Since the breakup of the Federation and until Rafael Zaldívar assumed power in 1873, the social and political life of El Salvador was marked by heavy conflict--generally issuing in armed conflict--between conservatives and liberals. One of the centers of attention in this confrontation was the position which each one assumed with regard to the Church and their privileges: while the conservatives proclaimed indissoluble unity between national interests and the interests of the clergy, the liberals spoke strongly for the separation of church and state, and even the subordination of religious order to civil order. Behind this confrontation was to be found a vision distinct from what ought to be the political organization of society and its administration. The conservatives placed their bets on the exercise of policies founded on ancestry and tradition; politics were the patrimony of those who could exercise it by hereditary right. The liberals announced a new way of practicing politics: political administration, in this model, was not a question of inheritance or tradition, but rather a question of elections on the basis of popular suffrage--that is to say, the people would burst on the scene with what was an inalienable right: the right to elect those who would govern them and who would legitimate their exercise of power on the strength of that popular mandate and not on the strength of divine providence or rights acquired through bloodlines.

Now, if on religious or political questions the differences between conservatives and liberals were sharp and categorical, on the economic level tensions were less serious, though more subtle. The central focus of the dispute was land, but the economic conception concerning land was different for each tendency. For the conservatives, what was important was the large aristocratic hereditary plantation, over which the great landowners exercised dominion. The extensive property, the stables, the central hacienda, defined the power of its owner, whose productive activities were, in this scheme of things, of secondary importance. For the liberals, land was important as a space for production: a place for generating products which could be commercialized and which provided income for the public treasury. Large, unproductive territorial dominions--the pride of the conservatives--held no meaning for the liberals, who did not miss the opportunity to introduce onto the land the dynamic of productivity, which explains the importance assigned by various liberal leaders to the production of coffee.

With the death of Gerardo Barrios, more radical liberalism gave way to a more moderate liberalism, with which conservativism found it easier to coexist. This process of coming together between liberals and conservatives had two basic premises: first, acceptance of the fact that land was a source of privilege which allowed one to become rich; and, second, that the indigenous peasant population--heavily exploited, but with no rights of any kind--was a necessary source of labor for agricultural work. The liberals could coexist with the conservatives on these basic coincidences, making way for the formation of oligarchic groups which dominated the economic and political life of El Salvador for the last three decades of the nineteenth century up to the latter half of the twentieth century.

It was in this way that, during the last three decades of the nineteenth century, the bases for the economic and social order which would dominate El Salvador during almost all of the twentieth century were laid. The practice of politics in which candidates for the presidency were elected among coffee-producing families was in effect until 1931; with the coup d'état led by General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, the military assumed the administration of political power. Nevertheless, the economic dynamic of the country was under the control of the interests of the coffee producers until well into the 1970's when, in the context of socio-political conflicts without precedent in the agricultural sector, industrial and financial sectors began to be the driving force in the leadership of the national economy. It was only recently, during the 1980's and 1990's, that coffee lost its stellar position as a fundamental center of the Salvadoran economy.

Simultaneously with an economic order centered on the production and export of coffee, in the last three decades of the nineteenth century there grew up an exclusive social order which marginalized the great majority of the population. The poverty and growing deterioration of the conditions of life in the countryside were the most palpable results of the imposition of the coffee-producing logic begun by Zaldívar and continued by his successors. Discontent and malaise among the peasants and indigenous peoples were contained by state violence, which became an ineluctable component for the exercise of state authority.

Structural violence, the root of which was the social and economic exclusion of the majority of the population, was subsumed under institutional violence, a necessary component for social control, always the orphan of legitimacy. This was the El Salvador born at the end of the nineteenth century and consolidated during the first three decades of the twentieth century. This is the El Salvador which began to be left behind in 1979 with the coup d'état in October of that year. In 1992, with the signing of the Peace Accords, the bases for a new political order were laid. From these bases it will be possible to effect a transition towards a new economic order. The first is still in its infancy; the second represents the unavoidable challenge facing the coming century.

One of the most notable aspects in the evolution of poverty in El Salvador during the decade of the 1990's has been the marked tendency towards the reduction of poverty. Data from the now defunct Ministry of Planning reveal that, between the years 1990 and 1995, total poverty had been reduced, which would be consonant with the high rates of economic growth and macroeconomic stability experienced between the same years. Nevertheless, the situation becomes incongruous for 1996 when poverty as well as production increase, raising the question of what could have happened to the supposed beneficent effects of economic growth for the general welfare.

Even if one lays aside any doubts about how the figures indicating poverty were elaborated, applicable for calculating the basic food basket as well as family income--it is notable that, for 1996, the amount of the basic food basket diminished substantially. This is at least consonant with the data produced by the United Nations Program for Development (UNDP), which is based, apparently, on official data. If we consider the criticisms of the methodology employed for the calculation of poverty, they could reveal, in fact, that official data on poverty is grossly underestimated.

An initial question arises when examining the manner in which the amount of the basic food basket is calculated (see Proceso, 531), which has had the effect of automatically diminishing the figures indicating the percentage of poor families.

The increase in poverty for 1996 broke the tendency towards contraction of the economy which had predominated throughout the decade and, at the same time, raised reasonable doubts concerning the true relationship between economic growth, salaries, income and poverty. If we consider that, for 1996, the economy will have grown by 3%--which implies, at least theoretically, a greater generation of jobs and income--, it turns out to be the case that it is difficult to explain the growth of poverty during that year, unless one places in doubt the economy's capacity to generate jobs and income. In this context it is important to review the recent behavior of poverty in order to illustrate the contrast between poverty and the "economic bonanza" which, according to governmental sources, the country is enjoying.

In order to examine the phenomenon of poverty during the decade of the 1990's, it will be helpful to divide the period into two stages: the period of contraction (1990-1995) and the period of expansion (1996 and after). During the first stage, poverty diminished notably. Between the data for 1991-92 and data for 1995, poverty had moved from the level of 59.7% to a level of 47.7%. The greatest reduction was experienced between the data for 1992-93, 1994 and 1995. It is important to point out here that, even for 1995, when an important contraction in the rate of economic growth was experienced, poverty was reduced more than during years of major growth. between 1994 and 1995, total poverty moved from 52.4% to 47.7%, which implies a reduction of almost 5 percentage points.

If we consider the dynamic of the components of total poverty (absolute and relative poverty), we can observe that extreme poverty diminishes more in the contraction stage-- extreme poverty being defined as the impossibility of acquiring even the basic food basket necessary for subsistence for an average family. Relative poverty--defined as the inability to acquire the basic amplified basket--also demonstrated reductions, although not in the same amount as was experienced by absolute poverty, as the figures below indicate.

On the other hand, between 1995 and 1996, the dynamic was totally different: extreme poverty moved from 18.3% to 21.6% and relative poverty from 29.4% to 30.3%. Total poverty moved from 47.7% to 51.1%; this is to say, it experienced an increase of more than 3 percentage points. In the rural area, poverty is a problem with greater dimensions, given that it is estimated that for 1996 it reached 64% of all homes.

The above suggests that economic growth does not necessarily translate into a reduction of poverty. Nor does it unequivocally translate into greater employment; effectively, during several years of this decade, the rate of unemployment has not increased, but has, rather, diminished. For example, between 1996 and 1997, economic growth did not impede the fact that unemployment passed from 9.7% to 10%. Which, at the same time, suggests that poverty has neither a relationship to growth nor to income.

A review of real salaries and real income for the decade of the 1990's shows that these have deteriorated in the course of the decade, although more profoundly after 1995, a year marking the stagnation of increases in minimum salaries, not reconsidered again until 1998. Paradoxically, in spite of the fact that the acquisitive power of the population declined, poverty diminished until 1995, suggesting a contrary relationship between the former and the latter.

This kind of economic growth, because it is concentrated in service activities, represents a limited capacity to generate productive employment and to improve the levels of income for the majority of the population. This is more evident in the case of the agricultural and livestock sector, in which volumes of production have been reduced, affecting the rural population. According to the UNDP, the permanence of rural poverty outlined above is owing to the fact that "the rural poor have not benefited from the global dynamism of the economy owing to the fact that the majority work in the agricultural and livestock sector. This sector has demonstrated a dynamism demonstrably lower than the rest of the economy".

The behavior of poverty in recent years has not maintained a relationship with the behavior of the economy, especially for the year 1996, when, in spite of economic growth, poverty increased. Neither does an examination of real income and salaries allow for greater explanatory possibilities, because, although they have been reduced, official data indicate that poverty--far from increasing--has also been reduced.

The incongruities in evidence between the diverse variables examined show that in the calculus of poverty exist elements distinct from the income and the cost of the basic food basket, to which proper attention is not being paid. In any case, the high level of poverty and its persistence justify the design and implementation of an anti-poverty strategy which does not begin with the premise that major growth can be translated automatically into great social wellbeing and less poverty.

Source: United Nations Program for Development (PNUD). Printed in: El Diario de HOY, Thursday, April 9, 1998.

During the month of November, 1997, the University Institute on Public Opinion of the UCA conducted a poll on public opinion to learn the opinion held by Salvadoran citizens on the educational and health systems of El Salvador. The inquiry, held on the basis of a national sample of 1,202 adults in rural and urban areas of the fourteen departments of the republic, allowing for an error in the sample of approximately 4%, revealed that Salvadoran citizens have a more positive vision of the educational system of the country than they do of the health system. In this document some of the more important results concerning the educational system are presented.

The poll opened with a general evaluation of the Ministry of Education (MINED). Of those polled, 73.8% consulted held the opinion that the work of MINED has been good or very good during the past year; 7.4% held the opinion that its work has been only "regular" and 12.4% evaluated the work of MINED in a negative manner.

Consulted on the quality of education offered at present in the country, 65.4% of the citizens said that it is good or very good; almost a fourth of those polled (24.4%) consider that it is bad or very bad and only 7.5 % evaluated its work as "regular". Likewise, those interviewed held the opinion that the interest of the government has demonstrated its interest in resolving educational problems. More than half--57.8%--held that the Calderón Sol administration is somewhat or very interested in the difficulties in the area of education and a little more than a third--35.6%--indicated that the government's interest in education is little or none.

According to 26.6% of the citizens, the principal problem confronting education at present is its high cost--13.5% mentioning the lack of training for teachers, a similar percentage indicating the failure of the schools and 11.8% said that there existed a great lack of discipline among students who attend school. Other problems mentioned were: lack of educational resources, inadequate programs, lack of civic and moral education and time wasted. Along this same line of thinking, the data revealed, moreover, that the concern about the high cost of education is greater among the lowest socio-economic strata. In this sense, the population was asked to indicate what it is that MINED should do in order to improve the educational system. Among the most frequent responses are: increase the number and better the quality of teachers (32.7%), open more schools (30%) and change teaching methods (10.6%), among other measures.

Consulted about the category which was most expensive in the area of family education, four of every ten Salvadorans indicated that it was the monthly payments for school tuition and two of every ten said that the most expensive category was school supplies and one of every ten declared that the most expensive category was food. Others declared that the most costly were the uniforms, transportation and other aspects.

In an effort to measure the perception of citizens concerning the different kinds of educational centers, those polled were asked to compare public with private education. For 43.6%, private education appears to be of the best quality, while 27.8% prefer educational centers of a public character and almost one fifth of those consulted could find no difference between the two.

Another point on the list of questions in the poll held by IUDOP was an evaluation of what ought to be emphasized most in the teachings and curricula. Some 36.4% of those interviewed held the opinion that it ought to prepare people for life; 16.7% considered that it ought to teach them to think; 12.6% said that it ought to prepare students to go to the university and 9.4% believe that more emphasis should be placed on resolving problems and a similar percentage thought it necessary to form the personality of the students.

In this effort to explore citizens' opinions of the diverse activities carried out by MINED, special attention was given to some aspects of the educational reform being led by the ministry. In the first place, the poll revealed that a little more than half of all Salvadorans (55.6%), have some knowledge of the educational reform in progress in the country. In second place, three fourths of those polled who had knowledge of the reform were of the opinion that this was a good or very good thing for improving education in our country and 19.8% consider that the reform is of little or no use. Moreover, practically in the same proportions, the persons consulted thought that with an educational reform more people would have access to education (75.7%) and 17.6% held the opposite opinion. In general, the citizens' perceptions of the educational reform--at least of those who have some knowledge of it--are positive enough.

The survey took the opportunity to evaluate some of the private initiatives laid out by the educational reform. The EDUCO Program or the PAES, for example. Concerning the EDUCO Program, the results of the poll showed that a good percentage of the population (7l.6%) do know or have heard of the program and 28.4% indicated that they had no knowledge of it. Asked about the way the program functioned, 77.1%, or 8 of every 10 persons polled, said they knew of the work of EDUCO and considered that it functioned well or very well, 9.2% indicated that they thought its functioning "regular" and only 3.4% said they considered its functioning to be bad or very bad and 10.3% did not wish to express an opinion about how the project was going. On the other hand, the poll was carried out a few days after the Learning Test for High School Graduates (PAES) was held and they were asked about this. The results revealed that more than half of those interviewed (55.9%) were somewhat or very much in agreement with the application of the PAES, while only 11.9% said they were somewhat or very much in disagreement with the testing instrument and 23.1% preferred not to give an opinion because they did not have enough information about the test.

An interesting fact came to light in this UCA poll concerning the vision of what is most influential in the formation of values for young people. According to the poll, more than half of the citizens (51.8%) considered that the family is what determines young peoples' values; almost one fourth (23.9%) believe that communications media play a decisive role in this; 18.7% indicate that school is the principal factor responsible for the formation of values and 1.5% think that all of the above play the same role and 4.1% did not express an opinion.

In synthesis, the poll demonstrated that Salvadoran citizens have a significantly positive opinion of the educational system, of MINED and of MINED's policies and practice. Although on some topics dealt with in the poll, the concern of those consulted came to the fore in concerns over educational costs, the need to improve the quality of educators and the infrastructure of education, in general terms Salvadorans are very positive about education in their country.

Sunday, April 12, marked the end of Holy Week, a time of reflection on the passion, death and resurrection of Our Lord Jesus Christ. But it seems to be the case that in Central American countries--and, above all in El Salvador--this period of time for meditation and good intentions has changed into a time for tears and the pain of many families is remembered in the loss of their loved ones under different circumstances. According to data presented by the National Committee for Emergencies (COEN), in our country--during the vacation period--some 300 persons were killed and another 1500 wounded. Seventy-five of those who died, died as a result of aggressions provoked by fire arms and other weapons. Some 53 persons lost their lives in traffic accidents.

The Director of COEN very correctly declared, on Sunday afternoon, April 12, that the figures were alarming and that they reflect the fact that this year, the situation of violence and death--far from getting any better--continued to worsen, indicating that the number of deaths for this year was 74 more than for last year. This data is even more scandalous if we take into account that 566 of those who died in Central American during Holy Week, more than half of those died in our country and so our country is marked as the most violent on the continent.

This same Director of COEN stated, as well, that the majority of deaths took place in the Department of San Salvador: a total of 125 translates into almost 23% of all persons who died in the region. In order to console ourselves and attempt to lessen our worries, he added that, in spite of all, he was pleased that not a single death was reported in Cuscatlán during the week in question; nevertheless, in the early morning hours of Tuesday, April 14, five individuals killed a young man in an inter-departmental bus at Kilometer 25 on the Panamerican Highway, precisely in that department. And so it is, all in all, in El Salvador, the brutality of death does not make distinctions between vacations and the work week: it continues as always.

To aggravate the situation even more, in an article published recently in La Prensa Gráfica [taken from Newsweek magazine news services] El Salvador is declared to be the country where more murders are committed on a daily basis than in any other place in the world. One need only glance at the following figures: an average number of homicides in Latin America is 30 for every 100,000 inhabitants, which is six times higher than the world average, four times higher than in the United States and two times higher than in Africa and the Middle East. If it is true that in our country there are less than 6 million people and if we use the figures provided by the Attorney General's Office, which tell us that between 1995 and 1997 the annual average for murders was 7,211, we find that we have surpassed all limits past, present or future: more than 120 murders for each 100,00 inhabitants!

And this is not simply fortuitous. That these things happen mean that there must be explanations and responsibilities; of these, we can mention a few. The majority of these acts in our country--during or after Holy Week--have something to do with impunity, which not only prevails but has been strengthened with the amnesty decreed in March, 1993. It is also related to the lack of a serious and efficient state policy to confront the phenomenon of arms ownership which is growing in our society, as much in the retrieval of instruments of war which remained in the hands of ex-combatants of both sides as in the relative ease with which anyone can acquire and carry a revolver, pistol or rifle.

In the same way, many of these acts are a result of the absence of a true insertion into the productive life of the country and a harmonious social coexistence of many persons who, during the periods of political violence and warfare belonged to diverse structures, open or clandestine, which existed in order to carry out brutal actions of all kinds: armed government forces, security forces, paramilitary groups, death-squads and insurgent forces. Finally, it must also be pointed out that these acts happen in such enormous dimensions because people do not believe in the institutions charged with carrying out justice. It is for this reason, on many occasions, that they seek to resolve conflicts in other ways, among which physical aggression holds a privileged place.

As a result of this, as the Archbishop of San Salvador, Monsignor Fernando Saenz Lacalle, said on one occasion, our country suffers from a "culture of death", which is not the exclusive domain of vacation periods, but is with us every day. It is true that the index of murders goes up during vacation periods for many reasons, among which is outstanding the excessive use of alcohol and other intoxicants. But it is also an unquestionable truth that in our land, people do not enjoy the security necessary in order to live permanently without fear.

The victims of violence during the vacations called "Holy Week" are no more than isolated data in the general context of Salvadoran society. It is tragic and reprehensible that people cannot enjoy security during their vacations; but it is equally tragic and reprehensible that these people do not live in daily tranquillity in their workplaces and in places of recreation or when they present legitimate demands. Worse still is the fact that many of those who are responsible for safeguarding and guaranteeing this very security from their positions in state institutions do no work for these goals, but, on the contrary, use the power commended to them in order to cover up, tolerate or exercise violence against the people. How many more deaths do we have to suffer before El Salvador becomes a secure country where respect for human rights prevails?