A mistaken struggle

Orthodoxy and heterodoxy in the fmln

Development, poverty and environmental deterioration

The problem of re-ordering downtown San Salvador

News Briefs

A MISTAKEN STRUGGLE

Delinquency is on of the two most serious problems besieging the Salvadoran population and, in order to fight it, it is important that the population itself participate in the struggle. In this context, the commitment of the National Association for Private Enterprise (ANEP, for its initials in Spanish) may be a determining factor, as it is in other aspects of national reality. However, the methodology proposed for this struggle is mistaken. Crime cannot be fought by launching crusades or by demanding reform of the penal codes. Apart from the fact that crusades have never been such a good thing because of their high level of emotional and even irrational content; additionally, replacing laws is not necessarily an effective action.

Combating crime is neither the responsibility of the population, nor of private enterprise, but of public security and police forces. The population can collaborate and it is very desirable that it do so, but it is not the function of the population. Currently there exists a dangerous tendency to stimulate the activity of private organizations to assume what should be state functions. No private organization can replace the state in matters of security, education, health, housing and jobs. It is a very fashionable illusion to pretend to attribute these responsibilities to private entities and this is a result of the privatizing mentality of neoliberal proponents.

This is a very delicate matter given that one of the objectives of the crusade is to organize the population to seek out criminals. In fact, in some areas, such organizations already exist under the auspices of the National Civilian Police itself. Apart from not being a responsibility of the population, the population is not prepared to assume this task and, given the antecedents and the current situation, it is not difficult to imagine what will happen if armed citizens set out to free their neighborhoods of criminals. This proposition is a logical consequence of the thesis that sustains the theory that criminals have no rights; only honorable citizens have rights. In this way, all that will be achieved is an increase in violence.

The terrain is fertile because of the anxiety in which the greater part of the population lives as a result of crime. Actually, crime has undermined the confidence of everyone else —above all those who seem different. Unfortunately, there are already examples of the practice of so-called social cleansing in the assassination of criminals, homosexuals and alcoholics. The anxiety of the population is based on the accumulated effect of what they have experienced in having been the repeated victims of crime and their frustration, as they perceive a lack of effective response on the part of public security authorities. The population is the repeated victim of crime and violence, and, even though the severity of the situation is recognized, the situation is not being taken care of satisfactorily. Again, all indicators point to public security forces and the police as well as —in the last analysis— the government.

Echoing the argument, which the government uses to justify its incapacity to respond satisfactorily, ANEP has placed reform of the penal codes at the center of its crusade. To insist on this point is to demonstrate a lack of understanding with regard to the complex problem of public insecurity and, what is worse, to contribute to disguising its origins. Contrary to the premises upheld by the government, recent data exhibits a tendency in which the incidence of crime is not growing —another thing altogether is that it is becoming concentrated and more specialized. The growth, therefore, occurred when old penal codes, which were supposedly more strict, were in effect.

Much more important than the reform of the penal odes is the consolidation of the Ministry of Public Security, the National Civilian Police and the justice system as institutions. As long as the police do not investigate crime, insecurity will continue to be a serious problem in El Salvador. Police activity must begin with organized crime and not with common crime, as it seems ANEP aims to do. And part of this activity ought to place special attention on parallel structures or death squads and crime, which operate inside of or very close to some of the state institutions.

The success of this endeavor depends on an efficient intelligence structure, which the Ministry of Security and the police themselves lack, but not the Presidency of the Republic, in whose shadow is to be found the so-called Organism of State Intelligence. If this institution is not informed about the activities of organized crime and the parallel structure it is because it is inefficient or because its activities are dedicated to gathering political intelligence, something which is not within its province to do. If it is informed and does not act, it is because there is criminal complicity involved. Whatever the explanation, that organism does not fulfill the function attributed to it by the law and, therefore, ought to be either reformed or simply eliminated.

In the measure in which organized crime and parallel structure may be persecuted, common crime will begin to diminish because this is frequently linked to organized criminal activity. A struggle without limits against impunity might contribute enormously to public security and might stimulate the population to collaborate with state organisms.

The reforms proposed by ANEP are ill conceived and demonstrate a class bias, which cannot be hidden. Instead of concerning itself with organized crime and parallel structures, it deals with common crime. Instead of making an effort to understand the phenomenon in its totality, it unleashes its anger against juvenile delinquency, even proposing a violation of the international treaty, which defines a child as a person under the age of eighteen years. Instead of including in its proposal corruption, tax evasion and destruction of the environment, it concerns itself almost exclusively with the theft of trailer and container trucks and the kidnapping of wealthy persons.

ANEP’s vision of crime and violence is too narrow and simplistic. It has not learned how to become independent of the discourse, with which the ARENA government aims to justify its failure in the matter of public security. Instead of repeating governmental arguments, it ought to have analyzed the problem using greater objectivity and it might thereby have been able to propose efficacious measures. ANEP would do well to use its power and its means to question the government of Mr. Calderón Sol and force it to present a coherent and integral policy on security. To use that potential in a crusade is to enter into a mistaken struggle.

ORTHODOXY AND HETERODOXY IN THE FMLN

The month of May this year was the period of time during which the discussion concerning internal struggles of the FMLN began. The "orthodox members" and the "revisionist members" were the terms with which the press pointed out the factions at the heart of the FMLN, which debated the future, and orientation of that party. Already in the National Convention held during the month of September of 1997 the existence of such a struggle had surfaced. But the discussion concerning it intensified after it was made public in an anonymous document called "CONCERNING THE PRESENT COURSE OF THE FMLN"—the source of which was presumably the "orthodox" tendency.

The heads of each tendency were clearly identified, since that time: Shafick Handal and Salvador Sanchez Cerén as leaders of the orthodox line and Facundo Guardado as the principal figure in the revisionist group. According to the media, the infighting came from the FPL, the organization from which Cerén and Guardado hail. Other tendencies inside the party have indicated their support of one or the other of those personalities. So it is that Shafick Handal opted for the orthodox option of Sanchez Cerén, while FMLN members such as Raul Mijango and Dagoberto Gutierrez are adherents of the modernizing proposal of Facundo Guardado.

The polemics concerning these tendencies in the principal left party were lessened as the hour approached for the FMLN to elect its presidential formula. And, in fact, it was this very moment in which the in fighting surged anew. This time it was with the participation of the rank and file, which, added to the fact that on this occasion the party played a role as one of the determining factors in the 1999 elections, lent greater force and complexity to the dispute. The first (and disastrous) National Convention of the principal opposition party made clear that the rank and file had made the conflict between the orthodox and revisionist tendencies their own. Slogans from the convention participants or the aggressive and lack of respect to which Dr. Hector Silva was subjected, made evident the virulence with which the FMLN, members especially of the conservative wing, took up the internal part of the discussion.

So then, behind all of these representatives of the FMLN and beyond the analyses corresponding to each one of the conjectural situations mentioned, there is room to explore a little more closely the internal struggle which currently shakes the FMLN. What, exactly, does it mean when one speaks of orthodox and revisionist tendencies? Do these terms indicate a lack of substance as the press adopts them in an arbitrary manner? Or are they concepts, which clearly reflect internal problems in the FMLN? Is there a real ideological and doctrinal discussion at the bottom of all this or is it a matter of nothing more than a power struggle for the control of the party?

In order to attempt to present a reply to these questions, it might be appropriate to clarify the sense in which public opinion has understood the word orthodox and revisionist in the concrete case of this polemic. One takes the term orthodox to indicate those members of the FMLN who question the work of Facundo Guardado as Secretary General of the party, accusing him of moving the party in a "rightward" direction, of forgetting the true horizon or direction —the socialist direction— and of following and accepting the precepts of neo-liberalism. Those who defend the need for a change inside the party which would allow room for the review and change of the traditional centers of action and which would allow for a potential in dialogue with the various sectors of society are called revisionists.

Orthodoxy has been called, then, the "nostalgic" wing of the party, adhering strongly to the older lines and contexts of Marxism-Leninism, who are not willing to accept the demands for transforming the country and are those who are stagnating in an ideology which prevailed in the left during the war. The revisionist current has been, on the other hand, identified with moderate, pragmatic and progressive ideas close to the new national reality, inclining towards change and tolerant of dialogue.

The document "CONCERNING THE PRESENT COURSE OF THE FMLN" underscores very well the ideological platform of what has come to be called the conservative tendency in that party. One cannot help but notice the fact that, in spite of the fact that no one wanted to take responsibility for the writing of the document, Sanchez Cerén has indicated his agreement with what is expressed in it. Even more noteworthy is the fact that, only a little while later, Dagoberto Gutierrez published in a San Salvador afternoon daily what appeared to be a response to the document in question but which, however, did not present substantive differences with the ideas it proposed to question. In this article, Gutierrez sustained the position that his party continued to be a revolutionary party and that his fundamental objective continued to be the coming to power with the objective of installing a socialist state. The author added, however, that, of course, this fact could not be mentioned in front of his fellow party members owing to the fatigue which these felt with regard to everything that had to do with social systems and proposals aimed in that direction. In any case, the important thing was to ignore the pessimists who rejected the Secretary Generalship of Guardado because, in spite of his negativism, the FMLN would continue its struggle, this time inside a democratic context, and would take the executive office in March of 1999.

In open contrast with the words of the "revisionist" Gutierrez, are to be located the words of the "conservative" Handal in some of his more recent discourses. It turns out that, appearances to the contrary, the ideas of Shafick Handal enunciate a much more novel posture and are more closely aligned to the stage of democratic transition than those held out by his ideological opponent. Far from making any allusion to a socialist state or to a revolutionary party, the lively discourse of Handal is directed, above all, towards the institutionalization of democracy. Moreover, the old banners of right-wing discourse, such as the insistence on the modernization of the state —are to be found taken up in the premises posed by the FMLN head of faction.

That this moderate discourse is owing to a pragmatic posture on the part of the legendary FMLN figure is an argument which could be alleged in order to place in doubt the sincerity of his commitment to democracy. Well then, this is precisely one of the points in which the confusion is rooted, which doubtless persists in the debate concerning the tendencies inside the FMLN. There is an erroneous tendency towards identifying pragmatic measures with revisionist or moderate postures, without taking note of the fact that pragmatism has very little to do with the ideological convictions of the cadre or the tendencies. In this way, one of the personalities of the party might characterize himself as having an ability to engage in dialogue, achieve accords or arrangements and obtain certain things in his favor —which would make him a pragmatist— without this signifying at all that his intention is to abandon traditional ideas, as retrograde and questionable as these may be.

One can state definitively that it is not possible at this point to determine with any exactitude who in the FMLN merits being called orthodox and who revisionist. Guardado and his people say they belong to a moderate left, but, with the exception of the publication by Gutierrez —which seemed more to favor orthodoxy— there have been no official statements in this regard. Paradoxically, the discourse of the conservatives is laden with content which proposes the renovation of ideas and defends the democratization of the country. In spite of this, Sanchez Cerén agrees with some points in a document, which for all the rest is pamphleteering and anachronistic, but for which no one has taken responsibility in the last analysis. The only conclusion which can be drawn from all of this is that the polemic surrounding orthodoxy and heterodoxy inside the principal left party is very confused and forms part of all of those dark aspects of that party which the leaders of the FMLN refuse, until the last consequences, to confront.

DEVELOPMENT, POVERTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERIORATION

A comparative review of the history of developed and underdeveloped countries what one notices especially is that many countries rich in resources can come to be underdeveloped while others less well endowed achieve greater levels of development. This is owing, principally to the influence of public policies on economic and social matters be this by means of subsidies, regulations and investments.

In El Salvador, as well as in the majority of underdeveloped countries, the results of the models of economic growth have demonstrated an apparent contradiction between economic growth and reduction of poverty and conservation of the environment. Models of agricultural exportation and industrialization as in substitutions for import as well as those of a more neo-liberal bent, have encouraged economic growth without considering their possibilities for improving the conditions of life of the population and that the growth is not accomplished at the cost of an irreversible loss of natural resources.

The developed countries have assumed those problems for more than twenty-five years; however, there still does not exist an effective schema for countering the negative effects of growth. This situation compromises the traditional models of economic development, owing to the limits, which impose not only the exhaustion of natural resources, but also the lack of satisfaction of the basic needs of the majority of the population.

This set of problems requires basic institutional reforms. This becomes clear as one examines the historic evidence concerning the institutional functioning of the state, which lays bare a policy initially considered necessary for development can become completely counterproductive for the state. It becomes clear, even at the present time, that in spite of the evidence concerning the public policies in the search for development, firm measures have not been taken to attack the historic results of development as this has traditionally been conceived.

The absence of criteria for sustainability in the use of natural resources is exemplified clearly in the examination of specific cases, such as the operation of the Executive Hydroelectric Commission of the Lempa (CEL). On the other hand, the inefficiency in its institutional conduct is reflected in the behavior of some of the entities related to the protection of natural resources and the planning for development, such as: the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG, for its initials in Spanish) and the no longer existent Ministry of Planning and Coordination for Economic and Social Development (MIPLAN, for its initials in Spanish).

So then, since the decade of the 1950’s, CEL took charge of developing the hydroelectric potential of the Lempa River and, afterwards, of the generation of electricity by means of thermal and geothermal means. Evidence exists that the construction of big dams on the Lempa River generated negative effects in the measure that it provoked massive migrations of the population, flooding of productive lands and forests, migration of wildlife and even loss of valuable infrastructure such as bridges and highways. The situation becomes more serious if one considers that the use-life of the dams has diminished drastically —as a result of their filling up with silt as a result of bad management.

One could likewise point out that the construction of these big infrastructural projects did not comply with the majority of the objectives sought in their construction, at least in the case of the Cerrón Grande dam because, although this dam fulfilled the objectives of increasing the generation of electricity, it did not satisfy other objectives: the prevention of flooding of the lower Lempa River and massive rural electrification.

Paradoxically, the elevated social and environmental costs of the construction of the dams were in vain because they could not avoid, since the decade of the 1980’s the fact that CEL dedicated itself to the implementation of new projects related to the generation of electricity by thermal means. Still more surprising is the fact that at the present time a study of new projects for the construction of hydroelectric dams for the Lempa River basin is in process.

Another important weakness in governmental policy is the lack of attention to fundamental problems of development which ought to be attended to by the state, even when institutions created for these objectives exist. MAG, for example, has entities charged with overseeing the protection of natural resources, under the umbrella formation of the General Direction for Renewable Natural Resources (DGRNR) and sustained by a body of laws created for the support of this work. There exist no less than five dependencies which are related to the preservation of the environment, but which in practice are totally overwhelmed by real demands.

The situation gets worse when one considers that, in the decade of the 1990´s , as a result of the process of the reduction of the state, the activities of these entities has diminished. Principally owing to a drastic contraction of the budget of the DGRNR, the flight of professional personnel an the lack of resources for carrying out its functions. Even for the year 1999, the government proposes in the budget for the nation a new reduction for the budget category assigned to MAG.

The reduction of personnel in the DGRNR does not imply, however, that the total personnel assigned for the preservation of the environment might have diminished because, since 1992, institutions parallel with the DGRNR, with similar objectives, such as the National Council for the Environment (CONAMA), the Executive Secretary for the Environment (SEMA) and, more recently, the Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources (MARN).

Nevertheless, MARN also confronts the enormous challenge of obtaining a more elevated budget that would permit the development of effective actions in order to modify the guidelines for the use of natural resources. For 1998, the budget for MARN was only 25 million colones, which represented 0.2% of the General National Budget and it is hoped that the situation will be maintained almost without change for 1999.

The elimination of MIPLAN is, probably the clearest demonstration of short-range vision government policy. MIPLAN was in charge of the formulation of budgets for political economy, social and environmental matters to achieve the big development plans. However, with the arrival of neo-liberal style governments, MIPLAN was suppressed and social and political economy adjusted to the objectives of maintaining macro-economic stability while encouraging growth. This posture mistakenly presupposes that this is not necessary to plan government policy measures.

The somber panorama of environmental deterioration together with inequality implicit in traditional development models suggests that radical measures are required in order to turn back the situation; these measures can be applied only with difficulty in a political context where neo-liberal economic doctrine is preached. Nevertheless, at the present moment it is least possible to request that the state assume its role as facilitator for development with greater seriousness, empowering the institutions related to social and environmental areas.

THE PROBLEM OF RE-ORDERING DOWNTOWN SAN SALVADOR

The city of San Salvador, in a perfect reflection of the country to which it belongs, is a city which for a long time has developed in an erratic way, blindly bumping into obstacles as a grew. It is a city in which ideals such as civic order and rationality have been words which fall on deaf ears as the city’s citizens go about their daily routine. The results of such ideas and practice are evident to all, although, it seems, not sufficiently evident to attempt to envision a new horizon and design a viable strategy for arriving there. This year, however, hopeful signs have been perceived, emanating from the spheres of civil society and government, which might permit one to suppose that there exists at least a willingness to change the current situation so that it can benefit everyone.

The launching of the document BASES FOR A NATIONAL PLAN and the subsequent discussion of that document —as polemical and open to criticism as are many of the elements in the process—, the signing of an agreement for collaboration between private enterprise and the San Salvador Mayor’s office and the decision —a first— with which the Vice Ministry for Transport and the National Civilian Police have set about putting the capital city’s vehicular chaos in order, and allows for the affirmation that the first steps are now being taken towards overcoming the lamentable status quo in which we have lived up to now.

Still more important, and parallel with this dynamic, the population has begun to understand that its participation in the rational re-ordering is necessary so that we can all live together in harmony. An example of this is the support and sympathy with which the Plan for the Recuperation of the Historic Downtown Area, was received, even when it implied re-location —at moments, by force— of a large number of small street-sellers. That the people at street-level who have traditionally been opposed to government policies, have understood that not everything that comes from the state is counterproductive to their interests and have harshly censured the street-sellers who refused to leave their stalls voluntarily, is a hopeful sign because one feels the upsurge in favor of a great change. The task at hand and now begun, however, is still a long-term and difficult one, given that the vices which make up the current situation are profoundly rooted in the greater part of Salvadoran society.

Today, downtown San Salvador has become a place where these ancient problems confront a new mentality which aims to prevail, and in this way coming to represent a privileged space for determining the real possibilities for changing the rest of the city, not to mention the rest of the country. This is, then, the process of re-ordering the downtown area —the symbolic and historic heart of the city in which is made manifest —with particular intensity— the majority of the defects of Salvadoran society— becomes a good indicator of what might be expected in the future of a process of rationalization of the national public areas.

Because of the preceding, it is interesting and useful to analyze the conflict during the last week between the transportation authorities and the owners of the route 42 and 42B bus lines as a result of a sudden change in the routes of the 42B line which passed through one of the principal streets of the downtown area of the capital city. One must begin by saying, in the first place, that the transportation union, as every Salvadoran knows, is not a big fan of dialogue and negotiation, nor is it know for its consideration for the needs of the population which uses its services —and even less is it known for its willingness to accept, follow and implement orientations and regulations emanating from transportation authorities.

On the other hand, the anarchic situation of the union found fertile ground in the arbitrary rejection and shortsightedness which still characterizes the Vice Ministry of Transportation. The favoritism in the assigning of bus routes, the lack of continuity in the policies implemented and the extreme variability of the criteria for putting vehicular traffic in order have obstructed the Vice Ministry’s ability to act with the required authority in order to call the bus drivers to order. The bus drivers, as a result, have ended up making their views prevail to a significant extent in the midst of this sea of confusion.

In the conflict which began on October 22 and ended with the confiscation of more than 40 micro-buses and an all-out battle between the micro-bus drivers and the police agents of the Unit for the Maintenance of Order (UMO, for its initials in Spanish), mixed up both factors. On the other hand, the arbitrary behavior of the governmental authorities was exhibited by the General Director for Transportation, Mr. Jose Cienfuegos, who revoked, without prior warning, the permission which just a month ago he had issued to the drivers of the 42B route to use the Primera Calle Poniente of the capital city. On the other hand, the extremist and anarchic attitudes and behavior of the owners of the bus lines was in evidence. As a first step, these opted for blocking the main artery of downtown by parking their buses to block it and stood firm against efforts of the transportation authorities to remove them peacefully. As a result the UMO was obliged to disperse the demonstrators with teargas and rubber bullets.

It is difficult to establish with any certainty what the motive was for the transportation authorities to revoke permission, which they had issued only a few days ago. Still less understandable is that, without having issued an advisory warning to the bus drivers affected by the measure, the authorities were waiting on the street to impose fines and confiscate buses. Without doubt, the root of the problem arose from the Vice Ministry for Transportation itself, independent of the fact that the measure, forasmuch as it aimed to support the process of re-ordering the downtown area, whether it was correct of not. It is on this point that we might stop for a moment to consider the various factors in the situation. It is true that the bus drivers —whether they be of the Route 42 or Route 42B or any other route—, are characterized by their attitudes and behavior as thugs and are known for their scorn for authority, but, is it valid to have recourse to the justification of making the order prevail at any price when the authorities charged with keeping the peace act on the bases of criteria which are totally illogical and irrational? Is it a reasonable thing to issue an order when there are no viable alternatives and, at the same time, change the order into a state of arbitrary chaos? Was it, definitively speaking, order which finally prevailed?

This situation and the situation of the relocation of the street vendors in the downtown San Salvador area demonstrate two completely different ways of proceeding in the rationalization of the public space o the city. In second place, as opposed to the first, a previously designed plan was being followed in which viable alternatives were established for those affected; moreover, the Mayor’s office , as opposed to the Vice Ministry for Transportation, set up and maintained a process of dialogue and negotiation in which the street vendors have been able to express their points of view and present observations concerning the Mayor’s office’s project. What is common to both cases is the lack of flexibility with which the process was carried out, but, naturally, the consequences which follow from it are completely different. It is not the case that Hector Silva’s plan does not provoke violent confrontations between the vendors and the authorities: it has already done so. It is, rather, that in this case , order is an objective and not a simple justification of the means.

When the Mayor of San Salvador sent the National Civilian Police or the UMO to remove the street vendors from their stalls, he had prepared a public space as an alternative. On the other hand, when the Vice Ministry for Transportation issues a similar order, the only thing achieved is to provide a solution to a conjuncture disorder, offering little or nothing to the general re-ordering on a larger scale. As is evident, the rational re-ordering of San Salvador operates in the first way and not in the second, which finally ends up being only one more indication of the state of disorder which must be overcome.

ANEP. The National Association for Private Enterprise (ANEP) presented, on October 20, a proposal for 27 reforms to the Penal Code and the Procedural Penal Code. According to statements by ANEP, from the time that the new penal norms went into effect, delinquency has increased. Mr. Felipe Umaña, judicial advisor to ANEP, declared that the reforms aim to "eliminate the possibility that, as a result of a technicality, delinquents might obtain their freedom". As a result, one of the reforms poses the exclusion of provisional freedom as a substitute measure. On the other hand, Mr. Umaña explained that the union believes it pertinent to reduce the age of minor offenders from 18 to 16 so that they can be brought to trial the same as adults (and with this Article 17 of the Penal Code would ge reformed);that swindling, theft, traffic accidents when the motorist is driving under the influence of alcohol and the shots into the air and others might be considered as crimes. Likewise, ANEP asked that bank accounts of those accused of being involved in kidnappings be investigated. On the topic of minor offenders, Ms Marta Valladares of the FMLN declared that to change the age limit for minor offenders would violate the constitution. However, all legislative factions coincided in the fact that the proposals will be subjected to an in depth examination.

ALLIANCE. The parties which call themselves the "Democratic Center": the Democratic Convergence, the Popular Labor Party (PPL), the Democratic Party (PD), the party of Organizational Strength and Hope (FE) and the Unified Democratic Christian Movement (MUDC) stated, on October 23, that the possibility of a coalition for the 1999 elections exists, but for the moment, there only exists a signed document of understanding.. Likewise, there exists an agreement to form a single umbrella coalition, which does not contain any distinct party. "We are opening up to the protagonism of Salvadorans without political definition as to party or ideology", stated Mr. Horacio Trujillo, leader of the MUDC. The Democratic Center, it seems, continues the project begun by the now extinct National Opposition Union (UNO), in which Mr. Ronald Umaña of the PDC participated. In spite of the fact that the Social Christian Union (USC) and the PDC are not in the alliance, Mr. Ernesto Vilanova, secretary general of the PPL, said that he hoped that a party alliance "would become a second or third electoral force in the next elections". For his part, Mr. Trujillo said that he did not doubt that the coalition would attract the support of various civic movements. According to other statements, the Democratic Center has presented Mr. Roberto Vilanova as a presidential candidate. Mr. Vilanova is the ex president of the National Association for Private Enterprise (ANEP) (EL DIARIO DE HOY, October 23, p. 8).

VILANOVA. On October 22, defense attorneys for five policemen accused of murdering Adriano Vilanova , presented a petition tot he Court of Instruction for San Marcos a petition for declaring the trial null and void. According to the argumentation presented by defense attorneys Boanerges Chavez, Alejandro Ruz and Julio Cesar Mojica, one of the members of the jury was brought to trial when the public trial was in process. They explained that this same person confronts charges for the crime of passing checks without funds against CREDOMATIC. The Judge, Mr. Victor Zelaya, explained that "what was done was to ask the Fifth Court of Instruction, which has venue in the case, for the certification of the said process". If it is demonstrated that the jury member was indeed charged while the trial was in progress, the petition to declare the trial null and void would be admissible. The court secretary for the Court of Instruction, Mr. Oscar Quinteros, affirmed that "should there possibly have been an arrest warrant issued against the jury member, the judge will evaluate if the case should proceed or not". Moreover, it must be determined whether the jury member in question had a defense attorney or not in order to verify if he had knowledge of the case against him. It must be determined if he lied under oath, when he affirmed that he had no cases pending against him (this is a requirement for forming part of the Tribunal of Conscience). In spite of all of the foregoing, the trial and sentencing of the police agents continues uninterrupted (EL DIARIO DE HOY, October 24, p. 12 and LA PRENSA GRAFICA, October 24, p. 8).

COALITION. The Secretary General for the USC, Mr. Abraham Rodriguez and the vice-presidential candidate for the FMLN, Ms. Marta Valladares, declared, on October 24, that the project to form a coalition between the two parties continues in effect. "By means of a free election, and without any pressure, the militants will decide...if the coalition with the FMLN will crystallize," declared Mr. Rodriguez. For her part, for Ms. Valladares "favorable elements exist for maintaining a coalition with the USC of a strategic character". On October 25, the USC acceded to the conditions imposed by the FMLN during the Social Christian Congress. It was established that the decision to accompany the FMLN accepting, moreover, candidates of the FMLN, Mr. Facundo Guardado and Ms. Marta Valladares. On this matter, Ms. Valladares declared: "now we are going to participate in a coalition under a single banner which would carry the emblem of each of the two parties. On the other hand, the political debt will be shared in with 80% going to the FMLN and 20% to the USC. Rodriguez explained that provisions of the pact provide for the FMLN to propose a three-person ballot in order to elect the next magistrate for the Supreme Electoral Tribune. The USC, for its part, will propose the substitute magistrate (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, October 25, p. 8 and 26, p. 5).

THE MAYOR’S OFFICE. The reorganization of the street vendors continues. In this context, on October 26, representatives of the Mayor’s Office met with the street sellers with stalls on Pasaje Cañas and 3ª Avenida Sur in order to negotiate the recuperation of the public areas where they sell their goods. The new area consists of 500 stationary stalls. "The relocation of the stationary stalls on Pasaje Las Cañas has been suspended until a solution is found which benefits the community and the vendors", stated Mr. Ismael Merlos, the manager of the municipal marketplaces. "It is vital that we achieve agreements in harmony with the vendors and recuperate minimum areas for the pedestrian and vehicular traffic," insisted Mr. Merlos. According to statements by representatives of the Mayor´s Office, the phase of adjusting the provisional installations for the relocated vendors could end during the month of November of this year. The reorganization of the street vendors is part of the "Plan for the Recuperation of Public Space and the Historical Downtown area of San Salvador", which is being carried out by the municipal administration of Hector Silva. This plan contemplates the reorganization of public transportation, the creation of roofed plazas for the relocated vendors and the recuperation of historic buildings among other things (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, October 26, p. 12).

THE SUPREME COURT. After four months, or, since the moment at which the Legislative Assembly accused the Supreme Court (CSJ, for its initials in Spanish) of having violated two provisions of the constitution, on October 27, a "judgment was passed down" against that institution. The case began when the Court decided to modify the questionnaire, which would be sent to Joaquín Villalobos, with which an effort is made to establish the possible responsibility of Shafik Handal in some of the kidnapping cases. The CSJ ordered the elimination of all questions referring to Mr. Handal. In this context, the court was accused of "manipulating" the questionnaire prepared by Mr. Alvaro de Soto, owing to which the document was sent six months late. On this basis, the Attorney General of the Republic, Mr. Manuel ordova, argued that the CSJ overstepped its functions in revising the questionnaire. According to the Attorney General’s Office, the CSJ violated Section 3 of Article 172 and Section 4 of Article 186, which aim to guarantee the independence of the judges " with reference to the exercise of the jurisdictional foundation". In this sense, the representatives or the president of the institution, Mr. Eduardo Tenorio, would be responsible for interfering in the investigation of the kidnappings. For now, the deputies have stated that before the issue a verdict is issued they will concede to the CSJ the right to a hearing or a defense argument. (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, October 28, p. 5).