PROCESO, 815
July 15, 1998
Editorial
Economy
The first draft of the general national budget for 1999
Society
Concerning the pre-candidacy of Héctor Silva
International
Outbreaks of social confrontation on the central american isthmus
EDITORIAL
The debate on the question of kidnapping in El Salvador is not yet over. Too many things have yet to be clarified: above all, on the question of the identity of those responsible for this criminal practice. Once the identity of the kidnappers is known, it will be easier to advance, not only on the question of clarifying their modus operand, but also to advance on the question of determining the whereabouts of the money extracted in return for release of the victims. But it is not easy to establish the identity of these people, as much because of the deficiencies which impede the National Civilian Police in their criminal investigations as for the political and economic interests which intrude between many who are suspected of having participated in kidnappings and the appropriate application of justice.
The capacity of the police to deal with the most sophisticated criminal activity —that which operates by means of well-organized groups using specialized military equipment and communications equipment which include celular telephones, radio transmitters and beepers— has been questioned more than once. Slowly but inexorably the thesis has begun to take shape that the National Civilian Police require a drastic restructuring in which must be included a technical component of the highest level for criminal investigations. The time has long past in which an increase in the number of police agents could be considered sufficient to reduce crime; the facts have dramatically belied this half-truth because, no matter how many police there might be, a poorly trained police agent using obsolete logistical resources will always be at a disadvantage when dealing with organized crime, which has consolidated itself in our country. At this point in time when changing the leadership of the National Civilian Police is being discussed, it may also be a good time to pose the necessary topic of the restructuring of the police corps. So it is that, sooner or later, overcoming various different kinds of resistance and inadequate work habits, this change must be effectuated.
All in all, the most delicate matter on the question of kidnappings —and with respect to organized crime in general— is not so much the capacity or lack of capacity of the police to confront this phenomenon, but rather the support which the kidnappers might enjoy —and the high-level criminals as well— with respect to their political and economic relations or as a result of their own political and/or economic capital, as much on the question of the police apparatus as in the justice system. If it is the case that this protection is in fact assured, the fight against kidnappers will be a waste of time, given that these people either are able to avoid being captured —if they can count on police agents who inform them of imminent arrest in good time—; if this succeeds, they will not be duly punished —with the help of corrupt judges; or, if they are suspects, they will be able to avoid judicial investigation— as a result of pressure applied by their "friends", protectors or accomplices, at high levels of government who make their pressure felt on the judicial organisms.
One would have to be truly naïve —or blind— not to see that the three scenarios described above have, in one way or another, have become a reality in El Salvador. That is to say, one must not close one's eyes when presented with evidence which indicates that the kidnapping industry has not been broken, nor the people responsible for it brought to justice because of the protection which these same people have found in the diverse areas of state power. The struggle against kidnappers —and, in general, against groups of organized crime, presupposes, in a parallel manner, another struggle: the struggle against those, who from a position of legality— be they police, judges, prosecuting attorneys, magistrates or deputies —protect these criminals through complicity, friendship or the payment of favors received or to be received. This is a way of fighting crime which up to this point has not been carried out with sufficient determination; only this struggle can contribute towards breaking down influence peddling and pork barrel politics linking the world of crime with the rule of law currently in force. The struggle against those who take advantage of the position in the state apparatus to support and protect —in an illicit manner— those who work outside the law is an essential component in the democratic struggle against criminality in its various forms and manifestations.
Returning to the question of kidnappings, one ought not to lose sight of the fact that these —as much during the recent past (in the decades of the 1970's and 1980's) as in the present time—have as their primary motive, purely monetary gain. The armed Salvadoran left, in these two past decades, gave to their kidnapping activities an ideological justification which, in and of itself, neither hid the economic motives of these activities, nor does it make them less open to condemnation. After the signing of the peace accords, some suspicions have come to light concerning persons of the disarmed left presumably linked to kidnapping cases which lack any ideological legitimization; this is to say, purely criminal kidnappings. The world of kidnappings spun and woven around the left (armed and disarmed) is a mystery which is not easily disentangled. The left itself is not disposed to reveal its secrets, nor do the authorities have within their reach a formula which permits them to disentangle it, without having this process being read as a paying back of accounts by ARENA and its political allies against the FMLN.
On the other hand, in the heat of the civil war, unscrupulous military personnel noted that a quick and sure way of making millionaire sums of money was by kidnapping prominent personalities in private enterprise. If the point in time in which the birth of the kidnapping industry in El Salvador must be fixed, it could be located during the mid-1980's when a group of military officers decided to kidnap businessmen with the objective of demanding money in exchange for the freedom of their victims. It is not inconceivable to suppose that, from that moment up until the present time, there could exist a continuous thread in the workings of gangs of kidnappers. If this supposition turns out to be true, one can presume that some of the gangs of kidnappers who are currently operating include among their members ex-military people —of medium or high rank—, whose experience offers great possibilities of succeeding in the planning and execution of these acts.
When one speaks of kidnapping and kidnappers in El Salvador, the existence of these two netherworlds (discussed above) must be taken into account. Examination of these places us on the road to discovery of in which direction the investigation could advance in order to determine responsibilities, but also permits us to see how difficult it will be to obtain positive results.
ECONOMY
The General National Budget is one of the most useful tools for achieving state intervention in the provision of basic social services. This is recognized by the World Bank itself in its press communiqués, in which, for example, it is pointed out that "the proportion of the national wealth earmarked for social spending in Costa Rica has been one of the highest in Latin American and the Caribbean, accounting for between 15% and 18% of the Gross Nation Product (GNP) during the last twenty years. As a result, Costa Rica enjoys some of the highest social welfare indicators in the developing world".
In El Salvador, in official discourse, the importance of social spending is recognized, to the point that, in 1995, a 50% increase in this rubric was offered for the General National Budget for 1999. According to the most recent proposal, the assignment of spending to social rubrics such as education, health, housing and employment will hardly account for 26.6% of the budget, which, although greater than 24.9% for 1998, differs a great deal in terms of offerings. In terms of the GNP, social spending will represent close to 3.9% in 1998 and for 1999 it will represent close to 4.06%(assuming growth rates in the GNP of 5%). It is not unusual, then, that the World Bank should affirm in the case of El Salvador that "its social indicators are among the worst in Latin America".
Just as the second semester of 1998 begins, a first draft of the General National Budget for 1999 has already been presented; the first draft has evoked a public polemic between the mayors and the central government with regard to the assignment of funds for the municipal governments. But, over and above this particular point, it is important to call attention to the distribution of the budget among the judicial, police and military branches, on the one hand, and the area for social service, on the other. This reveals that they are paying more attention to the symptoms of social crisis (common crime and violence) than to its causes (poverty, marginalization of the social classes).
Taking note of the figures in the 1999 budget, drawn up by the Ministry of the Treasury, it is possible to note that the total expense for institutions related to the prevention of delinquency and to combating violence are in conflict with the amount assigned to social spending implemented by the State. The budgets for the first categories have increase more than for the second. So it is that in 1999 5.2% of the budget would be dedicated to the budget for the Judicial Branch of the government, 1% for the Attorney General's Office, 1.6% for the justice branch, 8.8% for the public security branch and 5.9% for the national defense branch; that is to say, a total of 22.5% of the budget for 1999. In 1998, only 19.7% was assigned to these categories, which implies that 2.8% was assigned additionally to the budget, while the social area would receive only 1.7% more.
It seems clear, then, that in the formulation of the budget, the criteria for public security and combating crime has taken precedence over the provision of better and greater social services. In order to obtain the goal of assigning 50% of the budget to this social area it would be necessary to increase the entire budget by 25%, or dedicate the resources of other sectors to social spending.
Another aspect of the budget which requires attention is incompliance with the legislative disposition of turning over 6% for the financing of the public works projects of the municipal governments. As in 1998, it is expected that a total of 2.7% of the budget will be assigned to the municipalities.
The categories of the budget that will experience the most significant reductions and which would offer the resources for increasing expenditure in other sectors would be: public works, which would receive 7% instead of 10.5%; compensation for merits would disappear as a category from the 1999 budget after receiving 2.1% in the 1998 budget; and support for economic and social reactivation received 0.7% in 1998, would also disappear as a budget category. Finally, another category which would be reduced in an important measure is service to the public debt, which was 16.9%, but will be 16.2% in the 1999 budget reading.
These reductions mean that the increase in the global amount of the budget will be very low. In general terms, the budget will increase by 1.3%, the lowest growth rate for the decade of the 1990's because between 1991 and 1997 it tripled.
Even so, data concerning the sources of financing are not made public, but more changes in its composition cannot be expected, as it is based principally on the Value Added Tax and income tax revenues which account for close to 85% of total tax income. Here it should be noted that at present the government is facing serious problems in financing its budget owing to the fact that it has topped out at the limit of growth provided by tax income.
Effectively, in spite of the tax reform implemented during the decade of the 1990's, for 1997 the goals for proposed tax income in the Monetary Finance Program, owing to a reduction in the rhythm of growth in the IVA and income tax revenues. As a result of this, close to 20% of public income came from external loans.
In this context, to propose an increase in social spending from 15% to 18% of the GNP in El Salvador is practically impossible in the short run, given that this would imply dedicating the entire national budget to the social area or even to increase the budget to double its current figure, which would immediately provoke a substantial increase in the public debt and in the fiscal deficit. More realistic would appear to be the goal of 50% of the budget, although this still is feeling the strong limitations on its implementation owing to stagnation of public tax income.
The criteria for the assignment of funds in the budget still reflects an important participation by the parties destined to deal with the effects of social conflict. Although it is not a question of denying the necessity for financing public security and judicial processes, neither should one forget the necessity to adopt policies which permit the bettering of the social situation and in this way reduce the requirements of public security and the judicial system. This implies that a way of substantially increases tax income for the government must be found because the reform carried out has been ineffective owing to the fact that, although the application of IVA has been introduced, important taxes on businessmen have been diminished or eliminated; these are the tax on exports, patrimony and a reduction by half of income tax on businesses).
A viable solution must be posed in order to substantially increase social spending, which is necessarily linked to the increase in tax income. Meanwhile, if this is not achieved, the social indicators for El Salvador will continue to be the lowest in Latin American and a good part of the budget will be dedicated to containing social violence.
SOCIETY
Anyone who has spoken with members of Mr. Hector Silva's municipal team on the eve of the elections leading up to his election as Mayor of San Salvador knows that even the suggestion of the possibility that the future mayor would opt for participating in the presidential elections of 1999 provoked an irate response, or, in the least of cases, a prolonged silence which sought to punish the supposed hidden animadversion in the suggestion. All who were close to Mr. Silva would seem to coincide in this in the same degree of conviction: the only interest which might orient the new administration would be to satisfy the necessities of the population through a municipal administration founded in honesty, intelligence and the capacity of its members.
Given Mr. Silva's declarations, one can deduce that his team, in the context of being a different municipal administration, would adopt an ethic of commitment to governing the municipality without succumbing to motivations characteristic of a political party, foreign to the needs of a municipality and its inhabitants, given this strong negative response of not discussing the fact that the municipality could be useful as a trampoline to launch himself into a presidential career. Nevertheless, now that more than a year has passed since Mr. Hector Silva became Mayor of San Salvador, and without his administration producing the expected results, the mayor is coming ever closer to what, in the beginning, he showed no interest in: candidacy for the presidency.
Although Mr. Silva himself still continues to be reluctant to make affirmative statements concerning his possible candidacy, possibly consonant with the dispute inside the FMLN concerning the election and the personalities who will make up the presidential formula, everything seems to indicate that obstacles in the road to his candidacy are being removed. Meetings between Mr. Silva and Mr. Facundo Guardado, and the slow change in Mr. Silva's declarations (from declarations repeatedly indicating that he would not abandon his post as Mayor to more recent declarations that he would be disposed to accept the pre-candidacy) are some indications of this.
So then, what can be said as to the possible acceptance of the pre-candidacy in relation to the commitments which Mr. Silva acquired at the beginning of his administration? In the first place, Mr. Silva seems to be inclining towards giving precedence to the urgent necessities of the FMLN to find a candidate above all else. In this there is not much to reflect about: with the acceptance of the pre-candidacy, the mayor would enter into open contradiction with the content of the declarations which he made on May 1, 1997. Nevertheless, in second place, it must be taken into consideration that very possibly the change in his initial posture to that which he today maintains is due more to the configuration of events which faces the FMLN at present than to a plan thought out at a date previous to his assumption of the Mayor's Office.
If this were not the case, it would be difficult to explain the absence of political astuteness which the Silva Administration has used at the moment of attempting to proceed with his projects, an absence which has led him on no few occasions to come into conflict with a good number of social actors in the country. Had there existed from the beginning a plan to use the Mayor's Office of San Salvador as a platform for an electoral campaign, Mr. Silva and his team would not have acted in the way they have up to this point in time. They would possibly have laid to one side the implementation of projects which could, with forethought, have been seen to be polemical and could have dedicated themselves to implement more popular and inoffensive projects. In this sense, the political clumsiness and naivete that the Mayor's Office has demonstrated in the taking of decisions would be, over and above being demonstrations of the defects of a group of inexpert people with good intentions are proof of acquittal in his favor.
In third place, it must be considered that the fact that Mr. Silva must abandon his position as mayor should it be decided that he would accept the pre-candidature, does not necessarily imply that the Mayor's Office would be left adrift. Certainly, Mr. Hector Silva is the visible leader of the municipal administration, but not its fundamental lever —at least administratively speaking. As opposed to previous municipal governments, members of the Silva Administration have played an active role in municipal matters (his public statements have been frequent and on point). This makes it possible that, should Mr. Silva leave the municipal office, these will give continuity to the mystique and to the projects proposed at the beginning of his administration.
Nevertheless, administrative modifications which were implemented under the current municipal government would not short-circuit the problem of political leadership which Mr. Silva's stepping down might provoke. And this is an element which can not be laid aside in the discussion which presently concerns us. As is obvious, the mayor will have played an important role in harmonizing the interests of the parties which made up the coalition which led him to the mayorship. This is a harmony of interests which has made it possible not only so that visible party conflicts inside the Mayor's Office were avoided, but also, and even more important, that in the implementation of projects attempted, an effort has been made to keep at a minimum ideological distortions.
If there is anything which the Silva Administration cannot be accused of it is that during his administration, it is that political interests have not been given precedence over the needs of the population and those of the city of San Salvador. The mayor has known how to comply in this aspect. However, an unstable choice of a successor could cause all of these efforts to come to naught. Moreover, it is not impossible to think that, in the process of choosing his substitute, that internal conflicts among the parties which make up the coalition might be unleashed and this might cause the activities unleashed by the mayor's office to stagnate or move backwards. Should this be the case, Mr. Silva's leaving could cause a great deal of harm to the administration over which he presides.
As one can see, there is quite a lot hanging in the balance should the current mayor of San Salvador accept participation in the competition for the Presidency of the Republic. Nevertheless, the fact that certain groups inside the FMLN are making every effort to push forward a presidential formula is not an idle supposition. Although his closest competitor, Mr. Hector Dada Hirezi, is the favorite of some of the prominent personalities in the FMLN —including Mr. Silva himself— and he presents himself as a figure capable of attracting the sympathies of the business sector and of the moderate right, Mr. Silva holds the advantage in something that is fundamental for winning an election: his face is well-known by the greater part of Salvadoran citizens and opinion polls indicate positive results.
These characteristics, which distinguish the Silva phenomenon are vital as the future elections come to the fore, because it is difficult for the FMLN to decide to elect a candidate little known to the electorate when its principal contendant, the ARENA party, has already been presenting an intense promotional campaign for its candidate, Mr. Francisco Flores, for months now. Mr. Silva, in spite of his errors and the scant successes of his administration, presents himself as a favorite for making up the electoral formula which enjoys the possibility of relieving the ARENA party of the presidential office. It is to be expected that the sacrifice which the San Salvador's Mayor's Office will make towards the achievement of this objective will not be in vain.
INTERNATIONAL
In recent months, two countries of the Central American region have been the scene of varied demonstrations of discontent on the part of broad social sectors, which daily reality hangs in the balance between survival and marginalization. In Nicaragua, the state of abandonment in which close to 15 townships of the municipality of Cardenas (on the Costa Rican border) caused the open declaration of their desire to annex themselves to that neighboring country. Moreover, the appearance of a new armed group in the very region where, last year, President Arnoldo Alemán was obliged to sign disarmament accords with four armed groups, brings to light the little social concern which Mr. Alemán's administration has shown towards broad sectors of the population. Meanwhile, in Honduras, indigenous and environmental groups have offered resistance to the implementation of two huge hydroelectric projects (El Tigre and Patuca II), and the emergence of an armed clandestine group whose goal is to eliminate "gangs" which have proliferated in the country, predict dark consequences for the country immersed in the upcoming state of affairs envisaged by these circumstances.
In all of these situations, there is an underlying common denominator: the almost intolerable degrees of abandonment to which these groups are submitted. And although the variety of responses with which they have confronted their respective situations would seem to distance each initiative on the road to their private interests, all of them have joined among themselves because be cause there exist possible contradictions in the population's way of life which continue to threaten the stability of the society in general. For example, in the struggle for ethnic and environmental interests in Honduras which have as their principal opponent the government of Carlos Flores Facussé, in many situations the lives of those who defend such ideals are at risk: two leaders of movements in opposition to the hydroelectric projects have died in circumstances which have still not been clarified by the authorities.
Likewise, a clandestine military group aims to "clean up" the society by removing delinquent youth gangs; this group calls itself "Comando Papa" and is a response to the loose opposition that the security forces are making against the advance of violence. For their part, Nicaraguan separatists are claiming to act against the "historic abandonment" which they have experienced, a situation which was not resolved before the announcement of their annexation to Costa Rica. Although in this case the life of those affected is not threatened by the confrontation between opposing groups, if it is placed at risk in terms of quality of life. On the other hand, armed actions by the recently created "Armed Revolutionary Front" (FAR) respond to the lack of serenity demonstrated by Mr. Alemán in complying with his commitments to social development which he took on as a condition for the disarmament of the now extinct four guerrilla groups. Once again the president imprints the seal of improvisation on the solutions which he proposes for dealing with the problems when these become impossible to ignore.
Definitively speaking, the problems which are noted in the context of social protests mentioned above lay manifest the notable lack of interest which the authorities have demonstrated with regard to the situation of the social groupings of which they are an expression, as well as the lack of initiative for formulating and implementing integral solutions to these problems. The most negative consequence of this is experienced in some places in Guatemala, where lynching of criminals by the population are more or less frequent, taking, in this way, justice into their own hands when they are faced with the failure of the authorities to deal with the situation, is gaining ground. This philosophy supports committing actions outside the law as a response to the worrisome levels of insecurity. Moreover, the outbreaks of organized violence revive the risk of a new type of armed confrontation for social reasons —this time not tied to any political or ideological reasons—,which will make peaceful citizen coexistence extremely difficult.
For all the rest, FAR is a more evident indication that the armed opposition has not disappeared from the horizon of possible responses when faced with unkempt promises which, embarrassingly, are translated into abandonment and injustice which already form part of the structure of Latin American society. The Nicaraguan government does not tire of arguing, when faced with the problem of poverty in which the country is submerged, that the only reason why it has not succeeded in responding to the exigencies of the inhabitants of the regions in open conflict, but with this seems to ignore the scandalous investments it has authorized in the construction of public infrastructure and the increase in salary for high-level public functionaries approved a little more than a year ago, making them the best paid functionaries in all of Central America.
For its part, up until now the government of Honduras has not taken a position on the negative effects that the construction of the Patuca II dam will cause on the section of Honduras which is part of the "MesoAmerican Biological Corredor", which extends from Mexico to Colombia. Neither has any mechanism been established for compensating the villagers which will end up without land after the construction of the El Tigre dam. The stagnation in the negotiations to which certain political sectors of the country have alluded, because of the irregularities in the signing of the first agreement (implemented during the Cristiani-Cardenas administrations), neither does there seem to be sufficient reason for reconsidering the project: the National Agrarian Institute, one of the organisms which coordinated it, declared that it would carry out a census to determine the amount of indemnizations to be paid when the projects require them to proceed with the eviction of the inhabitants of the region, assuming, with this, that the evictions will proceed without resistance or obstacles.
The fact is that these kinds of policies do not even come close to presenting a solution to the problems that motivate the protests of the population. It seems easy enough for the governments of the region to continue ignoring the evaluations of the problem arrived at by the principal populations affected by them, but, with this, they could be placing at risk not only the citizens' security, but also the fragile social stability of each nation. The need to evaluate the problems from the point of view of their roots and origins, in a way that retrospectively attacks "front on and without truce" the structural evils of those that issue from this kind of social demonstrations, still is far from being the principal point within the official policies, much less are they the aspirations of the governments. Finally, in this way they leave themselves open to the population, which today condemns marginalization and abandonment from the point of view of the few openings which civil society offers them, tends to recognize organized violence as a useful tool for making them listen and for pressuring the authorities to comply with and respect their fundamental rights.
NEWS BRIEFS
INVESTIGATION. The Legislative Commission of the Legislative Assembly will investigate to find out if the new Ombudsman for Human Rights, Mr. Eduardo Peñate, complies with the requisites for being ratified in his position. This is owing to the fact that several denunciations against Mr. Peñate have been received by the Supreme Court (CSJ for its initials in Spanish). The Ombudsman was denounced, on February 17, for having committed serious delays in justice when he was Magistrate of the First Eastern Section of the Penal Court. The CSJ has nine files open as well against the functionary for alleged violation of the right to hearing and the right to defense, among others. Independent deputy, Mr. Arturo Argumedo, declared that, at the time, he advised his colleagues of the existence of the denunciations. Nevertheless, the 77 deputies who voted in favor of Mr. Peñate declare that they investigated the candidate and that he fulfilled the requisites required by the Constitution and the Organic Law for the Ombudsman for Human Rights. For his part, the President of the CSJ, Mr. Eduardo Tenorio, revealed that the Legislative Assembly "never asked formally for information concerning the denunciations", although he declared that the deputies did visit the Office of Judicial Investigation. He added that the deputies were offered all of the information on the Ombudsman, without hiding anything in the cases investigated (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, July 9, p. 8 and July 11, p. 4).
SUPREME COURT. The President of the Supreme Court (CSJ), Mr. Eduardo Tenorio, declared, on July 9, his discontent with the decision taken by the Legislative Assembly to form a special commission which would investigate the resolutions of the CSJ. Mr. Tenorio declared that this was an "intolerable, unacceptable and inadmissible" attitude. According to his arguments, the commission is not allowable when it deals with the leadership of another branch of state power. "The Judicial Organ, in accordance with Article 86 of the constitution, is a fundamental organism of the State... as fundamental as the Legislative Assembly", expressed Mr. Tenorio; adding that the intention to investigate is co-opted by the independence and authority of the judges. Likewise, he added that the Legislative Organism does not enjoy express attributions for creating special commissions. Nevertheless, Mr. Tenorio said that he does not fear the investigations of the Assembly and is disposed "at any time and in any place to confront any person" because he is supported by his twenty years of public service. "I have never resisted [any effort] to investigate me...I have never asked for a vote from a deputy and I repeat: if I have never asked for a deputy's vote, neither have I had reason to pay for political favors of any kind from anyone", he maintained (EL DIARIO DE HOY, July 9, p. 6 and LA PRENSA GRAFICA, July 9, p. 10).
DISCRETION AND RESERVE. On July 10, the Judge of the First Court of Instruction of Nueva San Salvador required complete reserve and discretion in the case of the kidnappings and urged those involved to modify the questions on the questionnaire which will be sent to Mr. Joaquín Villalobos. The resolution handed down by the judge explains that, on the basis of Article 97 of the Penal Code, reserve on these cases was decreed on the basis of the argument in "the public interest" and in order to avoid any obstacle in the investigation. That is to say that no communications media will have access to the trial. The Court Secretary, Mr. Carlos Sorto, explained, on the question of reserve, that it responds to the necessity for not politicizing the proceedings in which are included Mr. Shafik Handal, given that this is a pre-election year. With regard to the questionnaire, the National Association for Private Enterprise (ANEP, for its initials in Spanish), which is the accusing party, declared that it was not in conformity with the change in the written interrogatory because it considers that at no time is Mr. Handal treated as a defendant charged with a crime, as the Court argued at one point. According to the judicial resolution, the interrogatory should not include captious, suggestive questions; the questions should not employ coercion, deceit, promise or artifice [in the sense of trickery]. In this sense, the Attorney General's Office and ANEP will readequate the questionnaire so that it corresponds to the requirements of the Procedural Penal Code (EL DIARIO DE HOY, July 11, p. 2 and LA PRENSA GRAFICA, July 11, p. 6).
CONSTRUCTION. On July 8, the Ministry of Public Works (MOP for its initials in Spanish) declared that the freeway overpasses currently under construction will be finished in December of this year. Nevertheless, the contract stipulates that these projects can be finished in March of 1999. According to the head of the Special Projects Unit of MOP, Mr. Manuel Perdomo, the institution will make it possible for the projects to be presented before the end of the year, although "contractually [the period of time stipulated] is the first trimester of 1999". The four overpasses are being constructed by the Italian firm IMPREGILO with an overall investment of 60 million colones. Mr. Perdomo explained that the adjudication of the constructions to a single firm is because this firm offered the most economic and integrated solution to the problem of vehicular traffic. The current status of the two construction sites is that they are in the first stage of construction, which consists in the turning over of public services, such as telecommunications and rain water disposal close to the construction sites. In the case of the other two infrastructures, the work of turning over the services has not yet begun. "A whole process of is involved with the institutions involved in order to turn over the services", stated Mr. Perdomo, as he attempted to explain the delay in the period of time before which the construction would begin (EL DIARIO DE HOY, July 9, p. 14).
PRISONERS. On July 10, the Attorney General's Office declared an "alert" on the occasion of the second prison riot in less than a month in which 300 prisoners rioted in the Apanteos penitentiary. The prisoners were protesting the transfer of two of their prison-mates who were considered to be "leaders" of the riot which occurred on June 23 of this year in another penitentiary. Moreover, the prisoners requested that the judicial authorities move their trials forward, owing to the fact that the new law does not favor them as they would wish. Moreover, the prisoners demanded better living conditions and food. The head of the Regional Attorney General's Office of the Western Region, in the Department of Santa Ana, declared that "we are [in a state of] alert and emergency in response to any criminal activity might commit". Police Sub-Commissioner Oscar Aguilar declared that the National Civilian Police are on alert with regard to what could occur given the suspicion that the prisoners are preparing home-made arms with which to begin a new riot. As a result, the police raised roadblocks 100 feet from the building. A head count of the prisoners was carried out in order to determine if any had escaped during the riot. Prison Director Rafael Avilés stated the situation was under control (EL DIARIO DE HOY, July 11, p. 12).
POLICE DIRECTOR. Mr Rodrigo Avila, Director for the National Civilian Police will remain in his position in that institution during a second period, according to a report, on July 15, by the President of the Republic, Mr. Armando Calderón Sol. The president said that he had analyzed every department of the National Civilian Police, including the work of leadership, which led to the ratification in his post of the functionary and the application of legal reforms to the Law of the National Civilian Police and the disciplinary regulations of that institution. The goal of these determinations is to overcome the problems which that institution has suffered. Mr. Avila received the support of all of the political parties represented in the Legislative Assembly. Some deputies coincided in the fact that to call for the destitution of Mr. Avilés would be a mistake for the government given that Mr. Avila has achieved high levels of profesionalization in his post. For his part, the Vice President of the Supreme Court, Mr. Rene Hernandez declared that Mr. Aviles has led the police institution efficiently and that the lack of control over delinquency is owing to the fact that "the Executive Branch abandoned the police". Likewise, he expressed the opinion that the General Inspector of the National Civilian Police, Dr. Victor Valle,as he explained that the police chief has dedicated himself to bettering the quality of his work, within the possibilities of the resources available. He added that Mr. Avila is an honorable person committed to public security (EL DIARIO DE HOY, July 15, p. 3 and LA PRENSA GRAFICA, July 15, p. 6).
