. Its leaders refused to continue the negotiations unless the
media campaign was finished. President Saca did not want to give in. His
communicative abilities were useful. On January 15th, Saca stated that he would
be "tolerant" with the political opposition, besides he asked for the approval
of the National Budget. On 27th, the struggle finished. Legislative Assembly
approved the budget, without the votes of FMLN.
The FMLN
2005 was the year when a process of inner changes took place inside the FMLN.
This process was intended to overcome the conflicts between the so-called
orthodox wing and the reformists. In the last days of March, the FMLN leadership
reformed their statutes, according to which the former party coordinators would
monitor the candidates. This measure was interpreted as a mechanism to assure
the control of the party in the hands of the orthodox wing —all the former party
coordinators are members of this wing—. Also, the reformists said that this
reform was a way to put them away. One of these reformists, the mayor of San
Salvador, Carlos Rivas Zamora, was skeptical on these reforms when he stated,
"when there is competition inside the FMLN, some media said that there is a
break-up. I think that this is the fear of the FMLN".
On June, the break-up was more than obvious. Many deputies and mayors resigned,
before the leadership canceled the "political rights" of these FMLN militants.
In the case of the election for the mayor's office in San Salvador, the FMLN
leadership imposed its current candidate, Violeta Menjívar, without holding a
party convention. After this, mayor Rivas Zamora —a strong contender for
reelection, although not a favorite for the orthodox wing— resigned to his
militancy. Ileana Rogel, a congresswoman from the FMLN, did the same before any
reprisal occur. Rivas Zamora and Rogel were some of the cadres that left the
FMLN in order to create a new party, the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR).
The FMLN mayor for Santa Ana, Orlando Mena, chose to join the Christian
Democrats, in order to contend for his reelection.
The FMLN did not hesitate in sacrificing some of its better candidates in favor
of "ideological purity". This is the favorite argument to justify the total
control of the party. The FMLN felt resented for the revival of the PCN, due to
a politic maneuver committed by the ARENA party. But the FMLN made the same,
making an agreement with ARENA in order to impede the inscription of the FDR in
the electoral registry. The gesture was returned to the FMLN, when ARENA and the
PCN agreed that simple majority in the TSE could agree any issue. This reform
marginalized the FMLN in the electoral organism.
Early campaign, early fraud?
The electoral campaign started before its legal announcement in December. Beyond
the ARENA's propaganda in the cities ruled by the FMLN, the ruling party changed
the statutes of the Electoral Tribunal (TSE), in order to marginalize the FMLN,
as said before. ARENA, with the complicity of PCN, pursued to bring the FMLN
candidates into discredit, in order to cut short their political aspirations.
During the last days of November, the public auditing office —controlled by the
PCN— set a millionaire fine against a group of mayors and former mayors of the
Great San Salvador. In case of not paying the fine ($ 3,702, 671.02), they would
not be able to be appointed for public post, i.e., mayor offices and legislative
assembly. The charges were the supposed irregular payments to the solid
waste-processing firm (known as MIDES).
The media linked to ARENA party showed the case as a proof of corruption in the
mayor offices ran by the FMLN. The veredict also pursued to affect those mayors
that had the bigger chances to win their reelection. In other words, the
maneuver sought to cut ground to the most popular candidates of the left, that
is, the FMLN and the FDR: Carlos Rivas Zamora, Héctor Silva, Óscar Ortiz, Luz
Estrella Rodríguez, Carlos Menéndez and René Canjura. The veredict was suspended
after the FMLN appealed. The issue of the links between MIDES and the FMLN was
used as a way to discredit the FMLN. In the past, it was said that MIDES was a
tentacle of the Canadian mob, which was refuted. This is the way in which the
early campaign started, emphasizing the crudest characteristics of domestic
politics.
Another step into this way was the bill against terrorism. The ARENA party
committed a legal monstrosity, writing a document in which the most different
offences were conceived as terrorist acts, such as corruption, gang-membership
and taking public buildings. The opposition considered that this bill was aimed
against the leftist social organizations.
The election of the Attorney General
In October a lot of things were discussed in relation to the election of the new
Attorney General. One thing remained clear for the human rights organizations:
Belisario Artiga, Attorney General at the time, had to be removed from the
office.
When making a balance of Artiga´s performance, it is worth to highlight the
optimism with which the functionary began his administration. When he first
occupied the office, the Attorney announced that he would give the proper
attention to certain emblematic cases, just as if they were of his own. Those
cases have remained unpunished: the one of the Jesuit priests, murdered in 1989;
and the one of the child Katya Miranda. However, the functionary let the
people’s expectations down. Artiga refused to reopen the first case. And, as for
the murder of Katya Miranda, no significant progress was made either. That way,
along his administration, several cases turned into failures: the case of the
fraud committed by FINSEPRO-INSEPRO, which ended up with the release of the
person who was mainly involved, Roberto Mathies Hill, after a few years in jail;
the embezzlement that took place in FEDEFUT; the Guth-Zapata case, in which the
retired General Mauricio Ernesto Vargas was involved —also mentioned in the case
of the murder of the journalist Lorena Saravia—; the case of telephone tapping,
among many others.
At the beginning, it was known that the ARENA party would support the reelection
of Artiga for the office of Attorney General. However, the critics made about
the functionary were so strong that the official party had to diminish its
support to the functionary. In December, another name was mentioned, the new bet
of ARENA for the office: Ástor Escalante, the new Viceminister of Citizen
Security. The year came to an end without a new General Attorney being
designated by the Legislative Assembly, and with the deputies of ARENA and FMLN
accusing each other for that.
The stagnation of the election of the new Attorney General is a sample of how
injurious it is to the life of the country to have omnipresent political
parties. As it is known, the designation of offices such as the Attorney
General, Procurator General, President of the Court of Accounts, among others,
stays in the hands of the Legislative Assembly. The parties that compound it
choose the functionaries for such offices among candidates that they propose
themselves. That way, the office ends up being occupied not by the most capable
person for the job or by someone who is trusted by the citizenship —which by the
way has nothing to do with this matter—. The office ends up being occupied by
the most convenient person for the parties that have the domain of the
Parliament. This practice gives room for the most varied kind of negotiations
and pacts. This also encourages a perversion: institutions that should moderate
the doing of politicians end up at their full service.
With no intention whatsoever of making predictions, it is very likely that ARENA
will look forward bringing Escalante, or another convenient functionary suitable
to the interests of the party, to the office of the Attorney General. With the
re-change that took place within the Ministry of Public Security, designating an
ex deputy of ARENA for the office Chief of Police —also ex Director of the
institution, Rodrigo Ávila—, it is being pursued the strengthening of the
party’s control over the coercive apparatus of the State. President Saca had a
specific purpose when he gave a public declaration stating that he wanted a
Legislative Assembly that wouldn’t interfere in his way to govern. This means
that what he pretends is not that the Legislative Assembly includes the voice of
the opposition, instead he wants a soft organism that says yes to any order
given by the Executive authority.
Closing 2005, the view is clear: ARENA has the intention to consolidate its
hegemony. Not a very strong hegemony in the sense that it is not based on an
enormous popular sympathy derived from its governmental policies —as some
members of the media would like to present it—, but from the personal charisma
of President Saca and his knowledge on communications. This has been unwillingly
supported by the decadent left wing, which hasn’t been able to articulate
attractive political offers or to configure a leadership capable of persuading
the population. All that let it think that in 2006 the tensions between the
political forces will rise up and that El Salvador will face another electoral
campaign characterized by the same old vices and tricks.
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