The leadership of the nation's public security ministry is experiencing some difficulty in understanding the phenomenon of delinquency which, in turn, is a product of the culture of violence in which delinquency as a phenomenon occurs. Even more, he confuses delinquency with violence, or, if you like, does not know how to distinguish between them in a responsible way. Although he does not yet know how to diminish the incidence of violence and, in particular, delinquency affecting the population, he seems to have found in the new penal codes a scapegoat for disguising this failure. The public security ministry appears rightly to be very concerned by the elevated level of delinquency from which the country is suffering and is also concerned by the limited impact of their own efforts to deal with it. But instead of applying themselves rigorously to the combating the violence--and delinquency in particular--public security authorities are demanding the reform of the recently promulgated penal codes.

Everything seems to indicate that confusion exists at the highest levels of public security as an institution as it attempts to determine the difference between the attributes for its own functioning and those proper to the judicial system. It is as if the public security ministry is once again attempting to hold the judicial system responsible for the high incidence of crime. Public security authorities earlier struck out--not without reason--against venal judges; but now, they are striking at the penal codes. In the opinion of the security authorities, the codes encourage crime by favoring the delinquent. But the Minister of Security confuses the police function, which is oriented toward preventing and prosecuting crime and criminals, with the function of the penal codes, which consists in bringing to trial and sanctioning those who are found guilty. For the codes to be effective in bringing to trial and sanctioning someone, it is necessary for the police, first of all, to investigate the crime, identify and capture the criminals and present evidence which would establish guilt or innocence. It is not a question, then, of arresting just any suspect, jailing the person and condemning him or her without substantial proof and without due process of law.

Another of the Security Minister's concerns is that the population has not yet experienced the impact of the new penal codes, adding that the arrest of delinquents should have diminished considerably once the codes had entered into effect. The public official with primary responsibility for the security of citizens ought to take more care in choosing the expressions he uses when addressing himself to such delicate topics. It is practically impossible to feel the impact of the codes when these have only just entered into effect a few weeks ago and are still not fully operative. In any case, the same complaint could be lodged against his ministry which, in almost five years, still has not been able to control and contain delinquency. On the other hand, it is difficult to accept the allegation that the presumed diminution in the number of arrests is owing to dispositions promulgated in the codes. The fact that the Minister does not support his assertion with statistics notwithstanding, the Attorney General of the Republic has already clarified that the codes do not impede police work. Again, the responsibility for arrest of delinquents falls to the police under his command and is not the province of the penal codes.

One perceives in these complaints a certain longing for the erstwhile security forces whose practice it was to throw anyone in jail without a second thought. It would seem that the National Civilian Police would like to decide for itself and by itself who should go to jail and who should remain at liberty. Additionally, the major social communications media contribute towards the spreading of these authoritarian and verticalist ideas by not providing an objective balance for the opinions expressed by the directors of public security. On the contrary, they reinforce them by assigning responsibility for new crimes to the penal codes--without highlighting their advantages as well--as they emphasize the difficulties experienced as the penal reform enters into effect--which, by the bye, are to be expected in the implementation of any new system with limited resources.

Some of the Civilian National Police's recent behavior seems to confirm this longing for the past as eleven policemen--some among them holding the rank of commanding officer--face charges of fraud, precisely for the exercise of their power in an arbitrary and illegal manner. In one of these cases, several persons were accused of the murder of a radio announcer on the basis of evidence fabricated by the very police who were investigating the crime. Even when the suspects were directly implicated in the act, not one of them can be arrested or accused on the basis of false evidence.

Police investigation consists precisely in uncovering evidence which would permit the accused to be tried and sentenced for crimes for which they are found to be responsible. To the public security authorities, nevertheless, these fundamental dispositions of the penal law appear to be subtleties which only favor the criminals. These abuses should be avoided at all costs in police and security work. If the police accused were found to be guilty of fraud, it is irrelevant to ask why they did it, whom they wished to protect, or what they wanted to cover up. If they are innocent, then, who gave the orders to present false evidence and accusations?

President Calderón Sol, upon hearing the complaints of the Minister of Security, reacted rapidly, without giving himself time to consult, ponder and discuss the matters--as prudence would have counseled, and as he himself assures us is his practice--and ordered a review of the penal codes which had entered into effect only a few weeks before, in a practice that has come to be defect of Salvadoran legislation; that is to say, in effect, that laws recently approved and sanctioned by the President of the Republic are subject to new revisions, as if they had not had time to review them before or as if the legislators did not know what they were approving. Inevitably such a procedure generates juridical insecurity.

Doubtless there are some dispositions of the penal codes which ought to be revised, but the problem of violence is much more complex. It is understandable that the public security authorities are overwhelmed, but they should examine and analyze the phenomenon with greater care. Violence does not proliferate because of the entering into effect of codes of law; it is proliferated by the concatenation of many much more complex factors. Over and above the lack of police capacity to prevent, investigate and prosecute crime and corruption, and, over and above the incompetence of the judicial system, it is necessary to consider such factors as the free access to firearms, permissive attitudes of the society, drugs and alcohol, mental imbalance and poverty.

Last Friday, May 8, the National Council of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) met to declare that it would now receive proposals for possible presidential formulas for the 1999 elections. With this event, the highest authority of the principal left party finally and officially initiated its participation in the pre-electoral process. As is well known, the 1999 elections, more than being an example of party pluralism, will be the arena where country's two great political adversaries will engage in the contest to win the Presidency of the Republic. For the first time in the short history of its democratic life, the FMLN exhibits serious possibilities for supplanting the ARENA party--possibilities which, for all the rest, are sufficiently distant from the merits which the FMLN could attribute to itself as a result of its practice during this last and significant year of legislative and municipal administration. Nevertheless, the idea that the largest left political institution could come to exercise executive power causes some uneasiness and expectancy.

One ought not be surprised that the ARENA Party is beginning to prepare itself early on for the upcoming elections with the greatest possible vigor. What does seem surprising is that, while the official party set out to prepare itself for what would be a third consecutive term in office with noticeable haste and decisiveness, the FMLN appears to be dilatory in choosing its candidates. True it is that the decision about who will be the next possible president of the country should not be taken lightly, but it is also the case that the magnitude of the launching of Mr. Francisco Flores as ARENA's candidate closed off the possibility for any attempt by the FMLN to present a candidate substantially different from the one proposed by the governing party. The success of Mr. Flores' candidacy ought to have provided enough impetus for the FMLN to speed up the consolidation of what will be the fundamental factor in its electoral campaign: its presidential formula.

Mr. Mario Acosta Oertel, Minister of the Interior, is not far wrong when, in referring to the superiority of his party over the FMLN in the pre-electoral process, he affirms that "if we were in a thousand metres race, we already have an advantage of three hundred metres". The point is that the "advantage" of ARENA over the FMLN is not only based in the fact that the governing party defined who its presidential candidate would be seven weeks ago; it also has, more importantly, to do with the way in which that party has been able to sell the qualities of its candidate to public opinion. There is no doubt that "Paco" Flores has caused the FMLN some concern. The principal opposition party's tardy choice of a presidential formula is owing to nothing other than the lack of appropriate persons among the ranks of the FMLN for the candidacy-- persons with the necessary attributes for presenting themselves as powerful and attractive alternatives who could counterbalance the overwhelming reception of "Paquito".

The argument with which the FMLN has attempted to explain its not having chosen a candidate is difficult to believe: it is that its priority is the drawing up of a "Program of Government" on the basis of which it could decide who the person most capable of carrying it out would be. Should this be the truth, one must ask, "Where is that 'program'?" Why has it not been presented to public opinion? The problem is that there seems only to exist a "working draft for the internal use of the FMLN and USC parties", which is still sufficiently inconclusive and disappointing at the present time. One could expect, then, that by July 26, the day which the FMLN has stipulated for the presention of an official candidate, that left party would have satisfactorily concluded the preparation of its governmental platform and would indeed have taken it into consideration in the process of choosing a presidential formula.

Of course, one would have to evaluate, at the appropriate time, the final results of that platform. But beyond the discussion of the quality and importance of the FMLN's "Program of Government", what is certain is that that party has already begun to give shape to its concern for the choosing of a candidate. It is evident that a governmental platform is not a tried and true source for attracting votes. As well formulated as it might be, it is not, in and of itself, going to attract the electorate. The proposals for government ought to be accompanied by a face inspiring trust and confidence which would show signs of willingness and interest towards making the proposals viable. Of course, among the electoral preferences, other kinds of factors intervene, such as the tradition of the political institution, the attrition of the governing party or the level of the electorate's criticism, for example. But in general terms, and, taking into account the emphasis on the presidential office which characterizes Salvadoran politics, one could say that, when it is a question of electing a president, the figure of the candidate hangs more in the balance than the strength of his discourse.

It would be difficult to imagine that the FMLN is unaware of this reality, and, indeed, it is from this premise that its interest in initiating the process of electing the presidential formula arises. Some days ago, various names began to contend as possible considerations for the FMLN formula for the presidency. To the list headed up by the ex-Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights, Dr. Victoria Marina de Avilés, has been added the name of the Secretary General of the Social Christian Union (USC), Mr. Abraham Rodriguez; the renowned economist, Mr. Salvador Arias; the General Coordinator of the FMLN, Mr. Facundo Guardado; the current mayor of San Salvador, Dr. Hector Silva; and the Rector of the Technological University, Mr. Mauricio Loucel.

ARENA has criticized its principal political adversary a great deal for having to look for personalities outside its own party in order to compete in next March's presidential elections. But there is really no reason for this to be cause for alarm. There is, doubtless, no lack among FMLN ranks, of those who would aspire to replace Mr. Calderón Sol. On the other hand, Dr. Hector Silva's success in the recent municipal elections demonstrates that it is easier for personalities removed from party dynamics to attract the sympathy of the electorate. It would be difficult for anyone discontent with the official party and disposed to throw his or her lot with the left to decide for the FMLN were it to present candidates such as Mr. Shafik Handal or Mr. Salvador Sanchez Cerén, for example--assuming that their participation in the presidential elections were not vetoed beforehand.

One must accept, then, that the FMLN does not have personalities "apt for being presented as presidential candidates", but it must also be recognized that the seeking of personalities outside its ranks could become its winning card in 1999. The only FMLN militant with any possibility of achieving the candidacy is, as we see it, Mr. Facundo Guardado. But it must be added that he is not the best option. Much would have placed Mr. Guardado in the progressive forefront of his party, but this does not cleanse his name of the stigma of the war.

Serious doubts arise, as well, concerning Dr. Victoria Marina de Avilés with regard to the possibilities for her becoming an attractive alternative. It is true that she enjoys the sympathy of specific sectors--especially the feminist organizations--and the idea of a woman in the presidential formula could be attractive for some. But her name does not have sufficient weight, and from her good performance in the discharge of her office in the PDDH it cannot be concluded that she would discharge as well the office of president.

The USC, in its capacity as political ally of the FMLN in the future electoral race, has proposed its Secretary General, Mr. Abraham Rodriguez as a candidate, considering him to be the ideal person to occupy the office. Nevertheless, it must be recalled that this social christian has made two frustrated attempts to win the presidency; additionally, the polarization of the electorate is a given fact, as are the well-known preferences of the majority which do not lean precisely towards parties of the center--all of this taken together would make him a candidate with very few possibilities for winning against Mr. Francisco Flores.

Finally, there are three remaining names on the list of FMLN pre-candidates: Dr. Hector Silva, Mr. Mauricio Loucel and Mr. Salvador Arias. Of the first it must be said that the launching of his candidacy would be very questionable after the many negative responses he has made publically to the question of his interest in occupying the presidency. Probably pressured by those in the FMLN who support him, Dr. Silva is perhaps now considering the possibility of accepting the candidacy. Certainly, the current mayor of San Salvador is a good option to dispute the Presidency. It is clear that his municipal administration has not yet presented palpable results, and this could be held against him; but that he has charisma and inspires confidence was demonstrated in the March, 1997 elections.

Mr. Mauricio Loucel is a little known personality. His candidacy would represent the professional sector which sympathizes with the FMLN and the fact that he belongs to the academic world puts him on a par with the ambience which seems to be imposing itself on this electoral race. If Dr. Hector Silva decides to finish his municipal term, it could be Mr. Loucel who could become an attractive candidate in a formula with Mr. Salvador Arias. Mr. Arias is supported by the Democratic Farmworker Alliance (ADC) and enjoys a great deal of prestige in the professional world. He is an intellectual and a graduate of the Sorbonne University in Paris. He seems to be the ideal person to counterbalance the apogee of the candidacy of the lucid "Paquito" Flores. He is, moreover, an expert in agrarian matters; he was one of those who supported and worked for the Agrarian Reform; and he has not participated actively in the organic structures of any party.

In conclusion, it can be said that if it is true that the late choice of a presidential candidate and the inconclusive "Program of Government" could be considered as short-sighted strategies of the FMLN, the intelligent and realistic choice of a good formula and the finishing of a well thought out, creative and viable governmental platform could compensate for time lost by the principal left party. It is true that serious possibilities for the FMLN to capture the Presidency of the Republic do exist, but rather than being confident in this possibility--which is what it seems to be doing--the party ought to set in motion the mechanisms which would permit it to meditate well and consider good proposals, with the objective of arriving at March of 1999 at the height of circumstances. The formulas Salvador Arias-Hector Silva or Salvador Arias-Mauricio Loucel seem to be, for now, the most adequate as the FMLN confronts not only ARENA, but also the real possibility of governing the country. As for a governmental plan, we must wait until it is finished in order to see how well the FMLN has its feet planted on firm ground and how serious and how much of an alternative it is that this party proposes.

Recently the Central Reserve Bank (BCR) presented the most important results in terms of macroeconomic considerations for the early months of 1998. As always, in these the maintenance of growth and macroeconomic stability are highlighted as characteristics of the entire decade of the 1990's. This has been the principal argument with which the last two governments have justified their economic policies. So it is that the BCR declares that, up to this point in the present decade, high levels of growth have been achieved together with a reduction in inflation, increase in the Net International Reserves and a reduction in the fiscal deficit to levels lower than those observed during the decade of the 1980's.

It has repeatedly been pointed out that the basis of this relative macroeconomic stability is not attributable to the fact that the adjustment of the economy has produced endogenous conditions for macroeconomic growth and stability. The affluence of family remittances is what has facilitated the current economic situation because it has permitted a rise in consumption, it has counterbalanced the balance of payments and controlled inflationary pressures resulting from exchange rates (See Proceso 518, 619, 756, 788).

During the early months of 1998, the situation has not varied much in that the situation of dependency on family remittances is maintained while the government continues to attempt presentation of positive macroeconomic figures without concerning itself with the sustainability of these in medium or long range terms. In what follows, some indicators which are presented by the government in order to evaluate the behavior of the economy during the early months of 1998 are presented in order to be able to consider what the role of remittances is in obtaining these figures and what the necessity is for adopting corrective measures.

According to BCR figures for the first two months of 1998, the Index for the Volume of Economic Activity (IVAE) was 3.9%, which is clearly superior to that obtained for the same months during 1997 when the IVAE was 0.8%. It is worthwhile highlighting the fact, however, that in considering that the IVAE for February of 1996 was 7.5%, another fact must be taken into consideration, and that is that the IVAE for February 1998 is still at levels inferior to those observed in previous years.

On the other hand, another of the successes noted by the BCR is that, during the period January-March 1998, exports increased by 17%, within which category growth of 32% is noteworthy in the category of exports from the maquila (runaway shop) clothing industry and 22% in the rubric of non-traditional exports. According to the BCR, "this important dynamism in exports, added to the income from privatizations and the continued impulse of family remittances has strengthened external stability by permitting the accumulation up to the first trimester of U.S. $1,856 million in Net International Reserves".

It is worth pausing for a moment at this point in order to indicate that, although the information offered by the BCR presents an honest diagnostic of the sources of accumulation of the RIN, it does not indicate with clarity that in reality the debits in the balance of trade show an obvious tendency towards deficit. Except for the last year, the deficit in the balance of trade has been growing throughout the decade of the 1990's. During the first trimester of 1998, the aforementioned deficit increased by U.S. $ 12 million compared with the same trimester in 1997. The behavior of prices, on the other hand, has been relatively stable, given that for the month of March the annual inflation rate obtained was 1.5%, far below that of the 7.4% obtained for March of 1997.

As for public finances, the BCR is not very optimistic when it notes that, during the first trimester of this year, the normal income diminished by 4.5% in comparison with the first trimester of 1997, while at the same time the current expenditures increased by 9.5%. As a result of this, the fiscal deficit for the first trimester of 1998 was greater than that for the same period during 1997, reaching 260 million colones. This in spite of important reforms in the tax system implemented during recent years, among which the most important was the introduction of the Value Added Tax (IVA).

The financial and monetary sector would have experienced a new turn during the first trimester of 1998 as deposits in the financial system increased by 15.6% in comparison with the same trimester of 1997. The credits extended increased by 17.4% between the two periods mentioned. For this reason, the BCR points out that "this has permitted interest rates on loans to continue their downward tendency and has allowed them to maintain themselves below those experienced during the previous year".

At this point it is also important to pause for a moment, once again, in order to offer some considerations on the subject of interest rates, because, although it cannot be denied that these have diminished during the last year, it is certainly necessary to examine how the difference between active and passive rates has evolved. The clearest tendency has been a heavy reduction in passive rates (paid on deposits) and a not so heavy reduction of active rates (paid on credits). In fact, business associations such as the Salvadoran Association for Construction, have publicly expressed the need to reduce active interest rates.

The data presented by the BCR allow for the expectation of a clearly positive panorama: greater economic growth than during the past year, greater accumulation of RIN and less inflation. Nevertheless, there are some negative points which are systematically ignored in the periodic BCR reports, such as the extreme dependence on family remittances, the permanent nature of the trade deficit and the increase in the deficit of public finances. This, without mentioning other aspects linked to the kind of economic growth, such as the development of the service sector and the marginalization of the agricultural and livestock sector.

These economic results have been questioned even by the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES), an association which, curiously enough, has shown itself partisan towards the principal economic liberalization measures implemented throughout the decade of the 1990's as well as towards the proposals of the country's big business sector in general. FUSADES, in addition to indicating excessive dependence on family remittances, notes that economic growth had not filtered down to the most needy sectors and its level "is insufficient to significantly reduce poverty".

It appears as if the government prefers to wait until the current period of economic stability ends before implementing measures for reducing the economy's dependence on external factors. Reorientation of the economy becomes especially important if the economy is to generate production which increases exports and satisfies the domestic consumption needs of the population without requiring the massive importation of consumer goods.

Reorientation of the economy is certainly no easy task to be accomplished rapidly; it is, therefore, highly questionable that seven years of macroeconomic stability and expansion in consumption--product of the increase in remittances--have not been taken advantage of and capitalized upon for the benefit of national producers and workers. It is imperative that the government design a medium and long-range strategy for guaranteeing macroeconomic stability and simultaneously stimulating economic growth based in the sectors which produce transferable commercial and consumer goods for domestic consumption.

Events have shown that SIMETRISSS was not speaking through its hat when, in October of 1997, it declared that it would continue on to the last consequences to guarantee that its platform of demands be resolved favorably by the governmental sector charged with dealing with healthcare. After the passing of eight months since the formation of the trade union, it can only be said that the country's public health care system is certainly in crisis. It is a two-level crisis: the activities of the trade union movement SIMETRISSS, together with the Medical Guild (Colegio Medico) and the public health doctors (the Tripartite Commission), have caused the eye of public opinion to focus on the longstanding problematic of the health system. In this sense the union movement has given shape to the problematic situation which, by all accounts should have been resolved decades ago. As is evident, the health system has been in crisis for a long time; what SIMETRISSS did was to elevate the problem to the level of consideration by the consciousness and conscience of the citizenry.

On the other hand, the stagnation into which the discussions between the Tripartite Commission and the High Level Commission has fallen has led to a sharpening of the conflict, which is reflected in the fifth partial work stoppage by the health system doctors. This strike, or partial work stoppage, differs from their preceding actions in that it has extended to public hospitals and some peripheral health clinics and has meant that emergency services and pediatric consultations have been suspended. Moreover, the striking doctors, as a way of responding to governmental threats to make discounts from their paychecks or to proceed to apply the full weight of the law against them, have announced their intention to suspend, for one day, private consultations, effectuate massive resignations and proceed to call a general strike to paralyze the country's health system. As can be seen at first glance, what in the beginning aimed to set up a process of dialogue and discussion has degenerated into a tortuous exchange of ultimatums, threats and ill-advised actions.

Currently the negotiations are dealing with a moot point: the doctors declare that they will not desist from engaging in measures to apply pressure until the High Level Commission demonstrates a willingness to negotiate honestly; and so the High Level Commission refuses to dialogue while the doctors do not lift the work stoppage and abstain from threats. After having succeeded in reaching agreement on 18 of the 22 points raised in the platform of demands presented by the doctors, the apple of discord has become salary demands. The issue of salary demands was the root cause for the suspension of negotiations which pushed the Tripartite Commission to take action by applying the measures they have since adopted.

What can be said as we observe this panorama? In the first place, it is fair to accuse the doctors' union of abandoning the option for dialogue so quickly and easily and of using the work stoppage as the exclusive instrument for moving the process forward. One thing is sure, the doctors are using it. The government could have dealt with a work stoppage in Social Security, but they can deal with a general strike in the public and private health care systems supported by the entire medical workers' association only with difficulty. Especially when the extension of the problematic could darken the image of the ARENA government considerably with the approach of the coming elections. If social pressure is not enough, political pressure will be sufficient.

Nevertheless, the foregoing should not motivate the doctors to utilize the patients who use the health care services as a lever in the negotiating process--even though the doctors' demands may be just and, in the long run, may end up benefiting the population. It is possible that this government will only understand demonstrations of strength and muscle by the doctors' union in order to win the struggle, but the social cost that this would imply requires a serene and lucid reflection concerning the strategies to be followed.

On the other hand, the government is under obligation to reconsider the situation. Mr. Calderón Sol's attitudes--reflected in his threats to abandon a "flexible attitude" towards the union which he has never demonstrated in the first place, or to ignore the problematic by attending the vacuous inauguration of the new President of Costa Rica--are simply thoughtless, considering what hangs in the balance. In considering this problematic in particular, braggadocio and the dragging out of the negotiations, although they may have produced results with other trade unions, in this case only serve to sharpen the conflict.

Finally, one cannot fail to notice the urgency with which a mediator is needed at the negotiating table. But not a negotiator belonging to the church or some human rights organism--for all the good intentions which both may have--but rather one related technically with what has stalled the negotiations: the economic question. It is vital that, within the procedures at the negotiating table, a serious study be implemented to analyze the material capacity of the state to implement the application of the salary increases demanded by the doctors--a study which because of the objective willingness which it should demonstrate, can only be carried out by a third party. The "final consequences" announced by the doctors can now begin to be visualized as they take shape. It is the responsibility of all of the players implicated to adopt a plan of action rationally more adequate for dealing with the situation.

PRE-CANDIDACIES. The National Council of the FMLN met on May 8 and at that meeting two new proposals for pre-candidacies were presented: that of the General Secretary of the USC, Mr. Abraham Rodriguez, who was proposed by that party itself, and that of Mr. Salvador Arias, who was proposed by the Democratic Farmworker Alliance (ADC). According to statements by extra-official sources, there exists the probability that the current Director of the National Council of the FMLN, Mr. Facundo Guardado, and the Mayor of the capital city, Dr. Hector Silva, will present themselves as pre-candidates for the 1999 elections. Concerning this information, Dr. Silva said that "for me it is an honor to be considered as a possible pre-candidate; nevertheless, I have not received a formal proposal and therefore cannot say if I will accept or not". He added that should the proposal be presented, he would have to evaluate it, given his work as mayor. Mr. Salvador Arias said that he was conscious of the responsibility implied by standing for office and expressed his willingness to accept the proposal because "I firmly believe in the commitment to the country". In order finally to choose the official candidate of the left party, an extraordinary meeting will be held next July 26, according to reports by members of the FMLN Council. "As a party we cannot close the doors to candidacies"; up to this date "anything can happen", stated Co-Coordinator of the FMLN, Mr. Francisco Jovel (EL DIARIO DE HOY May 9, p. 10; LA PRENSA GRAFICA, May 9, p. 5).

DEMONSTRATION. Some five thousand doctors from throughout the country, including members of the Tripartite Commission, marched, on May 8, to the Presidential Residence, with the objective of presenting to the President of the Republic Armando Calderón Sol a letter in which they called for his intervention in resolving the national health problematic. Mr. Calderón Sol, however, was in Costa Rica participating in the inauguration of the new president of that country. Representative of the Public Health doctors, Dr. Alcides Gomez, characterized the president's attitude as irresponsible because he knew the march was to take place and the problem in the health sector should be worth his being present, he stated. The president of the Colegio Medico, Dr. Jose Marinero, explained that one of the objectives of the march was to show public opinion that the union is not tied to the political parties. According to those presenting the demands, the Presidential Residence security guards did not allow the six members of the Tripartite Commission to enter. The General Secretary of SIMETRISSS, Dr. Rene Zapata, said that if the government continues with the same attitude, a new general strike could be in the offing during the next few days. In response, the Secretary for Information of the Presidential Residence declared that the entrance of the six union representatives was authorized, but the doctors then demanded that four doctors more be admitted and this was not approved (EL DIARIO DE HOY, May 9, p. 8; LA PRENSA GRAFICA, May 9, p. 4).

STRIKERS. The medical workers' union announced on May 11 that they would paralyze private consultation services and reduce emergency attention in the peripheric units of Social Security in order to apply pressure. Meanwhile, President of the Republic Armando Calderón Sol threatened to bring the full weight of the law to bear against doctors who supported the partial work stoppage begun on May 5, and assured them that he would not offer more on the question of the doctors' salary demands. "I am the first who is obligated to respect the law, and all those who transgress against the judicial order must be punished," argued Mr. Calderón Sol. The strikers said that if they decided to expand the strike to a level including private consultation their action would be with the objective of pressuring the government to take up the negotiations again and seek solutions to the problems in the area of health. Concerning this, the National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP) expressed the opinion that it is the strikers who do not permit the negotiations to continue, and invited the doctors to end the work stoppage and initiate negotiations with the government again. According to data presented by Social Security, the strike has provoked a situation in which only 16,743 general consultations have been received of the 68,306 consultations scheduled during the last two weeks. Moreover the ISSS has also parcially paralyzed work at the Benjamin Bloom Children's Hospital, the Rosales Hospital and the Health Units (EL DIARIO DE HOY, May 12, p. 6; LA PRENSA GRAFICA, May 1, p. 4).

RATIFICATION. On May 12, the President of the Republic, Armando Calderón Sol, urged the deputies for the FMLN and USC parties to ratify three loans which would presumably serve to make up the six per cent assigned to the municipalities of the country, as well as finance secondary education and modernize the airport at Comalapa. "I would like to call upon the deputies who are opposed to giving their votes to reflect [upon their decision]", reiterated Calderón Sol as he called the political parties" to lay aside their political banners and look toward the development of the country " (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, May 13, p. 16).

CRISIS. On May 12, the President of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), Mr. Jorge Diaz, recognized publicly that there exists an economic crisis in that institution. The functionary explained that as a result the registering of voters in an efficient manner is placed at risk as is the development of important electoral projects. Mr. Diaz said that the TSE "has reached its limit", owing to the fact that the regular budget assigned for the institution is insufficient. According to this source, the salaries of several employees are not covered for the entire year, but that the Treasury Ministry has succeeded in authorizing a line item for paying their salaries through the month of December. "Now we need money for preparing carnets and contracting temporary personnel...we are having to request a budgetary reinforcement in the amount of 28 million colones", stated Diaz (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, May 13, p. 6).