Crisis in the armed forces

The pension fund quotas and commissions

Challenges for the National Civilian Police

News Briefs

CRISIS IN THE ARMED FORCES 

During the last few days of December 1998 a series of problems took place within the Armed Forces which revolved around promotions and changes in command which are traditionally announced at the end of each year. The news media not late in becoming aware of the situation occurring in the military institution and, after due investigation, revealed data which, in the context of the process of the democratization of the country would appear to be worrisome. In summary, the problem arose when President Armando Calderón Sol, after having denied the promotions of two colonels to the rank of general —promotions proposed by the Evaluation Commission of the Armed Forces— imposed two other candidates (and in so doing appealed to his condition as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces); the other two candidates imposed by the president appear to be bound to him by ties of friendship and affection.

According to sources in the press, the decision of President Calderón Sol caused immediate discomfort and ill feelings among the officer class of the Armed Forces, which even spoke of the possibility of a coup d’état. If this is true, there is really something to be concerned about because beyond the success which those planning the coup could have, the mere thought of a military coup would cause the political dynamics of the country to become seriously tense, and uncertainty about the future would be sown and old ghosts raised up. Certainly what happened —or, at least, what is known about what happened—because mystery cloaks most things which happen inside the Armed Forces —ought not to be taken lightly. What is clear is that the military officers are not comfortable with many decisions which emanate from the sphere of politics, above all when these decisions affect their internal structure.

On the other hand, after the main facts came to light, President Calderón Sol hurried to deny the gravity of the crisis. But not only this: he has insisted time and again that he, as the General Commander of the Armed Forces, has the power to make decisions on matters concerning its internal organization, and that, furthermore, no one could deprive him of this right during his presidential mandate. Calerdón Sol’s attitude, far from demonstrating that all is quiet, makes clear that there is strong tension existing between him and the military commanders, who have even met with the ex Commander in Chief of the of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Adolfo O. Blandón with the objective of presenting the problem to him and, it would appear, of asking him to provide orientation in the midst of the crisis. The reasons why the discontented military officers met with Blandón are not clear; but what is clear is that Blandón, has not only recognized —through the media— that the topic of a coup d’état was discussed in his meeting with the military personnel who visited him, but made clear as well that in the decision of President Calderón Sol —which led him to discount the Evaluation Commission— emotional factors played a decisive role.

Until now, none of those involved in the problem has indicated that there are factors other than personal ones involved. All seems to be reduced to President Calderón Sol’s stubbornness in insisting on his decision over and above the internal mechanisms traditionally followed by the Armed Forces in making determinations on the promotions of military personnel. At the risk of appearing to be alarmist, it may not be possible to rule out other elements, of a more political nature, in the crisis of the Armed Forces. Let us remember that the Peace Accords provided for a drastic reduction in military power in El Salvador. The military class moved from being a fundamental political actor to occupying a marginal role in national political life. That change, although it was accepted by military commanders, also produced tensions, resentments and longings for the past. It has not been easy for the Armed Forces to accommodate itself in a scenario in which the critics of its past behavior have taken over the podium. It has been difficult for many military people to assume and live with the idea that after the signing of the peace accords, they were the big losers. This aspect of the current state of affairs obtaining cannot be omitted if we are to analyze the current situation of the Armed Forces.

And at the moment in which measures must be taken concerning military norms and hierarchies, these aspects should not simply be laid aside. This being the case, President Calderón Sol has committed the unpardonable sin of myopia when he imposed his will upon the internal structures of the Armed Forces. He has insisted that his attributions as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces allow him to take the decisions which he esteems pertinent. Nevertheless, it has nowhere been said —nor demonstrated— that his decisions have been taken in a legal context. And on this point we must pause for a moment to consider why the decisions of a public official, be his position in the political hierarchy what it may, cannot fly in the face of legally established norms and procedures.

That President Calderón Sol as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces does not hold absolute power to decide on the basis of his own whims concerning the destiny of the military institution; by the same token, his condition as President of the Republic does not provide him with absolute power to decide on the basis of whim what is convenient for all Salvadorans. The attributions which he may enjoy as a result of one or another position he may hold are regulated by law, to which he, like it or not, must submit. The question which remains on the table, then, is whether President Calderón Sol violated the law which regulates promotions inside the Armed Forces when he went beyond his constitutional attributions or whether his conduct was at all times in strict accordance with the law. If the second is true, President Calderón Sol ought to explain clearly how and in what sense his behavior is in accordance with the law. If the contrary is true, the military officers affected ought to have recourse to the corresponding judicial entities in order to teach President Calderón Sol that he is first of all obliged to comply with the law.

Whatever the case may be, it is the president who has ended up in a dubious situation. Adjectives such as proud, arrogant, haughty which Colonel Marian Castro Morán has applied to him have been confirmed in the declarations which he has made to the news media in which, without mincing words, he has declared that while he is president he will do as he pleases.

THE PENSION FUND QUOTAS AND COMMISSIONS 

Since its implementation, the pension fund phenomenon has given rise to a broad debate with regard to how convenient or inconvenient it is and the discussion has based itself primarily on the limitations of the new system in its efforts to resolve traditional problems of the state’s handling of pensions. Take the following, for example: the low level of pensions, the low level of affiliation and the high administrative costs. A result of this debate is the presence of close to 150 legal demands before the Supreme Court against the system currently in effect, all of which were rejected by the court.

As had been proposed when the law was created, beginning in 1999 the System for Savings of Pensions increased the quotas to the employer and to the worker and, simultaneously, lowered the commissions of the Administrators of Pension Funds (AFPs). This is part of a program of increases in the quotas aimed at raising them by 39% between 1998 and 2002. These increases are a result, principally, of an increase in the worker’s quotas for savings which will increase from not quite 1% with the beginning of the system, to 3.25% during the year 2002. On the other hand, the commissions of the AFPs will be lowered from 3.5% to 3.0% during this same period.

In this program, beginning in 1999, affiliates of the system for saving pensions must pay additional interests which oscillate between 0.75% and 1% of their salaries; meanwhile the employees must pay close to 1% additional of the salaries for each one of their employees. In total, the increase in the labor quotas and the employer’s quotas will be 2% of the total amount of salaries and will be deposited in the savings accounts of the workers.

In this context, it is interesting to review what will be the change to be effectuated in the new quotas and commissions of the AFPs which enter into effect on January 1 as well as on the behavior predicted for the next 3 years; especially considering that the pension system has absorbed the employees of the formal sector completely.

According to the Law for the System of Savings for Pensions, it is expected that payments by workers will move from a maximum of 4.5%, in effect during 1998, to a maximum of 6.25% for the year 2002. In a parallel way, the payments by employers will move from 5% to 6.75%, which is a level even lower than that payed before the introduction of the savings system for pensions. It should be pointed out that the offering by the worker is detailed between payment of commission and savings quota .

As can be seen, the reason for these increases is the increase in the savings quota, which will move from 1% to 3.25%, because the maximum commissions will be reduced from 3.5% to 3% and will mitigate the increase of the savings quota in the case of those workers who are affiliated to the AFPs which charge maximum commission rates: Confia, Máxima, Prevision and Profutura, which represent 76.9% of the total affiliates. In the case of the workers affiliated with the AFP Porvenir, estimated to hold 23.1% of the total, there will be no mitigation because the quotas charged are below the maximum projected (3%), as is explained below.

For 1999, in accordance with the Law of the System of Savings for Pensions, the quota of the worker will be increase by 0.75% of his or her salary, given that this person is affiliated to one of the AFPs which charge maximum commissions —which are fixed at 3.5% for 1998 and 3.25% for 1999. In the case that the affiliate is affiliated with the AFP Porvenir, which charges less than the legal maximum (2.7%), the increase for the worker will be greater because this AFP is not affected by the reduction of commissions and can maintain itself at the same level as 1998. This implies that the affiliates to the AFP will experience a greater increase in their discounts, which will be equivalent to 1% of their salaries.

In effect, the worker will move from a total quota of 3.7% to another at 4.7%, while those affiliates to AFPs with maximum quotas will move from paying 4.5% to 5.2%; this is to say that they will experience a minor increase, but will invariably pay more than the affiliates to the AFP Porvenir. The previous situation supposes that there will be no adjustments to the commissions in this last AFP although most probably these are the ones which finally will be equal to the maximum rate projected of 3%.

It might be mentioned, at this point, that the AFPs will have succeeded in including close to 576,000 workers paying quotas, which, according to the Superintendence of Pensions, implies that 100,000 more workers were affiliated than was expected. These are workers within the age group of 36 and 55 years of age who enjoyed the option of staying within the state pension system. This data is not as impressive as it might be considering that there was a legal trap inducing the quota-payers to move massively to the AFPs.

At the same time as the new pension system was introduced, the quota-system of the old system was adjusted in such a way that it was equivalent to that of the new, which implied an increase from 1% to 4.5% for those affiliated with the Salvadoran Institute for Social Security (ISSS). Faced with this reality, the new system presented the advantage of giving 1% to the retirement savings account, although this was governed by the same 4.5% rate.

Although it might be argued that the increase in quotas for 1999 will fatten the savings accounts of the workers, the question persists as to whether the effects of these increases will translate into immediate consumption. In the coming years, the disposable income of the workers will be reduced approximately to 1.75% of the total amount as a result of the increase in the savings for pensions. On the other hand, the employers will stay in the same advantageous situation in relation to 1997 because they would than pay 7% of the quota and in the year 2002 they would pay 6.57%.

In this scenario, it is important to consider what will be the return which the workers will receive for the higher quotas that, as savings, they will make to the AFPs and for the reduction in consumption which that will imply. Owing to the lowering of the interest rates obtained during 1997 and 1998, 3.5% and 1.9% respectively, it might be expected that the returns on savings might likewise be low and. and so, close to this data.

Although the workers will not experience increases in the maximum AFP quota rates and will save more and more, what must not be ignored is the design of the pension savings plans which respond, more than to a genuine interest in social welfare, to the need to oxygenate the economies of the countries where they are implemented by means of a reduction of the employer quotas and the obtaining of funds for investment by means of forced savings and a reduction in the consumption of the workers.

CHALLENGES FOR THE NATIONAL CIVILIAN POLICE 

In the EVALUATION OF THE COUNTRY AT THE END OF 1998 (Press Bulletin XIV (January 1999) No. 1) of the University Institute on Public Opinion (IUDOP, for its initials in Spanish), indicates that crime continues to be a problem that concerns most Salvadorans: 43.7% of those polled mentioned the matter in these terms. Moreover, a considerable segment of the population (66%) considers that criminal activities increase during 1998 as compared with 1997, while only 9.4% of the sample of the population polled hold the opinion that crime had diminished.

On another point, the poll registers to what degree the population considers that the application of the new penal-procedural codes has not been an efficient measure for halting criminal activity. So it is that 84.1% of citizens polled held the opinion that the new codes were not effective during the year 1998 while only 13.2% held opinions to the contrary. With respect to the institutions related to public security, consulted particularly on the question of the PNC, 55.4% of the population held that its level of confidence in the police stayed the same during 1997, 18.1% indicated that it had increased and 24.9% affirmed that its confidence had diminished.

It is interesting to observe that in a previous poll, SALVADORANS EXPRESS OPINIONS ON THE PROBLEM OF CRIME (Press Bulletin XIII (August, 1998) No. 3), the National Civilian Police (PNC) received the highest evaluation among the institutions related to the fight against crime, followed by the Ministry of Public Security, the Attorney General’s Office, the Presidency and the Courts, which received the lowest evaluation. Additionally, the August poll revealed that 44.5% of the population thinks that, comparatively speaking, the behavior of the PNC is better than that of the former and now non-existent National Police although 19.9% expressed the opinion that it is the same while 30% held the opinion that it was worse.

From this data it is possible to draw the following conclusions: in the first place, the PNC, although it is better evaluated than other institutions, does not demonstrate significant advances in its operative capacity and in the degree of sympathy which it awakens in the population. In the second place, the fact that the courts and the penal and penal procedural codes were be perceived in such a negative manner might give rise to the possible affirmation that they are perceived by the population as obstacles in the fight against crime (only when compared with such weak contenders is the PNC could obtain such a positive evaluation by a little more than half of the population). Finally, it is deemed that, as a group, the institutions related to the fight against crime are carrying out their duties in a regular or negative way.

One of the most disheartening factors in this dark scenario is, doubtless, the way in which the PNC is perceived by the population. This is a perception on the basis of which it is not outrageous to affirm that the police is passing through a serious crisis of confidence and image as perceived by the population. It is significant that, in a year in which the population perceives that the siege of crime has increased, the institution with which the population ought to feel closest does not succeed in awakening greater levels of confidence. Moreover, it is worrisome that close to half of the Salvadorans consider that the behavior of the PNC is the same or worse than that of the former National Police, which was, during its existence, characterized by its arbitrary actions, abuse and corruption.

The reasons for this situation are varied and have been explained on previous occasions. On the other hand, to date, the PNC has not found the necessary mechanisms for assuring its impermeability when it deals with the influence or penetration by organized crime in its ranks. We are dealing here not only with low ranking police agents who have been involved in criminal activities of various kinds, but it can also be said that there is no certainty that members of the leadership of the PNC do not participate directly in them as well. Cases such as that of Lorena Saravia or Adriano Vilanova have offered proofs and indications that the criminal situation in which simple police officers acted was supported or at least covered up by individuals of the high-level PNC hierarchy.

On another point, the police, now seven years in existence after its founding, has not succeeded in inculcating in its agents two indispensable elements for any police corps: knowledge of and respect for citizen rights and strict adherence to established procedural norms. An instance of this is when, during the last six months of 1998, the Inspector General of the PNC received 534 denunciations against police agents, 31% of them for abuse of authority and arrogance in the use of power and 33% for poor police and administrative procedures.

Nevertheless, leaving to one side the repercussions of this crisis of well-being and tranquility of the population, it is important to analyze briefly the other side of the coin: the effect of the current situation of the PNC on the police agents which are part of it, one of the most important manifestations being the increase in assassinations of police agents. At first glance the relationship of the between the growing number of murders of police agents and the dynamic which the institution is suffering at this point in time is not obvious. Evidently, the risk of dying in compliance with there duty is a permanent part of being a policeman or woman. What is noticeable is the increase in the number of police agents which are assassinated when they are not working, because this would imply that the institution is slowly losing control over the security and protection of its own agents.

It is obvious that now more than ever the police are confronting heavy pressure from the population to comply with their mission and duties. The result of this is that the work schedules have been increased and permissions have been drastically reduced. As has been noted previously (see PROCESO, 812), these measures, in addition to the fact that they will have little effect on the fight against crime, will end up backfiring in physical and psychological exhaustion of the police agents, and this will affect their work performance. So it is that the policemen and women, engaged in long and intense work schedules, will not have the capacity to avoid or carry out well the efforts against crime which in good measure are inhabitants of their communities. The relationship of these two factors, personal carelessness and scarcity of institutional resources —material resources and resources for investigations— in order to deal with the necessity that perhaps is being perceived in a biased way, ought to be studied carefully by the maximum authorities of the PNC:

In addition to these two factors, it may be attractive for criminals to make attempts against the police given that the PNC lacks a policy of solidarity —which is publicly recognized— when one of its members is killed. In other cities of the world with criminal problems of similar magnitude, it has been demonstrated that the commitment of the police to pursue and arrest the individual which murdered one of the police and the increase in the severity of the penalties for murders of police have been sufficiently harsh as to drastically diminish attempts to kill police agents.

Until recently, the assassination of off-duty police officers had affected the lower-levels of the hierarchy, but the recent murder of the sub-commissioner Ana Inés Segovia demonstrates that organized crime is possibly mounting a response to the struggle against crime being carried out by the PNC. If the previous deaths of police are related to common crime, perhaps the murder of the sub-commissioner is raising the situation to a new level, in which criminal acts take place in the context of patient follow-up and watching by criminals.

The PNC must deal with a double task for 1999: on the one hand, to set the necessary gears in motion in order to strengthen itself internally —at the operative level and at the level of material resources— and, on the other, to be vigilant so that the health and security of its members is not affected. To achieve the first without the second will imply a weak and extremely vulnerable police force.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE JUDICATURE. The Legislative Assembly deputies, according to news confirmed on January 11, are preparing themselves to emit a third decree which would permit the council members of the National Council of the Judicature (CNJ, for its initials in Spanish) to continue in their posts for three more months. Lawyers and judges said they felt ridiculed by the decision and demanded a new election process. The Federation of Associations of Lawyers of El Salvador sent a letter to the president of the Congress, Mr. Juan Duch, in which he challenges the substitution of the council members for a new list of candidates, of the five which the associations had already proposed. It would seem that the decision to extend the terms of the council members is a violation of the Law of the CNJ, which requires that the said functionaries not be re-elected for consecutive periods, but the deputies have already done so on two occasions and are presenting themselves for a third term. According to reports from lawyer’s associations, extending, for a third term, the mandate of the members of the Council, they will present a request for relief before the Supreme Court, arguing that the deputies are violating the Constitution of the Republic. "The Assembly calls constantly for compliance with the law... and does not concern itself with overseeing its own activities," stated Mr. José Luis Lovo, of the Association of Salvadoran Lawyers (EL DIARIO DE HOY, January 12, p. 14 and January 13, p. 15).

POLL. The University Institute for Public Opinion (IUDOP) of the UCA announced on January 12 the results of the most recent poll on political preferences at the level of candidates. In the report on this poll Dr. Ruben Zamora, the presidential candidate for the CDU, is seen to have reached second position among preferences, leaving Mr. Facundo Guardado, of the FMLN, in third place. The poll was carried out between December 12 and 15 and, according to the results, Mr. Francisco Flores, of ARENA, stays in first place with 4l.l% of the preferences. Dr. Zamora appears to hold 11.5% and Mr. Guardado 11.3%. Nevertheless, at the level of parties, it is the FMLN which holds second place with 13.8%. The responses to these results were unexpected. On the following day, deputies for the Legislative Assembly expressed the opinion that the UCA poll had been manipulated as to political preferences by those who were in charge of the consultation. "It is a biased poll," stated FMLN Deputy Raul Mijango, as he also stated that the results were not congruent with other consultations. Likewise, he expressed that the UCA aims to encourage an option other than the FMLN. Deputy Julio Samayoa, of the CDU, said that the results of the polls were expected by his coalition and party (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, January 12, p. 12 and EL DIARIO DE HOY, January 13, p. 6).

KIDNAPPINGS. Fifteen suspects in the kidnapping cases involving Andres Suster, Alberto Hill, Guillermo Sol Bant, Kerim Salume and Nelson Machuca were freed during the month of December 1998. On January 7, private lawyers for the National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP), requested a judgement against 6 of the 15 suspects. According to the lawyer’s arguments, sufficient proofs to bring the suspects to trial exist. For those accused, there are crimes, such as that of kidnapping, which, given their complexity, it is difficult to believe that they had been committed by only a few persons. "It is difficult to believe that a single person could take on following the victim, his capture; then afterwards move the victim to an adequate place to maintain him kidnapped," stated the lawyer, Juan Jerónimo Castillo, for which fact it is considered that the declaration of the accused is necessary. "To the person who guards the victim, just as much guilt accrues as to the person who is in charge of the kidnapping, according to penal law," the lawyer added. With respect to the lack of appeal in the case of the eight remaining persons, ANEP confirmed that they did not merit appeal because the elements of proof were deficient in some respects and for this reason were not taken into account (EL DIARIO DE HOY, January 8, p. 14 and LA PRENSA GRAFICA, January 8, p. 6).

PROMOTIONS. Considering the procedures used by the President of the Republic, Armando Calderón Sol during the recent evaluation of the Armed Forces, the PCN demanded that the Legislative Assembly, on January 6, by means of a legislative bill, an investigation of these procedures. The PCN considers that the Selection Tribunal of the Army was not respected in the evaluations which held back the promotion of two military officers. This opinion was shared by the FMLN. Mr. Manuel Melgar of the FMLN held that the obstruction of the promotions places the Peace Accords in danger. Nevertheless, one day later, the new Defense Minister, General Juan Antonio Martinez, rejected the allegation that military regulations which govern Armed Forces promotions had been violated. Mr. Walter Araujo, the head of the ARENA faction in the Legislative Assembly, qualified the PCN’s arguments as "gossip". The ex military officer Sigifredo Ochoa Perez accused the PCN and the FMLN of wanting to involve the Armed Forces in political matters, while at the same time he affirmed that "these officers have the opportunity to be promoted next year". This lack of conformity has been characterized by many as a "crisis". However, Mr. Ochoa Perez categorically denied that it is a question of crisis proportions. These declarations were characterized by Mr. Jose Almendariz, of the PCN, as an attempt by Ochoa Perez to ingratiate himself with ARENA (EL DIARIO DE HOY, January 7, p. 12 and January 8, p. 4).