A phyrric victory

The FMLN faces its failure at the polls

The polls were right

The voters' opinion of election day

News Briefs

A PYRRHIC VICTORY 

The victory of ARENA in the first round should be viewed with a great deal of caution. It is not a landslide victory even through it was won in the first round; neither is it an expression of massive popular will although it obtained 50% of the votes plus one as the law establishes: close to 65% of the population did not vote. This abstention was not because of a lack of interest nor because the victory was sure and one vote more would make no difference, but because it was an express rejection by the majority of the Salvadoran people of right and left politics, of their proposals, of their parties and also of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The "no" majority is a vote to reject the Salvadoran political class and is, up to this point in time, the most rotund demonstration of the discredited state and lack of prestige of that group. The most telling of these elections is not, then, the triumph of ARENA in the first round. It is, rather, the massive rejection by the population of a Salvadoran political class fallen into discredit and scorned for its loss of prestige.

ARENA obtained a little more than the law establishes in order to win its first/round victory, but it had serious difficulties in achieving this minimal level. In fact, it is the lowest voter turnout that ARENA has had in its electoral history and adds yet another link in the chain of tendencies indicating the decline that this party demonstrates since the 1994 elections. The 1994 electoral result startled ARENA, and with good reason. It then undertook to prepare in a conscientious manner for these elections. It made changes in its leadership, reorganized its internal structures, launched a candidate that pretended to represent a new generation of right-wing politicians and invested close to 50 million colones in the campaign. But even so, it hardly managed to get a little more than the minimum established for crowing about its triumph in the first round of voting. This would seem to indicate that each percentage point cost it close to one million colones —a very big investment for such a limited result. The new president has been elected by only 10% of the adult population. Said in another way, not even the hard vote of the party responded. The victory was given it by the hardest nucleus of that vote. This reality limits the representativity of the new government even within its own ranks. From this perspective, ARENA cannot consider itself the party which won these elections. On the contrary, ARENA confronts serious difficulties in the upcoming elections of deputies and municipal councils which will take place within a year.

At the other end of the extreme, the FMLN is a big loser because a year ago it had the same level of electoral preferences as ARENA and had in its hand the very real possibility of becoming an alternative power. Its lack of vision concerning the country and, in particular, concerning the feelings of the popular majorities which it ought to represent, taken together with its internecine divisions, led the party to the embarrassing situation in which it currently finds itself. The defeat of the FMLN leaves a good portion of the population frustrated, and frustrated as well that portion which went to the urns to give the FMLN its vote, hoping to contribute towards a change in government; and many more abstained because, even though they wished for the same change, did not consider that this party represented such an option. In losing, the FMLN has not responded to the expectations of a great many Salvadorans who want a more just and solidary country. The defeat of the FMLN went beyond its bases and sowed despair among more people that might be imagined. It is that the FMLN has not yet assumed the historic responsibility which weighs upon its shoulders: that of representing the aspirations for social change of the majority of the Salvadoran population. The FMLN also finds itself in serious problems as it attempts to reconstitute its internal forces, re-think its left identity and gather up an understanding of the popular will. There are too many factors, and some of them are very complicated, for the short amount of time left it before the next election.

If anyone has won these elections it is the United Democratic Center, the only party that has grown in votes when all the rest tended to lose votes. Its growth is explained by its left identity and by its potential to push forward real social change. Its political future hangs now on what its leadership can unify from among the different currents which make it up and forge them into a common project and upon its ability to depend on a renewed and renewing leadership.

The elections were peaceful and orderly as the ARENA candidate declared, but only in the metropolitan San Salvador area. In the interior of the country, the same order was not to be seen. The reports of the YSUCA correspondents documented all kinds of irregularities, the majority of them led by ARENA members, even by their mayors. All of the parties —but most of all ARENA— continued with their propaganda, oriented voters and led incidents at the voting sites. There were ARENA militants, including a mayor, who voted twice. Some of them had two electoral carnets. At various voting sites, ARENA militants offered to buy votes. In general, the representatives of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal did not give this much importance or ignored the facts, perhaps because they were in agreement with the violations of the Electoral Code or because they did not dare to confront the arrogance of the government party members. In any case, they were a clear example of the weakness of the institution responsible for monitoring the elections.

The incapacity and the weakness of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal contributed in its own way to the disorder. The transportation service was concentrated in specific areas of the capital. The public lists of electors did not coincide with those at the voting tables. People who voted in the last elections, could not do so in this one because their name had disappeared from the list or because another had voted for them or because the code or name on their carnets did not coincide. In some voting centers no one oriented the voters, above all the elderly or illiterate voters who had difficulties in finding the correct urn to cast their vote. The information about the voting totals was deficient and late, in spite of the display of technology and good words. The magistrates of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal have discharged their responsibility onto the political parties and on the stubbornness of making structural reforms, ignoring the fact that they are an organic part of both things.

ARENA has won the presidency of the republic in the first round, but the Salvadoran people have lost because there is no real possibility that their social situation might improve and because they do not have politicians or parties to truly represent them. To judge, then, from the election results, the majority of the Salvadoran population is not willing to make an alliance with the new President of the Republic.

THE FMLN FACES ITS FAILURE AT THE POLLS 

Diverse analysts coincide in assuring us that the lesson that the FMLN must learn from its failure at the polls is that of the urgent need for renovation —renovation along the lines of the process carried out by ARENA during the 1997 elections. Those who have expressed this opinion appear to be convinced that the triumph of ARENA is owing to the luck of the "prize" that the voting public offered to the official party in compensation for its exemplary efforts at renewing and reorganizing itself, and, they say, it is this same effort which the FMLN must now imitate without hesitation. Following this line of reasoning, the deeply felt diminution in the number of votes received by the FMLN is to be explained by appealing to the lack of capacity of its leaders to foresee the necessity of including new personalities in its leadership body —leaders such as prominent businesspeople, for example—, thereby placing at the helm of the party some of the "holy cows" and electing a candidate with a moderate intellectual image, and so succeed in placing its party at the same level of strength as ARENA.

Definitively speaking, it this very choice of candidate that provided ARENA with the highly touted image of "renewal". One cannot help but notice that these new features —which are, up to a certain point, significant— what ARENA brought with it to this electoral process: Francisco Flores discourse which offered proposals and was not belligerent, on the one hand, and the image of a change to a new generation which his election to the presidency would represent, on the other. An examination of the first characteristic should show us that while Flores carefully avoided any reference to the FMLN during the campaign, not all ARENA leaders followed his example. Alfredo Cristiani, to use one example, did not hesitate to direct himself to his fellow party members using the same confrontational language as ever. And one should not forget the ARENA hymn which seeks "tombs" where "communists will die".

An examination of the second factor must not leave out the fact that, from the beginning, Francisco Flores allowed the idea to flourish that, when he won the electoral round, he would be a better president than Calderón Sol had been and that this is owing, in great measure, to his new energy and fresh ideas. His tour of the country in an attempt to establish direct contact with the people was a good tactic with which to begin the campaign. To speak now of consulting the diverse social and political forces of the country in order to elect his presidential cabinet is also a good idea. Both things show a considerably different attitude than that of his predecessors; in fact, Cristiani had already made the voice of the "old guard" of ARENA heard by declaring publicly that the cabinet will have to be made up of people "very close to the party".

Nevertheless, Flores' refusal to participate in the proposed presidential debate awoke suspicions that may only be dissipated in the course of the next five years. It was disconcerting that someone who was trying so hard to create precisely an image of this type would so roundly resist the opportunity of placing his abilities and background as a conciliator to the test. Moreover, his arguments that the president-elect of today justified this refusal could be nothing more than a reference to the customary practice of his party. The bottom line is that Flores was convinced of his victory and this was more than sufficient for him; the fact that the greater part of the voting public was interested in hearing the candidates debate was completely irrelevant .

As things go, to consider the "renewal" of the ARENA party as a direct cause of his victory and of the failure of the FMLN (as a direct consequence of its lack of "renewal") reduces the post-electoral analysis to a simplistic formula and contributes to a tendency towards disguising elements which it is really inconvenient to ignore. In the first place, one must evaluate up to what point what happened in ARENA after the elections of the mayors and of the deputies to the Legislative Assembly is to be considered a renewal. If by renovation is to be understood the giving of new energy to something, it undeniably was a renewal. But if newspaper columnists and those who contribute to the formation of public opinion speak of "the renewal of ARENA", and give themselves to be understood to mean a structural transformation of the party, one must have serious doubts about their argumentation.

In order to affirm, with honesty, that ARENA became a better party than it was before, one would have to present palpable demonstrations that it began to do more than simply inaugurate parks and raise up bridges. Innumerable examples of contrasting image with reality would demonstrate that the government party has not even made an effort to administer the country in a way which took into account the needs of the great majority of the population. The authoritarian attitude of Calderón Sol during the crisis in the health system in 1997, his negligence in dealing with the problem of public security, his authorization to use state funds in campaigns against the FMLN and his inability to design a reconstruction project for the homeless left by hurricane "Mitch" —or at least to notice what was happening with the donations— are palpable indications of this.

There has been nothing in recent years which would provide evidence of a sincere intention by ARENA to improve the party in all of its dimensions with all that this would imply. True it is that it has certainly known how to maintain the internal strength and cohesion of its institutionality. This is a very important success which all of the rest of the parties —including the FMLN— ought to take into account when they are making their respective evaluations. It is also true that the ARENA leaders are, as a consequence of their pragmatism, good strategists. And this, in and of itself, is not a bad thing. To think that the naming of Francisco Flores as candidate and all that that implied was part of the great ARENA strategy to win the presidential elections seems closer to reality —although this is open to discussion.

If ARENA has ever demonstrated with its attitude and manner of governing that for its leaders the most important thing —perhaps the only important thing— is to win, why, then , should this be an exception? And if, in order to win, it was necessary to name a candidate willing to involve himself more with the people, to speak poetically and make sure that his true rival was not Facundo Guardado, instead of the country's problems, why would the leadership group of the party not have to give him all of their support? From these cosmetic changes that, while supported by the monstrous publicity apparatus, effectively led ARENA to the presidency for the third consecutive time, is to be deduced that the true transformation of that party is either a hurried interpretive maneuver or myopic confidence in the right-wing party itself.

Even worse, to affirm that what the FMLN ought to do is to perform in a similar manner is not only myopic, but irresponsible. Is it the case that what is being said to the major opposition party is that it should carry out a few cosmetic changes in order to compete on a more even keel with ARENA? Of course the FMLN has to change and doubtless it will take the ARENA experience into account by examining what is positive about it. But one should not lose sight of the fact —as it appears to be doing recently— that ARENA and the FMLN are two very distinct parties with very dissimilar dynamics and interests.

If there is anything that the FMLN must learn from these elections it is precisely the need to re-examine its past practice and balance its internal dynamism and clarify its interests. But this does not —and ought not— to have anything to do with the reforms effectuated by ARENA. It is not a question of the FMLN "renewing" In the form of emulation of ARENA only in order to win. It is a question of succeeding in becoming a party worthy of confidence, capable of carrying out an alternative. It is not the case that the country needs a second ARENA. The country is calling aloud for a real opposition force.

THE POLLS WERE RIGHT 

The public opinion polls —especially those of IUDOP— were right. But they were not right because they exhibited the tendencies that placed the governing party in first place among the public's preferences and the left party, the FMLN, in second position, a good distance behind ARENA. Neither were they right because the UCA polls revealed that an ARENA victory was more probable if it took place during the first round than during the second. And neither were they right because, since December, they showed the CDU fighting for third place. No, this has not been the fundamental basis for the precise correctness evidenced by the public opinion polls. What was fundamental is that they demonstrated and insisted upon demonstrating in the same way that the people do when they speak of it, of an ambience of disenchantment and indifference towards the electoral process and pointed to the probable conclusion showing absenteeism. In fact, if one speaks of the prognosis of the polls, it would be most honest to say that they were right not because of the results in terms of parties but because they were very categorical in pointing out that these elections ran the risk of absenteeism, which is a product of the lack of confidence in the parties and a product of weariness on the part of the people in hoping that things would change and that that would not occur.

What happened on March 7, when more than 60% of the population stayed home and opted not to elect any party, is not a surprise —at least it is not a surprise for those who took the attitude of the people seriously with respect to the parties— but apparently it is an assumption for the majority of the political parties and functionaries who, moreover, pitilessly attack any poll results without basis. In so doing they were not conscious that they contradicted the thinking and the will of the people, not so much because of their party options but precisely because of a lack of options presented by any party. The public opinion polls essentially showed a population apathetic about the electoral process because they had no one to vote for. In attacking the results of the polls, the politicians scorned popular opinion and only contributed to placing one stone more in the wall which separates them from civil society , or at least from the majority of it.

It is fortuitous that the UCA polls were closely involved with the final scenario of the results of the elections according to party. This, in fact, could have changed, even as a result of the effect of the polls themselves, taking into account the samples which were closest, which were taken a month before the voting. Nevertheless, the scant variation in the results of the elections with respect to the tendencies indicated by the polls demonstrate not only the professionalism with which these were implemented but, above all, the unchanging nature of public opinion and the incapacity of the political parties to modify that for the benefit of the society as a whole. In this sense, the results of the elections are not surprising. What is surprising is to note that the majority of the political parties were not capable of changing it even though they had been advised long beforehand and with insistence. On the contrary, more than taking into account the results of the polls in a serious and critical way, they threw them aside and in so doing reduced their possibilities for understanding the voters. From this came the election results and from this, the absenteeism.

The most significant of all is to note that the fundamental efforts of the political parties ought not to have been in the construction of a better publicity image on the model of market analysts, but in the orientation of their own behavior, in the role that they ought to assume as representatives of the Salvadoran people and how to channel the interests of the majorities. However, no one —or almost no one— understood this and the polls were correct at the cost of the political parties and at the cost of the electoral system...and of the majority of the population which continues to await efficient responses to its most vital problems.

THE VOTERS' OPINION OF ELECTION DAY 

Approximately 25% of those who went to vote last March 7 reported at least one difficulty in voting, according to a poll implemented as the voters left the polling areas by the University Public Opinion Institute (IUDOP) of the "José Simeón Cañas" Central American University in El Salvador (UCA). The poll, carried out with the objective of learning the opinions of the voters concerning the electoral process and the problems that the voters had to confront on March 7, was implemented in diverse polling places throughout the country and the sample consists of 2,234 voters polled. This review of public opinion indicates that the problems begin with difficulties that had to do with the disorganized nature of the polling places and continue on to include irregularities such as finding out that another person had already voted in place of the person interviewed.

According to the results of the poll, 9.7% of Salvadorans could not find their names on the electoral rolls and many of them could not, therefore, vote. Some 3.3% had difficulties with the name which appeared on the rolls, which did not correspond to their real name. Some 0.5% of Salvadorans found that another person had already voted for him or her.

The ruling that no political party could engage in electoral publicity during the voting was not observed either. Some 9.6% of those voters consulted stated that they had seen persons openly engaged in propaganda work inside the voting places or influencing the voters in favor of one political party.

Finally, some 6.2% of those consulted had other difficulties on the day the voting took place. Some of these are: lack of information at the voting places, dealing with the disorganization at the centers, lack of ability of the Commission to Receive Votes (JRV), among others.

Those going to vote for the nest president of the republic were asked their reasons for participating in the voting. Some 55.3% stated that voting is a duty, their obligation as a citizen, while some 13.5% held that they went to vote to change the situation in the country; another 11.3% said that they voted to exercise their free right to do so and 10.9% alluded to the fact that they thought that elections were for improving the country. Some 4.8% stated that they went to vote in order to support their party of preference and the remaining respondents gave other reasons or preferred not to respond.

The voters' attitudes towards the elections reveal a tendency which differs from that shown by the majority of Salvadorans who responded to regular polls. Close to half of those who went to vote last March 7 (46%) expressed a great deal of confidence in the electoral process during which the next president would be elected. Some 21.6% stated that they had some confidence and 30.8% said that they had little or no confidence in the electoral process. The most confident voters were those who cast their ballot for ARENA while those who demonstrated the least amount of confidence were those who voted for PUNTO or LIDER.

The UCA polls revealed an additional piece of information: that the majority of Salvadorans who voted (61.7%) decided who they would vote for before the electoral campaign began while 24.3% did so during the electoral campaign and only 113.4% made the decision the same day as they voted. The majority who decided for one of the big parties did so before the electoral campaign began.

The vision of the future expressed by the voters is very optimistic. Some 42.9% of those voting believe that the country will improve after the elections and 26.7% think that it will stay the same and only 3.6% held the opinion that it would get worse. The rest of those polled did not answer the question.

The UCA poll asked the Salvadoran voters about the reasons why they chose the party for which they voted. Those who voted for ARENA stated that their reasons were sympathy with the party (26.6%), the candidate (15.9%), the work of the party (13.1%) and their campaign proposals (13.7%). On the other hand, those who chose to vote for the FMLN-USC Coalition did so because they sought a change (46.6%), for sympathy with the party (17.4%) and its work (114.9%) among other responses. The people who voted for the CDU did so because of its candidate (46.9%) for a change (17.2%), for its proposals (12%) and for sympathy with the party (10.4%), among other things. The PDC was chosen because of sympathy with the party (27.6%), for its candidate (19.7%) and because they sought a change (17.1%), were among the reasons most frequently expressed.

A poll conducted at the exits of the voting centers revealed that on March 7 many more men than women voted. It also demonstrated that on this occasion a greater percentage of young people went to vote than on previous years and that people of higher educational levels are those who continue to maintain a high percentage of electoral participation as compared with the rest of the citizens.

In summary, the poll conducted at the exits of the voting places carried out by the IUDOP of the UCA on election day itself on a national level demonstrated that the same problems, difficulties, anomalies and irregularities exist as have characterized previous elections. Although it is certainly true on this occasion that the people indicated that it was less disorganized and less disorderly, irregularities such as not having their name appear on the lists and finding that another person had voted in their place continue to occur. The poll confirms what was demonstrated in the pre-electoral polls that pointed out that participation in the elections had to do with the levels of confidence and interest in the elections themselves. In fact, the majority of those who voted did so having decided their vote before the electoral campaign began. The UCA poll demonstrated, as well, that women and people with a lower level of education continue to be the citizens who participate less in the electoral processes.

San Salvador, March 11, 1999

IMMIGRANTS. The President of the U.S., Bill Clinton, assured the Legislative Assembly of our country in his March 10 address that he would do everything possible to end the discrimination in treatment currently given to undocumented workers from Central America prevailing under the NACARA Law. The U.S. president committed himself to present before the Congress of his country "laws which were more balanced" on the question of immigration and in order to begin that he stated that he would soften the provisions required under the NACARA Law in such a way that undocumented Salvadorans would not have to demonstrate that deportation would cause them "extreme suffering". Nevertheless, the president declared to a U.S. newspaper that a limit had been reached on what the US. Could do for the immigrants. On the basis of these declarations it was said unofficially that the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala could refuse to sign the treaty which will be presented tomorrow at the summit meeting which Clinton will hold with the presidents of the region. For his part, President Calderón Sol of El Salvador stated that he felt satisfied by the agreements reached during the visit of the U.S. president. He underlined, moreover that the signing of the treaty of bilateral investment with the U.S. implemented by the Foreign Relations Minister of the Republic of El Salvador and the U.S. Ambassador to our country (La Prensa Gráfica, March 11, p. 4-5; El Diario de Hoy, March 11, p. 12).

FLORES. Francisco Flores, winner of the March 7 presidential elections for the ARENA party, during an interview offered to a morning daily on March 8, affirmed that he would imprint on the government the same style which characterized his political campaign: "open, close to the people and supported by all sectors of the country". The government, he stated, represents a great responsibility for ARENA. "The people are already awaiting the changes which we have promised", he said. On the other hand, he stated that one of his priorities before taking office is to mount a commission of notable personalities of El Salvador. "We are going to call the universities, educational centers and guilds to bring together a cabinet of the broadest possible spectrum. We want to call upon the most capable Salvadorans to come and work with us.". Regarding the principle measure he will take once the government is fully constituted, Flores affirmed that from the very beginning he would encourage "a project for the reactivation of agriculture. We will design the market producers in order to bring them closer to the consumers. We are going to reorient the Banco de Fomento Agropecuario so that it serves the small farmers". On the question of public security, he stated that he will form "an inter-institutional committee so that all institutions related to the control of delinquency will be in a single group" (El Diario de Hoy, March 8, pp. 16-17).

GUARDADO. Facundo Guardado, ex presidential candidate for the FMLN, publicly accepted his defeat on March 8 but held that he will continue working for the transformation of the FMLN, which he has been doing, according to his statements, for some years now and for which he has won the nickname "liberal". Guardado stated that the ARENA victory is owing to the fact that "Flores succeeded in interpreting the urgent need for change which the people of the country have because of their weariness with the ARENA governments and presented himself as the change which the party and the country wanted and this succeeded. And he began to do so with quite a lot of anticipation and with sufficient resources". According to these statements, the difficulties which arose during the electoral period for the FMLN candidates were one of the reasons why Ruben Zamora of the CDU took votes away from them. However, Guardado stated that the FMLN campaign had the support of the principal leaders of the party, although he affirmed that there were some who did not participate in it: that is to say, he accepted the fact that there is a sector in the FMLN which did not support his candidacy. He pointed out, moreover, that his party has confronted many obstacles at the beginning and during the campaign. "I knew that I would have difficulties to deal with. I feel a great satisfaction because we were at a disadvantage as we faced ARENA on the question of resources", he stated (El Diario de Hoy, March 9, p. 12 and 14).