Division in the FMLN: appearance or reality?

Economy

The evolutions of exports in the decade of the 1990’s

Society

Article 48 of the penal code and the problem of crime and delinquency

News Briefs

DIVISION IN THE FMLN: APPEARANCE OR REALITY?

Is the FMLN undergoing a process of democratization? Perhaps it is. But the convention organized to elect its candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency of the republic —the convention begun on Saturday, August 15 and which has not yet drawn to a close—is not the clearest representation of democratization; it is rather a manifestation of the contrary: it lays bare the intolerable lack of organizational capacity together with the lack of political vision of that left party. Is the FMLN prepared to govern the nation? The opinion of its leaders and most unconditional followers, is, of course, yes. Moreover, critical analysts do not overlook the ineptitude demonstrated by the FMLN in the organization of its national convention. If the FMLN is incapable of designing even the basic scenarios for the accomplishment of processes for the carrying out of its internal elections, will it be capable of designing and foreseeing possible scenarios in which national actors and leaders might be called upon to act? Or is it the case that each new situation will take it by surprise?

If the leaders of the FMLN could discard their sickly triumphal over projection, they would, perhaps, concern themselves more seriously with their more profound weaknesses. It might be a good thing for the party to decentralize itself and listen to voices from outside its own ranks; and not precisely those voices which tell it what it wants to hear, but rather those which attempt to point out its weaknesses and misprisions. It is time for the party to learn from its errors. But not only those errors that its leaders might be willing to recognize, but also those which are pointed out by those who have no interests in deifying themselves nor in deifying any of the "comandantes".

There are some things which are difficult to accept: one of the thorniest is the matter which indicates that divisions do exist within the FMLN. Time and time again, the leadership of the party insists that there are no divisions, only differences of opinion; they affirm that ideological pluralism is what exists inside the party. Every time one of its leaders mentions the topic, the same response can be expected: the most enviable harmony reigns throughout the FMLN. Some even say that the division between "the revisionists" and "the orthodox" tendencies does not exist, given that on innumerable occasions those who hail from one grouping change positions to the other grouping: one could say that, by this token, those presumed to be "orthodox" become "revisionists" and, by the same token, "revisionists" might come to assume postures which are characterized by the "orthodox" grouping.

As one FMLN deputy indicated, postures and positions adopted appear to depend on the topics under discussion and not on any previously assumed ideological identification. No one is able to affirm, however, that this mutation in postures and positions is produced when secondary topics are considered or whether it is when basic and fundamental topics are under consideration —such basic and fundamental topics as: commitment to the revolution, the conception and role of the party, the idea of socialism and democracy, the role of businessmen and the state in national development.

On the whole, then, it is possible that those who see that inside the FMLN there exists a serious internal division —a division characterized by two distinct ideological and political strategies— are totally mistaken. Looking at things this way, the FMLN suffers only from a minor problem, and it is the need to convince those who perceive the internal struggle among its rank and file of their mistaken perception. If they do not succeed in this, they will have to assume that there is a problem —if not of internal breakage into factions, at least one of credibility. And those who do not believe in the FMLN are surely not going to be willing to risk their vote for FMLN candidates in the up-coming elections next year. In an electoral process, what is important is not so much how the leaders conceive of the party —or even how its rank and file militants perceive it; it is, rather, a matter of how the population outside the party perceives it.

There are unmistakable indications that important social sectors in El Salvador perceive a situation in which two groupings coexist inside the FMLN and that, further, these groupings, factions or tendencies are engaged in a dispute for control of the party and that neither is willing to cede in its goal of displacing the other. Faced with this reality —which may decide itself whether the FMLN can or will govern or not— the siren songs of some of the FMLN leaders who shout at the top of their lungs that all is well in the party, that harmony and cordiality prevail over minor differences of opinion and that —even more!— these tendencies are characteristic of a democratic party serve for very little indeed.

If the social sectors mentioned above base their impressions on actual perceptions of the internal dynamics of the FMLN, then FMLN party leaders must be said to be totally removed from reality. But there is no reason not to accept the existence of a situation in which more than one member of the FMLN leadership sincerely believes that such divisions are non-existent. The challenge facing those who are sincere in this way, is that they should make every effort to reflect seriously upon what is really going on in their party. Neither is it inconceivable that more than one FMLN leader, knowing all the while that the conflict exists, and perhaps actually being involved in one of the factions confronting each other, might deny the situation over and over again. The challenge for those of this cynical persuasion is to accept the fact that, at bottom, they themselves are the only ones who are deceived. At any rate, as much those who are sincere as those who are cynical face serious difficulties in perceiving and coming to terms with the problematic of the party and it is precisely with this turning of a blind eye that they obstruct the possibility of dealing with the situation and coming to a solution. There is no greater obstacle to resolving a problem than to ignore it —or worse yet, to deny that it exists.

It is to be feared that the leadership of the FMLN might be undergoing a situation of cognitive dissonance with respect to its internal rupture. Were they openly to recognize this situation and work to overcome it, perhaps things would become simpler. To openly recognize the situation for what it is and work to overcome it implies reducing the formula for the candidates for presidency and vice-presidency to an expression of its fundamental division —between orthodox and revisionist factions— and not to a formula which, as in the case of the gender requirement which, over and above disguising and hiding the fundamental division, actually makes finding a solution more complicated.

THE EVOLUTIONS OF EXPORTS IN THE DECADE OF THE 1990’S

The promotion of exports was pointed out as one of the principal objectives of the economic reform initiated by the first Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA, for its initials in Spanish) in 1989. Nine years later, El Salvador enjoys relative macroeconomic stability and growth rates of between 3% and 7%; but this is not precisely because exports generate the production necessary for this growth. It is the family remittances which explain the macroeconomic stability and the economic growth, and these two factors are based principally in consumption.

Nevertheless, according to publications by the Communications Secretary of the Presidency of the Republic —in which is produced material from a Chilean newspaper—, ARENA’s economic reform took upon itself "laying the macroeconomic foundations destroyed during the civil war" and in this reform "participated numerous Chilean advisors [whose work] created a school [of thought ]". For some ex-functionaries the first ARENA government and, in general, for the apologists for the economic reform, this affirmation would be correct were it not for the fact that Salvadoran advisors and functionaries also participated. The "outstanding" results of the reform would be beyond discussion.

What is certain is that the results of the economic reforms are still very much under discussion. This cannot be considered to be necessarily positive in any absolute sense of the word because it can fall apart as rapidly and unexpectedly as the Asian banking system at the beginning of this year, independently of what has or has not been the result of the Chilean and/or Salvadoran advisory groups. It should be enough to point out the fact that the United States has applied the most severe migratory laws against undocumented Salvadoran workers who send remittances to their families residing in El Salvador. Exports would not be sufficient to maintain currency income at the necessary levels for sustaining stability and economic growth because its situation is worse than it was in 1990 when at least traditional exports represented an important proportion of total exports and of the Gross National Product.

In what follows below, we present a brief overview of the evolution of exports during the decade of the 1990’s with an eye to evaluating what their real contribution has been to such factors as balance of payment stability, currency exchange, prices and growth in production during the present decade.

When the behavior of total exports is examined, what most draws our attention is the loss in importance of traditional and non-traditional exports in relation to exports by the maquilas (runaway shops). So it is that, if in 1991 traditional exports represented 37.8% of all total exports, non-traditional exports represented 43.8% and the maquila 18.3%; for 1997 the percentages were 23%, 34% and 43%, respectively, which makes the category of the maquila exports the most important. It should be clarified that the maquila consists predominantly of the assembly processes for clothing in zones which are free tax-free and operated by foreign businessmen who, in general, pay minimum salaries to their employees.

Although in all fairness, it must be accepted that exports have grown during the last decade, neither can it be denied that they have not grown at the rhythm which stabilization of balance of payments and currency exchange rates require. Proof of the foregoing is that the trade balance continues to be negative and has even increased during the first semester of 1998, which implies that the country imports more than it exports. During 1997 it is estimated that exports reached U.S. $2,765 million, while imports to tallied out at U.S. $ 4,040 million. This is to say that there is a trade deficit of U.S. $1,275 million. This deficit could only be covered by the flourishing of family remittances (more than U.S. $1,200 million) and loans of more than U.S. $200 million.

An aggravating factor in this situation is rooted in the fact that the agricultural and livestock-producing sectors as well as the industrial sector find themselves farther behind than the figures for total exports might reflect. If the maquila contributions to total exports are excluded, it becomes clear that traditional and non-traditional exports become less and less important in the spectrum of total demand. If, for 1992, traditional and non-traditional exports represent 7.6% of overall demand, for 1997 they represent 7.3%, this is to say that they shrunk and, for this reason, cannot explain the increase in the GNP. For the first semester of 1998, preliminary data indicated that even traditional exports could undergo a reduction in comparison with the same period of 1997, although not so much because of the effect of economic policy, but because of conjunctural and exogenous variables such as the effects of the 1996-97 drought in the agricultural and livestock-producing sector and the fall in coffee prices.

The explanation for the relative solvency of the Salvadoran economy is not to be found so much in the growth of the productive sectors, but in the relatively clear movement towards becoming a service industry demonstrated by the economy, which has been alleviated by the flourishing of family remittances and the expansion in consumption which these remittances make possible. In fact, two the sectors which have benefited most from the growth have been commerce and financial services. The resources needed to maintain economic stability also come from the remittances because, as was pointed out earlier, the balance of trade exhibits chronic deficits.

The economic environment of El Salvador has improved, but this is not a product of a strengthening of its productive apparatus, but rather of its capacity to receive resources from abroad, be they family remittances or investment from the maquila. This poses serious limitations for the economic model because it means that it must depend heavily on factors outside of its control. There is no way in which economic policy can influence the behavior of remittances and, in the case of foreign investment, economic policy can positively influence foreign investment only when it can offer tax exemptions and a favorable legal context and climate favorable to the exploitation of natural resources and of the national labor force.

It is difficult to deny that a new generation of economic reforms is necessary in order to confront the problems of the economy becoming a service industry economy and the problem of greater and greater dependency on external resources. Nevertheless, it is also difficult to define the specific measures which such economic reforms should contemplate. Continuing to open up markets will not necessarily imply the resolution of the problems mentioned; it may, rather, deepen them, given that this implies leaving productive sectors even more unprotected as they face the competition of more efficient enterprises and, in many cases, more efficient subsidiaries. Nevertheless, neither will unleashing a process of state intervention on the market constitute a solution in and of itself.

In El Salvador, neo-liberal reforms have not been a success when one reviews the results, but this is because they have been joined with other factors which have facilitated a relative solvency in the economy. Even more so, then, are policies required which promote growth of traditional and non-traditional exports and, moreover, reduce dependence on family remittances.

ARTICLE 48 OF THE PENAL CODE AND THE PROBLEM OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY

After the passing of more than two years when the topic was number one on the public agenda of points to be discussed, much has been said on the matter of delinquency and crime —perhaps too much— without having reached the construction of an overall strategic vision which would satisfactorily and coherently explain the causes, manifestations and consequences of this phenomenon. With some exceptions, delinquency and crime —be it common crime or organized crime— has partially been taken up as a topic and with intentions foreign to those required for the examination of the problem so that it can be understood and a resolution to the problem reached. What is evident has been ignored: no plan or measure which could be applied would produce the necessary results for stopping crime unless there is a vision of the whole phenomenon.

But in El Salvador the problematic goes beyond the absence of this very essential element: the government, in its eagerness to commercialize the country abroad and carry out its administration, against all logic and reason, has been reluctant to recognize the true magnitude of crime and has minimized the responsibility which should be the government’s responsibility to seek a solution. To date, the role of the Executive branch has been reduced to blaming the media and public opinion for being responsible for the failure of the fight against crime.

Given the lack of vision and clear leadership which should characterize his work, the PNC as well as the Supreme Court and the judges have only been able to produce what is comparable to a fad of confusing cross-word puzzles, contradictions and mutual accusations. When the media indicates that it is the incompetence of the judges that results in the PNC not being able to comply with its duties and responsibilities, the judges attack the poor preparation of the police agents and their ignorance of procedural norms according to the law in order to apprehend a criminal. On the other side of the coin, when the media and the president of the republic point their accusing fingers at the PNC or the Ministry of Public Security, both argue back that the penal codes or the judges defend the rights of the criminals more than the rights of the population, thereby tying the hands of the PNC in their efforts to pursue criminals.

A factor which complicates the problem even more is the pressure which the media exercises in its ostensible role as presenters of citizen demands and needs and the attitude which the governmental agencies responsible for fighting crime assume when faced with citizen needs and demands. In this comparison, the acritical and politicized handling of public opinion has been fatally overwhelming. On the one hand, governmental agencies, in the confusion and lack of information and understanding of the problem of crime which characterizes them have been especially vulnerable to fault-finding efforts emanating from the press and public opinion (expressed in polls and citizen declarations). What has been lost from sight is that public opinion or the opinion of the media is not always the most on-point —nor is it the most qualified to discuss the validity of the measures to be drawn up and applied in the fight against crime. Certainly the voice of the citizenry ought to be taken into account at the point in time when this issue is discussed —and especially those whose ways of life and living are affected—, but this does not excuse, nor does it eliminate, the necessity for technical analysis and serene and lucid reflection.

On the other hand, and complementary to the first, this vulnerability has been fed, in good measure, by the politicizing of these national questions. Maintaining a good image has taken precedence —up to now— over acting well, as much with the political parties as with the governmental agencies. This may be a result of attempting to attract votes or ingratiate oneself into the good will of public opinion, many social protagonists involved in the fight against crime have not hesitated to become inconstant weathervanes when presented with the demands and declarations of citizens, even when these have been, on no few occasions, irrational and unfounded.

One of the clearest examples of this has been the coming and going of the declarations by the president of the republic on the question under discussion: when polls have demonstrated that those who were consulted held the opinion that crime had increased, Mr. Calderón Sol expressed the same opinion —even when he cannot support such opinions with official statistics which would provide validity to this perception—; if a good portion of the population calls for the death penalty as a response to crime, the president would surely not hesitate to defend this opinion and demand constitutional approval for it.

It is in this context that the polemic raised during the last few weeks should be considered; it has been brought into the public eye in the context of the polemic surrounding the Penal Code and the Procedural Penal Code, with especial focus on Article 48 of the Penal Code itself. The controversy came to light after declarations in the media concerning the application of the said article in the sense that the application of it would automatically free "thousands" of prisoners, because this legal norm provides for a situation in which "provisional detention of a person for an act for which he or she would be condemned could be paid with one day of prison for each day of provisional detention during a period of the first six months, with two days of prison for each day of provisional detention, for the period of time which does not exceed six months and not exceeding one year and, for three days of prison for each day of provisional detention during a period which does not exceed one year".

As one would expect, the reaction of the Legislative Assembly, the Supreme Court and the Executive Office has not been the most positive: frightened by reports which have brought to light many details and have unreasonably enlarged and magnified others, these three governmental agencies have thrown themselves into a confused and confusing judicial discussion which leaves out what ought to be the basic concern in the interpretation and application of Article 48: in what way does this article respond to the needs of a real struggle against crime. The absurdities into which this discussion is falling are vast: the discussion has centered on the formality of Article 48 and not on the spirit which gives it life and on the effects (both positive and negative) which this article would have in the correlation of arrest-sentencing-incarceration of the delinquent.

Deputies of the Legislative Assembly, the Supreme Court and the President himself, affected by demagogy and myopia —some in greater measure than others—, have paid little heed, in their analyses of Article 48, to two fundamental realities: the role which this would play in accelerating penal trials and the situation obtaining in the penitentiaries of the country. It appears to be the case that, up to this point, what has worried them is that the population will perceive that Article 48 shortens the periods of incarceration of some prisoners (to allege that all would be benefited is an unsustainable falsehood), ignoring the fact that some of these have had to spend more years in prison than the term in prison stipulated for their crime and that one of the causes of overcrowding in the prisons and penitentiaries can be located in just this situation.

We do not affirm here that the discussion of Article 48 is unjustified; it is rather the case that what is being pointed out is that this very discussion ought to take into account elements which, from all points of view it is more important to please and placate public opinion than to free oneself from the political cost of effectively carrying out a penal norm which, for the lack of information and knowledge on the subject and the Draconian enthusiasm of the citizenry, has become unpopular. For the way in which the discussion is being carried out, it is to be feared that the abrogation, modification or transfer from the Procedural Penal Code of the aforementioned article, more than resolving a conjunctural problem, could possible end by heating up an already explosive situation even more: the lack of capacity of the penitentiaries to receive prisoners in minimally humane conditions (which directly influence their possibility of moving from being simply places of incarceration to being institutions for social readaptation) and the law’s delays which make an exact application of justice inoperative.

LOAN. On August 19, the FMLN stated that it was willing to support the ratification of two loans for the National Civilian Police (PNC, for its initials in Spanish), one for U.S. $5.7 million and the other for U.S. $10,000. Representative of that left party, Mr. Humberto Centeno, said that their votes will be cast in favor only if the President commits himself to develop a policy of indebtedness. Moreover, Mr. Centeno stated that the FMLN considers that the president of the republic, Mr. Armando Calderón Sol, should not veto the reforms to the Law of Economic and Social Development (FODES), which provides for the distribution of 6% of the nation’s budget to the municipalities. At the same time, members of the FMLN demand a response to the proposal for the investment of funds from the sale of the National Administration of Telecommunications (ANTEL) in the reactivation of agriculture and highway infrastructure. The program for loans is provided by the government of the United States under Public Law 480. This consists in the U.S. government’s purchase of oil and animal fats which would then be given to the Salvadoran government which would, in turn, sell them to national businesspeople. The money obtained from these sales will be invested in several programs, such as the creation of a database of persons arrested, arrest warrants, records of prisoners, cases under investigation and start-up of the project for the "automation of information of the PNC 2000", among others (EL DIARIO DE HOY, August 20, p. 4).

ARTICLE 48. On August 19, deputies of the Legislative Assembly accepted the fact that they had committed an error in approving Article 48 of the Penal Code. This after they became aware that the said article will continue to permit freeing of condemned prisoners who wish to avail themselves of its benefits. According to the Magistrate who is President of the Penal Section of the Supreme Court, Lic. Roberto Gustave Torres, it is irrelevant if the deputies decide to abrogate, interpret or transfer the article, "the prisoners in provisional detention and who might possibly be condemned" can benefit from the article, owing to a judicial consideration denominated "ultro-activity of the intermediate law". All prisoners provisionally detained and sentenced up to and including April 20 of this year can avail themselves of this conversion of sentences. In the event that Article 48 might be modified, Article 407 of the same Penal Code provides for the same benefits to be continued to be applied. Confronting these arguments, the deputies decided to abrogate Article 48 of the Penal Code and they will, thereafter, present a bill to transfer the whole of the texts and provisions from the Penal Code to the Procedural Penal Code. Nevertheless, ARENA opposes the transference of the article to the Procedural Code and has taken up the presidential proposal which provides for one day of detention for one day of reduction in the sentencing (EL DIARIO DEHOY, August 20, p. 6 and LA PRENSA GRAFICA, August 21, p. 10).

CANDIDACY. On August 8, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC for its initials in Spanish) designated Mr. Rodolfo Parker as its presidential candidate in the 1999 elections. Mr. Parker has not been a member of the party and his nomination comes from professional, business and academic sectors, according to declarations by the general secretary of the PDC, Mr. Ronal Umaña, who added that the choice of this candidate was achieved after diverse consultations with several aspiring candidates who did not win the approval of the party leaders. The new candidate must enter into membership of the PDC and then begin a series of visits throughout the country. In the opinion of Mr. Umaña, one of Mr. Parker’s advantages is that he has not been a member of any political party and comes from civil society, these being two of the requirements presented by the CD and PD parties. Mr. Umaña, at the same time, declared his confidence in hopes that Mr. Parker will enjoy the support of the different tendencies within the PDC. "Hope is green", the political project of the PDC, will be inaugurated as a campaign slogan and project soon and this will stipulate the work which the presidential candidate will engage in during the campaign period leading up to the presidential elections and a government program. "This is a rigorously PDC project, but the possibility exists for a consolidation with the National Opposition Union (UNO, for its initials in spanish), to which formation the CD and PD parties have incorporated themselves. The Christian Democrats admit that the government platform must provide solutions for serious problems (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, August 21, p. 8).