ARENA has practiced the curious phenomenon of transvestism as it attempts to present an apparently transformed reality. The first act of transvestism changed the internal party struggles between at least three groups or power elites into a serene process of discussion and understanding about possible candidacies. The choosing of a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic will have been the result of broad consultation with the established party organisms and will not have come from the presidential palace nor will the process of choosing have had help from President Calderón Sol and his group. The pre-candidacy will not have been launched in order to clip the wings of the Cristiani group, but will have been an act of common accord. The abrupt reaction with which Mr. Cristiani received the news will have been a result of surprise and the news and support will have been immediate and total. What was rejected in reality, was unconditional support. Others aspiring to the candidacy--representatives of the Cristiani and Acosta Oertel groups--would not be annoyed for having been taken out of the running, but would rather enthusiastically applaud the decision of the highest leadership of the party. The competition for the nomination would be a palpable demonstration of the abundant number of leaders which ARENA can count upon and the acceptance will have been a demonstration of the granite-like unity of the party.

Interest groups, including powerful national and international economic interests, collective and individual ambitions and power struggles within parties and in the country are normal in political institutions. This is precisely one of the most important activities in political parties. They are the instruments accepted by democracy in order to achieve state power. As a consequence, the politicians orient almost all of their activity towards winning in this competition for power and they are satisfied only with the Presidency of the Republic--and then there are those who would want to continue, like Menem, Fujimori or Cardoso. One should not be surprised by reality. What is surprising is that some of the ARENA leaders are irritated because their ambitions and interests are being exposed to public light. It makes them uncomfortable that the romanticism and demagogy with which they are accustomed to dress up their interests, struggles and ambitions are dissolving and in their place appears the hard reality of Salvadoran politics.

In a second act of transvestism, ARENA presents as deeds already performed what are, in reality, only promises. In this act, the candidate, Mr. Francisco Flores, presents himself as the only possibility that the official party might change. Nevertheless, Mr. Flores is only one possibility for the abandonment of the confrontative, anti-communist past of the party. Much, however, is lacking before this possibility might become a reality, as was revealed at the General Assembly of ARENA. While Mr. Flores was committing himself to abandon the old way of doing politics, to respect adversaries and to engage in dialogue about the problems of the country, Mr. Cristiani was referring to the FMLN as a threat to freedoms which he presented as won only through the efforts of ARENA in the process leading to the Peace Accords. He also spoke of war, cadavers, tombs and cemeteries, using the language of the recent past as if nothing had changed since he himself was President of the Republic.

The third act of transvestism occurred during the evaluation of the last two governments of ARENA. While Mr. Flores was committing himself never to state "that the country is doing well when all is not well with [the people] , "never, in order to win others over [to his positions], to promise what we cannot comply with" and "never to deny the truth of our country no matter how crude it may be". While Mr. Flores was committing himself in this manner, President Calderón Sol, in what would appear to be an early good-bye, declared, "from this point on, you will be the protagonist in everything...God be thanked", he said to the candidate at the party office. He affirmed that the Cristiani government had led to peace and harmony for Salvadorans and that to him [Calderón Sol] had fallen the task of the moral and physical reconstruction of the country as well as the task of laying the bases for development of a social agenda. Nevertheless, the diagnosis of the National Commission for Development which he himself named assures something very different: it aspires to a non-existent country--green, modern and clean--whose inhabitants have all of their basic needs satisfied, and in which they feel secure and can contribute towards creating a new culture of responsibility, productivity, solidarity, tolerance, humanism and respect for law.

Perhaps the enthusiasm of the moment made the president lose a sense of reality of the country, but this forgetfulness is a serious thing because it is in such moments of great political intensity that the document Bases for a National Plan, must be validated. Apart from what this lack of knowledge and consciousness could signify for the plan which is being formulated, it is clear that Mr. Cristiani, as well as Mr. Calderón Sol ought--as Mr. Flores indicated--to "go out to confront reality with courage, and recognize what we have forgotten".

ARENA has much to change before it can become a modern party adequate to the needs of El Salvador and to the times we live in. An ARENA candidate will have a great deal of work before the party can assume its discourse and support a government platform such as has been announced. The General Assembly reflects the internal reality of ARENA: Mr. Flores' candidacy has introduced a new element which has not yet been fully assimilated. The presentations of its leaders demonstrate the contrast between the new and old discourse. ARENA will have to decide which way it will go. It would be difficult for both to coexist for any length of time in the same party.

The ARENA candidate faces a double challenge. It must impose its vision inside its party, because, otherwise, the possibilities for change will be annulled by the traditional practices of the party. It seems difficult that this could be achieved without an intense internal struggle which could place the candidacy itself in danger. The Cristiani group will attempt to win an important quota of power in what could be the third ARENA government. Differences between the groups are not overcome because the approved candidate demands substantial changes in the ideology and practice of ARENA. Looking outwards, Mr. Flores must win the votes of the population, which could become more difficult in the measure that he is assimilated by the current structures of the ARENA party, or in the measure that he distances himself from these structures, because then the electoral machinery of the party will distance itself from him.

After almost two months of controversy, ARENA decided to present Mr. Francisco Flores, the ex-president of the Legislative Assembly, as the official party candidate. Why did the Mr. Flores' candidacy become so controversial? At first blush, it is possible to assume that there are two reasons. The first surprise is that the young and little-known Flores would launch himself with such decisiveness as to aspire to the candidacy for the government party. His academic preparation and moderate posture are not exactly characteristics of right-wing politicians in El Salvador. Traditionally it has not been the Francisco Flores types who aspire to seek the presidency of the republic. This was, indeed, a surprise.

The second reason is perhaps more striking: initially, Mr. Flores' aspiration does not seem to obey the dictates of the ARENA party's "golden leadership group"; on the contrary, he promised the emergence of another party sector, little listened to--or not at all--by the leadership of the party. It was astonishingly innovative for someone not part of the "power elite" to seek the candidacy independently--even against--the wishes of the party's leadership. It was, then, the selling of the image of a moderate, intellectually independent young leader with initiative which inspired the confidence of the bases: this is how Mr. Francisco Flores achieved his popularity and following, which, up to two months ago, were non-existent.

Now, when his candidacy is a reality, new aspects of Mr. Flores' aspirations have come to light, aspirations which give the lie to some of the early hypotheses formulated after he launched his pre-candidacy. It turns out that the ex-president of the Legislative Assembly is not as independent as he was made out to be. It is true that a group of ARENA fraction deputies had previously proposed to Mr. Flores that he launch his candidacy, but, according to Mr. Flores himself, he did not accept that offer. It seems as if the rumor of Mr. Flores' possible pre-candidacy produced aversion among the opposition deputies and it was this, according to COENA president Alfred Cristiani's declarations, which determined the launching of the presidential candidacy. The launching of his candidacy found a quick echo of support from the Calderón Sol group. So then, the original thesis that his pre-candidacy was a definitive expression that a particular group of the new ARENA generation wanted to gain the field in the party in order to take its own decisions, fell apart.

Mr. "Paco" Flores, himself, admitted, after the National Assembly in which his candidacy was made official, that the support of Mr. Calderón Sol was "very important" for him--that support was "definitive", according to the headline in one of the morning dailies. It really was naive to think that ARENA's dominant groups would make room for initiatives presented outside the arena where they could apply their rubber stamp. It should not be forgotten that ARENA was created to defend the interests of what was then called the oligarchy, against what was then called the communist menace. Today "the oligarchy" is made up of the financial sector, the big agricultural landowners and private enterprise. And ARENA continues to respond to their interests. How can one assume, with such strong economic interests in place, that the ARENA leadership--which is, definitively, what leads and defines the party--would allow into the inner sanctum of its structures, the development of groups which might defend their own ideas, or ideas foreign to those emitted by the leadership?

What is at stake (and Mr. Cristiani has already said this) is to prevent, at all costs, assumption of the executive branch of government by the FMLN; that is to say, to avoid any serious threat to the interests of wealthy ARENA party members. As a consequence, it was essential to seek the ideal person, choose the best possible card to bet in order to win in the election in March, 1999. Mr. Francisco Flores' candidacy is the result of this process and of nothing more. His academic preparation, his conciliatory tone, his age and even his membership in the middle class would have been factors evaluated beforehand by the ARENA leadership. He is simply the candidate that ARENA needed to set out on the successful road to the polls next year. After some disagreements, the ARENA leadership ended up deciding that it would be that way; and so it is.

Mr. Cristiani would, of course, have preferred a candidate whom he himself proposed as opposed to one supported by Mr. Calderón Sol. Of course Mr. Flores' candidacy nipped in the bud the hopes of many veteran ARENA members who harbored desires for assuming the leadership of the country. But all in all, this is completely secondary. And it will be even more so when ARENA succeeds in selling to their fellow party members the idea that "Paquito's" election was unanimous and nothing more than a question of deciding upon the characteristics which would make up the personality of its new candidate.

There seems to have been an exaggerated interest on the part of the press to verify who supported Paco Flores and who did not. True, it is important to clarify to public opinion that the affirmation of ARENA's "granite-like unity" is a fallacy. But the insistence with which the news media has dealt with the problem of the "leadership caste" in the government party cannot help but awaken suspicions. That groups which defend distinctive interests coexist within the ARENA party and that, as a consequence, these groups have distinctive conceptions of the country, is definitively true. Whatever efforts its members make today to affirm the contrary would be in vain. Nevertheless, it is also true that the principal right-wing party has maintained a certain unity; which signifies that those who make up the party pursue the same goals, although, in order to achieve them, they each present a different focus.

The gut reaction with which certain news media refer to ARENA does nothing more than lay bare the fact that, behind the facade of news reportage, delicate personal feuds are hidden. During the weeks in which the Francisco Flores polemic has been circulating, there have been very few moments in which journalists have dealt seriously with national problems. All seems to indicate that reporting on the information about the recent movements within the official party is owing either to the typical sensationalism characteristic of the news media or it is owing to the need by some of them to lower the prestige of the official party at all costs, as a result of reasons which have nothing to do either with the job of keeping the public informed, or with matters which concern the country.

But, laying aside the dubious treatment by some news broadcasters of Mr. Flores' candidacy, there are several conclusions which might be drawn concerning the process it stirred up. The first conclusion is that the idea that this candidacy is something new must be broached with caution. True, "Paquito" is far removed from the classical right-wing presidential model, but one cannot look askant at the fact that his independence will be curbed by the sector of the party which supports him.

The second possible conclusion is that the fact that it was not Mr. Cristiani who launched Mr. Flores' candidacy should not lead one immediately to think that matters inside the ARENA party are changing. When all is said and done, all that can be said is that one group supported him and the other did not; and this changes matters not at all: one cannot suppose that ARENA is undergoing changes to produce internal democracy or that the party's conception of the country will be modified.

Finally, those who are led to jump quickly to conclusions are mistaken if they underestimate the strength and solidity of ARENA. As a political institution, it has controlled the destiny of the country for eight years and this gives it an advantage over the rest. It is true that it is suffering from an imminent weakening and deterioration, and it is also true that the electorate has clearly manifested its rejection of just that deterioration. The March 16, 1997 elections made clear that the FMLN had considerably increased its possibilities for replacing ARENA in the upcoming presidential elections. Nevertheless--and in spite of all of its limitations--the official party continues to control one of the largest opposing poles in the voting spectrum which still dominates the Salvadoran political panorama.

That part of Salvadoran legislation which deals with the minimum wage is perhaps one of the best formulated in the world, owing to the high level of its ethical content and concern for the interests of the workers. For example, Article 144 of the Labor Code establishes that the worker has a right to "receive a minimum wage which sufficiently covers the normal material, moral and cultural needs of his home".

In practice, the minimum wage has functioned as a floor which prevents the interaction of the market forces from paying even lower wages, but not as a guarantee of the satisfaction of material, moral and cultural needs of the workers. Wage policies have obeyed guidelines which have nothing to do with legislation or the labor market. The minimum wage has always been below the cost of the basic food basket and, in recent decades, its acquisitive power has fallen due to inflation: this implies that real wages have been progressively reduced. Paradoxically the labor sector has not presented platforms of demands of any stature concerning the matter of wages--this is true to the degree that the last initiative for raising the minimum wage was produced by the government.

So it was that last March 16, the President of the Republic, Mr. Armando Calderón Sol, announced that he would request of the legislative branch representative of the National Council on the Minimum Wage, an increase of 105 colones (9%) for the minimum wage level in effect for the commercial, industrial and service sectors. According to Mr. Calderón Sol, the proposal, which is doubtless beneficial for the workers, was made "so that the Salvadoran workers can absorb the 3% increase in payment to the new pension system".

Although the government initiative responds to the need to implement the new private pension system without major traumas, it might be considered opportune to review, at this point, what the relationship actually is between the minimum wage, the cost of the basic food basket and the relation of these to inflation, because such a review might contribute towards clarifying the current precarious economic status of the workforce.

Since mid-1995, the minimum wage had been established at the following monthly levels: general wage for agricultural and livestock workers: 594 colones; daylaborers in coffee production: 709.5 colones; daylaborers in sugar cane production: 600.6; industrial, commercial and service sectors: 1,155 colones. The governmental proposal would only affect the industrial, commercial and service sectors, raising the salary level of those sectors from the current 1,155 colones to a proposed 1,260 colones. It should be mentioned that, in general, the minimum wage levels under discussion here represent the wages received by the great majority of workers and daylaborers in the rural as well as urban areas, including the employees of the numerous runaway shops (maquilas) founded on the basis of foreign investment. According to official statistics, of all those employed at the national level, close to 70% receive less than the legally required minimum wage in effect.

On the other hand, the cost of the basic market basket subsumes the costs of goods and services classified in the following categories: food, housing, clothing and miscellaneous. For December, 1992, it is estimated that the cost of the basic food basket was 1,313.4 colones. For 1997, the value of the food basket rose to 2,148.8 colones and the market basket had increased to 4,738.7 colones.

Taking this data into account, the minimum wage for the industrial, commercial and service sectors would be insufficient to cover the cost of the food basket--not to mention the cost of the market basket. One would need 1.85 minimum salaries to acquire the first and 4.1 minimum salaries to acquire the second.

The situation in rural homes is also critical because, although the cost of the basic amplified rural basket is less than that of the urban basket, the wages in agriculture are much less than urban wages. The general wage for agricultural and livestock workers is only 51% of the wages paid in the industrial, commercial and service sectors. A daylaborer who receives a basic agricultural and livestock worker's wage needs 3.2 minimum salaries in order to acquire the amplified rural basket, which costs less than the urban basket, but is also a great deal more modest.

Deficiencies in the minimum wage are accentuated more and more owing to the fact that these are not tied in any way to the national levels of inflation. For example, since August, 1995, when the current minimum wage was established, the country experienced an accumulated inflationary increase of close to 8%, without there having been any wage adjustments. In retrospect, the behavior of real minimum wages during the 1990's reveals a blatant deterioration which, nevertheless would have been more pronounced if there had not been an increase in the nominal minimal wage for the years between 1990 and 1995.

The information presented above clearly reveals that the majority of employed workers receive a salary which is not in accordance with the law, does not satisfy basic needs and which stimulates the proliferation of poverty. In fact, when one considers the broadening gulf between the cost of the basic basket and the minimum wage, one could infer that there exist greater and greater pressures toward the deepening of poverty, contrary to what the official data on the incidence of poverty might indicate. One could consider that the minimum wage might be a factor promoting poverty, as well as a factor to be considered when designing strategies to combat poverty.

It is not very difficult to demonstrate that the increases in the minimum wage are possible because there exists sufficient value added to allow for the increases. The major setback lies in the fact that raising minimum wages would imply a reduction in business profits, a category hard to touch without setting off immediate rejection from the business associations, which usually prevail when it comes to imposing their interests over and above the interests of the workers.

There are two closely-fought arguments presented by the business and governmental sectors when discussing wage increases: precarious economic growth and possible inflationary pressures. But the truth is that, as indicated above, it is possible to raise wages without compromising growth, although it is true that business profits would then be compromised. Likewise, it is possible to live with some level of inflation if this, in the end, is translated into an increase in real minimum wages: in fact, this is what happened with the increases in minimum wages in 1992, 1993 and 1995. Inflation control is not an end unto itself.

A clear and recent indication of the speciousness of government arguments is that what is now being dealt with is making the implementation of the private pension system viable in comparison with wage increases without giving much importance to the topic of the possible inflationary effects of the measure. The President of the Central Reserve Bank himself considers that this will not cause any significant impact on the inflation limits set for 1998.

In reality, the motivations for fixing minimal wages have more to do with maintaining privileges than with a genuine interest in solving the economic and social problems of the country. It has been so since before the formation of the Salvadoran state and, for the same reasons, it is impossible to change the situation without provoking profound traumas, or even a governmental crisis, especially if one considers that, in order to comply with he Labor Code, it would be necessary to triple or quadruple the minimum wage. All in all, one should not lose sight of the urgent need to create a mechanism for fixing the minimum wage which, as soon as possible, would consider an annual adjustment over and above the inflationary rhythm.

RATIFICATION. At the March 29 Extraordinary General Assembly of the ARENA party, Mr. Francisco Flores was unanimously elected to be the official candidate for that party for the presidency in the 1999 elections. The assembly was held in the National Gymnasium with the participation of COENA and 1500 delegates from throughout the country with the right to vote and some 10,000 affiliates who, with hands raised, expressed their support for Mr. Flores. President Calderón Sol referred to the assembly as demonstrating to detractors of the party the existence of party unity and "a profound internal renewal within the party". The president of COENA, Mr. Alfredo Cristiani, as well as President Calderón Sol, spoke of those detractors and recalled that "the FMLN said that we were a cadaver and that they had everything ready to move into the Presidential Palace", emphasizing, however that "[the FMLN] would never get into the Presidential Palace". Mr. Flores, speaking during his own discourse, asked for a vote of confidence and declared that he would not promise what he could not deliver and announced, at the same time, that he would take a trip around the country to listen to the concerns of the bases and sectors of the party so that he could respond to them in his governmental program. The consultation, said Flores, would begin on March 30 in the province of Morazán, "given that it presents indications of the severest poverty in the country" (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, March 30, pp. 4 and 5; EL DIARIO DE HOY, March 30, pp. 2,3 and 6 DIARIO LATINO, March 30, p. 5).

REJECTION. On March 30, the Democratic Convergence (CD), Christian Democratic (PDC) and National Conciliation (PCN) parties denied that they had any intention of making strategic alliances with ARENA for the 1999 elections. The statements came in response to comments made by the president of the Nationalist Executive Council, Mr. Alfredo Cristiani, and by President Calderón Sol with regard to advanced talks with those parties, which, they said, aimed at establishing political alliances. Mr. Cristiani himself proposed to COENA that it consider presenting Mr. Ruben Zamora, General Secretary of the CD, as a vice-presidential candidate. "Cristian's declarations are irresponsible because they are a result of a desperation to revive his party", stated Mr. Jorge Villacorta, Deputy for the CD. Mr. Rene Aguiluz, PDC Head of Fraction, said that his party was occupied with planning the National Opposition Union (UNO) project together with the CD and the Democratic Party and that they were not, for the moment, considering any kind of coming together with the official party. Ex-ARENA member and current leader of the PCN, Mr. Francisco Merino, roundly denied any kind of alliance with his old party and recalled that the political party to which he now belongs had always gone it alone during elections and "even in the most difficult periods we have won at least 100,000 votes) (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, March 30, p. 6 and March 31, p. 8; EL DIARIO DE HOY, March 31, p. 11).

DISMISSAL. The deputies who support Mr. Ronald Umaña as General Secretary of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), requested, on March 23, that a special commission of the Legislative Assembly be created to evaluate the work of Magistrate of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), Mr. Eduardo Colindres. The PDC group's proposal is a result of the recent dispute within the PDC in which Mr. Horacio Trujillo, a party member retired from the rank and file of the Christian Democrats, claimed the post of General Secretary of the party. The aim of the commission would be to decide if sufficient reasons exist for calling for the removal of Mr. Colindres from his post in that institution given that his wife belongs to the group of those calling for an internal party coup led by Mr. Trujillo. The PDC Head of Fraction, Mr. Rene Aguiluz, introduced the piece of legislation in the legislative plenary and declared that he enjoyed the support of the ARENA and PCN parlamentarians. "Mr Colindres is acting immorally," said Mr. Aguiluz, because he has not excused himself from being provided with the details of the dispute between Mr. Umaña and Mr. Trujillo. The petition was heard favorably in the Assembly and the Commission began its work on March 30, announcing that it would call Mr. Colindres to testify about the conflict in the PDC. Of the five deputy members of the Commission, none is a member of the PDC Fraction in the Legislative Assembly (EL DIARIO DE HOY, March 24, p. 6; DIARIO LATINO, March 30, p. 3; LA PRENSA GRAFICA, March 31, p. 14).

INTERROGATION. The Public Security Minister, Mr. Hugo Barrera, and the Director of the National Civilian Police (PNC), Mr. Rodrigo Avila, will be required to appear before the Commissions for the Interior and for Public Security of the Legislative Assembly in order to clarify recent administrative irregularities detected within the PNC. Legislative Commission members made the decision to interrogate the functionaries on March 31 after several days of debate on the topic. The irregularities referred to have some relation to the construction of two buildings for the National Civilian Police, with the purchase of helicopters and vehicles and with anomalies in the handling of the maintenance shops as well as the distribution of replacement parts within that institution. The most sensitive point to be dealt with concerns the illegal turnover of 38 million colones as indeterminate bonuses, documented in the audit of the Fiscal Controller's Office (Corte de Cuentas) carried out in 1995. Mr. Manuel Melgar, FMLN deputy, stated that, in spite of the investigations already carried out by the Attorney General's Office, there are still some unresolved doubts about other anomalies and that, for these reasons, it was necessary to confront and compare the data in the presence of the deputies. For his part, Mr. Mauricio Aguilar of ARENA said that his party saw the initiative as somewhat precipitate, given that judgements could not be made at as long as the Supreme Court had not made any determination on the issues at hand. (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, April 1, p. 16; EL DIARIO DE HOY, March 25, p. 8).

NEGOTIATIONS. On March 24, members of the Medical Workers Union of ISSS (SIMETRISS) lifted the strike one week after it had begun. After the second day of negotiations between the union and the High Level Commission, the doctors agreed to resume their normal activities. "We are demonstrating our good will by lifting the strike, above all because we are going to begin to deal with economic concerns," stated SIMETRISSS Records and Agreements Secretary, Mrs. Evelin de Calderón. According to Labor Minister Eduardo Tomasino, the strike was suspended because there were now specific agreements and a willingness to resolve the problem. The negotiators stated that 18 of the 22 demands presented by SIMETRISSS had been discussed, and that, among those, 7 agreements had been reached, including the following: to provide the resources necessary for the doctor to carry out his work and to revise the administrative procedures of the institution. Moreover, on March 25, an agreement was reached to negotiate the remaining agreements, among which is the topic of salary increases, considered to be one of the most important. "We are going to try to establish, inasmuch as is possible, that the economic [points are] in accordance with the requirements that they presented as part of their 22 demands", Mr. Tomasino said. (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, March 25, p. 4 and EL DIARIO DE HOY, March 25, p. 2).

EL ESPINO. On March 20, by order of the Minister of Public Works (MOP), the felling of some three hundred trees in the Finca El Espino began. The felling of the trees is required as part of the broadening of Chiltiupan Boulevard, which will connect Ciudad Merliot with the San Benito neighborhood, both of which are located in the greater San Salvador metropolitan area. On March 25, the Salvadoran Ecological Unit (UNES), accompanied by FMLN and PLD deputies, presented a petition for a temporary restraining order against the Planning Office of the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador (OPAMSS) and the Forest and Wildlife Service of the Agricultural and Livestock Ministry (MAG). The petition for the restraining order was presented to the Constitutional Section of the Supreme Court. The ecological organization alleges that the OPAMSS authorized the implementation of the construction of the highway through El Espino and that MAG approved the felling of the trees. The petition presented requested a restraining order suspending the action in question. President of the Supreme Court, Mr. Eduardo Tenorio, committed himself to make a ruling as soon as possible on the demand presented by the deputies and the ecologists. One day later the Constitutional Section of the Supreme Court ordered MOP to halt operations until the petition had been studied and until a definitive ruling had been made. Work was suspended until March 30 after a Supreme Court commission could be present in situ to make a notification of the decision (EL DIARIO DE HOY, March 24, p. 40), LA PRENSA GRAFICA, March 26, p. 4, LA PRENSA GRAFICA, March 27, P. 10, EL DIARIO DE HOY, March 31, P. 39).