The army deployed in the cities

"Mitch" in Nicaragua (part I): lack of prevention and forethought, arrogance in the face of tragedy

Salvadorans as they face the 1999 electoral process

THE ARMY DEPLOYED IN THE CITIES 

Several months ago there was much discussion about the convenience of deploying the army in the streets. Obviously voices were heard who spoke in favor of the measure. From government —with President Armando Calderón Sol out front— to common citizens, the clamor for a solution from the hands of the military to the problem of crime became an important public topic of discussion. If the National Civilian Police were not able to confront common and organized crime —it was said—, the army had to be brought out of the barracks to deal with the problem; nothing would be better than soldiers patrolling the streets and command and patrol posts established in the neighborhoods to control the outbreaks of criminality.

It was not long before critical voices were heard from; there was no lack for institutions and persons who, although they spoke against the vox populi, called attention to the dangers the army’s presence in the streets would bring with it. The outrages which military personnel are wont to commit notwithstanding —the last decade is full of examples of this kind—, the principal concern had to do with perceiving the risks associated with the militarization of the society. In a sense, reason prevailed at that time because the most that it came to were patrols in the rural areas of army troops under the command of the National Civilian Police. This way police coverage was extended throughout the national territory but operative and disciplinary controls were in place so that this aid and support did not get out of hand.

The solution —on all other counts adequate, given previous behavior by the army in rural zones, limitations in the ability of the police to cover extensive rural areas and the high crime rate— was not agreeable to diverse social and political sectors which called for the presence of military personnel in the rural as well as in the urban areas. At the level of the presidency of the republic, the decision to deploy the army in rural areas continued in effect, although prudently safeguarded because the failure of the first initiative was still fresh. It was a question of being alert to the first opportunity to present itself; and this came with the tropical storm "Mitch".

In reality, the disaster caused by the climatological phenomenon permitted President Armando Calderón Sol to declare a "state of national emergency", and immediately, in spite of the emergency situation in effect in the rural and coastal zones, began patrols in the cities throughout the country. What led, in the past, to an interminable debate, at that point in time was resolved without discussion. Using the state of emergency in support of his decision, President Calderón Sol took things into his own hands and ordered the deployment of the army in the urban areas. In San Salvador, where the impact of "Mitch" was minimal —so as not to say non-existent—, were now seen, as in the worst years of the civil war, groups of soldiers not accompanied by National Civilian Police agents, posted on the corners or patrolling streets and avenues. Finally the dreams of those who believe that there is no greater institution than the Armed Forces for solving the nation’s problems have come to life; now that the army is in the streets, think those who love measures involving force, all of us can live in peace and tranquility.

The danger of the militarization of society again reappears, this time together with the possibility of its really coming to life. The danger that military personnel once again come to believe themselves the "saviors" of the country once again stalks what has been achieved in terms of political democratization and respect for human rights. One should not simply cross one’s arms when examining the deployment of the army in the streets; one must stand in the way of military efforts to once again occupy civil and political terrain which they occupied by force during the recent past. President Calderón Sol must feel the pressure of those sectors committed to democratizing the country in order to require the military the abandon the terrain in which their presence is not longer requisite. The rejection of the presence of the army in the cities and the countryside —once the National Civilian Police achieve greater deployment capacity— ought to be loud and clear and without compromise. Here, indeed, is a question of principles; the militarization of society is absolutely contrary to democracy and few will always be the precautions taken to prevent it. The African and Latin American experience demonstrates that it is best never to confide in the military —in no place and at no time.

On the other hand, beyond the positions based on principle, are the practical considerations; those which have to do with the preparation of the army for fighting crime. One example: faced with an assault on a bank in which hostages have been taken to which soldiers must respond. What will they do? Are they going to negotiate with those assaulting the bank? Are they going to wait for police reinforcements? Or are they going to charge with their guns and grenades against the criminals?

These are not idle questions. Neither is the concern behind them. Police agents are trained efficiently to fight crime in the context of respect for human rights. Soldiers are not; soldiers are trained for armed head on combat to annihilate the "enemy". From this premise —leaving to one side the outrages which soldiers might commit on their own account— it might be a risk for citizens if military personnel take charge of public security. Faced with robberies, kidnappings, traffic accidents or homicides, doubt exists as to how soldiers are going to behave and how judges will respond to military actions. That doubt is joined with the uncertainty which the crime wave is causing at the present time.

President Calderón Sol and his advisors ought to have given serious thought to this subject of deploying the army in the cities. Perhaps his decision arose from a sincere concern for citizen security, but this does not diminish the importance of the dangers which could arise from a measure of this kind. It is urgent, then, to make decisions aimed at taking a few steps back before irremediable situations come to pass.

"MITCH" IN NICARAGUA (PART I): LACK OF PREVENTION AND FORETHOUGHT, ARROGANCE IN THE FACE OF TRAGEDY

From the moment the communications media —before, even, the governmental authorities— traced the dimensions of the magnitude of the disaster, we knew that "Mitch" had been worse than the earthquake which destroyed Managua in December of 1972, even with its 10,000 deaths. Worse because the surface territory devastated is greater. Worse because the country was dismembered in broad areas and this complicates reconstruction in the extreme. And worse because the country devastated in 1998 carries upon its shoulders more problems than it did at the time of the earthquake: damage still not overcome in a decade-long war and the damage caused by more than ten years of an economic model which has fallen deeper and deeper into the extreme of inequality among Nicaraguans. In 1972 Nicaragua was a country undergoing a kind of economic bonanza. Twenty-six years later, Nicaragua is, after Haiti, the poorest country in Latin America.

On November 10, the figures on damage caused by the storm continue being very different, depending on where they come from: the figures presented by President Arnoldo Alemán speaking on national or international news media, those of Vice President Enrique Bolaños —who led the Emergency Committee—, those of the producer’s guild, those of the local leaders or authorities... In round numbers, the human cost of the disaster seems to be 5,000 dead and 800,000 homeless. It is not alarmist to affirm that we will never know the exact number of dead because the census in many disaster areas —isolated and distant— has always suffered from historic blank spaces. The number of homeless represents almost a fifth of the national population; and as it is a country of children, more than half of the homeless are boys and girls.

During the first week of the tragedy the dangerous mixture of sloth and self-sufficiency of the president and vice-president and some of their ministers was notorious. Arrogance and a lack of foresight accompanied, as well, the dawn of the tragedy. The hurricane "Mitch" advanced slowly and it is known that it was so powerful —one of the four most powerful in the Caribbean Ocean during the twentieth century— that some elementary preventive measures could have been taken. But it was not that way. The president’s tendency to minimize the danger and the effects of the rains, even up until Saturday, October 31, could have contributed towards contributing to the aggravation of disasters.

The lack of responsibility of those who were responsible —in Nicaragua and Central America— is shared with others, more difficult to identify, throughout the world. "Mitch" was a lethal monster borne of the dangerous current La Niña which followed close in the footsteps of the current El Niño. What relationship do these destructive phenomena of the great droughts followed by great floods have to do with the global climatic change? What is clear is that the terrible effects of these phenomena have much or almost everything to do with the model of economic growth which is more and more irrational and inhuman which is dominating the planet; it is a model which imposes a majority of the few upon the whole world and in each one of the countries.

There was, especially in the first week, demonstration after demonstration of improvisation and inefficiency sustained by arrogance. One of the first and most notable was the public rejection of the Nicaraguan government of the offer made almost immediately by the government of Cuba to send to Nicaragua a brigade specialized in disasters consisting of 12-15 doctors who would arrive in the country with tons of medicines. The Minister of Health, by presidential order, accepted the medicine, but declared that the doctors were unnecessary because Nicaragua had sufficient professional personnel to confront any problem. Various Cuban medical brigades arrived in Honduras and Guatemala to lend their valuable services.

The liberal government of Alemán has created--among its most characteristic features—a cult of appearances. Dating from the first day of his administration, in 1997, one of its priorities has been to attempt to impose appearance upon reality. The appearance of development imposed upon an "economy of smoke’’ spread over Managua when the inauguration of the first McDonald’s, in July of 1998, provided the occasion for him to exclaim pompously to Mr. Bolaños, the nation’s vice-president, that with the opening of the transnational hamburger restaurant that "Nicaragua has finally twitched off the fig leaf"’. The appearance of governability spread over growing social decomposition. The appearance of reconciliation took the place of the reality of provincial anti-communist ideology and a policy of excluding capable professionals in all public office for the sole reason of their not being fully aligned with liberalism.

"Mitch" felled not only 70 bridges and numberless high-tension electrical towers. It brought down, perhaps for a good while, the possibility of continuing to live with deceit and the deception of appearances. The fragility of our "development" and the ephemeral and deceptive quality of our statistics showing "progress" was laid bare before us and before the whole world. And not only because Nature was fierce with the country, but because it is not difficult to discover that dozens of thousands of homeless of today were homeless even before the hurricane because of their marginalization in a dead end imposed upon them by a minority of their compatriots.

Another tense debate which has never been resolved, also accompanied the first days of the disaster. President Alemán resisted decreeing a state of emergency and attempted to maintain the appearance of normality and so maintain confidence. Diverse social and political sectors demanded the declaration of the state of emergency but to no avail. The question was politicized, as it always has been. Finally the President declared a "partial state of natural disaster", but only in specifically designated areas of some departments, arguing on the basis of a legal fallacy that the emergency would require the suspension of a large number of civil rights enjoyed by the citizens and that "a democracy" would not permit such a thing. The major contradiction was produced when the President created The National Committee on Emergencies —albeit without declaring a national emergency— and placed Vice-President Bolaños at its head. Mr. Alemán also decreed three days of "national mourning" during which the flag would be flown at half-mast. Some days before Mr. Alemán had called Mayor Posoltega "crazy" when, in despair, she called for aid for the survivors in her municipality buried in mud from the Casitas volcano.

What were the reasons for the hesitancy in declaring a state of emergency? There were several. The fear, on the part of a government where many high-level functionaries are bankers, that the private bank would be obligated to pardon debts in a massive way. Although private banks have not placed many of their credits in agriculture, it is calculated that 28% of the entire portfolio of the private banks is indeed invested in agriculture and that this money would be lost. There was also a fear on the part of the centralized government of seeing itself forced to transfer power, resources and functions to the municipalities. And a government, which has tried by every possible means to corner, weaken and delegitimize the organizations of civil society feared the loss of control or hegemony over the donations which such an emergency would attract.

In the measure in which, during the first week in November, the waters began to recede and cadavers began to appear buried under tons of mud, the accumulation of in Nicaraguan society of social political and ethical errors began to come to the light of day. There also appeared the unstoppable will to protagonism and of "taking over in front of the camera" of a goodly group of political leaders of all stripes and colors. The high costs that were now to be paid for the years of disorganization among the poor came to the fore. Power vacuums appeared, provoked by the attitude of central power as it faced local power.

But all crises are also opportunities. And, alongside the flourishing of so many negative attitudes, there also began to be seen and felt a new consciousness of responsibility and solidarity, a consciousness of nationhood in new and even unknown local leaders as well as a spontaneous organization in municipalities and communities that —although insufficient to deal with such a tragedy— had created linkages forged in pain and which caused new experiences to break forth at the heart of local powers. Perhaps this tragedy signifies that municipalism’s time has come —the moment to strengthen municipalities and to strengthen their arenas of action and decision.

But municipal governments will not be empowered without tension. Attention to the emergency made clear the political rivalries and the high levels of polarized party lines in which a sector of the national leadership class and some sectors of society as well live. Sectarian party manipulation became evident in the performance of high level governmental figures. Political discrepancies impede the coordination of the immediate turning over of the aid in various points of the country and a measure of negligence was added to the aid and rescue activities as well as in attention to the homeless and the receipt of donations. These discrepancies can make the work of reconstruction difficult. The president of a government which proclaims itself daily as the "facilitator" does not facilitate the lessening of polarization nor does it cease to demonstrate intolerance and exclusion, not incorporating into the National Emergency Committee nor the organized sectors of civil society nor the organization of the mayors of the country nor the evangelical sectors.

On November 4 an Alemán less sure of his words and actions turned over to the Catholic bishops of the dioceses most affected by the hurricane the leadership of the departmental Emergency Committees so that they could channel the aid by means of their parishes and religious groups, while at the same time many mayors had decreed a "municipal emergency" by using the autonomy which law concedes to them. The decision to turn over the leadership of the emergency to the bishops was questioned as an attempt against institutionality because it meant ignoring municipal authorities. Evangelical leaders also questioned this action in a country where more than 30% of the population belongs to the evangelical denominations.

It is difficult for the government as well as for the principal opposition party, the FSLN, to evaluate the political costs of the disaster. The institutional leadership of the FSLN also tended, for a long time, to ignore local power. At the moment of the disaster, while the central government violated municipal autonomy, certain parts of the FSLN leadership dealt with local power in an opportunistic manner, tried to manipulate for the benefit of the party, the heroism of some of the mayors, especially in the example of the mayor of Posoltega, Felicitas Zeledón.

It should not be forgotten that before the disaster, liberal leaders in the government and leadership of the FSLN, in a climate dominated by the "hurricane of corruption", were at the point of concluding a questionable economic-political and institutional pact which represents a formidable blow to the already fragile institutionality of the country. And this represented a serious challenge to the already fragile social movement.

In 1973, Ernesto Cardenal wrote a historic poem called "Oracle concerning Managua". Concerning Managua destroyed by the earthquake of December 22, 1972. Concerning the ruins of death, Cardenal wrote: "Now from the seminary one sees another Managua / a few seconds and all of its pride went to hell / shells of houses like rotten and burnt eggs / smoking walls / windows like caves without eyes..." And he concluded his tragic description of the disaster giving notice of the resurrection, the beginning of the end of an era of injustice, the era of Somocismo: "Only the dead rise again / once again there are other footsteps / the pilgrimage has not ended." And so it was. What beginning does this catastrophe presage? The pilgrimage of the people of Nicaragua never ends.

SALVADORANS AS THEY FACE THE 1999 ELECTORAL PROCESS 

More than half of all Salvadoran citizens—58.7 per cent—think that elections are a waste of time because things never change in El Salvador, according to the results of an opinion poll conducted by the University Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP) of the "Jose Simeón Cañas" Central American University (UCA) of El Salvador. The poll was carried out with the objective of gathering the opinions and attitudes of the Salvadoran people as they face electoral process of next year, took place between October 10 and 18 of this year with a sample of 1,247 people of voting age who live in urban and rural areas of the fourteen departments of the republic. The investigation revealed, moreover, that 37.5 per cent of those polled hold the opposite opinion —which is to say that elections are not a waste of time. Some 3.8 per cent did not respond to the question.

Along this same line, the poll found that six of every ten Salvadorans were in agreement with the idea that, independently of who won the election, things in the country would stay the same. Salvadorans were asked if they thought that the next elections would contribute to the solution of the principal problems of the country: somewhat less than half of Salvadoran citizens, 43.2 per cent, answered in the affirmative; that is to say, they think the next presidential elections will contribute to solving the fundamental problems of the country; while at the same time, 38 per cent believe that the elections will contribute nothing to resolve the problems and 18.8 percent said that they did not know if the elections would serve to adequately confront national difficulties or not.

 More than a third of the population, or 35.7 percent of those consulted, think that the situation of the country will continue to be the same after the next presidential elections while some 24.2 per cent consider that the national situation is going to get better and 12 per cent believe that it will worsen. Nevertheless, the responses of 18.l percent of those interviewed cannot be overlooked; these said they did not know how the situation of the country would be after next year’s elections. The same poll revealed that at the present time, two of every three Salvadorans, or, 63.3 percent were not satisfied with the political and social situation of the country.

Almost one fourth of Salvadorans indicated that they were very interested in the process for electing the President of the Republic, while another fourth indicated that they were only somewhat interested. Some 31.l per cent of the citizens polled said that they were not very interested and l7.3 percent affirmed that they had no interest in the electoral process.

On the question of confidence, Salvadorans answered in a somewhat more reserved manner: 19.9 per cent declared themselves to have a great deal of confidence in the 1999 elections while 30.5 per cent sustained only a little confidence. Fifteen per cent said they had no confidence in the process.

On the other hand, asked directly if they had any interest in voting, 29.5 per cent said that they were very interested while 11.7 per cent said they had only some interest. The rest of the citizens, or 47.8 per cent demonstrated little or no interest in voting in March of next year.

When citizens were asked about whether they thought the process was clean and transparent, close to half of the population, or, 47.2 per cent, said that there would be fraud, while some 35.7 per cent held that the elections would be clean and 16.1 per cent declined to respond on the dilemma or electoral transparency.

The poll revealed that greater levels of interest and confidence in the electoral process were to be found among persons who prefer one particular political party while those who had no party in mind tended to demonstrate higher levels of indifference and lack of confidence in the elections.

Some 59.3 per cent of the citizens polled think that the rank and file of the parties ought to elect the candidates they present to run for elected office. On the contrary, 20.4 per cent think that the leadership ought to elect the candidates. The rest of those consulted did not respond to the question.

However, when asked directly about the image of the FMLN after their national convention to elect candidates, 46.4 per cent consider that the opinion they held concerning that party did not get any better, but neither did it get any worse. Some 34 per cent indicated that the image of the FMLN got worse and only 15.4 per cent consider that their image of the party got better.

On the other hand, the UCA poll consulted citizens on what they thought about the smaller parties in the national political spectrum. Some 31.6 per cent of those polled responded that such parties ought to join together among themselves; 23.3 per cent said that they ought to stay they was they are and 18 per cent held the opinion that such parties ought to disappear. Some 9.9 per cent suggested that they ought to join ARENA while some 5.8 per cent said that they ought to join the FMLN. The opinion that the parties ought to join together is more frequent among those citizens who support the PDC or the PCN.

The topic of preferences for certain personalities as presidential candidates was taken up by the UCA poll in various ways. In the first place, those consulted were asked openly to identify a person who would be the best candidate for the presidency of the country. Some 26.2 per cent mentioned Mr. Francisco Flores while some 7.2 referred to Mr. Facundo Guardado and 3.2 per cent indicated Dr. Victoria de Avilés and others mentioned Dr. Hector Dada, Mr. Alfredo Cristiani and Dr. Hector Silva, among others. Nevertheless, some 42.3 per cent of those consulted declined to identify a specific person. This same tendency was found in the evaluation of political personalities involved in the electoral race.

Asked about their ideological tendency, 28.9 per cent of those polled defined themselves as right or center-right leaning while 29.4 aligned themselves with he center and 14.9 per cent defined themselves as left-leaning. The rest of the citizens did not state an ideological tendency or declined to answer the question.

Salvadorans were asked as well about the party they considered to be most capable of leading the government with specific actions. ARENA is the party most mentioned when dealing with capacity for governing (36.6 per cent) and with creating jobs (27.6 per cent). On the other hand, the FMLN is most mentioned when the question deals with combating corruption (24.5 per cent) and in lowering the prices of goods (23.8). In the areas of combating the problem of crime and poverty in the country, both parties received similar percentages.

Finally, Salvadorans were asked about the party for which they would vote if the elections were held at the same time as the poll was being conducted. Some 32.5 per cent of those consulted affirmed that they would vote for ARENA. Some 21 per cent said they would vote for the FMLN and 2.6 per cent mentioned the PDC and 1.1 per cent indicated the PCN. They rest of the parties were mentioned by 1.5 per cent of the citizens while 41.3 per cent indicated that they would not vote for any of them, that the vote is secret and that they still did not know for whom they would vote. In spite of these responses, 41 per cent of those consulted said that they could change their option to vote later on. In summary, some days after the beginning of the campaign, the UCA poll shows a population appearing not to be very convinced of the usefulness of the elections.

Salvadorans seem to be divided almost in half by their attitudes towards the political process: while part of the citizens tend to express certain levels of confidence and interest in the process, the other part—above all that which characterizes itself as being the poorest—tend to demonstrate very little confidence and interest in the elections.

The UCA poll reveals, moreover, that ARENA and its candidate have broadened their advantage over their principal opponents, the FMLN and Mr. Facundo Guardado. These results suggest that the principal fight to occupy the presidency is to be found, as the tendency has been during recent years, between ARENA and the FMLN. Ideological affinities notwithstanding among a certain portion of the population, the rest of the parties and their candidates do not appear to be winning leverage among the Salvadoran population.

The advantage of ARENA over the FMLN could be a product of the campaign work performed by Mr. Flores as candidate during recent months and the impact on public opinion of the FMLN convention which took place before the poll was conducted.

The results of this poll reflect a state of opinion just before the beginning of the electoral campaign. Events yet to happen could significantly modify the opinion of the electorate in the coming months.

San Salvador, November 10, 1998