The internal conflicts in the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front party (FMLN) have become news once again. Leaving aside the interpretation which is, by all accounts, ridiculous, that it is a pantomime set up by the FMLN to obtain coverage in the news media, it is necessary to direct our attention to what is really at the bottom of the continued crisis in that left party. It has been insisted upon again and again that the unity achieved by the FMLN during the civil war did not do away with the quarrelsome bickering and anxieties for protagonism which were the daily fare of the political military groups during the decade of the 1970's: to wit, the ERP, FPL, RN, PRTC and FAL-PCS.

Once the peace accords were signed and the FMLN was changed into a legally registered political party, the hegemonizing ambitions of every one of the factions which make up the FMLN once again began to flourish and rupture became inevitable: Joaquin Villalobos of the ERP and Ferman Cienfuegos of the RN, with their respective attendant groups of unquestioning followers, broke with the FMLN, which itself moved from being a party made up of five factions (which the most optimistic call "tendencies") and came thereafter to be made up of three: the FPL, PCS and PRTC.

All seemed to be resolved when the so-called "revisionists" and "pragmatists" left the party in the hands of those "committed" to "principles". The dispute between the former and the latter was not a simple matter of differences of opinion or divergent visions; it was a dispute for the control of the political apparatus together with image and prestige pieced together in an imaginary collective. Before the constitution of the FMLN the factions of the armed left had no problem in acting in a modality which isolated one from the other. When the war ended, there was little that each one in and of itself could do that would be politically significant, given that it was the FMLN and not the FPL, the ERP, the RN, the FAL-PCS or the PRTC which had waged the revolutionary struggle and which could capitalize on the credits for this commitment during the last decade for electoral benefits.

So then, in this first dispute for the control of the FMLN, the RN and the ERP lost the round. The party stayed in the hands of the FPL, the PCS and the PRTC, who pieced together a pact by means of which, by accepting the existence of distinctive tendencies, the first group (i.e., the FPL) would control the coordination of the party, leaving the other two (especially the third, i.e., the PRTC), in subordinate positions. The Popular Liberation Forces, then, took the prize and continued on with their decades-long fervor for hegemony of the FMLN.

Nevertheless, the troubles did not end there, given that it was not only among the tendencies that the struggle for control of the party apparatus took place--the position of coordinator of the party has always been an apple of discord--rather, it is a question of the fact that inside the tendencies themselves an intense debate concerning the ideological identity of the FMLN has been generated. In the heat of this second dynamic, two positions have emerged which, at this point in time, appear to be irreconcilable. They are: (a) the position held by those considered to be orthodox: debunking the market economy, capitalism, businessmen and neo-liberalism while holding forth for socialism, state-controlled economy and revolutionary commitment; and (b) the position held by those wishing to renovate the party and who are open to the market economy, free enterprise, neo-liberal reform and a redefined welfare state while holding forth against the dogmatic acceptance of classical socialist theses, against a state-controlled economy on the model of the ex-URSS and the revolutionary struggle.

Again and again, those who align themselves with each of these perspectives have entered into open or veiled conflict, thus contributing to the political weakening of that left party. Curiously enough, at the beginning of every pre-electoral period during which efforts by political parties ought to be channeled toward engaging in serious work for the candidates and projects proposed, the left explodes in conflicts at its very heart and these become impediments to a fully operative commitment to the formulation of a proposal acceptable to the electorate. At bottom, there is, in the FMLN, a problem concerning an adjustment of scores with the values and commitments held high in the past. Until now, the FMLN has not submitted itself to the undertaking of a responsible effort towards self-evaluation which would surely help the party to pose once again not only its most closely-held principles, but would allow it to ponder the real capacity of its current leaders to carry out the necessary institutional reformulation.

No doubt exists that it is urgent for the FMLN to begin a process of renewal of its leading militants, which presupposes, in many cases, replacing these with younger militants who are less bound to immobile policies and ideologies. The party must modernize itself; it must be able to count on a leadership structure which is efficient and competitive. Its members, although they enjoy the complete freedom to express their opinions and disagreements, must accept agreements and commitments taken by the highest levels of leadership, whether this is at the level of electoral strategies or of doctrinal and programmatic questions.

In the event that one or more members do not accept these agreements and commitments--and cannot make their opinion prevail in the forums where the direction of the party is decided--it would be better if these members were to leave the party. It should never be the case, under any circumstance, that these members be allowed stay in the party conspiring to undermine the authority of the established leadership levels or to attempt to change party orientations. Other parties--the PDC is the most pathetically notable among them--have allowed such groupings who are openly opposed to accepting the authority of the party to stay--with disastrous results. Will the FMLN tolerate groups and individuals who are not willing to accept the rules and values of democracy? And, of the latter among these, it might be asked, why, if they believe or feel that the party no longer fulfills their aspirations, do they not leave the party, join another party or found a new one? It would also be a good thing for the historic leaders of the FMLN to desist in thinking that the party is their private property and, as a consequence, that they ought to control it in an absolute manner. Since the FMLN became a democratic political party, they--the erstwhile commandants and maximum leaders--are none other than members of the party with the rights and responsibilities conceded to them by the party.

Four important functionaries of President Armando Calderón Sol's cabinet have presented their resignations in the last few days. They are: Mr. Roberto Orellana Milla, President of the Central Reserve Bank (BCR); Mrs. Maria Teresa de Rendón, President of the Social Inversion Fund for Local Development (FISDL); Ms. Ana Cristina Sol, Presidential Commissioner for the modernization of the State; and Mr. Arturo Zablah, President of the Executive Commission for the Autonomous Port Authority (CEPA). For the moment, these resignations swell the list led by the recent and unexpected resignation of the ex-Minister of Education, Mrs. Cecilia Gallardo de Cano.

It is understandable that five resignations in less than a month have given cause for public opinion to think that there is a possible crisis in the ARENA administration. Nevertheless, questioned as to the motives that led them to leave their posts, the five ex-functionaries did not hesitate to argue that their reasons included a desire "to work in private enterprise" and "to dedicate more time to their families". One would have to be extremely naive to believe that the five resignations from important government posts are solely for "personal motives". Would it not be too much of a coincidence that "personal reasons" led Mr. Orellana Milla, Ms. Ana Cristina Sol and Mrs. Maria Teresa de Rendón to leave their responsibilities exactly on the same day?

On the other hand, the case of Mrs. Cecilia Gallardo de Cano also calls seriously into doubt the arguments presented as explanations for the desertion of these government functionaries. One should recall that in the period when she resigned, the ex-Minister of Education indicated that for some months back she had begun to consider the idea of resigning and that she had not done so earlier because she hoped to successfully complete her last two goals: that of achieving approval by the plenary of the administrative restructuring of the Education Ministry (MINED) and that of resolving the final receipt of the World Bank loan for the development of a project aimed at strengthening secondary education. The first point was accomplished without problems, but the second, as is now well known, still faces uncertainty. One must ask oneself, then, what was it that obliged the most outstanding government minister of this presidential term to leave her post so abruptly, leaving her most significant tasks undone.

In the first place, it is difficult to imagine that Mrs. Gallardo de Cano would give higher priority to her personal interests just at the point when events coincided in such a way as to place the continuity of the Educational Reform at risk. It would definitively have had to be something rather serious to cause her to abandon a project in which she had worked seriously and with efficiency over the last nine years. One of the hypotheses formulated in order to make sense of her resignation from public life is that she had aspirations for the presidency and was not in agreement with the candidacy of Mr. Francisco Flores. But even were it true that she had harbored aspirations for the presidency, the argument still does not explain a resignation which left in limbo a process to which the ex-functionary seemed to have applied herself with a great deal of sincerity.

Another explanation bandied about in an attempt to explain the motive for her resignation from the presidential cabinet is that it was a result of indignation produced as a result of President Calderón Sol's extracting Education Ministry funds without her consent in order to finance a costly publicity campaign against the FMLN. This is an explanation which, for all the rest, is better tailored to the profile exhibited by the ex-Minister throughout her term in office. All seems to indicate that, during this period, Mrs. Gallardo de Cano was a very efficient, upright and honest woman committed to her work. It is not a wild supposition, then, to imagine that her resignation was due to her inconformity with the way in which the ARENA administration handled government funds. This is especially true if one takes into account the rumors that ARENA thought to carry out its electoral campaign using the funds of the state education ministry's portfolio--something which ARENA had in fact begun to do when it launched the campaign against the FMLN which had not been authorized by Mrs. De Cano.

So then, far from being so naive as to believe that every resignation from the Calderón Sol cabinet is an isolated event and that each and every one is owing to "personal motives", it must be affirmed that the present ARENA administration is experiencing an extremely difficult problematic on an internal level which is very difficult to hide at this point in time, although presidential functionaries seem to be bent on presenting the contrary. ARENA deputy Rene Figueroa, for example, has said that he "does not see a crisis, but an opportunity to strengthen the party". This is a curious affirmation as it would be difficult to see how a party could be strengthened through the desertion of several of its most important militants from their government posts. Mr. Orellana Milla has been presented by ARENA authorities as the savior of the national economy, as the ideal person to preside over the BCR; and even, when the opposition began impeachment proceedings, attributing to the BCR president certain participation in the INSEPRO-FINSEPRO scandal, the official party defended his integrity against hell and high water. How are we to understand, then, that his resignation could contribute to the strengthening of the ARENA party?

President Calderón Sol, for his part, has done nothing more than ignore the facts, thanking fervently each person who resigns for services rendered. He probably thinks that in this way no one will notice that his relative, Ana Cristina Sol, resigned her directorship of the government portfolio for the modernization of the state after less than a year from when she had declared such willingness and enthusiasm for carrying out the modernization projects inherited from her predecessor, Mr. Alfredo Mena Lagos, another leader in the controversial round of resignations. It is impossible to see the resignations as isolated and individual events and attempt, in this way, to disguise their political implications, not only because of the number of resignations in such a short period of time, but also because one cannot look askance at the precedent set by the exit of Mr. Mena Lagos.

Even without taking into account the impact caused by the resignation of the ex-Presidential Commissioner for the Modernization of the State, what has happened during these last few days does not allow us to think other than that something is happening in the ARENA government. It would, of course, be much easier for the ARENA leaders to minimize the importance of these resignations were it not for the fact that others of even greater import had not occurred in the past. Among these (of Mrs. Mirna Lievano de Marques, of Mrs. Norma de Dowe and of Mr. Jorge Sansivirini, etc.), the most polemical resignation was doubtless that of Mr. Mena Lagos. And it was so not because the motives that he presented for his resignation were so far different from those offered by the functionaries who today present their resignations--possibly indicating the same--, but rather, what sets him apart from the rest is that he decided to make his reasons public and because he declared himself to be frankly at enmity with the governing party.

It is certainly more gallant and respectful for those who are leaving their posts not to allude to the real reasons which led them to take such a decision. Surely, internally ARENA maintains the principal that "dirty laundry is to be washed at home", and this has doubtless been very beneficial for them inasmuch as it preserves intact its institutionality. Nevertheless, nothing of the ex-functionaries' diplomacy nor the efforts by ARENA to hide its weaknesses is going to obviate the necessary question about why those who resigned did so "finally and irrevocably", even though it is a pre-electoral year. We will probably not be privy, in the short run, to the minute details which would provide a full response to the questions arising out of this situation.

Incorrect handling of state funds, incompetence in the executive branch, the incapacity of ARENA to maintain itself at the cutting edge of the dynamics of government are, among many other things, reasons which could explain the permanent flight of government functionaries from the Calderón Sol cabinet, a phenomenon which his government has faced throughout his administration. A final point is that the deterioration of the party in government can no longer be disguised and is, in fact, reaching unexpected proportions.

The drought experienced during the agricultural year 1997/1998 has had a marked influence on national agricultural and livestock production, especially on the cultivation of corn, rice, maicillo, coffee and sugar cane. Preliminary data indicate a loss of approximately 1% of the Gross National Product (PIB) for 1997; nevertheless, to judge by recent government evaluations which include losses suffered by the fishing sector, the figure for losses could in reality be closer to 1.6%.

This figure might be even higher because other types of direct and indirect losses have not been taken into account in these calculations, such factors as, for example, the increase in the costs for the generation of electricity, the fall in the incomes of the producers, the increase in imports and the prices of basic grains, the reduction in the availability of water and, in general, the proliferation of activities causing clearly negative effects on the environment.

Faced with this situation, the government has created a ministry-level committee for the development of actions to mitigate these factors; more recently, meetings have been held between the Ministry of Agriculture, bankers and deputies with an eye to examining the dimensions of the problem and to propose possible actions for the mitigation of the drought.

Although it is still not known which measures will be dealt with in the series of sustained meetings, what is certain is that the data presented by the Ministry of Livestock and Agriculture reveal the profundity of the crisis in the agricultural and livestock sector and, especially, its vulnerability to natural phenomena. Concrete contingency measures have been taken with clearly negative affects on the farmworker sector, but such measures are necessary in order to maintain the supply of food to the urban population. A case in point is the importation of 520 million colones of basic grains (Proceso 805). It is, nevertheless more than true that while emergency measures must be taken, what is really called for is the adoption of a plan for the medium and long-term development of the agricultural and livestock sector.

This topic has been dealt with previously and has even moved the government to formulate development plans for the agricultural and livestock sector (see Proceso, 711) which, two years after their having been published, have stayed at the level of exhibiting good intentions. Some of the measures contemplated were lines of credit with preferential interest rates, the launching of a special financial instrument for agricultural and livestock activities--the Certified Long-Term Agricultural and Livestock Deposit--and the creation of small producers' guaranteed funds.

The serious effects of the drought 1997/1998 open up an opportune correlation of events propitious for the reconsideration of the problematic situation presented by the agriculture and livestock sector and in order actively to propose the implementation of a program for the reactivation of agriculture. As opposed to other similar cases, the drought of 1997-1998 is significant because of the fact that not only the cultivation of basic grains has been affected but also affected are export crops such as coffee and sugar, as well as the fishing industry. Of all of these sectors those who been most vociferous in demanding compensatory measures has been the coffee growers; this is not really so strange, given that coffee has been the most favored and protected by the state. On the other hand, the poorest, most vulnerable sectors--those engaged in the production of basic grains and involved in small-scale fishing--have not enjoyed the same coverage in the news media and in political circles to the extent that they could request the application of compensatory measures.

In what follows, some of the most important effects of the drought on production in the agricultural and livestock sector will be examined in an effort to demonstrate how that sector has become particularly vulnerable to natural phenomena; a case in point is the delay in the coming of the rains this year.

The losses provoked by the drought represent almost 1.6% of the total Gross Natural Product of the country. Considering that economic growth for 1997 was approximately 4%, it can be said that, as a result of the effects of the drought, 40% of the equivalent in economic growth for this year has been lost. The situation is seen to be even more serious if we consider the specific effects on the agricultural and livestock sector where the greater part of the damage has been concentrated.

If the total losses for the agricultural, hunting, forestry and fishing sectors are taken into consideration, we are dealing with approximately 11.5% of production in these areas which must be considered to be a loss as a result of the drought. This situation aggravates the agricultural and livestock sector to an even greater degree given that it has experienced important reductions throughout the decade of the 1990's. As the graph below illustrates, there are cases in which losses have come to represent up to one fourth of the expected production; the crops most affected are corn (25.2%), shrimp (23.5%), coffee (17.1%) and small scale fishing (16.3%).

The agricultural situation is even more serious if we consider that, according to predictions by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, should the drought be prolonged for another year, agricultural and livestock production for the 1998-1999 harvest would be affected. Faced with this possibility, the need for government to adopt firm measures for encouraging agricultural and livestock production becomes much more important. The current crisis in agriculture has been considered by the government to be a temporary event requiring, therefore, only temporary measures for resolving it. Nevertheless, the reality shows us more and more clearly that the drought is a structural phenomenon requiring the adoption of specific development strategies for the agricultural and livestock sectors. There exist precedents in planning for agricultural and livestock development which might, of necessity, have to be implemented in order to stimulate growth and generate employment and income in that sector.

(Quintales, metric tons and thousands/colones)

*With relation to the agricultural and livestock GNP

Source: Agricultural and Livestock Policy Analysis Office,

It would be difficult to affirm that the BASES FOR A NATIONAL PLAN as a document has not succeeded in achieving at least one of its objectives, even though these objectives may have been achieved only indirectly and not in the way the writers of the plan would have wished. We refer here, specifically, to the objective of initiating discussion around the points necessary for defining a National Plan. Certainly, this has been achieved, but only indirectly, given that over and above providing guidelines for the direction to be taken by the national discussion, BASES... has unleashed upon itself a polemic on the question of the theoretical validity of its orientations.

Beginning with universities and continuing on to political parties and independent social actors, the great majority of these voices which constitute or influence public opinion have expressed opinions and criticisms awakened by the document. BASES... not only lays out guidelines for discussing the country, it does so in a negative way, given that it has begun a process for discussion and analysis of what our reality is not (negation of the diagnostic) and what are not the assured ways to overcoming our problems (negation of the methods of solution).

This situation, although beneficial for the dynamics of the country and congruent with the spirit which aims to move the document onward, has not been much appreciated by some of the members of the National Development Commission. Editorials and columns which aim to defend at all costs some of the most questioned of the theses presented in BASES... (social and cultural margination as a cause of poverty and the category of the whole, among others), are public samplings of this discontent or discomfort, over and above being a poor indication of which could derail a process only just begun.

The crux of the problem lies not in the defense of the postulates presented in the document, nor in that it presents rebuttals to the arguments raised against it--for this, as has already been pointed out, is positive. The problem is that this task has been assumed by the writers of the document and not by sectors of the population, who, in theory ought to be those responsible for analyzing it. If anything, up to this point, is clear, it is that BASES... is a public, open document which is valid only to the extent that the society makes it theirs by discussing it. If, in the course of this discussion, the document fails or, on the contrary, is reaffirmed, this should occur only according to the argumentative dynamics which the citizens present. Some members of the Commission have possibly begun to care too much for their firstborn and are working, therefore, on the basis of sentiments and ego-involvement, just as parents would; this attitude, however, would appear to betray the objectives upon which the document was first published.

But from this premise it does not follow that the tendency in the process begun with the presentation of the document will end in sterile confrontation between its writers and the sectors of the society interested in refuting and analyzing it. The mixed signals would have to be repeated in the two phases following the presentation of the document: (a) in "the process of discussion and reflection on the content of the document by the Administrative Group, as well as [in] the receiving of opinions and suggestions from the citizens in the various departments of the country; and (b) in the establishment of the "National Agreement concerning the National Plan, as well as [in] the definition of follow-up and evaluation mechanisms in order to assure the sustainability of the process" (BASES... p. 48).

The process currently finds itself in the first of the two phases indicated (i.e., in (a) above). Leaving to one side the analysis of the Administrative Group and the role it has played in the process (principally for the innocuous and passive posture it has maintained), it is interesting to examine the consultative mechanisms of the document at the departmental level and the results obtained up to this point.

What can be expected from the "Consultation with the Citizens" at a departmental level on BASES FOR A NATIONAL PLAN? The Commission hoped at least to achieve two objectives: on the one hand, to "encourage a shared vision of the challenges which we must confront in order to make El Salvador the country where the population as a whole can enjoy the benefits of development"; and, on the other hand, to "facilitate a consultation in which the national conscience, participative dynamism and social commitment are made manifest" (see LA PRENSA GRAFICA, March 23, 1998, p. 31).

Curiously and paradoxically, in the objectives published in the communiqué announcing the beginning of the consultations with the citizens, what is presented as material for consultation is neither mentioned nor suggested, in spite of the fact that in the document the definition presented is that the consultation will be on the content of the document BASES.... Moreover, the communiqué uses verbs such as "to propitiate" and "to facilitate", instead of what might be expected for the process: "to discuss", "to analyze" or "to engage in dialogue". This concern, which might at first appear to be a mere linguistic subtlety, actually represents a very important practical factor: to discuss or to analyze a document does not have the same implications as to propitiate or facilitate attitudes or cognitive states. To propitiate or facilitate are synonyms for "to present", "to transmit" and create possible conditions, for which reason, the focus of the action is on what that which transmits, presents or creates possible conditions so that something else can happen. On the other hand, when something is proposed for discussion or analysis--but not something vague without a text--the strength of the action, the decisive fact, lies with all of those who are involved in the act. Was it not, perhaps, this last which was sought in the Consultation with Citizens, and not the first?

As happens in the letter of the text of BASES..., the process of Citizen Consultation is drowned in the confusion of objectives and concepts. Certainly, the objective of the document is to construct a society integrated with its national conscience, but it is not exactly on point to absolutely subordinate the practical objectives of this phase to the process for carrying out that phase. Because of the way in which the Citizen Consult is being implemented (seven departments have been covered already), the roundtable discussions, instead of deepening or analyzing the diagnostic and the solutions, present in the document BASES..., end up supporting the document or, at least, leaving it intact. In this scheme of things, nothing has yet been achieved. What is happening, however, is that a process is being carried out after the fact which ought to have been carried out before the writing of the document. What good does it do for the population consulted to be in agreement with the fact that delinquency or unemployment are national problems when what should be under discussion are the proposed bases for resolving these problems?

To have achieved the true objectives of the Citizen Consultations would have implied several things: in the first place, it would have been necessary for the participants in the Departmental Assemblies to have had a minute and lucid knowledge of the content of the document. The participation of high school students and housewives in the local Administrative Groups could perhaps serve to placate a certain democratic sentimentalism and give the process a popular character, but little or nothing would be contributed, thereby, to clarifying the theoretical validity of the document. In the second place, it would have implied tracing the long and difficult thread of arguments and counter-arguments--something which seems to be being sacrificed in favor of temporary illusory objectives. Finally, it would have implied laying aside the fear that BASES..., in its first steps on citizen terrain, might suddenly fall and return to its progenitors' hands changed into something unrecognizable.

In what has been accomplished up to now, one can definitively affirm that there is little room for the initial optimism. If what has been seen up to now will be the manner in which the construction of "the El Salvador that we all want" is to continue, the final conclusion of the process will be defined in an elitist discussion of the document, in which one side will aim to base its positions on a popular consultation which not only was never popular in nature, but never aimed to be so.

RESIGNATIONS. The President of the Central Reserve Bank (BCR), Mr. Roberto Orellana Milla; the National Commissioner for the Modernization of the State, Ms. Ana Cristina Sol; and the President of the Fund for Social Investment (FIS), Mrs. Maria Teresa de Rendón, presented their resignations on April 15 of this year. According to their respective statements, all expressed interest in working in the private sector. The President of the Republic, Armando Calderón Sol, assigned the presidency of the BCR to Mr. Gino Bettaglio, who was previously the vice-president of that institution. Mr. Orellana Milla explained that his resignation was owing neither to problems in the carrying out of his office nor to problems with the government. The Presidential Commissioner, for her part, declared that, should her resignation be accepted, it would not enter into effect until after the sale of the telephone company, CTE-ANTEL. In this context, the opposition parties expressed the opinion that the resignation of the three functionaries was "linked to the internal crisis of the government and of the ARENA party". At the same time, they considered that the resignations would bring possible repercussions for the monetary and financial policies of the country, for the modernization of the state and for the process of municipal decentralization. For PDC deputy Donald Ricardo Calderón, it is to be lamented that the deputies resigned with so little time remaining for Mr. Calderón Sol to finish his term of office, as this will negatively affect the government (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, May 16, pp. 4, 5 and 6).

FIRINGS. On May 16, authorities of the Salvadoran Social Security Institute (ISSS) called together the doctors interested in continuing to work in that institution in order to reactivate their petitions for incorporation and so that they could replace the doctors who would be fired. Some 200 doctors have already been notified that they have been fired after the union did not respond to the government's warning to lift the strike. The representative of the Doctors' Union of the Social Security Institute (SIMETRISSS), Dr. Guillermo Mata, called for a cessation of threats against the medical sector which, according to his statements, have no validity. "They cannot fire us because the petition concerning the illegality of this measure is still under consideration before the Supreme Court," stated Dr. Mata, who added that none of the doctors threatened with being fired had been notified in writing. "First of all, the firings are illegal and, second, there is nothing in writing and, therefore, we do not take [the measure] into account," he declared. Concerning this situation, the President of the Colegio Medico, Dr. Jose Marinero, expressed the opinion that the judicial situation of the unions is in conformity with the law. The representative of the Lawyer's Association of El Salvador, Mr. Raul Calderón, declared that the government was engaging in functions which are not its province when it ordered the unjustified firings which only serve to intensify the problem (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, May 17, p. 5).

SIGET. On May 18, the head of the General Superintendency for Electricity and Telecommunications (SIGET), Mr. Eric Casamiquela, in an interview with the deputy-members of the Commission for Economy and Agriculture of the Legislative Assembly, admitted that the Distributors of Electrical Energy and Telecommunications are not applying the new rate for service structure in a correct manner. As a result of unjustified increases, those affected will receive reimbursements with interest, in accordance with the General Law of Electricity. "If the energy distributors have sent incorrect charges for services, we will demand that they return the money with interest", explained Mr. Casamiquela. The President of the Hydroelectric Commission of the Lempa River (CEL), Mr. Guillermo Sol Bang, stated that he was in agreement with Mr. Casamiquela when he indicated that they are complying with an agreement which establishes subsidies for consumers using less than 200 kilowatt hours and another additional subsidy to consumers of less than 300 kilowatt hours. SIGET will receive the results of an audit of the distributors in order to learn at what level the companies are not in compliance with the new rate structure. "The objective of the audit is [to be sure that] the errors are not repeated. We will first know the results of SIGET, because it could be that there are deficiencies in the computer program or in the equipment used for readings, but the excessive charges are real", added Mr. Casamiquela (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, May 19, p. 4).