On the first day of May this year, the Legislative Assembly elected in March of 1997 completed its first year of work. The previous legislature had been almost totally dominated by ARENA, which made it relatively easy for this party to impose its decisions on the plenary in which the voices of the opposition were heard almost not at all. Beginning in March, 1997 that situation changed drastically because, after the elections, there was an important recomposition of the legislative scenario as a result of the number of deputies elected for the FMLN (27) and for ARENA (28) and the new strength acquired by the PCN, which, with its 11 deputies, became a party with which the majority parties would have to negotiate if they wanted to move their initiatives forward. The affinities of the other parties became sufficiently clear: the PDC, with its 7 deputies, gained on ARENA, while the Democratic Convergence (with 2 deputies), MU (with one deputy), the PLD (with 2 deputies) and the PRSC (with 3 deputies) either inclined toward supporting the FMLN or got together a center block--without excluding the FMLN--to push their own initiatives.

From any perspective, the 1997 elections made various things clear: first, that ARENA had lost its hegemony in the Assembly; second, that the FMLN had become a political force of primary importance; third, that legislative decisions had to take the PCN into consideration; and, fourth, that the rules for achieving agreements in the Assembly required pacts and negotiations between the different political forces. After a year of this new configuration of the Legislative Assembly, how realistic were these evaluations?

ARENA, of course, saw the number of its deputies reduced and with that saw its possibilities for imposing decisions without resistance reduced. Nevertheless, the orientation of the Assembly during the period from May,1997 through May, 1998--with a strong bias toward the options of the right on questions of privatization and public security--nay say this loss of power by ARENA in significant measure. The ARENA deputies have juggled the influence that this party exercises over the PCN and the PDC, with great skill , and this has allowed them not only to advance their initiatives, but also to obstruct the FMLN's initiatives, many of which were aimed at correcting the pernicious social effects of ARENA proposals. That is to say that the FMLN legislators have invested a good amount of their time in trying to turn back--although most of the time, infructuous and tardy in their efforts--the decisions of the ARENA deputies had succeeded in imposing with the help of their allied parties. The logic of the "early risers" won out again and again as the FMLN was able to make its efforts felt.

So it appears that the strength won by the FMLN at the ballot boxes has not yielded the legislative influence optimists had expected and hoped for. FMLN initiatives in those areas most needful of attention--public health, environment, modernization and privatization, the agricultural crisis--have not occupied centerstage in the public debate. What has occupied centerstage, however, are their questioning of and opposition to measures moved by the ARENA legislators in almost every area of national life. The problem is that that opposition and questioning have taken place either when there is little that could be done to change the situation--as in the case of the AFPs--or when there was already a consensus on the direction taken by the country, for example, on the issue of the privatization of public services. In the most absurd cases, the FMLN stood off against ARENA without being sufficiently prepared, as in the attempt to impeach the President of the Central Reserve Bank (BCR), which brought neither success for the FMLN nor for the country.

As for the role of the PCN as a party which tipped the balance toward one or the other of the majority parties, the initial evaluation holds: the PCN has tipped the scales toward ARENA. This is only to be expected. The only error was to have thought it could have been otherwise; that is to say, that the PCN was not going to commit itself beforehand to throw its political weight with ARENA, and that, as a result, it could maintain its capacity to support key initiatives for the country that came from and were promoted by the FMLN. Only hopes based on unfounded optimism could have expected such a change in the PCN ranks which, for all the rest, have no basis in reality, given that party's political practice since the early 1980's.

To the eternal calling of the PCN to support ARENA interests was added the breakup of the center block, encouraged by the minority parties. Both dynamics placed serious limitations on serious and responsible parliamentary debate; the hope that pacts and accords formed in the Assembly could succeed was not supported in practice. Many of the bills approved--especially those of overriding importance for the country--were not debated; nor were they approved by consensual agreements among political factions; rather, they were approved because of previous agreements among ARENA and their political allies.

One year after the entry of the new legislature, an overview of the sum total of its practice cannot but be discouraging. Responsible debate was almost nonexistent; political influence-peddling has continued to be the coin of the realm for the imposition of decisions by ARENA. The FMLN has drown in the posture of an opposition almost always late and sterile. Putting a good face on this situation, the withholding of manifestations of political credibility by the Salvadoran people has its raison d'etre. It is, after all, difficult to believe in politicians who make decisions behind the backs of the majority of the population and their interests. It is difficult, as well, to believe in politicians who lack any clarity at all as to what the problems of the country are and the way to confront them.

The Legislative Assembly owes a debt to society. One can only hope that for the rest of their terms in office that they will pay this debt to the Salvadoran people. For all this, however, they must break with the inertia which has dominated their first year in office.

That the election has become politicized; that the PDC had negotiated beforehand with ARENA for the post of Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights (PDDH) in exchange for a favorable vote in the approval of the nation's General Budget; that there are private interests at work; that it is more convenient for the official party that there be no election.... These are some of the explanations that are being bandied about in reaction to the lack of movement on the election of a successor to Dr. Victoria Marina de Avilés, the previous Ombudsman. At this moment, when in the Legislative Assembly, all seems to indicate that the holding of an election for the new Ombudsman will be delayed indefinitely, it would behoove us to explore other possible hypotheses. There is one, in fact, which seems not to have occurred to anyone, and it is this: simply that none of the legislative factions has taken the problem of the election seriously enough; which is as much as to say that none of the parties takes the PDDH very seriously.

It may be true that between ARENA and the PDC there exists a previous agreement that would oblige ARENA to guarantee the post of Ombudsman of the PDDC to the PDC. A year's legislative work has demonstrated that past ills and evils continue to be practiced in the plenary and that this is, in good measure, owing to the phenomenon of the imposition of the interests of those who have traditionally wielded political power in El Salvador. Given this, no one should be surprised if ARENA has cornered the post of Ombudsman with an eye to obtaining support for an initiative convenient for itself as a party. This explanation could be considered valid if one takes note of the high level of interest evidenced by the Christian Democrats in capturing the leadership of the PDDH and that this interest is openly supported by the governing party. But, what, one might ask, is the reason for this interest in the post of Ombudsman? The response to this question will remain shrouded in mystery, probably because it has served to minimize the importance of the rumor of an arrangement of some kind between ARENA and the Christian Democrats.

At any rate, to declare that ARENA has little or no interest in the PDDH does not seem too out of place. It is not difficult to imagine that the concern for the relevance of an office of this nature is completely foreign to the official party, for whom, on the contrary, it is more convenient that the post lose its precedence and active protagonism. It is definitely not ARENA from whom one would expect the exercise of pressure to push forward a moderately satisfactory election. On a final point, the practice and achievements of the ex-Ombudsman, Dr. Victoria Marina de Avilés, constituted more of an irritant for the ARENA government than a banner to wave when ARENA boasted of the achievements of its administration, especially in the area of public security.

It is not, then, from ARENA nor from any other right or center party that one might expect the solution to the current problem of the PDDH to emerge. What is clear is that the responsibility for resolving the problem falls to the political institutions of the left. And it is not that vigilance for compliance with the protection of human rights is not one of the roles that the state should undertake. Of course, the respect, protection and defense of the rights of the citizenry are the responsibility of the state. Ideally, the PDDH should be the most important office whose function has to do with human rights and the various governmental bodies ought to facilitate its work. So much so that President Armando Calderón Sol has committed himself to guarantee compliance on human rights issues. The Peace Accords, the signing of the various international treaties and a good portion of the presidential discourses demonstrate that the last two Salvadoran presidents have committed themselves--at least in theory--to a firm defense of human rights.

That commitment has been more honored in theory than in practice because specific practice has demonstrated that the government party is not only not disposed to defend the rights of the citizenry to the last consequences, but that, on various occasions it has even offered an extreme defense of projects which weaken those very rights. Examples of this are the government's reaction to the labor problems in the runaway shops (maquilas), the Emergency Law against delinquency and the way in which the medical workers' union demands are being handled.

But the opposition parties are also part of the state and it has been seen that, in certain concatenations of events, their participation could become a determinant factor. Why, then, can it be said that, at this point in time, it falls to the left to provide a way out of the impasse on the question of the election of the Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights? Very simply stated, the PDDH was created in response to demands raised by the left during the negotiations which ended the war. It is with great difficulty that the office of the Ombudsman could be called into existence today by one of the traditional political powers. The defense of human rights is an attribute of the state; that is, of the state in its totality and not only one of its parts. But much is still lacking before all who make up the state might take up the responsibility to guarantee compliance. The commitment to fundamental rights of the population falls to those who have shown greater evidence of being interested in making them prevail. The achievement of the creation of the PDDH imposes upon the left--the democratic left of today--the moral and political obligation of procuring, at least, its functioning.

The fact that today it seems of little importance to the FMLN and the CD if the person in charge of leading the PDDH is elected or not, is totally incongruent with the supposed interest in making human rights prevail that the left demonstrated in proposing the creation of that institution as one of the conditions for the signing of the peace accords. Can we imagine that the Salvadoran left's initial interest in fundamental rights of the citizenry was not genuine? Or is it the case that democratic life has caused a maladjustment in the hierarchy of its causes? All seems to indicate the principal opposition party is more concerned to elect a more or less convincing presidential party candidate, in justifying its rejection of a policy of deepening the external debt or in guaranteeing its diplomatic relationships than in breaking the deadlock surrounding the election of the Ombudsman.

So it is, then, that the current absence of an Ombudsman of the PDDH could have been vulnerable to manipulations of another kind, for a multiplicity of possible interpretations, but which respond, in the last analysis, to a lack of interest by the politicians. One must be realistic: none of the parties--for as much as it corresponds to them and for all that should be able to expect from them--is disposed to struggle for the strengthening of the office of the Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights. Now it could be argued that the non-election of the Ombudsman, or, even more, that the lack of interest on the part of the different political factions in the matter, responds to the lacunae which the previous PDDH administration left.

It is true that the ex-Ombudsman, Dr. Victoria Marina de Avilés, became deeply involved, many times, in specific cases which contributed little toward a general understanding of the value of human rights; that she succeeded in gaining very little in her frequent disputes with Security Minister Hugo Barrera, and that she did not put much effort in to the area of education in human rights. These factors, nevertheless, do not negate the efforts and advances which she succeeded in accomplishing during her term of office, nor can they be used as a pretext for diminishing the importance of the work of the PDDH. The lack of real willingness on the part of politicians to provide a solution to the situation of the PDDH is the only reason which has been in evidence in the more than two months during which the current debate has been waged. Two months have passed, during which we have been obliged to watch lists of names being paraded by, of being obliged listen to rumors, and obliged, as well, to assume that the defense of human rights in El Salvador is destined to remain for an indefinite period of time in the hands of non-governmental organizations.

Historically speaking, one can affirm that the production of basic grains has been one of the least favored by the diverse development policies implemented in the country. During the colonial period, the production of foodstuffs was one of the most important agricultural and livestock related activities in which the rural population was engaged, and which was not abandoned with the introduction of the big haciendas nor with the introduction of export products (cash crops). At the present time, close to 75% of all agricultural producers are engaged in the cultivation of basic grains. They dedicate approximately 60% of their efforts to the production of foodstuffs for their own consumption, develop their production on lots of less than 5 hectares in size and do not have access to technology for carrying out these activities. A factor which tends to aggravate the situation of the basic grain producers is that in the last two decades they have had to suffer an important reduction in the real prices of their products, contrary to what occurred with the prices of all other economic sectors.

The situation of the basic grain subsector has become critical during the last 20 years because it has confronted not only limits imposed by economic policies, but also limits imposed by increased deterioration of the environment and natural resources, especially the soil. Droughts are an expression of these limits and droughts translate into important reductions in agricultural and livestock production, especially in the basic grains subsector. For the year 1997 alone, losses of approximately 25% of the total harvest of basic grains were reported. Faced with this, one of the most characteristic reactions by the government has been to resort to the importation of grains, by which measure it aimed to fulfill the internal demand and to keep prices of these grains down.

It is worth pointing out that the aforesaid does not imply that there have not been other agricultural and livestock subsectors affected by the drought, given that coffee production as well as sugar cane production experienced up to 20% reductions in their total production. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the very sensitive effects which have befallen the basic grains subsector because in this sector is concentrated the great majority of farmers with the lowest levels of income, in part owing, in part, to the practice of supplying the internal market with exports.

In this context, it was recently learned that the country will be obliged to import basic grains in great quantities--valued up to 520 million colones. Although this is apparently a justifiable measure in the face of the imminent scarcity of these grains, the effects are, in reality, very much open to discussion and generate, as well, reasonable doubts as to the advisability of the measure and about the need to implement policies of encouraging basic grain production as a measure for reducing rural poverty. Below, we will evaluate, briefly, the effects of grain importation on the balance of trade and on national production, as well as the evolution of real prices for corn and beans. This evaluation aims to demonstrate that, in practice, economic policy still has a debt pending in the promotion of alimentary security and the reduction of rural poverty.

With respect to the effects of grain importation on domestic basic grain production over and above the balance of trade, it is interesting to examine the behavior of grain imports during the last three decades, paying special attention to the years immediately following those in which a severe drought was reported, such as in 1972, 1982 and, more recently, 1994. The first facts to be examined are for 1973 when grain imports came to represent more than 52% of the total deficit in the balance of trade, after which, in 1972, the same percentage would be 0.07%. For subsequent years, the percentage fell to single-digit figures until 1983 when grain imports came to represent 11.55% of total debits in the balance of trade.

During subsequent years, the participation of grain imports in the trade deficit diminished appreciably, coming to be located at levels of between 0.8% and 2%. This does not imply, however, that grain imports have diminished during the last 15 years. On the contrary, the value of these imports has increased dramatically during recent years, coming to represent 12 times

its original value for the years between 1973 and 1995, for example. The fall in percentages of grain imports is owing to the fact that the deficit in the balance of trade has broadened enormously during the period mentioned, reaching 385 times the original figure.

On the question of grain production, grain imports have come to represent a significant percentage, in the following way: in 1973 they represented 20% of local production and 15% by 1983. There are no figures for the production value of corn in 1995, but in relation to total production of basic grains, imports represented 8.4%.

For 1997 it is expected that total combined imports of corn, rice and beans will reach 518.7 million colones, which represents 4% of the expected deficit in the balance of trade and close to 16% of the total production value of basic grains for 1996.

Considering the data presented above, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the importation of basic grains--especially corn--plays a role in the determination of the deficit in the balance of trade, but, above all in the supplying of foodstuffs for the population. Imports, because they fulfill the deficit offering, are not limited to their incidence in the balance of trade; rather they exercise strong influences over the prices of basic grains and, consequently, over the income of producers.

Basic grain imports have actively contributed to reducing the increase in their prices, even though these are less than the increase in prices of products for other economic sectors, which have caused a severe reduction of real prices of corn and beans during the last two decades. So it is that the prices of these two products fell from a level of 100 in 1978 to an inferior level of 25 in 1996; that is to say, they were reduced by approximately 75%.

As a result of the situation described above, producers have had to confront permanent income reductions, and it is therefore not unusual that rural poverty has maintained levels close to 65% throughout the decade of the 1990's, while in the urban setting, this was reduced from 54% to 43% between the years 1991 and 1996.

Evidently economic and social policies have not succeeded in reaching the rural sectors and this explains why the great majority must resign themselves to the reproduction of the labor force in conditions of poverty. And so, at least in what concerns import policies of basic grains, it can be said that these policies have become an element working against the income and well-being of the producers and of the rural population in general. At the same time, this policy gives way to the resurgence of a reduced group of importers and intermediaries which speculate on basic grain prices, accruing enormous benefits to themselves in this way.

Basic grains import policies oppose the objectives of price stability and supplying the needs of the urban sectors to the reduction of rural sector poverty. Given this, basic grains sector policies must be reviewed and modified in order to conciliate consumer interest with producer interests. This presupposes the design and implementation of a strategy to encourage self-sustaining basic grain production in special programs providing--among other things--agricultural credits and technical assistance for small producers.

Dr. Hector Silva concludes his considerations on the first year of his municipal government in an interesting way by saying: "If what we have succeeded in doing up to this moment were all that we would be able to succeed in doing, it would be worth while having been mayor". Evidently, given these words, the questions to be answered are: In Dr. Silva's judgement, what is so important that his administration has achieved? And another question: these achievements, if they be such, on the basis of whose expectations are they valid not only up to the present moment, but also for the future?

What characterized the new municipal team from the moment of its arrival in the San Salvador Mayor's Office were the great number of expectations and suspicions aroused among sectors close to the right-wing as well as from left sectors, given that Dr. Silva exhibits the great administrative-political experience of the Salvadoran left. Following on three uninterrupted terms of office by ARENA party mayors, the arrival of Dr. Silva promised a radical break in the administrative style for the biggest mayor's office in the country. For the population which would potentially receive the benefits of his service, this only meant one thing: their needs and concerns would not only be satisfied, but would become the guiding lights of the new administration,--at least so it was announced in the electoral promises offered. In other words, the party-directed way of doing things in the San Salvador mayor's office (with its most evident expressions in pork-barrel politics, influence-peddling and the propagandistic use of projects carried out) would come to an end, it was promised, with the inauguration of Dr. Silva as mayor.

Nevertheless, the greatest among the obstacles which the new administration confronted was precisely the political coloring with which his actions were inevitably read, whether they led to successes or failures. For as much as his team was made up of professionals not affiliated with any political party or that his projects would provide a good for the citizens as their primary objective, right-wing sectors--political or economically speaking--would predictably do all in their power to diminish the electoral merits of the new administration. In this logic, if, for example, the San Salvador mayor's office was able satisfactorily to complete the installation of a waste processing plant, the interpretation imposed was that it was not a good thing achieved for the citizenry, but rather a political good: the left presented itself to the electorate as capable and diligent in the administrative posts they held.

On another issue, outside the purely political context and outside the confusion which is inevitable and natural to it, another of the difficulties confronted was that related to available economic resources for completing projects and for moving the administration forward. As is well known to all (see Proceso 758 and 760), the previous mayor's team led by ARENA's Mario Valiente left a disquieting legacy to the Silva Administration: severe administrative disorder and, even more serious still, financial bankruptcy. Because of these factors, it was reasonable to expect that a good part of the Silva team's first efforts would be focussed on alleviating this situation.

From this context, the possible successes would not be, of course, political gains (great popularity and acceptance), but rather those specifically for the benefit of the citizens-- although, in this, it is necessary to recognize certain shades and nuances. On the one hand, given the state of affairs external to the mayor's office, as successes for the mayor's office one could point out physically visible works projects (in which could possibly be include the ornamentation of public places or the introduction of street-lighting), as well as those which are not so material, among which are consciousness-raising campaigns, or citizen education, for example. On the other hand, the level of internal functioning, another success for the mayor's office, would also be the perfecting of the administrative and financial structures necessary for offering better service to the citizens.

This being the case, what, of all that was done by Mayor Hector Silva's team, can be classified as a transcendental success? Although Dr. Silva himself includes as a success of his administration the approval of 6% of the budget for the mayors' offices nationally and the setting in motion of the waste processing project, these must be eliminated as not being exclusively attributable to activity by the San Salvador Mayor's Office. Measures such as establishing the technical-administrative regulations of the relations between the boss and the worker or implementing a catalogue-description of job categories, a salary scale and an effective process for hiring and naming personnel, will probably not make the population remember Dr. Silva with appreciation but, in the measure that these steps set the bases for establishing the future efficient mayor's office functioning, they comprise a great success for the team led by Dr. Silva. So now, is this success sufficient to give him an okay for his year's work and for those years yet to come?

From the sectors of the population affected by what the Silva Administration does from now on, the answer is no. As positive as it may be having put the house in order, Dr. Silva cannot excuse himself with this for not completing, in the future, some of the projects he promised to carry out. This would imply accentuating the administrative character of his administration out of proportion with the social projection which should accompany it. Moreover, with the affirmative with which he concludes the sum-up and evaluation of his first year in office, Dr. Silva seems to want to respond to his detractors--to those sectors which opposed or obstructed his administration and tried to show it up as incompetent to carry out real and palpable works-projects.

Here there comes into play an element which must surely be taken into consideration: the role of society or of some of its sectors in the results obtained by the San Salvador Mayor's Office. As has been evident to everyone, much effort has been uselessly spent and many proposals have been abandoned without serious feasibility studies as possible goods in the context of the all out war which was waged against the Mayor's Office. One by one, the large-scale projects coming from the Silva Administration have been vetoed by groups close to ARENA.

Certainly, after the passing of the year since the Silva Administration began to function, it is necessary to sum-up the balance sheet of his administration. But it is not possible to do so without evaluating the citizenry's behavior in relationship to an administration which aimed to be--and in good measure succeeded in being--different. Attitudes such as openness, dialogue and consultation with the citizens are keys to actualizing the potential most appropriate to a mayor's office: that of bringing governmental administration closer to local neighborhoods; to comply with the specific needs of the community. Likewise, however, nothing can be gained if the population does not share these same characteristics: if the citizens do not know how to, or are not interested in, taking advantage of the opening offered by the mayor's office; if the members of a community do not participate in viable and worthwhile proposals to deal with their own problems; if they are political criteria which end up orienting the opposition or support for the proposals coming forth from the mayors' offices' administrations.

The left, at least in the dimension which deals with municipal administrations, ought to avoid taking the easy way out by making of the ill disposition of the population and the other political parties the excuse for its poor performance in office to date. Nevertheless, if at least one of the mayor's offices the left holds has succeeded in making itself administratively and economically more cohesive in order to provide better service to its municipality, if it can be proved that at least one of these has an open attitude necessary to comply with its functioning, and, in spite of that, has not implemented works and projects vital to municipal development, then, more than questioning ourselves about why the mayor's office failed, we must, in all justice, ask ourselves how we, as citizens committed to the social reality closest to us, have failed.