The vote in El Salvador

Social spending in the national budget

Non-governmental organizations and social-political movements

THE VOTE IN EL SALVADOR 

In El Salvador, less than half of the population of an age to vote decides upon the political leadership of the society. The outlook becomes even darker on the question of representation if we consider that abstentionism is a threat which, far from diminishing, is increasing. Should ARENA be concerned about this? The answer is yes, if it decides to open an area in its business project for the social, economic and political viability of the country, but the answer is no, if its interest is to maintain itself in power and do the minimum necessary for the viability of the country Nothing would lead us to think that ARENA is going to give up this second way of doing things without being concerned about the consequences which this would have for the future of democracy.

Are the leaders of ARENA sure that the party can count on a percentage of votes sufficient to win indefinitely? Who knows to what point the confidence of the ARENA leaders will lead them; nevertheless, it is valid to ask the following question: Where does the ARENA vote come from? To answer this question, it might be pertinent to sketch out a few hypotheses —although highly provisional— concerning the Salvadoran voter.

One frequently hears talk of the "hard vote" of a party and, more often than not, this vote is identified with that of a well-determined social sector which sees its objective interests as consonant with those of the party in question. The "hard vote", then, appears to be a "class vote". Seen from this angle, it is possible to affirm not only that "those who are rich vote for ARENA", but that the votes of the rich constitute the hard vote of that party.

This way of posing the question ignores something important: that ARENA and the FMLN have —or seek to have— in addition to a vertical link with determined social groups (a class link) —which can be seen as much in its origins as in its fundamental discourse— a horizontal link with social groups of socio-economic characteristics distinct from the first group. So now, both parties seek to obtain the greatest number of votes as much from the vertical dimension as from the horizontal dimension. It is difficult to say which group gets more votes for each of the parties. But what is certain is that the vertical link of ARENA (its class-link) is more solid than the vertical link of the FMLN.

As a consequence, that vote is firmly assured. But ARENA has assured, as well, a transverse vote, a vote that comes from the poorer sectors as well as from the middle sectors who are not fully entrenched and comfortable in that sector. Taken as a group, these voters constitute, as the last three elections reveal , the "guaranteed" ARENA vote (of which the class vote would be the "hard nucleus"): it is the part of that 40% that has permitted ARENA to take over the executive branch for the third consecutive time.

The FMLN, for its part, can count on a "hard nucleus" of voters, which comes fundamentally from a social sector made up of peasants and urban workers —who were organically linked to the FMLN during the last decade, or to the political/military organizations. Not all poor people or the majority of them are part of this "hard nucleus", because if this were the case, the FMLN could easily defeat its opponents. So now, the FMLN, apart from this vertical linkage, has a horizontal linkage with social groups which are not poor —professionals, university students, intellectuals, public and private employees— who believe that the FMLN can make the changes which El Salvador needs. Both groups of voters make up the "guaranteed vote" of the FMLN, that part of the 40% of effective voters that have permitted it to position itself in second place during the two presidential elections in which it has participated.

The ARENA "guaranteed vote" can be called the "right-wing vote", that is to say, a vote that is cast because of firm confidence in political and economic values which are associated with the right-wing (free enterprise, individual progress, private property, becoming rich, competition, order and stability) and, reciprocally speaking, of a frontal rejection of the political and economic values which are associated, from the point of view of the right, with the left (instability, scarcity, blockage of individual initiative, obstacles to economic development, threats to private property).

The "guaranteed vote" of the FMLN can be called the "left vote", that is to say, a vote which is exercised as a result of firm confidence in economic and political values which are associated with the left (equality, distribution of wealth, social equality) and with a frontal rejection of the political and economic values which, from the perspective of the left, are associated with the right-wing (consumerism, lacerating inequality, impoverishment, marginalization and exclusion).

As can be seen, neither the right-wing vote nor the left-wing vote can be reduced to a "hard vote" (class vote), unless by this can be understood to include as well voters whose "class interests" are not linked to the party for which they vote but who, because of commitment or because they are deceived, firmly accept the values held high by the party of their choice. As a consequence, it is very difficult for a voter who locates him or herself with the left to move towards a right-wing preference: this can happen, but only in exceptional cases. It is, likewise, very difficult, except in exceptional cases, that the contrary might occur: that a right-wing voter might change to a preference for the left. In a country in which left preferences are concentrated almost entirely in the FMLN and those of the right in the ARENA party, the movement of a voter from one party to the other is highly improbable, taking into consideration that the ties that bind him or her to identification with these parties have established with "their" voters sink their roots into deep commitments which are considered mutually exclusive.

That ARENA should wish to steal the guaranteed votes of the FMLN or, vice versa, that ARENA would like to do the same with the FMLN is absurd from all points of view —even should they propose to do so, it would make no sense. To assume as a hypothesis that possibility for interpreting the triumph of ARENA in the last two presidential elections ("ARENA won because it won votes from the FMLN"), or that the relative electoral triumph of the FMLN in the elections for deputies and mayors in 1997 (the FMLN won because it won votes from ARENA") is to formulate the matter wrongly, as was the case with the situations we sketched above.

SOCIAL SPENDING IN THE NATIONAL BUDGET

One of the ways in which the state can contribute to the promotion of development is by using its capacity for redistributing income by means of collecting taxes, assigning social spending towards social areas and supporting of sustainable productive activities. The history of developed countries shows this, even the plans which are most fully adapted to the neoliberal economic vision contemplate a state of affairs in which the state invests growing amounts of its income in "social compensation" to affect the political economy. Lamentably, in El Salvador, in spite of the fact that the government plans recognize the importance of increasing social spending, there still does not exist a policy which deals with this, and neither has there arisen from the Legislative Assembly negotiations any significant change in the distribution of public spending.

What is noteworthy is that the General National Budget for 1999 has not been approved by the Legislative Assembly, in spite of the fact that we are almost finishing the first trimester of the year, which has caused some state institutions to declare themselves in a state of crisis and unable, therefore, to continue with the normal programs. In general, the budget is approved before beginning the year to which it corresponds, but since 1997, with the recomposition of the forces in the Legislative Assembly, the situation has changed to such an extent that apparently the 1999 budget will not be approved until after the month of March.

The delay in the approval of the 1999 budget allows us to examine its distribution, given that this element has been limiting participation in social spending and the encouragement of productive activities, which is made evident in the stagnation of this and in the shrinking of the percentages of the budget of ministries related to the encouragement of agricultural and livestock production.

During the decade of the 1990's, social spending has been maintained between the range of 23% to 26% of the total General National Budget, in spite of presidential offers to increase it up to 50% and, more than any other reason, because the amounts assigned to important portfolios such as health and education are clearly insufficient to cover the needs of the population.

The Social Development Plan offered, in 1995, to increase investment in that area up to 50% of the total General National Budget for 1999, but for certain the budget proposal for this last year, drawn up by the Treasury Ministry, revealed that social spending is still far from reaching such a percentage and only 16.7% was proposed for education, 9.2% for health and 0.3% for labor and social benefits and 0.2% for housing —all of which implies a total of 26.4% of the budget for the area of social needs. This percentage is low not only in comparison with presidential offerings but also for historic percentages assigned to social spending which, between the decades of 1960 and 1980 held firm at average levels close to 30%.

In the actual situation, the provision of state services has become all the more precarious owing to the delay in the approval of the budget. Effectively, according to functionaries related to the areas of health and education, regular programs are held in suspense and, in the case of the Ministry of Education, the head of that ministry has even affirmed that she does not have the resources to implement regular programs nor to cover the administrative costs of that institution.

On the other hand, the budgets assigned to the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG) and the Ministry for Environment and Natural Resources (MARN) reflect the scant importance that recent governments have given to the problem of the agricultural and livestock sector and environmental protection, two of the areas most affected by the policies of past governmental administrations. During the last three years, the budget for MAG has moved from that of 314.4 million (2.1% of the total budget for 1997) to that of 302.7% which, although small, demonstrates the tendencies and priorities of the distribution of the budget.

Since its creation, MARN has had to confront problems similar to those of MAG, because it was allotted a budget that was too low for the requirements of environmental protection and has not received increases in consideration of its income. From an initial budget of 25 million colones in 1997, MARN has come to receive 29 million colones for 1999 (0.2%) of the total, should the budget be approved in the form in which it was presented to the Legislative Assembly.

These lacunae in the social area and in the encouragement of production are a result of the existence of different priorities such as a chronic insufficiency in tax collection to finance public spending. If, during the war, expenses in defense and public security competed with the areas of social needs in the allotment of resources, at the present time, it is the administration of justice and public security which are now competing. During recent years, one may observe that these categories have grown to a level higher than costs in education and health, for example, and have thereby absorbed scarce resources and have made the broadening of social spending more difficult (see Proceso, 827).

What is certain, however, is that the solution to the problem of the budget is not limited to reducing the spending of some dependencies and raising others, but rather to obtain additional financial resources in order to broaden spending in several priority areas without affecting others. The tax reform implemented during the decade of the 1990's does not seem to have succeeded in increasing tax income to the levels necessary for financing the growth in public spending. During 1999 alone it is estimated that the expected income for the budget is lower by about 2,000 million colones and, in accordance with the Central Reserve Bank (BCR), it is projected that the year closes with a fiscal deficit of approximately 2.5% of the Gross National Product. (GNP).

Faced with this, state proposals arising as a result of the impasse in the approval of the budget, contemplate reforms to the Law for the Value Added Tax (IVA) and Income Tax which aim to increase tax income. In the case of IVA, what is sought is to prevent contributors from evading the payment of the taxes on personal and family consumption while, in the case of Income Tax, what is sought is to eliminate the deductions for living allowances for owners, business partners, directors and employees, which have, up to now, been deducted from the declarations presented by businesses.

Apparently, the delay in the approval of the budget is not a result of a situation in which a review is being made of important lacunae, but rather it is a result of the pre-electoral period up to and including March 7 and, according to declarations attributed to the deputies of the Legislative Assembly, in disagreement with the ways in which the government aims to reduce the gap between income and fiscal spending. Doubtless, one of the challenges for the new government is the implementation of policies which permit an increase in tax income and a reduction in the fiscal deficit, but even more important will be the need to pay more attention to the severe deficit that the preceding governments have left in the area of social compensation and to promotion of development.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIO-POLITICAL MOVEMENTS 

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) focus on projects, not on movements: "they mobilize the people to produce on the margins and not to struggle for control of the basic means of production and riches; they focus their attention on technical financial assistance to projects and not on the structural conditions which make up the daily lives of the people. The NGOs co-opt the language of the left: "popular power", "the strengthening of power", "sexual equality", "sustainable development", "leadership from below towards above", etc. The problem is that that language is linked to a structure of collaboration with donors and governmental agencies which subordinate practical activity to policies of non-confrontation.

The local nature of the activity of the NGOs —which means "strengthening power"— never goes beyond influencing small areas of social life which enjoy limited resources within the conditions permitted by the neoliberal state and the macro aspects of the economy.

The NGOs and their professional post-Marxist contingents compete directly with the socio-political movements for influence over the poor, women, those who are excluded because of race, etc. Their ideology and practice diverts attention from the sources and solutions of poverty (looking backwards and inwardly rather than using a process which involves looking from above and towards the exterior or outside). To speak of very small businesses instead of referring to the exploitation by international banks reflects —more than the search for a solution— the underlying notion that the problem has to do more with individual initiative than with transferring capital outside the country. The aid offered by the NGOs reaches small sectors of the population, causing competition between communities which fight with each other over scarce resources, provoking insidious differences and rivalries within and between communities which destroy class solidarity. The same goes for the professionals: each one is concerned from the vantage point of his or her own NGO to seek international financial aid. They compete in presenting proposals which are to the liking of their donors and which offer the lowest costs while sustaining the greatest number of followers... The concrete result is a proliferation of NGOs which fragment poor communities into sectorial and sub-sectorial groupings incapable of seeing the social context which affects them and incapable, as well, of uniting among themselves in order to struggle against the system.

Recent experience demonstrates as well that international donors finance projects during "crises" (political as well as social) which challenge the status quo. Once these movements have died down, they divert the financing toward NGOs which "collaborate" with the regime, adjusting the projects to a neoliberal agenda. Economic development compatible with the free market, is considered to be more important than the base organization for social change, and so becomes the dominant criterion for the distribution of funds. The structure and nature of the NGOs, with their "apolitical" posture and their concern with self-help, depoliticize and demobilize the poor. They strengthen the electoral processes encouraged by neoliberal parties and the mass communication media. They avoid political education about the nature of imperialism, the bases of class neoliberalism, the class struggle between the exporters and temporary workers. Instead of this, the NGOs speak of "the excluded ones" or "those without voice", of "extreme poverty", of "racial or sexual discrimination" without going beyond the symptoms, committing themselves, in this way, with the social system which produces those conditions. By incorporating the poor into the neoliberal economy solely by means of "private voluntary action", the NGOs create a political world in which the appearance of solidarity and social action hides a conservative conformity with the structure of national and international power.

It is not a coincidence that in certain regions in which the NGOs became dominant, independent political class action declined and neoliberalism moved in with no obstacles in its way. The heart of the matter is that the growth of the NGOs coincides with the greater financing coming from neoliberalism and the deepening of poverty there where it is produced. In spite of the many local successes which the NGOs claim, the power of neoliberalism as a construct is maintained and confronts no obstacles in its way and the NGOs must seek niches in the interstices of power with more and more intensity. The problem of the formulation of alternatives has been obstructed in various ways.

Many of the former guerrilla leaders and the social movements, trade unions and popular women's organizations have been co-opted by the NGOs. The offer is tempting: high salaries (sometimes in hard currency), prestige and recognition by international donors, trips and access to work networks, helpers and equipment in infrastructure, relative safety from repression. The NGOs and their international financiers (Inter American Development Bank and the World Bank) publish reports and bulletins about successful experiences of very small businesses and other self-help projects without mentioning the high averages of breakdowns and failures which are produced in the measure in which popular consumption is lowered and low cost imports flood the market and raise interest rates.

And the "successes" themselves refer only to a small fraction of the total number of poor people in the degree in which others cannot enter into the same market. Nevertheless, the propaganda concerning individual successes in small business dealings is important to feed the illusion that neoliberalism is a popular phenomenon. The frequent outbreaks of violence which take place in regions in which small businesses are promoted suggest that the ideology which sustains them is not hegemonic and that the NGOs have not yet displaced the independent class movements.

Lastly, the NGOs nourish a new type of cultural and economic colonialism and a new dependency. The projects are designed —or at least approved— within these "guidelines" for priorities in the imperial centers and their institutions. They are administered and "sold" to the communities. The evaluations are made by and for the imperial institutions. Changes in priorities in financing and bad evaluations provoke disasters in groups, communities, farms and cooperatives. Every person and thing is adjusted in order to comply with the demands of the donors and the evaluators of the projects. The new viceroys supervise and control them in such a way as to require conformity with the objectives, values and ideology of the donor, as well as the adequate use of the funds. If "success" is achieved, it is made more and more dependent on the continuation of external support; otherwise, they collapse.

While the majority of the NGOs are instruments of neoliberalism, there is a small minority which succeeds in developing alternative strategies which support class policies and anti-imperialism. None of these receive funds from the World Bank or the European or U.S. governmental agencies. They sustain themselves by means of efforts to link the local power organizations with the struggles for state power. They link the local projects with national socio-political movements which encourage land takeovers, which defend public property and national control when faced with multi-nationals. They give political support to the social movements involved in struggles to expropriate land. They are in solidarity with the women's struggles with a class perspective. They recognize the importance of politics in the orientation of local and immediate struggles. They believe that the local organizations ought to struggle as well at a national level and that the national leaders ought to be responsible to local activists. In a word, they are not post-Marxists.

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This article is a collaboration by James Petras of the State University of New York at Binghamton.