Politics disguised as technical decisions

The demise of Umaña?

Political growth and economic stability?

The "NO" in Guatemala

News Briefs

POLITICS DISGUISED AS TECHNICAL DECISIONS

The naming of a new cabinet and other important posts in the new government is being presented as an eminently technical decision, well thought out, and extensively discussed in a process which focuses only on the needs of the country. Those chosen will be people who are very well prepared, sensitive to the national problem and steeped in the government proposals for alliances. As a consequence, we may be able to expect a capable, efficient government and perhaps an honest, even brilliant one. Salvadoran politics needs a good dose of technical ability to counterbalance the irresponsible and superficial manner in which the majority of important decisions are taken. In this sense, what the technically-prepared people can offer is not only welcome, but also very necessary.

But the make-up of a government is not only a technical question; but it is also a political question. Frequently it is more political than technical and, in general, is only a political matter. The Flores government is no exception. At least this seems to be confirmed by the naming of the new Director of the National Civilian Police who, according to authorized sources, will fall to the current Director of the Intelligence Unit of the State.

Public opinion is still the only unknown in the matter of how the Flores government will be made up. The press is publishing some names but there is no follow-up. In ARENA circles, in the spheres of economic and diplomatic power, lists with names of those designated by Flores are circulating. Their decisions are being discussed in these spheres of power and some of their opinions, doubtless, are being listened to and taken into account. To postpone official information until the end of the month is to add an air of mystery to what the power elite already knows.

From a technical point of view, the naming of Mr. Mauricio Sandoval as Director of the National Civilian Police is not comprehensible. No specialist in matters of security and police trained and familiarized by the police with the should place at the head of a police institution which aims to become a democratic institution a person trained and familiarized with the "dirty war" and who, moreover, in recent years has headed the entity dedicated to political espionage, including the violation of the right to privacy. The activities of the State Office of Intelligence may be located, in the best of cases, at the edge of legality. It would not be at all odd that he would have been implicated in criminal activities and very probably in the cover-up of all kinds of criminal activity. For some very special reason, not fully explicable, President Calderón Sol has maintained one of his brothers deployed in this very office.

The Office of State Intelligence reports only to the President of the Republic and the president reports to no one. In taking note of the fact —at this late date— that the Office of State Intelligence has never presented a report to the Legislative Assembly as all other agencies which are the dependencies of executive power do, and of the fact that its director is about to assume the leadership of the police, the FMLN has requested his presence to ask him to report on the agency's activities. Given that there are only a few days left before the second ARENA government administration ends, this petition will probably be shelved.

The Director of the national Civilian Police cannot be linked to the former security corps, nor their methods, nor the methods of the extreme right of the ARENA party. The Director of the National Civilian Police cannot be the same person responsible for the national radio broadcast system which during the November 1989 FMLN offensive incited the assassins of Ignacio Ellacuría and the other martyrs of the UCA, those of the San Salvador archdiocese and its auxiliar bishop and those of the oppositions politicians. The leadership of a police force which aims to be democratic cannot be confided to a functionary linked directly with murder and impunity. The judge in the case did not wish to call him to testify. The Director of the National Civilian Police ought not to be related to an intelligence agency whose activities, by their very nature, are carried out at the edge of legality, in secret and in violation of the rights of the population. It also must not be the case that a person who does not have a university degree could become Director of the National Civilian Police, even when this person can resolve the question for himself by obtaining one, changing the law or simply violating it.

The naming of Mr. Sandoval for this very delicate and complex post would provide continuity to the line held by the current Minister of Security, who up until the last days of his administration has held firm to the belief that the solution for crime is the dissolving of the security forces. This is the same authoritarian hard line which has shown itself to be so inefficient in controlling crime as well as organized crime. To continue with this security policy would doubtless satisfy the extreme right wing of the ARENA party and an important sector of public opinion, incited by the big print media; but it would not be more efficient than the current Minister of Security has been during the last five years' time.

It would be a crass error to think that the Flores administration will be more efficient in the fight against delinquency and organized crime if the leadership of the National Civilian Police and the Office of State Intelligence should become one and the same. This would signify joining together what the Peace Accords separated forever, as we believed then: the police and intelligence agencies. To unite these functions once again would be equivalent to repeating a past error, which was the cause of numberless human rights violations and thousands of victims. If what is sought is to lower public spending, the country could, as well as eliminating the Public Security Ministry, eliminate without any major problem the Office of State Intelligence. It would surely be an irony that the past should return by means of a government which presents itself as ultra modern and innovative, in an area so sensitive for the peace and tranquility of the population.

The decision to place Mr. Sandoval at the head of the National Civilian Police which demands a much higher level of professionalism, much greater honesty and much greater closeness to the population is an eminently political decision. While it may not be possible to judge the whole cabinet of the new government by this nomination, which is already a given fact, it can be said that such a nomination it is a false step. The confidence that the technical team which advises the new president could awaken falls apart with this very unfortunate decision. The worst of the case is that the new administration wishes us to believe that this appointment and those which follow are the most adequate for El Salvador for the coming five years. They will attempt to disguise as technical decisions what are, in reality, exclusively political decisions.

THE DEMISE OF UMAÑA?

Since the moment that Mr. Ronal Umaña became General Secretary of the Christian Democratic Party there has been not a single piece of news from that party which has not shown him to be a shameful leader. The most recent information published about this dark personage would make him —should it turn out to be true— the most resounding proof of an open secret known to all: that the only interest Umaña has in politics is money. It turns out that the ex members of the party of which he is also —in some inexplicable way— the vice president of the Legislative Assembly accuse him of having expropriated a political fund of 4.8 million colones which accrued to the PDC as a result of the 1997 elections. In that year, Umaña deposited into his bank account this sum of money without offering a single report to the Christian Democratic leaders.

In theory, the Department of Probity and Honesty of the Supreme Court (CSJ) demands that all government functionaries make a sworn declaration of their goods and monies with the objective of controlling their income while they occupy public positions. This declaration is being requested by the Attorney General's Office for the CSJ in order to determine if Mr. Umaña has committed the crime of obtaining money in an illicit way. Moreover, the PDC dissidents have declared that Mr. Umaña holds shares in several businesses —among them a motel and a university— about which he has not made the appropriate income tax declarations. On the question of this accusation, the Attorney General's Office has asked the Treasury Ministry for a report on Mr. Umaña's income tax declarations for the years 1997 and 1998.

Given these facts, a question arises: why is it that the Attorney General's Office is beginning investigations two years after the presumed theft? To begin with, it must be said that the press has done nothing to contribute to clearing up this doubt because, occupied as it is in justifying its unharnessed tendency to make matters of public interest into a business, little has been said of this particular matter. Speculating, then, two hypotheses may be posed: (a) that the accusations which are now being made against Umaña are nothing more than a new strategy by his enemies to remove him from the PDC leadership —and this would explain the late accusations— ; and (b) that such accusations are true and that for some reason difficult to understand they have not been made public before.

With relation to the first hypothesis, it must be recalled that those who are against Mr. Umaña have been willing to do almost anything to get rid of the current general secretary of the party. The most recent and palpable demonstration of this was the holding of an extraordinary convention which sought to remove him from office the same day that, in another convention, Umaña named Rodolfo Parker as candidate for the presidency. But even taking this kind of antecedents into account, it is difficult to think that the dissidents of the PDC would risk themselves by accusing him of theft only as part of a move to break the power which he has acquired in the party.

With respect to the second hypothesis, nothing in Mr. Umaña's political past would make the accusations which hang over him today surprising. On the contrary, it is to be expected that a tangible fact such as this would be made known in order to corroborate that the image which public opinion has made of the PDC leader has some real foundation. His unconditional support for ARENA in the Assembly, the favoritism in the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in his favor in cases which were never cleared up the appointment of Mr. Peñate Polanco as the Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights; the arbitrary elimination of primary elections in the PDC...are acts which constitute a red alert to public opinion in the case of Mr. Umaña, but which prove nothing against him.

Looking at things in this way, a third hypothesis might be presented: In their desire to seek the removal of Mr. Umaña, the dissidents have uncovered truths which would not be convenient for many in power should they come to light. This would explain the reason for the late accusation. It was necessary for someone to stick their finger into the wound of Mr. Umaña's illicit conduct in order to open the case. One should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Umaña —as a result of the shady alliance which he maintains with the government party— has always enjoyed ARENA's protection. This protection, probably, extends even to the Attorney General's Office, impeding an earlier investigation by that office.

One more fact can be added to the foregoing: days before the publication of the news that involved Mr. Umaña in corrupt acts, Umaña announced to the PDC leadership his intention to resign as secretary general of the party. It is difficult not to imagine that this unusual interest might have something to do with the accusations which he now has against him. It might not be out of line to think that, preventing a possible scandal, Mr. Umaña has decided to leave the leadership of the party. And because this involvement in a scandal does not appear to upset him —it appears to have very little importance for him— he is not afraid of losing a reputation which he does not have, but is, rather, resigning out of simple convenience.

In spite of the sensitive deterioration which the PDC has suffered in recent years, the party continues to be strong. This was demonstrated by the fact that it came in in fourth place during the recent elections. But during those elections it also became clear that the close relationship between Mr. Parker and Mr. Umaña eliminated many possibilities for this party to obtain greater electoral support. On the other hand, there are no indications that Mr. Umaña could have any intention of leaving the political sphere. There are always opportunities to get rich quick in politics and for this reason he will stay in. And since the PDC is the ideal platform for continuing to obtain recompense for "cooperating" with ARENA, it would be odd that he did not wish to stay in the party.

So then, as certain things change and public opinion seems to begin to open its eyes to the evil reality of corruption, the fact that a person whose name is as stained as is Mr. Umaña's, continues to hold a position of such notoriety in one of the political parties of major relevance becomes problematic. What would be most convenient, Umaña might be said to think, would be to leave the position as general secretary of the party by appealing to a consultation of the diverse sectors of the party. This, it is clear, does not eliminate the possibility that he could continue holding the reins of power in the PDC behind the scenes and obtain the same benefits as ever.

Definitively, the fact that in the Attorney General's Office the Umaña file is still open and that as Mr. Umaña has stated his intentions to leave the official leadership of the PDC it cannot necessarily be deduced that something good is going to happen inside that party. In the first place, it awaits to be seen if the Attorney General's Office will proceed in an open and objective way in this case. In the second place, that Mr. Umaña leaves the party leadership does not signify in the least that his influence is going to diminish.

If it is true that Umaña is guilty of having used the party apparatus to obtaining money for himself illicitly —which is not improbable— what is bound to be true is that he will continue to be immune from prosecution. If it is true that he is willing to leave the party leadership, nothing guarantees that he will not continue selling it in exchange for a growth in his personal bank accounts. Lamentably, none of his convulsions will open new horizons for the Christian Democrats. The PDC has stagnated among its internal feuds and ambition is the cancer of the current leadership.

POLITICAL GROWTH AND ECONOMIC STABILITY?

It has become a matter of course that the representatives of the Central Reserve Bank (BCR), in a simplistic way, evaluate the economic activity of El Salvador as "growth with macroeconomic stability". Since the beginning of the present decade the annual economic reports of the government have highlighted aspects such as the rates of economic growth, the reduction of inflation, the increase in exports and the increase in net international reserves. Nevertheless, the evaluation of these results cannot be laid aside when there are basic considerations such as the orientation of growth, the behavior of imports or the principal capital income, the situation of public finances, the effects of the monetary policies, etc.

Official data on the economic results of the first two months of 1999 demonstrate this tendency once again. So it is that, for the current BCR authorities, this year the "macroeconomic growth and stability have been maintained", as would be reflected in the statistics of the index of the Volume of Economic Activity (IVAE) inflation rate, exports and growth in Net International Reserves. Below are presented the principal economic results published by the BCR, the reactions of the representatives of the business sector to this data and some elements which seek to present the apparent economic bonanza of El Salvador in context.

Examining the BCR data during the first two months of the year there have been outstanding results, beginning with the increase of the IVAE in relation to the same months for the year 1998 because it went beyond 4.1% to 5.5%. The sectors which have felt the greater rates of growth have been industry, construction, the financial sector and the transportation sector, all of which have grown to rates higher than the IVAE average.

At the same time, the information provided by the BCR highlights the fact that the inflation for the month of April, recently past, was 0.1%: the "lowest inflation that the country has had in the last 27 years.

With regard to the external sector, the data of the BCR establishes that, during the first trimester of 1999, exports, excluding coffee, grew to a rate of 4.7%. It is mentioned, moreover, that the rates for the "maquila in particular, increased in March to 15.1%, by which the accumulations for the trimester reached a growth rate of 6%. On the other hand, in relation to imports, the information is limited to indicating that the imports of goods and capital increased by 34% owing to the "investment of privatized sectors". Finally, it is to be noted that the family remittances reached 317 million dollars during the first trimester of the year, which permitted the net international reserves to grow by 68 million dollars. The net international reserves, in total, reached 1,833 million dollars, which is sufficient to finance 6.6 months of imports.

Each of the facts mentioned presents a counterpart that should be considered when evaluating the macroeconomic context. The reduction of the inflation rate to unheard of levels is counterbalanced by the fact that the legal adjustment to the financial system has limited the increase in credit, has provoked increases in interest rates and has exercised a limiting of investment.

Official statistics on growth, on the other hand, have provoked objections by the industrial and construction sectors and, even more important, the supposed rebound of growth rates is contradicted by the contraction of fiscal tax income (see Proceso, 847). For some business guilds, such as the Salvadoran Chamber of Commerce for Construction (CASALCO) and the Salvadoran Association of Industries (ASI), the official figures for growth are very questionable when compared with the experience of some of their members. According to CASALCO representatives, the government figures raise serious doubts about the possibility for reaching the growth peak for the Gross National Product (3.5%) projected by the BCR for 1999. On the other hand, in agreement with what ASI has stated, the industry is found to be in crisis owing to its having to confront problems such as unfair competition, elevated costs of operation, crime and deficiencies in the infrastructure which do not permit that "the Salvadoran industry to grow". Paradoxically, for the BCR this is one of the sectors which has grown most during the months of January and February.

In what is relative to the foreign sector, it is important to take note of the fact that exports which are considered to be the measure of the growth rate exclude coffee, which is an artifice which is translated into a higher rate. In reality, the growth rate of the exports has been less owing to the fall in the prices of coffee and sugar and the deceleration of the maquila exports.. This situation aggravates the tendency towards a lack of equilibrium in the balance of payments, the deficit of which increased by 7.6% between 1997 and 1998 alone and it is expected that it will experience an additional increase of 7.1% by the end of 1999.

The only thing which could explain the growth in the RIN is the affluence of remittances and capital because both cover deficits in the balance of payments and the current accounts. Nevertheless, the situation is not yet so encouraging even in the projections published by the BCR because they reveal the increase of the RIN which has been falling. In fact, it went from 3.200 to 2600 million dollars between 1997 and 1998 and it is expected that, for 1999, it will reach only 600 million. This is the result of less optimistic projections on the growth of family remittances and the flow of capital, especially private capital.

Concerning the behavior of the fiscal deficit, the report for the period by the BCR does not present data, but in the monetary and financial program for 1999 it is noted beforehand that an increase in the fiscal deficit is to be expected as much in its total as in the proportion of the GNP which it represents. The fiscal deficit, excluding donations, is expected to increase from 2,149 to 2,975 million colones between 1998 and 1999, which implies that it would move from representing 1.2% of the GNP to representing 2%.

The projections for increase of the RIN and of the fiscal deficit already in and of itself reflect a not so promising macroeconomic scenario. .But the panorama is complicated even further if we consider that as much in the foreign market as in the domestic market indicators exist which show, on the one hand, a reduction in the prices of the principal export products and a deceleration of the maquila exports and, on the other, a reduction in fiscal income which includes the Value Added Tax, which should have grown in a coherent form with the supposed increase in the GNP. Nevertheless, this decreased by 0.9% between the period of January and February 1998 and January and February 1999.

As a whole, the macroeconomic panorama, although it is still stable, begins to show signs of not being sustainable, given that it depends more on exogenous factors than on the economic policy. For this reason, it is important that the new economic authorities of the country abandon the posture of supposed economic success which has been held and presented up until now and adopt more realistic policies for fomenting production, jobs and well being for the population.

THE "NO" IN GUATEMALA

The events of Sunday, May 16 in Guatemala have left little more than shock: the Popular Consultation convoked in order to approve or reject 50 amendments of the Constitution of the Republic —and in this way provide follow-up to the Peace Accords— was won by the feared "NO". The sectors which favored the reforms —among them the erstwhile guerrilla organization URNG— have had to pull back in consternation from their defeat. But those who voted against the constitutional modifications have taken over public opinion which, according to these sectors, have proved that the objections interposed since March 2 are right. In both cases, the position on the results of the Consultation is the same: upon this plebiscite has been placed the power of decision over this crucial stage in the Guatemalan process of pacification.

A little less than shock, doubtless. The negative consequences of the results of the Consultation have been opportunely minimized thanks to the balance in the preference of the voting never inclined in favor of either of the two options. Since the process of drawing up the reforms began, followed by the much discussed legality of the convocation and the mechanism for implementation, it was clear that the forces which placed themselves fully in defense of their conceptions of the country had sufficient strength to hold the line. Now, the referendum being over, this tension results from the power of a vote which, beyond having defined the direction of the national process of transformation, politically strengthened those who incessantly spoke for its stagnation..

But have the sectors opposed to the reforms really won? Paying attention to the way which these have aimed to become the owners of public opinion, anyone could think that this is the case. The right-wing parties with representatives in Congress (accompanied by members of the government Party for National Advancement (PAN), the influential Coordinating Committee for Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Chambers of Commerce (CACIF), the civic-democratic organizational network which interfered in almost the whole of the process, together with the most conservative communications and press media; all of these participants have articulated a pattern of discourse in which they exult in the victory of popular sovereignty, the unquestionable word of the population and the ideals of unity and national equality. This is what, in their judgement, Guatemala won in the Consultation.

On the other end of the scenario, the ex guerrilla and recently formed political party, the URNG, the Coordinating Body of the Organizations of the Mayan Peoples of Guatemala (COOPMAGUA), diverse catholic and human rights organizations, some center-left parties and the government itself, with its tail between its legs, have demonstrated their concern for the future of the pacification process, seeking among phantoms or untouchable entities the responsibility for the defeat. President Alvaro Arzú, himself, has said that he is "saddened" by the triumph of the "NO" while the Congress is already readying itself to modify the legislative agenda, paying tribute to the popular will without appeal expressed on May 16..

But the problem is that this consultation does not represent the whole weight which the reformists and opposition groups would like to confer upon it. With more than 11 million inhabitants, an obsolete domiciliary voting apparatus, an electoral roll of 4 million, 85 thousand 832 registered voters, those 757 thousand 940 thousand voters who expressed their "will" which today some suffer and others applaud do not constitute more than 6.89% of the total population. Of those votes, a resounding "NO" won with only 50.6% of the votes; that is to say, 3.49% of the population of the whole country was what served, according to winners and losers, to place in check the compliance with the Peace Accords. According to the information which, to day, has been published, the high level of abstention (81.5% of the voters) grew principally from the lack of decision and the ignorance of the indigenous population which lives in the interior of the country, where the conditions for transportation and access to the news media are precarious or nonexistent.

In this sense, as much the defeatism demonstrated by the government and its allies as the triumphalist enthusiasm with which the opposition leaders received the news of the rejection of the reforms, has little authentic basis. First of all because, as a result of the few voters who voted, there was no exercise of the popular will in the May 16 Consultation. Moreover, because that low percentage of voters did not even represent a significant number of the opinion of the sectors which would most benefit, at least in the medium range, with the aimed-for reforms. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, because the negative was imprinted in the polling places not only sowing doubts about the future of Guatemala domestically. A good part of the aid committed by friendly nations for the coming years aimed to support exactly what was negated in the Consultation: the strengthening of civic power, the participation and egalitarian recognition of all of the inhabitants of the country and the economic reforms necessary to give stability to the process.

Doubts about the process also spread beyond the borders and, surely, will hardly fit into the objectives which the countries which collaborated in the pacification process have, to date. It could be that those who, today, see themselves as the owners of the patrimony of truth will come to such a conclusion savoring beforehand the political benefits which the results of the referendum presuppose: in the general elections, called for November of this year, this could be a demonstration of the influence difficult to equal for the rest of the political forces. But, to come to present oneself as the owner at least of the executive power, that victory will bring many more problems now than before because there will be no reforms in the making.

The constitutional amendments, although the president and his congressional allies would like us to believe the contrary, are far from being dead as a result of the "NO" of a minority. There still remains to be seen the composition of the Legislative body which will arise from the November elections. That will be the new catapult for those changes and, whoever it may be which deals with that possible new composition of forces, his or her tranquillity will not last beyond election day. There are, therefore, no defeatisms which count. Now the responsibility for the reincorporation of the reforms on the road to peace is in the hands of all of the organizations which saw in them an opportunity to identify themselves with the causes of those who most need them. The behavior of those organizations vis-a-vis the general elections will be because much more crucial for deciding the destiny of the transformations posed by the Peace Accords.

Those who see in the rejection of the constitutional modifications sufficient motive to be sure that the people have expressed their will and believe that that will places in danger the peace process, doubtless have little vision and less political astuteness. The results have been impugned not by the law, but by reality: once more, the consultation was not popular and the sovereign mandate which follows from it derives from the portion of the population which feels comfortable with the status quo and which, therefore, is most fearful of change. These are the sectors of the population which, supported by the political, religious and professional organizations which represent them, wish to —and can— place in danger the march of the pacification process in Guatemala. To say that this insubstantial "NO" of May 16 is a real defeat is the true defeat which can affect the peace process in that country.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CABINET. The hermeticism which surrounds who will make up the new cabinet has still not been broken. Nevertheless, Vice President elect Carlos Quintanilla, stated, on May 16, that the process of choosing is almost over. "Well, we can say that already President Flores has proposals for the majority , he has specific proposals for each post", he stated. Even so, he declined to reveal names and confirm or deny those who currently are being considered as possible candidates to hold the various state portfolios. On this, he affirmed that the person "[the person] who will confirm or deny is President Flores". He recalled that no details about the new government can be revealed until May 29 when the new president will make them known. "President Flores already has proposals for each of the posts and it will be he who —in accordance with the programming— will define, finally, who the persons are who will be named in each one of the posts", he insisted. Likewise, he affirmed that the posts will be occupied by persons who comply with the profile defined by the technical team. His affirmation was supported by mentioning the dynamics which have been adopted: what is required of the ministries and what will be required of the ministers themselves. "First we will defined the kind of functionary we would like and, afterwards, we will seek names within our own database in order to define which of these people it will be (La Prensa Gráfica, May 17, p. 18).

RONAL UMAÑA. The house whip for the Christian Democratic faction of the Legislative Assembly, Mr. Rene Aguiluz, stated, on May 14, that the general secretary of the PDC, Mr. Ronal Umaña, intends to resign from his post, possibly during the June convention. Mr. Aguiluz explained that Mr. Umaña announced to the political leadership that he began a process of consultation with the diverse sectors of the party about the possibility of his resignation. The political leadership body of the party will take charge of the preparations for the convention and hear the reports of the diverse units of PDC activity. Mr. Aguiluz declared that Mr. Umaña "cannot resign until June because Article 15 of the attributions of the convention stipulate that he must do so in the presence of those who elected him". Simultaneously, even the supposed resignation of Mr. Umaña, it is rumored that Mr. Aguiluz will substitute for him. Mr. Aguilluz limited his comments to saying that, if the party thinks to name him temporarily to the post, he will have to accept it because of his responsibility as an affiliate. Nevertheless, Mr. Umaña rejected the possibilities for resigning when he declared that he will finish his period in office in the year 2000. Mr. Umaña committed himself to the leadership to abandon the post during the convention in exchange for a "winning" candidacy among the deputies for the upcoming year (La Prensa Gráfica, May 15, p. 21 and El Diario de Hoy, May 15, p. 6).

EXONERATED. The judge for the Implementation of Sentencing for San Miguel, Berta Nohemí Reyes, "waived" the charges, on May 17, against the news media for publishing photos of the juvenile delinquent known as "El Directo". Nevertheless, she threatened to take judicial action against the media if the again revealed the identity of delinquent minors. The judge, during a press conference, stated that she did not question the publication of the photos at the moment of the escape of "El Directo", but she did question the "sensationalism" which took place after his capture, which was what violated the state of law. "Because of my judicial independence and on the basis of healthy criticism, I prefer to educate the society and not impose a sanction" was the argument which the judge presented to justify waiving the charges. Nevertheless, according to what she explained, if the media continues to reveal the identity of the minors, not only will they be penally reponsable, but, moreover, they will be responsible for new juvenile delinquents worse than "El Directo". "They are creating a bad image and if today this young man killed 17 persons, there will be another, if he wants to be famous, who will kill more," she stated (El Diario de Hoy, May 18, p. 14).

DETENTION. A Justice of the Peace decreed, on May 14, the provisional arrest with formal instruction of three of the eleven persons implicated in the kidnapping of a 24-year-old woman and a minor. Three of the accused, who were recently captured, were definitively charged while the other five remained free, but must present themselves every 15 days before the tribunal and may not leave the country because of their condition of having been formally accused. This is because of the supposed lack of proof against those involved in the kidnappings. The supposed leaders of the group known as "Los Gordos" are the only ones who will remain in detention while investigations continue. Given the resolution, the Attorney General of the Republic is preparing to appeal the decision. The prosecutors of the Special Crimes Unit stated: "we definitely do not feel satisfied given that [with the conditional freedom] we consider that they are not given the necessary guarantees for the process to take a normal course because the witnesses might be at risk". For his part, President Calderón Sol reacted with indignation when he learned of the freedom allowed to the greater part of the group. "In this case, the efforts of the Prosecutors Office and of the Police are in vain and society is defenseless", he said (La Prensa Gráfica, May 15, p. 8 and El Diario de Hoy, May 16, p. 6).

CASINOS. The Corporation of Municipalities of the Republic of El Salvador (COMURES) met, on May 13, to define its official position on the question of the functioning of casinos in San Salvador. In recent days, the debate has revolved around the legality or illegality of the gaming houses. Some mayors allege that they are legal, given that the Municipal Code authorizes this kind of business. "The authorization and functioning of the gaming houses, as in the case of lotteries, raffles and other similar activities, is within the power of the council. So then, of course, if we obey the Municipal Code, then I believe that we are acting within the context of the law", held the mayor of Santa Ana, Mr. Carlos Macall. Nevertheless, diverse legal authorities consider that the casinos are illegal because they are prohibited by three different laws which are currently in effect. During the meeting, it was decided to consult with the Supreme Court and the Attorney General's Office about the legality of these businesses in order, afterwards, to draw up two questions to be included in the plebiscite. Mayor Hector Silva, nevertheless, stated that some difficulties are to be foreseen in the consultation with the governmental entities and, because of this, the consultation may be extended to other entities. The preference would be, stated the mayor, a consultation with independent lawyers and non-governmental organisms (El Diario de Hoy, May 14, p. 16 and La Prensa Gráfica, May 14, p. 24).

OBSERVATIONS. It is hoped that President Calderón Sol will send the General Budget of the Nation to the Legislative Assembly so that, at the latest, it might be approved by the last week in May. The President explained that he will send it with some observations more formal than of substance. "They are arithmetic details, some totals do not match", he expressed. As a result of these errors, he added, he has not sent it to the Congress. The deputies ought to amend the errors so that the Executive Office can finally approve the budget. Nevertheless, the FMLN has stated that it will present a writ of unconstitutionality against the law for the emission of bonds before the Supreme Court (El Diario de Hoy, May 19, p. 6).

REFORMS. The possibility for approving in the course of this month almost one hundred amendments to the Penal and Procedural Penal Codes faded on May 17 when the deputies announced that they will await the opinion of the judges, which implies two more weeks of study. At the petition of the court magistrates and the judges of the second instance, 15 days will be given to the analysis of the 97 amendments discussed by the legislators. The President of the Legislative Commission, Mr. Abraham Rodriguez, lamented the delay but assured that they will approve those days in order to cite the lawyers of the National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP) (La Prensa Gráfica, May 18, p. 19).

THE DEFENSE. The legal representatives of an investment group which aims to install casinos in the country presented demands, on May 15, charging the right to economic equality. The president of the international business Crown Group, Jhozesef Arguedas, expressed his concern for the criticisms made against those businesses at the same time as he denied that among them existed —or that they might be promoters of— prostitution, drug trafficking or violence, as has been argued. Five casinos operate in the country and since their installation, two years ago, they have not demonstrated abnormality in their functioning, stated Arguedas. Aldo Conde Siliezar, legal representative of the enterprise, held that to prohibit the installation of the gaming houses implied negating the economic liberty which exists in the country (La Prensa Gráfica, May 16, p. 4).

COMMISSION. The deputies of the United Democratic Center block (CDU) proposed, on May 13, to create a commission to elect the functionaries at a second degree and establish a time limit in order to make the selection. The proposal, which implies reforming the internal regulations of the Assembly also requires that the candidates not belong to any political party. The functionaries of the secondary degree are those who depend upon the vote of the deputies in order to occupy their posts, such as is the case with the Attorney General and the President of the Comptroller's Office, for example (La Prensa Gráfica, May 14, p. 18).

BUDGET. The debates around the General Budget of the Nation continue, this time because of the lack of balance caused by an excess of 96 thousand 230 colones in the category of income. Article 226 of the Constitution of the Republic demands that the Executive Office maintain the equilibrium of the budget. Precisely on this question the imbalance is the responsibility of the General Leadership of the Budget, dependency of the Ministry of the Treasury. Mr. Julio Gamero, President of the Commission on the Treasury and the Special Commission on the Budget, recognizes the ruling. "The technical team [of analysts] is new. We may commit errors", he stated. "All will be resolved with the recognition of the error and the correction of it", he added. This position is not shared by Mr. Hugo Molina, FMLN deputy, who affirmed that "the amount is not important. The budget will be not be balanced. It could be ten or one hundred colones...the problem is that it does not balance on a global level". President Calderón Sol still has not approved the legislative decree. If the budget enters into effect as it is, that is to say in a state of imbalance, the Constitution will be violated. "It may be that there has been a lapse or an error. We will have to solve that and look at the possibilities of continuing to study it", stated the president (El Diario de Hoy, May 14, p. 8).

FMLN. The leadership of the FMLN has still not been elected and this is causing debate. It is not clear how long the term of office of the Political Commission to be elected in July will last. For now, there are two interpretations: according to the first, the leadership elected in July is transitory, of limited term, which will last until the last trimester of the current year. Mr. Shafick Handal, of the orthodox line stated the following:, "what I think is that there will be an election at the end of the year and that the period in office will be this period. It is only a complementary term [of the current period until October, November or December". The second is that the new Political Commission will complete the unfinished mandate of Mr. Facundo Guardado, ex coordinator of the FMLN and it will assume the new period, which will end in the year 2001. So think revisionist tendency members Ms. Violeta Menjivar and Nidia Diaz. "Some of us think that it will stay firm and the new Commission will be ratified in October," affirmed Ms. Diaz. But, finally, Ms. Menjivar is in charge of clearing up the polemic: "There is no clarity.. the only thing that is clear is that there are three months until October in order to decide what is to be done". The FMLN statutes in effect do not contemplate the substitution of a leadership body until the end of the term in office for which it was elected, which poses a new debate because any kind of illegal procedure will be invalidated by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (La Prensa Gráfica, May 13, p. 18).