The FMLN's self-criticism

The challenges facing the new government

Is something in ARENA changing?

How much longer will the country be without a budget

News Briefs

THE FMLN'S SELF-CRITICISM 

The FMLN has moved from the most vulgar triumphalism —of which its principal leaders made such a show before the recent elections— to the most clumsy defeatism —which these same leaders now publicly affirm: and this, always, within the context of the tradition of that party. The mechanism which was used to recognize errors committed during the recent electoral process was, as it was in former days, that of self-criticism. Self-criticism is a process much used in the traditional armed left —the left of closed collectives and democratic centralism, the process of self-criticism aims not to leave one stone on top of the other. All of the failures, even the most absurd and pathetic, must be publicly recognized because this "mea culpa" is the necessary condition for the rectification of errors committed, a process which follows self-criticism.

In the recent past, when a militant of the armed left deviated from the "revolutionary line" —either for his or her petit bourgeois attitudes or because of his or her ideological inconsistency— he or she was obliged, if the person wished to continue being part of the group of privileged persons which had understood the designs of history, to confess before the collective of which he or she was a member, deviations, without omitting details which, although they might seem to be irrelevant, would help to evaluate revolutionary integrity. This calling in of personal accounts had a name: self-criticism. To be willing to engage in self-criticism was a sign of maturity and commitment with the interests of the proletariat.

Self-criticism had to be as prolific as necessary and the person how presented it should make every effort to demonstrate his or her limitations and personal weaknesses of every kind: the person had to fully demonstrate the small value of his or her own person and interests as compared with the magnificence of the principles and project of the revolution, compared with which he or she was completely replaceable. In this perspective, self-criticism became somewhat humiliating and, on many occasions, absurd: many militants, convinced that they had deviated from the "revolutionary line" made their most intimate secrets and dreams public, as well as their most harmless "faults": from having drunk Coca Cola to have thought of the comrade "comandante" was mistaken when such and such a decision was taken. Nothing should be hidden from the collective all must be recognized and spoken from the mouth of the person responsible. After the recognition of the guilt itself would come the corrective measures which, obviously, were accepted with complete willingness by the person who had "deviated". This became the condition of the "return" to the correct line.

In a similar scheme of things, after the electoral debacle of 1999, the leadership of the FMLN made its own self-criticism. Some aspects of the process have already been made public; in it, the FMLN recognized a series of errors which make one doubt its capacity to become an effective alternative government. Without any second thoughts —and even with a certain candor— the leaders of the FMLN have recognized something that all the world knew: that in the manner which the electoral process had been promoted —unresolved conflicts, the conventions, the candidates and the campaign— that left party was destined for resounding failure. This —they say— they already knew; they knew that they were a party which would lose the elections and, although they tried to correct some faults, the efforts made to change directions were insufficient.

At the moment in which the dynamics indicating the FMLN failure were being concocted, there was no lack for critical voices which called attention to the serious situation which the FMLN's electoral possibilities was facing. However, almost invariably, the main leadership figures rejected any analysis which showed up party weaknesses. They insisted ad nauseum that everything that happened in the FMLN was an expression of democracy which was the ambience prevailing in the party and which ought to be imitated by the rest of the political parties. When the FMLN was made to see the fact that it had no chance of displacing ARENA, the FMLN leaders repeated that the party was marching towards victory.

With the same firmness with which this same position was maintained before the elections, they now maintain the opposite-that in the party there are important factional divisions (that there is no such expression of democracy at all) and that these factional divisions contributed to the electoral defeat (which was no surprise whatever). Finally, the leadership of the FMLN tells us that it knew beforehand that the party was going to lose, in spite of the fact that throughout the electoral process, its members fiercely maintained the opposite evaluation and raised expectations of a hope for victory throughout the rank and file of the party. They were also conscious of the deteriorating effects of the internal disputes, although they firmly maintained that it was a question of healthy democratic debate. This is to say, the leadership of the FMLN wanted to deceive public opinion and its own rank and file as well on two counts. But, isn't it just one more deceptive tactic to pronounce that "they already knew" of the seriousness of the internal disputes and the impact that these would have in issuing in a probable electoral defeat? Wouldn't it be more truthful, in this way of seeing things —and in those moments— if the FMLN had gone ahead with a democratic debate and, moreover, if this had led them to political victory? Who knows what the answers to these questions might be; what is true is that the credibility of the FMLN, far from strengthening it, has undergone a process of erosion in the situations such as those described above.

All in all, if we accept as truth that the FMLN leadership "already knew" that it was headed for an electoral defeat, one must take note of the manifest lack of capacity demonstrated by their leaders in order to change the focus. If they had not known it, it makes sense that they would make an effort to continue with the political strategy which led the party to defeat. If they had known it, to continue with this same strategy was a brutal contradiction. They say that thew knew beforehand but that, in spite of this knowledge, they were indeed unable to implement the changes necessary to reverse the logic of the events. If this is true —if they were unable to make the necessary changes—, we are looking at a declaration (an acceptance) of political incompetence the magnitude of which has seldom been seen. Perhaps this admission is sincere and this is of some value. But it is not the public recognition of their miseries which might best serve the party, but rather a no holds barred debate concerning the party's identity, leadership, structure and perspectives in an uncertain process of democratic transition-consolidation.

THE CHALLENGES FACING THE NEW GOVERNMENT 

From the moment he took office, President Calderón Sol has not ceased to proclaim to the four winds how much the country has progressed in social matters as well as in the institutionalization of democracy. His discourse —efficiently expressed through commercial television, paid ads and other resources of this kind— seems to refer always to the marvels of a country which is not this country. It could not be more obvious that the heart of the message which the president is trying to transmit is that, thanks to ARENA, El Salvador finally took the road towards development and that without ARENA the country would still be submerged in confrontation and backwardness.

Of course, nothing is farther from the truth than that idyllic vision which Calderón Sol is attempting to sell. It is true that there have been some important advances in democratization, but ARENA cannot take full credit for these advances and neither are they sufficient for El Salvador to enjoy a "full state of law" —such as the president announces at every opportunity. This country is far from being on the sure road to development. The list of obstacles to development is interminable: poverty, unemployment, violence in all of its diverse manifestations, deterioration of the environment, corruption, incompetence, conformity, apathy, authoritarian holdovers...

And the most serious of all is that these and other problems not only have not begun to be solved; on the contrary, they become more serious every day. It would be stubborn to continue hammering away at the same thing at this point , when the most diverse analysts have for many years now recognized the seriousness and complexity of the obstacles which bog down the Salvadoran process of transition. But, faced with a government party which calmly turns its back on what is so evident to all, there is no other remedy than to continue insisting. Especially when it is the same party which will govern the country for five more years.

What has been said already on many previous opportunities is that Francisco Flores seems to be more promising than his predecessors. It became clear early on that nothing much could be expected from Calderón Sol. But, although it was ARENA which won the electoral victory in the presidential elections and, although at a structural level practically nothing has changed in the country, the conditions under which the government will operate have changed somewhat. The El Salvador that "Paquito" will inherit on June l is, in essence, the same which his predecessor received five years ago: a country desolated by poverty, violence, negligence and corruption, but there have been modifications in the way in which the population considers the behavior and accomplishments of public functionaries.

One should not be very much amazed that Flores has more eyes focussed on his administration than were focussed on the current president as he began his administration.. And this not only because public opinion has matured considerably in recent years; above all, it is because of the image created to sell "Paquito" to those who elected him. If ARENA has made special efforts to make us believe that Flores is the figure to hold up the flag of democratization and, if he presented himself as the leader with the "new way to doing politics", then there is nothing left but to hope that public opinion will demand that he act in such a way as to live up to this image. It is clear that to act in such a way as to fulfill expectations of this image is not easy and "Paco" will surely encounter certain foreseeable difficulties.

In first place, there is Cristiani. It is true that ARENA has known how to shore up their internal differences and that on the question of institutionality it could give lessons to the rest of the parties. But this does not mean that the internal feuds disappeared altogether. This was made particularly evident in the ex-president's statements as he reacted to Flores' proposal on how to make up his presidential cabinet. It is obvious that Cristiani is not willing to cede his quota of power within the party. We can remember the rumors of his possible alliance with "The Friends of Freedom" in order to counterbalance Flores' maneuvers. So then, what "Paco" encounters in Cristiani is a strong obstacle to making changes, especially when those changes threaten to affect the wallet of the ex-president and his "godsons".

In second place, there is the structure of the government with the characteristics that ARENA has made felt on that structure. There is no doubt that the "good old boys", the tradeoffs, the practice of clienteles and the rest of the knots that make up the "old way of doing politics" will place serious brakes on Flores' intentions to exercise power with true professionalism. The fact that corruption almost does not appear in the ARENA government's plan as a problem serious enough to require urgent responses —gives the lie to his commitment to "security". It is quite probable that "Paquito" will have to decide to ignore the problem of white collar crime simply in order to avoid committing himself to fight for something that is far beyond his possibilities. It is an open secret that in order to fight corruption in El Salvador would imply attacking high level groups which are full of either ARENA party members or of people very close to ARENA. The flagrant irregularities that the PNC and the Ministry of Public Security have committed in the handling of serious cases of corruption all demonstrate this.

In third place, one encounters a certain sector of private enterprise. Francisco Flores is not going to bring about any structural change in the social-economic area. That is something that should not be taken lightly in order not to raise false expectations. As things go, what is most probable is that as clashes between the Flores administration and big business begin to take place, these will be for only small, minor reasons. However the case may be, it is important not to lose sight of the relationships between "Paco" and, for example, the industrialists quickly began to be irritated with the refusal by Flores to participate in the presidential debate organized by the Salvadoran Association of Industrialists (ASI).

It should be said, however, that of the first two are obstacles which should be cause of worry, this last, on the other hand, is, at first sight, positive for the country. It constitutes an indication that it is not only the universities and some individual columnists who, from outside the political system, offer critical opinions about the government administrations activities in office. The divorce between the government and private enterprise —only in one sector of this, of course—, that began to take place during the campaign shows promising signs of being one more step in the slow march towards the institutionalization of democracy.

It is still too early to offer any definitive judgements about what the Flores administration will be or be allowed to be. Before anything else, one may have to wait until "Paquito" gives some indication of being really willing to begin acting in such a way as to demonstrate a new way of doing politics. In this scheme of things, what hangs in the balance is not only the credibility that important sectors of the voting public might feel towards the party, but also, and in great measure, towards the political class taken as a whole. It is in intelligently balancing the changes in these and other obstacles that will doubtless come up along the way, and in engaging in honest and professional work that the recently elected president may be able to demonstrate that he is a different kind of politician.

IS SOMETHING IN ARENA CHANGING?

This year's presidential elections were a demonstration of what ARENA may come to be with the objective of staying in power. For one outside observer it was unthinkable that the party of only two years ago could put up a candidate such as Francisco Flores and keep up the tone of conciliation and appeasement that he attempted to imprint on the campaign. It was also unthinkable that to the one who was, at that moment, the visible leader of the party, so resistant in taking criticisms and accounting for his own errors would permit dissention on points so important to the preceding government administrations and accept that certain fundamental problems of Salvadoran reality still have not been resolved.

The dynamic which fed this process was not, as some naive persons and party publicists attempted to make it seem, a willingness to change, but rather a will to power, at least from the institutional perspective. In other words, the party was not very interested in promoting a Francisco Flores who was, in appearance, so unmarked by the traditional attitudes and aptitudes of the party, if, in this way, they could guarantee five more years controlling the state. Given this, it would be absurd to ask oneself if Flores could insinuate himself and his moderate background into the internal ranks of the party, which has always been characterized by intolerance.

Only had it been the case that there was a verifiable generational change inside the party would one be able to sustain the hypothesis that Flores would represent an abrupt change in the way of doing ARENA politics. A generational change which is not limited to a simple turnover of old party cadre for younger ones, but a change in mentality and attitudes. And of this, obviously, there is not a trace in that right-wing party. It should be enough to observe how other members of the Flores generation (such as Rene Figueroa or Walter Araujo, for example) are exact models of the cynicism, intolerance and a lack of social awareness which characterizes their elders. Between one young ARENA leader and Acosta Oertel the only observable difference is in the number of years.

The only important question posed during the electoral campaign was whether Francisco Flores' party would permit him to carry forward a different governmental administration. Given this, one accepts the fact that Flores was an exception and that his characteristic would end up implying permanent clashes with party authorities and ARENA functionaries. Taking into account what we have said above, the answer to this question is to be found in the benefits which the Flores administration will provide for ARENA. So it is that, in the measure in which it is useful to the party and that the party considers that the possibility of seeing itself relieved of power is held at bay, Flores will be permitted to carry out the sui generis government that he promised. On the contrary, given the case that ARENA might feel once again sure of its position in the political spectrum, a government similar to that of its predecessors might come to be expected, in which Flores will be obliged (assuming for the sake of argument that he is truly interested in doing politics in a different way) to heel before the needs and demands which ARENA and the sectors it represents.

To pose the question on a realistic basis is useful as the inauguration of Flores and Quintanilla approaches, especially if the objective is seriously to evaluate one of the measures that Flores aims to carry out once the inauguration has taken place and that is to reformulate the selection of the presidential cabinet. Yet another example of what is disconcerting and surprising in such a personality as Flores can be perceived as he announced, a little after he was sure of his electoral victory, that the process of choosing his cabinet members would be placed in the hands of a Commission of Well-Known Personalities who would evaluate the capability of candidates as well as whether they are the right person for the job, in which case it may even be possible to include people who are not members of the party. Moreover, Flores has been clear in stating that the new ministers would be constantly supervised and would have to explain their actions publicly.

Apparently, with this, Flores is trying to show his commitment to a new government (with a "New Alliance" with a "New ARENA") was not just empty campaign rhetoric but a real promise. It is, in fact, so real that it may have obliged Cristiani —the permanent ARENA conscience for the unquiet Flores— to clarify that the personalities who would make up the cabinet ought to be "very close" to the party. The seed of concern expressed by the president of COENA did not fall on unfertile soil: Flores promised to change the bases upon which —up until now— he had thought to choose the cabinet: they will be handpicked and the pool from which they will be chosen will be restricted to personalities who adhere completely (read, will submit) to the requirements and ideology of the party.

From an optimistic point of view and laying to one side the political astuteness for which ARENA is known, the measure which Flores plans to implement would be a sign that things may have advanced to the point that the doors may be opening for a change in the way ARENA government administrations have been led. For the first time in ten years, a president-elect has demonstrated his willingness to follow-up on at least one of his campaign promises. This being such an important event as the election of cabinet ministers, upon which choices will depend, in good, part, the efficiency and transparency of his administrative behavior, this gesture of Flores' will be a transcendental one and will set the guidelines for his behavior in his upcoming term of office.

Given this, and from the point of view of ARENA's willpower, Flores' statements concerning the cabinet might be a sign that for the right-wing party, the electoral campaign has not yet concluded and that it will not end until the elections of deputies and mayors reach the same level as before ARENA's electoral loss in 1997. This is to say, ARENA, much as it did during the recently past electoral campaign will continue utilizing Flores to attract (and broaden) the sympathies of the voting public. In this sense, what would be more efficient than to construct a scenario in which the lead man enters into contradictions with the old guard of the party, who, finally —all fall down— cede to the well-intentioned ideals of the lead man.

If we consider things from the point of view of this interpretation, the administrative work which Flores implements from the moment after the inauguration until the results of the legislative and municipal elections are over will be the backdrop of the ARENA electoral campaign— a backdrop from which the goal will be to modernize the political class which is as faithful to its ideological inheritance as it is to an outlook characterized by radical pragmatism. If this is the case, we may be awaiting more surprises from Francisco Flores and ARENA throughout the period understood to begin now and continuing through March of the year 2000.

So now, if the foregoing scenario turns out to be a true one, this does not mean that Flores' decision to choose a different kind of government cabinet is not an important opportunity for civil society and even for the rest of the political parties. A good way to take advantage of the dynamic currently affecting the ARENA party is to take Francisco Flores at his word, meaning, that social organizations —independently of their ideological tendency— should propose their candidates for the presidential cabinet and monitor the process of choosing the members to assure that it is really open and clean.

The possibilities that Flores has opened up —or the willingness of ARENA— will be lost if the incredulity or sloth of the opposition parties and social formations of some prestige and weight do not listen to the call and, in so doing, leave total control of the government in the hands of ARENA because there are not alternative candidates presented. The important fact about the state of affairs currently in effect is to take advantage of and radicalize the democratic force with which Flores aims to begin his presidency. In this way, the president-elect might be obliged really to carry out what he has promised or publicly give the lie to something which he never intended —or with which he could not comply.

HOW MUCH LONGER WILL THE COUNTRY BE WITHOUT A BUDGET

The national budget for fiscal year 1999 has still not been approved by the Legislative Assembly, in spite of the fact that almost three and a half months of the year have passed. This is somewhat unusual because, generally, the annual budget is approved at the end of the foregoing year so as not to cause complications in the functioning of the state and of the economy.

Up until now, the explanations for the delay in the approval of the budget have been of a various and sundry nature. The most important reasons, however, have to do with the imbalance between incoming and outgoing funds which the budget presents, the reforms to tax laws, including income tax and value added tax, the use of the funds resulting form the sale of the National Administration of Telecommunications (ANTEL) and the emission of bonds in order to cover the budget deficit.

Faced with this gridlock, diverse government functionaries expressed opinions on the inconvenience which this situation is causing in the implementation of programs of the various ministries (see Proceso, 848). Surprisingly enough, according to data attributed by a morning daily to the Analysis and Evaluation Unit of the Treasury Commission of the Legislative Assembly (see La Prensa Gráfica, April 10, 1999, pp. 4 and 5), during the first two months of 1999, the government implemented a notable increase in its spending as compared with the first months of 1998. Faced with these contradictions, it is important to review the possible causes for the delay in approval of the budget and the implications of this for the economy and for the functioning of the state itself..

Among the factors which have made the approval of the budget impossible, the one which is causing the greatest number of contradictions is the one related to the emission of bonds —for a total of 2,200 million colones— and, in a lesser degree, the use of the ANTEL funds for ends different from those which the law for its privatization establishes. According to the FMLN deputies, the fact that the budgetary project contemplates the emission of these bonds, without there having been a law passed to authorize it, is unconstitutional. Moreover, they question the fact the funds obtained from the sale of ANTEL are destined to be utilized for public works when the privatization law for this entity is specific in stating that they should be used for investment in social spending.

Faced with these questions, the Ministry of the Treasury, Enrique Hinds, has declared that the unconstitutional status would not apply because the budget still has not been approved and it is still at the level of a legislative bill. Additionally, it may be denied that the ANTEL funds could be used for expenses not contemplated in the law for its privatization because these are handled by means of a special account which guarantees that it will be this way. Be that as it may, what is certain is that the situation is that the process of approbation is at loggerheads and this could have implications of very large dimensions. In fact, one of the principal concerns expressed by representatives of private enterprise concerns the delay in payment for the infrastructure projects which the government has contracted out to construction companies. Inevitably, this delay could also affect the job or income of the workers of the business which could be affected. In the same way, the private enterprises which provide goods and services to the state could confront a reduction in the demand generated by the public sector.

The delay in the approval of the budget for an indefinite time could become an element which could paralyze the state's activities. If this should occur, there might even be a reduction in national income as a result of the reduction in public spending not only of direct goods and services but also as an effect of the holding back of salary payments for public employees. This would imply, automatically, a lower level of demand and possible reduction in the production. This is to say, the lack of a budget would surely have an impact on growth rates.

For the moment, the implications for the functioning of state programs have already been pointed out by diverse public functionaries and, according to the Ministry of Hacienda, close to 18 new projects have been frozen because of the absence of a budget for fiscal 1999. Among the branches most affected are the ministries of health, public works and education. According to the same source, in the Ministry of Health they have not contracted 92 health workers and have not equipped close to 60 medical dispensaries. Neither have they increased the salaries for more than 17,000 employees.

In the case of public works, they have not repaired close to 166.8 kilometers of urban highways in the principal cities of the country. For the Ministry of Education, 686 school equipment projects have been frozen, which means leaving 20,580 students without attention. Moreover, 300 teachers were not contracted, which means that 9,000 students will not be taught and, finally, some 2,450 students have not received their scholarships.

This is a dark panorama, but when one considers the behavior of public spending during the first months of 1999 the perspectives change. According to data from the Ministry of the Treasury, in spite of the fact that there is not yet a 1999 budget, public spending during the first two months of the year would have been carried out in an almost normal way if the total spending effected is considered. Even more, according to the report of the Analysis and Evaluation Unit of the Budget, spending during January and February of 1999 has been greater than that of the same months in 1998 and 406.9 million colones, which implies an increase close to 23.9%. Along this same line, the General Director of the Treasury, Salvador Portillo, recognized that during the month of March, 1999 expenses increased by 381 million colones in relation to the same month in 1998. The foregoing implies that, during the first trimester of the year, public spending has increased by approximately 780 million colones.

The foregoing demonstrates that in reality the absence of a budget has not been translated into a reduction in public spending given that his had increased during the first trimester of 1999. This is noteworthy in that the real implications which the delay in the approval of the budget are having because, given this data, the government's statements concerning a supposed "crisis" in the state institutions are called into doubt. Apparently, the government has the capacity to continue financing its budget by using funds from tax income to such a degree that it has been able even to increase spending much above income, with which additional pressures are created for the increase in the fiscal deficit.

All in all, it is important to note that the budget cannot continue to be bogged down for much time owing to the implications which this might bring with it for production, budget, income, demand for service and facilitation of basic social services. Should it be true that there is an impasse of large proportion to be encountered on the question of the emission of bonds, it would be relatively easy to approve the budget by means of an agreement that might resolve the supposed unconstitutionality of the simultaneous approval of the budget and the emission of bonds, approving the first last and then, afterwards, the budget.

It is curious that the budget still has not been approved as a result of questioning of some aspects which do not fundamentally change other deeper problems have always been present, to wit: stagnation in the assignment of percentages to the social area; the persistence of an elevated participation of the costs related to the administration of justice, defense and public security; and the ever-present lack of tax income to cover the global total of public spending.

INCREASE. A report from the Treasury Commission of the Legislative Assembly entitled "Behavior of the Cash Budget of the Central Government", corresponding to the period of January and February of the present year reveals that during 1999 more is being spent than during 1998. This places in doubt all of the Executive Branch's complaints expressed previously about there being no funds and that for this reason an economic crisis exists. Technical personnel of the Analysis and Evaluation Unit of the cash budget demonstrate in the document that during the first months of the year 406.9 million colones have been spent and that this is more than was spent during the same period for the year 1998. In other words, spending has increased by 23.9%. This increase involves spending for consumer goods and other categories such as investment and payment of salaries. The General Director of the Treasury, Salvador Portillo recognized that "yes, there is an increase in spending", which he attributes to a salary increase for public employees. Nevertheless, he clarified that it is not a question of "an excess in total budget expenses". According to this source, the disbursement between January and March of much more than 700 million colones spent during the same period in 1998, will necessarily be repeated during the rest of the year. "On cannot take the expenses for a few months [as the basis for] projecting expenses for the whole year," he concluded (La Prensa Gráfica, March 10, pp. 4-5)

FMLN. A recent internal analysis by the FMLN confirms that one of the principal causes of that party's electoral defeat was owing the "terrible" image of the party as it emerged from its internal strife and that, during the period in which the presidential election formula was chosen, this became even more evident. The document, "Elements for the Evaluation of the Campaign by the Coalition for Change in the Presidential Elections of 1999" was drawn up by the Center for Studies on Public Problems. The document explains the fact that, had the party not entered the elections with this negative image, the FMLN would have had a good possibility for winning the elections. The study reveals, moreover, that much before the Supreme Electoral Tribunal might publish the first results of the elections, the FMLN already knew it would be defeated. According to the explanations presented, the FMLN party members realized after the March 7 poll (on election day), the results of which coincide with other polls which reflected a state of affairs in which ARENA would win in the first round. The document also affirms that the FMLN made changes in its campaign strategy in order not to lose the first round and to increase the 24 percentage points in favor of ARENA but the efforts were insufficient and fruitless (La Prensa Gráfica, April 10, p. 8).

DOUBTS. The Treasury Commission of the Legislative Assembly determined, on April 12, that the project for the General National Budget for 1999 is not unconstitutional. According to the deputies of the ARENA, PDC, PLD and PCN factions, the legislative bill presented by the Treasury Ministry in September of last year does not violate Article 227 of the Constitution which obliges the budget to be based on current laws in effect. Deputy Kirio Walso Salgado, of the PLD, argued that he had in his hands only a legislative bill for the budget and not a law and that, therefore, it could not be unconstitutional. Salgado's logic defined the direction of the voting of the rest of the factions. During the meeting some accords were reached but other doubts also arose and that for this reason the project still could not be begun. Gerson Martínez of the FMLN complained that "this has always been the custom, to approve legislative bills for the budget marked with irregularities which cause large contradictions". The deputies have agreed to wait ten days more in order to hear the version to be presented by the Ministry of the Treasury, Manuel Enrique Hinds about what will be done with the money derived from the sale of ANTEL and his determinations on other reference points on the topic of the budget (La Prensa Gráfica, April 13, p. 12).

LANDFILL. The new sanitary landfill in Nejapa was implemented once again on April 12 is designed to receive approximately 400 trash collection trucks, which pass through several municipalities of San Salvador on a daily basis. According to explanations provided by the organization Integral Handling of Solid Wastes S.E.M. de C.V. (MIDES, for its initials in Spanish), all vehicles which use the landfill will have to present identification emitted by the municipality in which they work. However, few trucks were able to enter the landfill because persons who collect trash in the neighboring dump site in the city of Mariona caused disturbances which required closing the recently inaugurated landfill sit. The measure was taken on the basis of consensus between the authorities of the company in charge of the project, CINTEC, MIDES and the Municipal Council of Nejapa. The trash collectors of Mariona caused the disturbance by blocking the passage of the trash trucks which circulated through the dump site in Mariona on the way to Nejapa. "We are fighting this because we want promises made to us kept. They told us that we would always have work and now it turns out that no truck can come to dump trash...all of them are going to the new landfill", declared the "pepenadores" [persons who live from collecting items from the trash]. The disorder was dispersed by members of the National Civilian Police and Metropolitan Police Agents (La Prensa Gráfica, April 12, p. 6 and April 13, p. 5).

VOTE. The Ad hoc Commission for Electoral Reforms will modify Articles 50 and 421 of the Electoral Code in order to permit the Juntas in charge of Ballot Boxes with the capacity for less than 400 ballots. This new modality will permit the multiplication of the number of Juntas in charge of Ballot Boxes on a national level. The magistrates of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) demonstrated that the deputies of the Ad Hoc Commission that the residential vote could be applied without incurring large expenses. The Technical Committee for the Support of the Electoral Commission presented to the legislators on April 14 proposals for reforms to the Code in order to permit the adoption of the residential vote. Jorge Díaz, the magistrate who functions as president of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, made clear that financing from the Spanish government exists for the development of the project in the long run. However, he recognized that for the legislative and municipal elections next year there could be variations. Up to the point of the last elections, the voting centers determined the number of electors. In the system for residential voting is established, first of all, how many voting centers should be created for each nucleus of the urban population. The new voter registration will be voluntary, for which reason the large and old voting centers will continue to function (El Diario de Hoy, April 14, p. 8).