The FMLN opts for the traditional

Public policies, private benefits

Delinquency and police inefficiency

News Briefs

THE FMLN OPTS FOR THE TRADITIONAL

 The FMLN finally elected its candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency of the republic. Those elected are two ex-commanders of the FMLN, representatives of the so-called revisionist wing of the party. Those not elected were two professionals who were not rank and file members of the party, but who are representatives of the so-called orthodox, or hard-line, tendency. In this way, the FMLN opted to elect two of its best-known militants with a long history in military careers, instead of leftist politicians not involved in that party’s internal struggles and, above all, not linked to the military conflict. The fact that the two elected candidates call themselves revisionist does not eliminate their antecedents, which, doubtless, will come to the fore in the heat of the electoral campaign, and place them on the defensive and thereby divert their attention away from the real problems of the country.

The election was possible because the FMLN adjusted its rules so as to make them more flexible. On this occasion the voting was for formulas and not for persons, thereby making the conformation of a formula made up of candidates of both tendencies impossible; another modification implemented was that the number of votes necessary in order to win was reduced to a simple majority. Likewise, the moderate quality of the participants’ spirits during the convention influenced the course of events; in this, the leadership of the party had much to do with the outcome, as well. It should be pointed out that the leadership of the orthodox current recognized and respected the wishes of the majority with aplomb and elegance.

So now, this is only the first step because what follows is the negotiation with the Social Christian Union Party, with which the FMLN is attempting to form a coalition. In theory, both parties ought to negotiate the candidacies of the coalition under discussion, which opens the door to changes which have not been openly discussed because the social Christians have their own candidates. But more important still, the unity of the FMLN is a task still pending. To think that the simple act of electing two revisionist ex-commanders of the FMLN automatically eliminates internal differences which for months have held the party in check, is a dangerous illusion. The very result of the voting is a fact that cannot be overlooked. The winners only won the advantage by a slim margin of 33 votes over their adversaries. It should not be forgotten that the votes of the more than one hundred delegates who did not attend the convention could incline the decision to the contrary.

The division of the FMLN is not caused by the candidacies presented but by the struggle for the control of the party. The candidacies served as instruments in this power struggle which, as it has not been satisfactorily resolved, will continue to cause new struggles and, simultaneously, continue to weaken the party, reducing its electoral possibilities as compared with those of ARENA. The call for unity against ARENA is nothing more than a mere shout in the dark. Slogans give animus to, but do not create, realities. Even when the political necessity to defeat a common enemy might succeed in uniting the FMLN —as is often the case— and should the FMLN win in the coming elections, the struggle for power will obstruct the creation of a consistent government which could satisfy the aspirations of the majority of Salvadorans.

As a consequence, the heart of the matter is to be focussed not in the exercise of democracy with which the FMLN has wished to distinguish itself, thereby setting an important precedent; the heart of the matter is, rather, in the solution which it attempts to find for the power struggle which exists in its ranks. The FMLN aims to resolve its internal unity problem with mechanisms oriented towards obtaining national power through elections. The revisionist ex-commanders might be able to satisfy the wishes of a good part of the party’s rank and file, but not those of a national electorate seeking an alternative. In the electoral arena, the FMLN can count on the votes of an important percentage of the electorate —called its "hard vote"— which is more inclined towards preserving its purity; but this is insufficient to defeat ARENA. In order to win, the FMLN must broaden its electoral base to include more than this sphere of influence and it is here where new, capable and fresh alternatives assume a decisive quality. Over and above confirming its democratic calling to society in general, the FMLN has demonstrated that it is not in step with the times and is out of step with the political realities of the country.

The FMLN confuses democracy with its own national convention. Democracy is a means for ordering collective life based on norms which are established, recognized and respected by everyone; the FMLN national convention, however, is an instrument for announcing candidates selected by means of more or less democratic mechanisms and governmental programs, agreed upon by consensus beforehand by the internal organisms of the parties. It is not customary to convoke a national convention by electing candidates and even less so in order to discuss and approve a government plan. The reason is simple: the structure of the convention does not permit delegates to discuss, decide and vote on the basis of their political maturity. This is what the so-called conventions are for, and there are diverse modalities for these events, but everyone coincides with permitting —some more than others, of course— the rank and file of the parties to express their choice with respect to aspiring candidates. The winner of the primaries is proclaimed in the convention. In its desire to discover internal democratic modalities, the FMLN forced its possibilities.

As important as democracy is, it has its limits. It would seem that by insisting on democracy, a belief has grown up that democracy can resolve all national problems. This is similar to what has happened with the idea of the market. One should ask of neither what it is not able to give. In not being aware of these limits, the FMLN needed three attempts in order to elect its candidates, changed its rules at a whim, gave arguments to other political parties for not following its example and clouded its image by not presenting what had been promised in the time frame that had been promised.

The political experience of the FMLN demonstrates how difficult it is to move from a military regime to a civil regime, from a military schema to a political schema, from authoritarian practices to democratic practices. The FMLN is still deeply immersed in its military origins and marked by the war years. The time which has passed since its legalization as a party does not seem to have been sufficient for the old military logic to have been abandoned, in which it is more concerned that what it does or leaves undone might not favor its adversary, than to do what it ought to do, independently of whether this favors its adversary or not. Paradoxically, the revisionists ended up opting for the traditionally way of doing things.

PUBLIC POLICIES, PRIVATE BENEFITS

The economic reforms encouraged by the state have presented results which are not precisely hopeful for the majority of the population, especially if one considers the higher levels of poverty currently prevailing. Deliberately or accidentally, public policies have caused changes in the productive activities which have only encouraged successive processes of concentration of income and wealth.

Privatization is the most recent economic reform and it points in the same direction, although with the variation that it permits the participation of international as well as national investors. The reform of the state is resulting in big business for international businesses which have invested in the companies which distribute electricity, in the telephone company and even in the Administrators of Pension Funds (AFP, for its initials in Spanish). Local groups with economic power have not stayed behind either, given that they acquired the banks which were reprivatized at the beginning of the 1990’s and maintain important levels of participation in the AFP and have acquired agroindustrial enterprises such as coffee and sugar processing mills.

The next step in the process of privatization is the sale of the generators of electrical energy, which include thermoelectrical generators and geothermic units located in thermal sources of the department of Ahuachapán. Likewise, the projection is to put up for sale the operation of the geothermic fields in the Department of Usulután. The operation of the four hydroelectric dams constructed at the mouth of the Lempa River and administrated by the autonomous Executive Hydroelectric Commission of the Lempa River are the only entities which would be left in the hands of the state.

Associated with the process of privatization, a series of negative effects have been observed which should not be ignored when evaluating public policies: these are the concentration of property in private enterprises, increases in the rates of interest, concentration of credit in service activities and immoderate increases in electrical and telephonic charges, among others.

It has not been possible to determine with clarity the concentration of property in private enterprises, but neither can it be denied that indications of irregularities in the process of privatization have been detected (at the beginning of the 1970’s)in banking, while privatization of businesses distributing electrical energy and the telephonic enterprise have implied greater participation by the big national and foreign investors. Any participation whatever by the sectors of intermediate and lower income is very unlikely and, if it exists, is not significant.

Although legal limits have been defined for the sale of public enterprises which established percentages for the big investors, the small investors and the workers in the enterprises, what is certain is that since its beginning, privatization has shown indications of irregularities. First, the sale of the banks was permanently surrounded by rumors concerning the use of strategies to avoid legal prohibitions with regard to the limit of shares which could be acquired by one single investor. It was, in addition, necessary for the Legislative Assembly to promulgate a specific law in order to mitigate the concentration of property in banks.

On the other hand, the privatization of electricity and telephone companies have implied the participation of foreign businesses in order to acquire 51% of the stocks in telephone and up to 75% of the shares in the electricity distributing enterprises. The remaining shares of these enterprises were distributed in the following schema: 20% for the workers and 5% to national investors.

An indirect effect of privatization of the bank has been related to the criteria for assignment of prevailing credit in the new private bank. If in the past the credit was concentrated among a small group of agricultural exporters, today it is controlled by sectors arising from agricultural experts, but now dedicated to service activities, including the whole gamut from business to financial services.

In recent times, interest rates have been considerably elevated as a result of private administration of banks, bringing them to levels which have caused even the business guild enterprises themselves to protest—especially the Salvadoran Chamber of Commerce for Construction (CASALCO, for its initials in Spanish) and other professional groupings engaged in agriculture and livestock. Consider the difference between active and passive rates—or "spread"—which are found at levels close to 19% in some of the principal banks, while the rate of inflation declared by the government for 1997 does not reach even 2%. Obviously, a good part of the stabilizing contribution of a fixed low inflation rate is lost if the interest rates do not behave in a coherent manner.

The panorama becomes even more complicated if one considers that the assignment of credits during the last decade has principally favored commercial activities and construction, relegating to a second level credit assistance to the agricultural and livestock sectors where half of the population of the country is concentrated as well as the greatest number of poor people. It is not unusual, then, that the agricultural and livestock sectors are currently facing contradictions in production at constant prices.

Fixing rates is another very delicate element to consider at the moment of privatizing basic service enterprises. In the case of energy, increases were announced almost immediately after the distribution companies were privatized. In fact, such increases were registered in the billing that they provoked reactions even in the Legislative Assembly and in the General Superintendency for Electricity and Telecommunications, which ended by sanctioning some of the distributors for the undue charges. All in all, increases in the charges for electrical energy are being contemplated which, for the moment, have been absorbed by the subsidies which the Executive Branch of government has provided for the consumption of electricity.

The results of privatization make clearer and clearer each day that the biggest winners in this process are the big investors. One can, with difficulty, argue that privatization is beneficial for the majority of the population. First of all, because one cannot access the property of privatized companies and, secondly, because when basic services are included, they are placed at the mercy of the voracity of national and foreign private enterprises.

Privatization could have been beneficial if access to the property of the privatized enterprises had been guaranteed to the workers. The manner in which it was implemented, as not been more than another test of the relationship between public policies and the search for personal gain by a small group of businessmen, generally very close to government or foreign investors which are taking advantage of the different processes of privatization which are being implemented around the world.

DELINQUENCY AND POLICE INEFFICIENCY

Faced with the problem of a presumed increase in delinquency, the population in general, guided by those in charge of the system for citizen security, blame the reforms on the penal codes and the procedural penal codes, on the laws in general and, especially on those codes which are classified by the citizenry as being weak and which favor the delinquents.

The viability of the death penalty, as a form for alleviating the phenomenon of delinquency, has again come up on the agenda for discussion by all sectors of Salvadoran society. People call for more rigid laws, for an increase in the number of police agents in the National Civilian Police and for training them better, as well as strengthening the institution itself.

Nevertheless, the perception of the population is that the National Civilian Police carry out fine work and that the problem of delinquency is rooted in the judges who pamper and favor delinquents by freeing them.

In the public opinion poll on delinquency carried out recently by the University Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP, for its initials in Spanish) of the UCA, 39 per cent of the population consulted held the opinion that judges have a greater responsibility in the problem of delinquency; 18.6 per cent held the opinion that the police have the greatest responsibility and 40.5 per cent hold the opinion that both are responsible.

Even the Director of the National Civilian Police, Mr. Rodrigo Avila, assures us that the institution which he directs has its hands tied by the justice system of the country and has repeatedly asked to modify the codes in such a way that they provide the police with a certain margin of freedom to act.

If it is true that a quota of responsibility for the fact that delinquency has not decreased may be laid at the door of the reforms to the penal codes and the procedural penal codes. This problem still cannot be reduced to a single aspect; it is necessary to take into account that the roots of the existence of that phenomenon are structural and complex and so, the ability to combat them and thereby diminish the phenomenon will depend on measures of the same kind.

The persistence of delinquency as well is owing to the fact that the effectiveness of the persecution of crime is very low. Delinquency cannot be diminished if robberies, assassinations, rapes, etc. are not investigated and if arrests are not made. According to the report of the National Council on Public Security, in 1996 saw the commission of 6,792 homicides, while only 415 persons were arrested for homicide—that is to say, only 6.1 of the presumed murderers. On the other hand, a columnist for the Diario de Hoy declares that 90 per cent of car thefts, fraud, kidnappings, contraband, narcotics trafficking, etc., is never clarified. As exaggerated as this may seem, it is possible that the columnist is not far from the truth, given that, according to data published in the Prensa Gráfica during the last three years, close to 20,000 persons were victims of homicide, but only 1,500 persons were brought to trial for these crimes. The remaining murders must surely be filed in Police Headquarters or in the office of the District Attorney’s Office.

The lack of effectiveness in the institutions charged with citizen security can be said to be owing to their not having the capacity to deal with the number of denunciations presented daily, or that they do not count on the necessary mechanisms so that all of the cases might be resolved (the crime investigation branch of the National Civilian Police does not have sufficient personnel, declares its director repeatedly. In order to combat delinquency, the creation of a specialized structure must be created so that information and analysis might be carried out in order to anticipate and counterbalance criminal acts.

Constitutionally, it is the obligation of the state to provide security for the citizenry; nevertheless, 72.3 per cent of the population polled by IUDOP in their polling on crime held the opinion that the government is not solving the problem of delinquency and the reasons most frequently given are that it is because it does nothing about it (49.3 per cent) or simply because it is incapable of doing anything about it (18.2 per cent).

But the government and institutions such as the National Civilian Police or the District Attorney’s Office can do very little without the collaboration of the citizenry. People must forget their fear and understand that in order for justice to be done, the crime first of all must be reported. Authorities cannot act without a report on what happened. Of 315 persons assaulted between January and April of 1998, only 29.2 per cent reported the crime, according to IUDOP data. The population maintains silence and indifference as it faces the violation of its rights or the rights of others.

On the other hand, for a person to be incarcerated or punished according to the law, the Attorney General’s Office and the judges, as well, require witnesses who can prove that a crime has been committed. But very few persons do this and those who do dare to do it must suffer distinctive kinds of intimidation and threats, given that in the country there is no mechanism to protect the security of witnesses.

Probably the reforms to the codes do not adapt well to the needs of the country; nevertheless, in the measure that the population collaborates with the justice system and denounce criminal acts, a greater efficiency in the use of the codes might possibly be achieved. In the fight against crime the whole of Salvadoran society must be involved, not only the laws or those who enforce them. we must all accept our quota of responsibility and must become actors, as well, in the matter of citizen security.

[This article by Leida Monterroza, IUDOP analyst]

POLITICAL PARTIES. According to the most recent GALLUP-CID poll during the last trimester, ARENA holds the advantage over the FMLN by five percentage points on the question of Salvadoran political preferences. The study demonstrates that of each of 100 Salvadorans, of adult age, 26 declare that they prefer ARENA and 21 the FMLN. Nevertheless, both parties have increased the number of their followers as ARENA demonstrates a gain from 23% to 26% and the FMLN from 19% to 21%. The remaining 5% of political support is distributed among political parties such as the Christian Democratic Party, the PCN and LIDER. On the other hand, a majority of some 48% exists which is made up of those who state that they have no preference for any of the political parties. In this sense, the presidential candidate for ARENA, Mr. Francisco Flores, said that the polls reveal that "our party is ascending and increasing the distance between the stalemate which we had during this year". For his part, the candidate for the FMLN, Mr. Facundo Guardado, expressed the opinion that the poll demonstrates a constant between both parties. "I believe that the difference is that ARENA defined its candidacy six months ago. The tendency continues to be 50% possibility of each party, on the question of efficiency for heading up the elections for 1999", he stated (EL DIARIO DE HOY, September 29, p. 2).

DRA. AVILES. The presidential pre-candidate for the FMLN, Dr. Victoria de Avilés declared, on September 9, after the convention, that her defeat will not motivate her to give up her militancy in the party. "I believe that it is necessary to continue supporting the FMLN; we have to become a party with an image as a single pluralist party", she stated. Likewise, she added: "I have not been defeated. In the first round I was a winner. In the second I won and this was when the formula entered into competition and the sovereign decision of the convention members must be respected". On the question of the election, Dr. Avilés said that she hoped that the process had been transparent: "I do not know, I cannot express any other opinion". For his part, Dr. Salvador Arias stated, with relation to the results of the convention: "we were for the democratic process of the party and we said that the decision to be taken is that we should accept the results…and that is the result of democracy, we accept the decision". He added that, in spite of the various problems that transpired during the election, "there has now been a voting procedure well carried out and the electoral commission monitored the process. Moreover, I have not heard of any abnormality". For his part, Mr. Shafik Handal, leader of the orthodox line of the FMLN, said that now the most important thing is to maintain unity in the party (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, September 28, p. 5).

THE FORMULA. The FMLN finally elected, during its September 27 convention, its presidential formula to run in the 1999 elections. Mr. Facundo Guardado and Ms. María Marta Valladares won against Drs. Victoria de Avilés and Salvador Arias by 33 votes of the convention members—or, 463 to 430 votes, respectively. The next step is the discussion phase of the candidacy of the coalition with the Social Christian Union, whose candidate is Mr. Abraham Rodriguez. Mr. Mauricio Salazar, Deputy for the USC, declared that his party will not request a modification of the FMLN formula. "It was never a conditioning factor on our part that the vice-presidential or presidential candidate had to be from the USC. We are going to give our total support by means of a concertation which will marginalize the neoliberal political line of the ARENA party", expressed Mr. Salazar. For his part, Mr. Guardado declared that he did not compete in the internal election in order to defeat anyone. "The only adversary for us and for the FMLN is the totality of the right-wing which is reconcentrating economic power in few hands and forcing our country into poverty and misery," stated Mr. Guardado, while, at the same time declaring that an FMLN victory is a victory for the country (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, September 28, p. 4).

AGRICULTURE. The agricultural and livestock producing sector of the country declared, on September 25, its concern about the recent sanction of the Law Governing Free Trade Zones and Commercialization because, according to sources allied with this sector, this will facilitate the multiplication of free-trade zones and, as a consequence, contraband will increase. For his part, Mr. Ricardo Quiñonez Avila, Minister of Agriculture, and Ms. Vilma Hernandez de Calderón, Vice-Minister of Agriculture, explained that the impact that the new law will have is that, as more free-trade zones are inaugurated in the country, with the advantages that the new law offers, it will be possible to "engage legally in contraband". In this sense, it is feared that adequate mechanisms cannot be employed within the artificial borders, such as the free-trade zones, in order to avoid contraband. Likewise, they explained that the distortions in the market would become more severe if an adequate combination of the current law with a clear policy with regard to the said distortions did not exist in such a way as to put a brake on these distortions which place them at a disadvantage as they face national competition. The ministers of agriculture and the economy are currently analyzing the possibility of introducing new legal concepts because, according to them, "that is where the response to the concerns of the sector [might be found]" (EL DIARIO DE HOY, September 26, p. 32).

REFORMS. The Chamber of Commerce for Agriculture, Livestock and Industry of El Salvador (CAMAGRO, for its initials in Spanish) and the inter-guild coordination for small enterprise presented, on September 24, two bills calling for reforms to articles 3 and 6 of the new Law Governing Free-Trade Zones. In the bills, the businessmen in small enterprise proposed various measures and norms for protecting the national producer from possible "inundation by foreign products", that could come in subsidized by the international market. According to the businessmen, the reforms will permit a major participation by national agricultural and livestock products in the offer of raw materials for production in the free-trade zones, at the same time that it will expand free commercialization of sugar and sugar derivatives and sub-products of national origin. The president of CAMAGRO, Mr. Ernesto Gonzalez, clarified that the sector is not against the law per se, but did indicate that the sector was not consulted before the approval of the law, and that at the national agricultural and livestock sector is left at a disadvantage as it faces foreign producers. The deputies for ARENA who received the bills said that the document would be presented for study so that by September 30, the reforms could be discussed with the Chamber of Commerce (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, September 5, p. 40).

CODES. On September 24, the Legislative Assembly unanimously approved 27 reforms to the Penal Code which aim to make the work of the National Civilian Police easier in its efforts to fight crime. The only proposal for reform which was not approved was one that which deals with searches without a court order because some parties held the opinion that this could contradict the Constitution of the Republic. One of the reforms consists in the suppression of Article 176 of the Penal Code currently in effect, which prohibits searches during the night. With these reforms, the National Civilian Police can carry out operations during the 24 hours of the day with a court order in hand. Likewise, the requirement for the presence of two witnesses during a search and seizure operation was omitted, leaving in effect as the only requirements the signature of the police and of a functionary in charge of the search in the provision governing inspection and searches. Mr. Walter Araujo, of ARENA, declared that the reforms demonstrated that "we have a constitutional situation which protects us and [we have] rights and guarantees which are making us a democratic and civilized people". Currently, the only reforms pending, and under study, are two articles: Article 48 of the Penal Code, concerning the reduction of sentences and Article 177 of the Procedural Penal Code which concerns searches without a court order (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, September 25, p. 5).