Perspective on the FMLN

FMLN: ideology versus political practice

Plans for reconstruction and the prevention of disasters

News Briefs

PERSPECTIVE ON THE FMLN

The results of the last FMLN convention have laid bare the enormous difficulties which this left party will have to deal with in order once again to launch itself as a viable option for power. Following the electoral disaster in March, the "orthodox" wing as well as the "revisionist" wing began to prepare themselves to deal with and take advantage of in the best possible way what the convention might offer: the "orthodox" wing, after blaming the failure in the elections on the electoral formula, were clear that what was being presented to them was the ideal opportunity to take up the reins of the party; the "revisionist" wing, in spite of Facundo Guardado’s resignation as coordinator of the FMLN, did not hide their intentions to capitalize on the negligence and laziness with which, according to the revisionist, the orthodox wing assumed the electoral commitment. Each mutually accused the other of the electoral failure, each wanting to win advantages at the expense of the other.

Of course, the orthodox members were the ones who had positioned themselves in the best manner, given that, all in all, the electoral formula of Facundo Guardado and Nidia Díaz even from the beginning did not have their approval. One thing was even clearer: the orthodox members went to the convention with the intention of blaming Guardado and his followers. For their part, the revisionist members were ready to defend themselves using the best weapon available to them: the elections had been lost because the "FMLN defeated the FMLN".

Things being as they were, it is no wonder that in the FMLN convention of Sunday, May 9 the crisis was not resolved —rather, the contrary: the crisis was prolonged for a longer period of time without there being any clear sign that there will be a solution. It could not have been any other way because the two principal factions squared off one against the other went to the event with one objective in mind: to defeat the rival faction and force it to accept its conception of the party and its rules of the game. The news media, especially the print media, has pronounced its verdict: the orthodox wing made the revisionist wing yield. One piece of evidence, among others, that things went this way is the FMLN’s subsequent reaffirmation that it is a "socialist" and "revolutionary" party. Perhaps the verdict is clear; perhaps it is true that the "orthodox" wing won and took up the reins of the party in order to direct it down the "correct" road to socialism and revolution.

But from this is does not follow that the FMLN’s problems are over. And this is the case, fundamentally, for three reasons. The first is, because the members loyal to Facundo Guardado [known as "Facundistas"] are not going to rest with their arms crossed —this being also true of the actions of the orthodox wing— while they see themselves replaced by their rivals for the control of a party whose leadership believes it has the inalienable right to belong. The Facundistas will not easily agree that the party should deviate from what they consider to be "its historic mission". Neither will they easily give up a quota of power which would permit them to make the party comply with that "mission". The second reason is that the revisions, with the firm opinion that the failure of their project was a result of a boycott by the orthodox wing, are waiting to pay them with the same coin. When all is said and done, the notions of conspiracy and treason are as innate to the Latin American left as arrogance and cheating are to the right. The third reason is that it cannot be assumed in a simplistic way that the FMLN is a socialist and revolutionary party; the discussion must take place as to what is currently understood to be socialism and revolution, and with this it is almost unavoidable that the most deeply rooted passions and dogmas will come to the fore from each of the groups —as much the revisionist as the orthodox members of that party. The situation, then, is that as long as the revisionists heatedly defend the premise that the essence of the revolution and socialism must include passing through political democracy and the market, the "orthodox" group will surely ascribe to the thesis that the revolution and socialism pass through a kind of class struggle and a restructuring of the productive apparatus in favor of the majority sectors of the society.

In a scenario such as that described above, the internal situation of the FMLN, far from achieving normalcy, has become highly unstable. At the recently celebrated convention little was achieved in terms of a solution to the problems; dealing with these problems has been postponed until the "orthodox" faction can prepare the definitive blow which would force their rivals to submit to their plans or leave the party —unless the "revisionists" can turn the tide of the current tendencies.

In this sense, in the coming months, the "revisionists", on the defensive as they are, will have to think of something good to change the dynamic that threatens to leave them out of the leadership group of the FMLN. The "orthodox", knowing that they are faced with a group which had earlier attempted to marginalize them and keep them out of the circles of control of the FMLN, must mount a resounding offensive, in such a way as to shake themselves once and for all and rid themselves of the problems which the "revisionists" have been causing them. Before the convention of Sunday, May 9, the internal disputes of the FMLN were covered up with the cloak of "internal democratic debate"; now this cloak has been rent asunder: it is now a question of an open struggle for power between the two factions —the others which presumably exist do not count in this dispute—, neither of which is willing to cede to the pretension of the other to take control of the hegemony of the FMLN as a whole. We are seeing two factions with great experience in the battles where conspiracy and audacious intrigues play a central role; it is a question of two factions willing to risk everything in order to maintain what they consider their birthright. As things go now, what is most probable is that both groups will continue submerged in the dispute which has concerned them for at least the last two years.

The perspectives of the FMLN? They are dark indeed inasmuch as they are noisily disintegrating and inasmuch as its social credibility —which was won through long years of struggle— is being lost in giant steps. The more things change, the more they stay the same and it is not clear how the FMLN can emerge strengthened from the current internal breakage which currently wracks that party. It is not even clear how the FMLN can be an alternative which could counterbalance the ARENA machinery. It would not be out of line to think of a new option for the left, which the FMLN could support with more than the letters which stand for its name, but with the experience and political wisdom of which it was so proud during the civil war.

FMLN: IDEOLOGY VERSUS POLITICAL PRACTICE

On May 9, the FMLN made a date with itself to try to resolve in a definitive way its serious internal differences, which have been slowly undermining its position as the second political party of the country. The confusing results of this last round between the tendencies which make up the FMLN become today a battleground are not at all hopeful. In this context, ARENA emerges as a modern up to day party which seems to have all the necessary elements for staying in power almost indefinitely. The will to power, hermeticism and the favor of the big news media are the ingredients which seem to make of ARENA a politically unbeatable opponent. It is important to analyze these elements in order to attempt to understand, by comparison, the whys and wherefores of the FMLN debacle.

That ARENA is the party with the highest degree of institutionalization is not open to doubt. Its party unity has not only resisted and succeeded in coming out ahead of situations as explosive as the one generated by the slender electoral results it obtained in 1997 or the frequent clashes of interest between groups which make it up (the financier group versus the agricultural and livestock producing group, for example), but rather has given as much of itself as would permit the autonomy and singularity of a Francisco Flores. As we have said on previous occasions (see Proceso, 850), much of this institutionality, much of the much touted iron party discipline is owing to the complete acceptance and compliance with the will to power which is above any individual or group difference. In other words, in ARENA there is no individual interest of group initiative which, at the appropriate moment, may not be subordinated to the demands of a specific institution as a result of its impetus to maintain itself eternally in power.

This, of course, is translated into radical pragmatism. It is a pragmatism which makes possible the study of and/or choice of a specific direction —as heterodox as it may appear— in order to maintain the party at the summit of political competence. For all of this it is possible today that there are few cases in which a member of ARENA openly criticizes his or her party or one of their peers, or openly makes manifest that his or her interests do not coincide with those of the party. Any member of group inside ARENA knows that his or her private opinions can and should be maintained at a secondary level when faced with the imperious need to maintain the party in power. So it is, then, that the only loyalty, the loyalty which is above all others, is that which is owed to the will for political and governmental domination; all others are perfectly postponable and superfluous.

If ARENA’s institutionality as a party grows inside the party, at an external level, when faced with public opinion, on the one hand, the hermetic nature of the party is nurtured and, on the other, as a consequence of the docile amenability of the national communications media faced with the requirements and needs of the party. This hermetic quality of ARENA as a party has been made possible, even while tensions and discussions inside ARENA have reached a maximum intensity, outside the party the image is one of relative serenity which makes it difficult for the party’s detractors who wish to point out, using good judgment, the origins and causes of these instances of internal breakage. What happens inside ARENA stays inside ARENA; its internal discord and internecine struggles almost never made public.

The national communications media not only respects this hermeticism (its reports and news briefs never go beyond minimum declarations which reveal little of its members), rather they are submerged beneath party interests (which, in the majority of cases, coincide with their own interests). Aside from the criticisms which limit certain ARENA personalities, the big media fortify the institutionality of the party and do not question the structures and mechanisms of the entity as a whole. From the version presented by the media, it is always an ARENA member and not ARENA which has done a mediocre job or who is committing anomalies. So it is that individual attitudes and behavior are made to appear to be unconnected to the institutional dynamics of the party.

What is happening with the FMLN? If inside ARENA the hierarchy of priorities is dominated by the will to power, in the FMLN the tip of the pyramid is occupied by loyalty to ideological principles. So it is, then, that if in ARENA it is possible to resolve the differences in the group by having recourse to the common will to achieve power, in the FMLN the specific political practice is given second place to the question of identity (read: ideological loyalty). If the question of ideology is causing a crisis, political practice also causes a crisis. For this reason, in the multiple conventions of the FMLN, an attempt has not been to resolve is who and what is most adequate to carry out an efficient and competitive political practice, but rather who and what principles are most adequate to the FMLN ideological identity —if it is the case that one exists.

For an ARENA member, to submit his or her interests to the will to power which defines his party is profitable; on the contrary, for an FMLN member to place his or her principles in check is an attack against the party and the identity which gives it meaning. It is for these reasons that words such as "treason" or "dogmatism" are ever present in any discussion among FMLN members. In the FMLN a leader is always the priest of ideas (submerged in distributing them and preserving their purity); in ARENA on the contrary, a leader is the pragmatic leader without any other ideal than obtaining power. In this way, for the FMLN, diversity is always fundamentally problematic because the guiding principle is loyalty to an unquestionable ideological identity which provides guidelines for interpretation and for acting in the real world.

On the other hand, it is this fanatical adherence to ideas which in great measure has impeded the FMLN’s ability to keep up its internal feuds inside the limits of discretion and control. Hermeticism which impedes political credibility was impossible when the members of the party, imbued with ideological actions were seem to be impelled to manifest in a public way who was or was not a true member of the FMLN (the devotion to an ideological identity always implies a public purge of those who have transgressed the order of the community). It was too late when the FMLN, in a flash of political rationality, decided to close its private talks to the eyes of public opinion. The efforts to impose silence which it aimed to impose before and after the last convention proved to be useless because everything which the members of the FMLN could say to each other with an eye to damaging the institutionality of the party had already been said.

Added to this, the FMLN has clashed with some of the news media anxious to demonstrate the ineptitude and disorientation of the party and its members. Some media who have magnified the errors, have spurred the differences and have used every FMLN leader who is willing to play the game as fuel to light the candle of lucidity, serenity and aplomb for Francisco Flores and his party. Once again, late in the game, the FMLN understood that it ought to be prudent with the press and that it ought to design an efficient strategy in order not to succumb to the provocations of interviewers and journalists.

In June, the FMLN will have a new date with itself. At this opportunity, it will attempt, perhaps for the last time, to find the mechanisms for the reintegration of its political career with a minimum of internal stability. With what has been observed up to now, it is difficult not to prophecy that in the upcoming convention what will be agreed upon will be nothing more than the terms in which the death certificate of the party will be stated —and this of a party which once enjoyed the possibilities to being able to enter the executive office and the birth certificate for a new political party destined to irrelevance and continual fragmentation.

PLANS FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND THE PREVENTION OF DISASTERS

One aspect of poverty to which little attention is given is that it generates a high level of vulnerability to natural threats. It is not by change that natural phenomena of similar intensity affect countries in development to a much greater extent. For this reason, there has come to be a tendency to state that disasters are really evidence of severe deficits in the development of countries. In this context, the effects of the hurricane "Mitch" on the national environment was particularly noticeable and has provoked discussion on the need to incorporate plans for the prevention of disasters in the plans and programs for development.

This is, really, not a new idea. Historical and social studies of disasters have been mentioning it for at least two decades. Even the UN declared the decade of the 1990´s as "The International Decade for the Reduction of Disasters" in order to call governmental attention to the importance of dealing with disasters in such a way as to minimize their impact.

"Mitch" once again placed the topic on the agenda in perspective within the Central American area because of the unprecedented devastation which it provoked, which reaffirmed the need to prevent disasters and generate greater openness towards the topic of international financial organisms, especially the Inter American Development Bank (BID, in Spanish).This has provoked the formulation of reconstruction plans for the countries of the isthmus most affected: Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador, which presented preliminary versions in the first meeting of the Consultative Group for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America, created as at the initiative of the BID.

This dynamic has joined with the effort by the Operational System in the United Nations in El Salvador to promote the incorporation of civil society in the formulation of the strategies for these plans for development. This incorporation, at least in the case of El Salvador, has generated a noticeable process of consultation which has involved diverse social sectors. In this context, it is worth reflecting on the content of the Reconstruction Plan which the government presented at the first meeting of the Consultative Group, as well as on the first results of the process of consultation.

To begin with, the Plan, although it was explicitly drawn up to deal with the problem of reconstruction, does not reflect but a minimum of concern for improving the way in which the state deals with the problem of disasters and, in general, the needs for development. In fact, it might be noted that the greater part of the proposals contained within the plan have little or nothing to do with the attention to the effects of "Mitch" or with the prevention of disasters.

It is clear, then, that in this project, the plan for the prevention of disasters for the year 2000 is focussed on the rehabilitation of the highway, water and drainage systems while the protection and restoration of natural resources —one of the factors which is most vulnerable— receives only one tine part of the budget (approximately 15% of the total), as is reflected in the reconstruction and productive modernization plan for El Salvador for the period 1999-2000, presented by the government in the first meeting of the Consultative Group for Central American Reconstruction and Transformation, in December of 1998.

Another important piece of information is that the greater part of the funds for the line items dealing with environmental protection and restoration are earmarked for an integrated agricultural development (irrigation, drainage and flood control, dredging, excavation, construction of controls, erosion control, landslides and floods). Moreover, the governmental proposal for reconstruction includes the implementation of plans for the restoration of frontage roads in areas which were not affected by "Mitch".

In this context, the Operation System of the United Nations for El Salvador posed the problem of the need to develop an alternative proposal, which included among its principle premises the fact that "emergencies can become an opportunity for making available spaces for strategic decisions for the reconstruction for a future of greater social integration".

It is worthwhile to point out here that this effort has taken shape at a point in time when the program called The International Decade for the Reduction of Natural Disasters and only after the impact of a disaster of huge proportions, especially in the cases of Honduras and Nicaragua. With all of this, including its slow development, we are still in good time to incorporate the topic of prevention into the future development strategies and to include it on the agendas for the agencies for cooperation and financial entities.

Along these lines, a process of consultation between different organizations of civil society and the government has been developing which aims to formulate a proposal for reconstruction which includes the implementation of policies which reduce social vulnerability in different environments: systems for the prevention of disasters and programs for housing, health, education, reconstruction and broadening of infrastructure, small rural enterprise and environment. What is valuable in this document lies in what has emerged as a result of the incorporation of the observations of organizations of civil society and which, moreover, can serve to offer support so that the government presents, during the second meeting of the Consultative Group, a more coherent document with a focus on reconstruction based on the prevention of disasters and the promotion of sustainable development.

Nevertheless, what is still lacking is the incorporation of other aspects within the proposal for reconstruction which would contribute to optimizing its possible offering towards the efforts in development. For example, it is necessary to deepen the way in which efforts for construction are articulated with the dynamics specific to the financial sector or with the diverse social and economic policies. Moreover, the fact that the results of the consultation convoked by the United Nations is centered on the proposals for seeking to reduce the vulnerability of the sectors recurrently affected by floods, results in lack of attention to the incidence of other kinds of disasters which already have a history in the country or which are potential threats (i.e., earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, explosions, chemical spills, etc.).

What is interesting about these dynamics is to demonstrate important changes at the international as well as national level, especially because they open up the opportunity for obtaining financial resources to loosen up bottlenecks characteristic of Salvadoran economic processes, among which are outstanding are the stagnation of agricultural and livestock production and environmental deterioration.

These first efforts for incorporating the prevention of disasters into the development plans for the country constitute a recognition of the need to review effects of the models for development in order to correct, or, at least, mitigate the elevated levels of social vulnerability which have been generated. The government ought to take advantage of the moment to request international cooperation in the most favorable terms, reducing social vulnerability and preventing what we might otherwise have to suffer in the future.

REFORMS. Next May 17, the Legislative Commission of the Assembly must issue a transitory determination on the 91 reforms to the Penal and Procedural Penal Codes. With this, the deputies will be one step closer to approving the changes proposed by the National Association for Private Enterprise (ANEP) and the National Civilian Police (PNC). For more than five months, the reforms have been tabled and it is only during the last two weeks that the Commission began its study with the help of the Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of Justice and the Technical Executive Unit. The finding, or determination, will permit the legislators to determine which are the reforms which are viable and which need to be reviewed, this time with the advice of a member of the Penal section of the Supreme Court, the General Ombudsman of the Republic and a representative from among the judges. Before the end of May, it is hoped that these reforms will be brought before the plenary session for their approval. The FMLN has stated that it supports the provisional document, but it will not sign the final determination if, beforehand, the future of some of the articles which contradict the Constitution are not defined. "There are points which clash with the constitution, for example, the proposal to guarantee defense only when the individual is detained and not from the moment in which he or she attains the status of charged with a crime", stated Benito Lara of the FMLN (El Diario de Hoy, May 12, p. 6).

OPINIONS. Given the situation which currently confronts the news and communications media after the Judge of the Minor Court declared the possibility for sanctioning them for publicly identifying Gustavo Adolfo Morales ("El Directo"), there have been those who defend the position taken by the media. The Salvadoran Society of Businessmen and Industrialists (SCIS) expressed their support for the work carried out by the journalists. "Our guild supports, in an unconditional way, the news and communications media and we call upon it to continue its journalistic labors in spite of the threats against the Judge [Berta Nohemi Reyes] and the Attorney General’s Office for charging the media". According to the SCIS, the decision of the media to ignore the article which prohibits the publication of photos and names of minors was correct, given that they were offering a service to the population. In order to sustain this thesis, the guild supports Article 2 of the Constitution which establishes that "every person has the right to live, to physical and moral integrity and to security". President Calderón Sol, for his part, stated the opinion that if those responsible for the administration of justice "apply sane judgment, there will be no judge who can condemn the media". He stated, likewise, that he was confident that the Legislative Assembly as well as the Supreme Court, will use the correct channels so that the case does not become more than it should (La Prensa Gráfica, May 6, p. 4 and El Diario de Hoy, May 11, p. 10).

MEDIA. Some 98 members of the media may be sanctioned for publicly identifying the juvenile delinquent Gustavo Adolfo Morales, alias "El Directo". Print media, radio, television and international news agencies made public the name and face of the minor. The Judge for the Minor Court, Berta Nohemi Reyes, declared that she was studying the possibility of "sanctioning the media", appealing to compliance with the Law for Minor Offenders which prohibits making public the identity of a minor who is in the process of being brought to trial. According to the law, the public functionaries (police, judges, prosecuting attorneys, etc.) who identify the person charged can be sanctioned with a maximum of ten days’ salary as a fine and the news media (owners and/or journalists) with a maximum of 100 days’ salary. The functionary did not specify when she would begin the process, but repeated that the sanctions will be applied. However, the president of the Supreme Court, Eduardo Tenorio, held that the Law governing Minor Offenders is not applicable to the media because nowhere does it establish sanctions for journalists (La Prensa Gráfica, May 5, p. 4 and El Diario de Hoy, May 8, p. 8).

BACKWARD MOVEMENT. Political parties coincide in affirming that the agreements achieved during the recent FMLN Convention of May 9 are a step backwards in the democratic processes of that party. According to René Figueroa of ARENA the fact that the "orthodox" wing of the FMLN had taken power means that the democratic process will stay at the level of lip service. He stated the opinion that the hard line of the party manipulated and defeated its internal opponents. The ARENA deputy Julio Gamero expressed the opinion that which these results "the people cannot expect that things will move forward, we are moving backwards and we will always have an FMLN which is opposed to itself for the sole reason of being opposed to itself". For ARENA, this division between the two tendencies could cause a situation in which the reformists of the FMLN might seek another party or form their own for the upcoming elections. Likewise, Ruben Zamora of the Democratic Convergence stated that the tacit internal struggles in the FMLN bring with them later divisions and that, moreover, the problems of the FMLN are not the regulations but the political criteria. PLD deputy Kirio Waldo Salgado was of the opinion that the "revisionists" have no place inside the FMLN, for which reason the problems of that party will not be easily resolved (El Diario de Hoy, May 11, p. 14).

FMLN. On May 9, the FMLN held its ninth extraordinary convention in which it approved the renewal in office of its leadership. The Political Commission, the maximum organism for the leadership of the party, as well as the rest of the departmental and municipal leaders will end their term in office in July. The FMLN statutes indicate that every two years new figures should be sought to participate in the leadership bodies. This year is the elections of authorities. However, the process moved forward after the "orthodox" wing (linked to Shafik Handal) introduced a proposal to request the immediate resignation of those who held key posts. The "revisionist" tendency (which is linked to Facundo Guardado) laid their bets on a gradual change which would culminate in a definitive election of authorities in October, but did not win sufficient votes for their proposal, obtaining only 347, while their rivals won 391. Francisco Lorenzana, of the "orthodox" tendency, expressed that "those whom we have won over in this convention are those who are obliged at this moment in time to offer bridges to all of their compañeros so that they can recognize that there are virtues in the minorities". On the other hand, it was established that the last day of July will be the date of another FMLN convention to elect a new leadership (La Prensa Gráfica, May 10, p. 4-5).

BUDGET PROCESS. The Legislative Assembly approved, on May 6, the General National Budget for 1999 for a total of 17 thousand 79 million colones. The political negotiations were able to gather up only 45 votes. This is to say, two more than the 43 necessary for approving the plan for state spending. The votes correspond to the ARENA, PDC and PCN deputies. The technical personnel of the Treasury Ministry decided to reduce the adjustment of the line items for the Presidential Office and the Vice Ministry of Transport, who will be cut by 18 million and 1.6 million, respectively. Two hundred and forty-one million will be cut from the Supreme Court budget and its budget will, thereby, be left at 857.6 million colones. ARENA approved bonds which will serve to finance part of the spending as well as the special law for resources arising from the privatization of ANTEL, which will also serve the same end. The said bonds will be in the amount of 2 thousand 200 million colones which will be placed on the international financial markets. This caused debates in the plenary of the Legislative Assembly between the deputies of the FMLN, PLD, USC, and CDU who were assured that, as the sources of financing were approved almost at the same time, the constitution had been violated. The constitution establishes that the budget must be based on laws currently in effect at the moment of budget approval (La Prensa Gráfica, May 7, p. 20).