El Salvador: a country of absurdities

The rate increases: the real face of the privatizations

Will Pososltega change after stockholm?

An evaluation of the second year in office of the municipal governments of the greater San Salvador municipality

News Briefs

EL SALVADOR: A COUNTRY OF ABSURDITIES

El Salvador is a country where the most absurd situations obtain. Beginning with our political class —made up of ambitious personalities the majority of whom are mediocre—, and then our businessmen—the more rich they are the more voracious and arrogant they are —and ending up with our media— characterized by yellow journalism and ready to sell all to the highest bidder. The absurd is an integral part of our national activity. Below we review some of the most relevant institutions in El Salvador which, were it not for the important role they play, do not rise above being the stage for chap comedies set up to entertain the unwary.

I. The Legislative Assembly. This entity where fundamental decisions are taken concerning the lives of more than 5 million people (supposedly "represented" by members of this state body), is made up of individuals who, with the exception of a few cases, do not have in mind more than the benefits which they and the parties they serve can obtain during their term of office in the legislature. It is a question of the majority of individuals —who are, at the same time, ambitious and without any commitment whatever with the overall progress of the country— with notorious intellectual limitations and few technical abilities. But, as absurd as this may seem, these persons, who not only are those who know the least about what is good for El Salvador, but are also those who worry the least about it, are those to whom the Salvadoran people pay a juicy salary with additional benefits so that they can decide for us (in general with bad decisions) about the problems which vitally affect all of us. Here is an example: a little while ago our brainy deputies approved —and with this approval demonstrated a limitless sense of irresponsibility— a law governing firearms which will raise the levels of violence in the country. This decision was a decision contrary to a concern for the security and lives of our inhabitants.

II. The Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights. This institution, created in the context of the Peace Accords in order to guarantee the rights of the citizens vis-a-vis the state, has fallen into a state of the most absolute irrelevance and lack of prestige. The institutional bases which were laid during the administration of Dr. Victoria de Avilés have fallen into disrepair with the new ombudsman, Mr. Eduardo Peñate Polanco, whose incompetence has been proved beyond the shadow of a doubt. This very ombudsman has dedicated himself to give evidence of his own mediocrity on diverse occasions, as when he had to ask the help of an assistant in order to give answers to news reporters’ questions. Nevertheless, Mr. Peñate Polance continues unmovable in his post without showing the slightest concern for the abundant reasons provided which prescribe a long rest at home. In this case, as well, the absurd state of affairs obtains in which the Salvadoran people are paying a salary to a functionary (and also to his unconditional followers) who does not serve us in any way and who is causing serious harm to the institutionality of the country.

III. The Minister of the Interior. This government body not only aims to concentrate information about Salvadorans —through the passport registers—, but also controls the musical tastes and preferences of the inhabitants of El Salvador. This state portfolio, with the greatest imaginable arrogance, "suggested" (that is to say, ordered) the radio stations to withdraw from the air music contrary to the "morale", "order" and "good customs" of the Salvadorans. The Salvadoran Association of Radio Broadcasters (ASDER, for its initials in Spanish) which, on more than one occasion, has advocated freedom of expression, submitted without any resistance at all—rather, all to the contrary—to the official "petition". And so it would appear that in El Salvador we are going from bad to worse. During the decade of the seventies and eighties, the government administrations in office censured music as well as books and films which they considered subversive and they did so with the support of guilds and associations such as ASDER. During the 1990’s, when we believe that, finally, we are going to leave authoritarianism behind, the pretensions of the state to control the conscience of the citizens reappears, and with it the compliance of ASDER. Here is the absurdity of the situation: those who say they defend freedom of expression (and its counterpart: the freedom of reception) applaud decisions which oppose this freedom.

IV: The Comptroller’s Office of the Republic. This institution is, perhaps —together with the Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights— the institution which best reflects the ills which El Salvador suffers at the level of institutional functionaries. It is a question of an organism which, far from complying with its tasks of monitoring public finances, does all the contrary: it covers up and supports the corruption which pervades divers government spheres, above all at its highest levels. On the basis of a "pact" which favors the interest of all Salvadorans in absolutely nothing, three parties —to wit, ARENA, PDC and PCN— decided to divide up among themselves three institutions which are decisive for the progress of the country, one of which is the Comptroller’s Office (the other two being the Public Defenders Office and the Attorney General’s Office), the which was given over to the PCN. The "pact", of course, is thought to favor the interests of those who signed it and not the whole interests of the population. It is from this premise, while this "business" continues afoot, not only are corrupt and incompetent functionaries going to continue in control of the Comptroller’s Office but the public will never be informed of the manner in which the state’s financial resources in all branches of government —which belong to all Salvadorans— are being used. And if things continue in this vein, it will never be known how public resources were spent (or misspent) during the Alfredo Cristiani and Armando Calderón Sol administrations. And this because the entity upon which the country depends for monitors spending does all in its power to hide information about this.

Definitively, it is sufficient to glance at entities such as the Legislative Assembly, the Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights, the Ministry of the Interior and the Comptroller’s Office to give credibility to the most radical pessimism. The fact is that El Salvador has no viability at all as a nation open to the challenges which the twenty-first century will present while it has such weak and mistreated institutions as those which currently characterize it. We have no alternative: we either clean up the state institutions once and for all and seriously concern ourselves with seeing that they comply on all points or we will continue to find ourselves in a swamp of corruption, petty interests, mediocrity and social, cultural, economic and political backwardness.

THE RATE INCREASES: THE REAL FACE OF THE PRIVATIZATIONS

Public service rates have always been a sensitive topic because of their direct and indirect impact on the family economy. On the one hand, housing services have a weight of 7.24% within the who basic food basket and, on the other hand, the increase in services presupposes as well an indirect effect on the price of goods and services given that they increase costs to business. For the same reason, the permanence of low rates for public services is important in order to contain the inflation and protect the real income of the population.

Precisely one of the principal arguments which the government of Calderón Sol used for the privatization of public services was one which provoked important reductions in the rates. Nevertheless, when one observes the dynamic and perspectives of the rates once privatization of telephone service and the distribution of electric energy has taken place, one becomes aware of the fact that everything is to the contrary. The most recent examples of this contradiction are: increases in telephone rates, evident since last March; announced increases in the electrical energy rates for big consumers and the beginning of the process for decentralization of the water supply systems.

Last March, the General Superintendence of Electricity and Telecommunications (SIGET, for its initials in Spanish) and in Articles 1 and 8 of the Law governing Telecommunications, a well as Articles 86 and 87 of the Regulations" which fundamentally establish that the rates for telephone service will be determined and approved by SIGET through maximum access charges. Moreover, Article 8 of the Law governing Telecommunications establishes the fact that, the moment the law inters into effect "and, until the year 2002, these values will be readjusted annually by SIGET in the same percentage as the IPC".

Consonant with the foregoing, SIGET allowed increases of 4.2% —equivalent to the rate of inflation for 1998— for the fixed telephone quota, for the value per minute for local calls and for the value per minute for national long distance calls. On the other hand, the cellular telephone and international long distance calls were excluded from the increment.

On the other hand, it was recently learned that the rates for electrical energy homes which consume more than 200 kilowatts on a monthly basis and commercial and industrial sectors will suffer an increase. This increase will oscillate between 6% and 9% and, according to SIGET, this is owing to the fact that because of the rainy season they began late and the cost per barrel for petroleum had increased in recent months. These two factors would influence the cost of electricity, first of all, because the late beginning in the rainy season lowers the capability for generation in the hydroelectric dams obliging them to have recourse to thermal measures to maintain the levels necessary for the generation of energy and, secondly, because the thermal generation plants function on the basis of petroleum derivatives.

Once again, this rate increase is based on legal dispositions provided in Article 90 of the General Law on Electricity, which establishes that the distributors will be able to adjust rates every three months, adjustments which will "enter into effect on the first day of the months of April, July or September". According to SIGET, this increase can be considered "transitory" given that it may be that they will turn back this increase if, during the coming trimester, the rainy season is normalized, as happened this year when —according to the same source— decreases in rates for electrical energy were documented.

In addition to these increases in telephone and electrical rates, recently the possibility for an increase in the rates for the provision of potable water are also on the table with the announced process of "decentralization". In his June 1 inaugural discourse, President Flores announced the decentralization of the provision of potable drinking water and, recently, this process began with the concession to supply potable water to six municipalities in Usulután to the firm "Tetralogía Sociedad de Economía Mixta", which will administer the provision of services for 18 months from the municipal capitals of Santiago de María, Alegría, Mercedes Umaña, Berlín, Tecapán and California.

For the coming six months, the National Administration of Aqueducts and Water Provision (ANDA, for its initials in Spanish) projects the decentralization of another twelve water systems. The President of ANDA, Carlos Perla, stated that "initially there will not be a rate increase because ANDA will partially subsidize".

For now, the majority of Salvadoran homes still enjoy a state subsidy for the consumption of potable water and electrical energy —in homes which consume less than 200 kilowatts per months. This is to say that the real market prices of these services are really above what is currently being charged to consumers and should they be applied in reality, we would see a big increase in rates associated with privatization.

Evidently, the privatization of basic services is not synonymous with lower prices to the consumers. In fact, international experience is a demonstration proving the contrary, as in the cases of Chile and England, where the rates were increase by 300% and families faced problems of being in debt to the companies which provided the services. However the case may be, what is certain is that the recent increases in electricity and telephone rates were foreseen in national legislation and, at the moment in which the subsidies are eliminated, increases could be enormous.

The increases in the rates for electricity will provoke a reaction in the growth of the internal prices which will be added to the effects of the elimination of Value Added Tax exemptions for food and medicine (see Proceso 861). Even more, it is clear that the possibility for new increases in national telephone rates, which will be adjusted according to inflation rates; in rates for electrical energy which will be reviewed every three months; and in the provision of potable water owing to the opening up of these areas to private participation. The greatest threat, however, seems to be the elimination state subsidies to the consumption of electrical energy and potable water. In spite of the fact that privatization has been applied as an unfailing recipe for channel the way to develop, in reality it contains highly questionable aspects, as the case of public services demonstrates.

WILL POSOSLTEGA CHANGE AFTER STOCKHOLM?

Nine months after the Hurricane "Mitch" and the subsequent tragedy that still maintains us in disgrace, the situation of the refugees of Posoltega continues to be almost the same. A huge mass of mud which came from the Casita Volcano, buried in minutes 2,513 people. Some 667 families were affected, more than 2,800 people, 14 of the 33 communities of the municipality were severely damaged and two disappeared completely. 1,500 houses, 50 wells and 650 latrines were destroyed. Two thousand nine hundred and forty-one manzanas of crops, two thousand head of big cattle, 3 thousand poultry birds and two thousand head of small livestock such as goats and pigs. Some 119.5 kilometers of rural road infrastructure was damaged as were 13 bridges.

To deal with this catastrophe, the government of Nicaragua has presented many solicitudes to the international community. Nevertheless, huddled in some small plastic tents, thousands of homeless people are still waiting to begin the reconstruction of their lives. But no conditions exist for them to succeed in doing so.

Psychological help reconstructs in an atmosphere of normality. The refuge and the dependency are not propitious to re-establishing emotional equilibrium. The construction of housing and the recuperation of production —houses and work— are necessary components for a healthy situation. And land is the basis for home and work. Only very recently were lots obtained for the construction of housing —although not for all of the homeless families— and some parcels of insignificant dimension for renewing the sowing of crops.

Posoltega comes from the Nahuatl word "posoli-tecatl", a word of various meanings, all referring to the proximity of the Casita Volcano: "town close to the burning earth", "neighbors of the boiling place", "neighbors of the spewing fountain". With this antecedent, and with the data for studying the territorial ordering, financed with funds for the World Bank months before the tragedy, it was known that the major part of the population of the municipality lived in high-risk situations.

On the other hand, the "abandonment" and almost "hostility" of the central government made of the Posoltega municipality, because of the mayor’s office was obviously Sandinista —was clear from the first moment of the emergency, especially because of the affiliation with the Sandinistas and the history of "subversion" attributed to the major part of the homeless people. When the mayor of Posoltega, Felicita Zeledon, a teacher, sounded the first alarm, hours after the mudslide, with the modest estimate of 1000 dead, President Alemán accused her of being "crazy" and of trying to sow panic. This insensible and negligent attitude held up the intervention of rescue brigades.

In Posoltega there is an almost unanimous conviction that many lives could have been saved had there been rapid intervention by rescue brigades. The people of Posoltega do not forget and resentment towards the central government is still very strong. But there was no rectification and the abandonment has been prolonged. No one can yet explain how Posoltega, being the focus of attention of international cooperation so generously given to Central America after the advent of "Mitch", has received so little aid from the central government.

To make the situation even more inexplicable, the neighboring town of Chichigalpa —not so seriously hit by the hurricane and also having a Sandinista mayor—, already has had 100 houses constructed by the state Secretariat for Social Action and inaugurated by President Arnoldo Alemán himself who gave to the project the name of Villa Dolores, in memory of his wife who passed away.

Now, once the Stockholm meeting has ended, it should be asked how the best perspectives for Posoltega are doing? Lamentably, with the 1992-1998 presidential decree emitted on December 9, 1998, the government laid the foundation for answering that question in the negative for as much as President Alemán’s presidential speeches try to create another impression.

The problem of the lack of housing in Posoltega also reflects the lack of operational capacity of the general concepts when the details are examined. CARE, of the Salvation Army, CONAUSTRIA, the Maria Elena Cuadra Movement, the Juan XXIII Institute of the Central American University of Managua, the Spanish Red Cross and other NGOs arrived in Posoltega and, all of them succeeded in covering the whole demand for housing for the homeless of the municipality. But they did so in a process that was excessively slow in a rhythm marched, at times, by perfectionism which was out of place, and dealing with a thousand and one obstacles.

In the first place, the NGOs who wished to construct homes for the homeless stumbled on the previous requirements in these circumstances. It was necessary to obtain the support of the Nicaraguan Institute of Territorial Studies (INETER), an entity which should define what were the high-risk areas on the basis of a very focussed analysis in order to select land which offered greater security. It took more than two months to figure out where to construct.

Afterwards, came the really thorny task which is not dealt with in any post-disaster rehabilitation manual: negotiations with the proprietors of the lands where the homes were to be located. Proprietors of large, medium and small parcels wrung their hands as they saw in the tragedy the opportunity to take the lion’s share. Lands which were evaluated at 300 and 500 dollars per manzana —this being the established value— were offered at 3,000 dollars per manzana. The majority of the organisms, following arduous negotiations, succeeded in buying them at 1,700 dollars per manzana.

On the other hand, some NGOs —those which strain at a gnat and swallow a camel— which build homes at a cost of 4,000 dollars per unit, were not willing to spend similar amounts for the land. Certainly, to pay those prices was to play the game of the opportunists, but also to accelerate the process aimed at satisfying urgent needs. The dilemmas have been enormous and continuous. So it is that, given these realities, the global concepts are brought to earth.

Curiously enough, before the NGOs began their labyrinth, it occurred to the government to declare —through the presidential decree for "92-98" referred to earlier— the land public land and confiscate the whole area of the mudslide (2,352 manzanas) to create a national monument for those who died there. Naturally it did not occur to the government to seize other land and use it for the benefit of the homeless and construct homes for the people on it. The decree was elaborated and emitted without consulting the municipal government or the families of the victims who quite justly demanded to be those who decide upon the use of the land which they consider sacred to their dead.

The poligonal erected by INETER on the area affected by the mudslide served as the basis of the presidential decree and the list provided by the Ministry of the Treasury and Public Credit emitted after the decree recognizes 135 properties eligible for indemnization. But, strangely enough, what does not appear on the list of registers are the cooperatives with deeds from the Agrarian Reform which took place in the area of El Porvenir and Rolando Rodriguez, only the previous owners of these lands, confiscated by the Sandinista revolution and already indemnified after 1990. This is to say, they do not appear as owners of the lands affected by those who inhabited them, possessed them and made them produce during the last two decades. After the decree, the Ministry of the Treasury recognized as valid the titles held at the time of the dictator Somoza.

In this presidential decision lies the root of the conflicts which currently exist among many inhabitants of Posoltega and the Executive branch which included within the area decreed public lands which were not affected by the hurricane and who decided to indemnify, for the second time, a group of landholders. For this reason the homeless say that, after Hurricane "Mitch", came Hurricane "Alemán".

During his first visit to Posoltega, when the tragedy had only recently occurred, President Alemán insisted that the homeless persons go and participate in the coffee harvest in the haciendas located in the departments of Matagalpa and Jinotega. The homeless people decidedly rejected the proposal but today interpret this invitation as a strategy to distract them while Decree "92-98" was being concocted.

And now, families all along the area such as those from Callejas Deshon, Teran, Reyes, Montealegre, , Ulloa and Cerda are pointed out by the homeless inhabitants as the big beneficiaries of the tragedy. They are the ones who appear on the list of the Ministry of the Treasury as the legitimate owners. Eduardo Callejas, deputy for the government Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC), owner of the Bella Vista hacienda, located at the top of Casita Volcano, will be one of those who receive the best indemnification. The powerful proprietors of this farm have always known how to apply the principle "there is not ill which does not bring good".

An opportunity was sought in the flow of donations which followed Mitch aimed at the economic reactivation of Nicaragua. It was an illusion. The situation in which the homeless still live in Posoltega demonstrate this fully. What prevailed, as always, was and is "everyone for himself". Now it is said that the aid obtained in Stockholm will compensate for social inequality, the effects of natural disasters and state inefficiency. Will this be another illusion?

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This article presented by Equipo Envío, Nicaragua

AN EVALUATION OF THE SECOND YEAR IN OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS OF THE GREATER SAN SALVADOR MUNICIPALITY

Most f the municipalities in the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador has been evaluated in a positive way by their communities after two years of administration, according to the most recent poll carried out by the University Institute for Public Opinion (IUDOP) of the "José Simeón Cañas" Central American University (UCA). The poll was implemented with the cooperation of the Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo Foundation (FUNDAUNGO). The poll was held during the first two weeks of June in the municipalities of San Salvador, Antiguo Cuscatlán, Soyapango, Apopa, Ciudad Delgado, Santa Tecla and Mejicanos (as well as Santa Ana, as an additional municipality), and was designed to gather the opinions of the inhabitants of these municipalities in the metropolitan zone of San Salvador concerning their municipal govenrments. The sample consulted was 2,378 adult residents of those seven municipalities, with a n average of 300 persons interviewed per municipality, with the exception of the San Salvador municipality where there were 575 valid interviews.

According to the results of the poll, the mayor of San Salvador obtained the best average evaluation with a rating of 7.16, followed by the mayor of Antiguo Cuscatlán with 6.92, the mayor of Soyapango with 6.41, Apopa with 6.37 and Mejicanos with an average of 6.20. These mayors received a lower average rating: Santa Tecla with 6.93 and Ciudad Delgado with 5.92.

The poll revealed that the mayors of each municipality were evaluated as being the best by their own municipal councils. The municipal council of the city of San Salvador received an average of 6.71, followed by the mayor of Antiguo Cuscatlán with 6.66. The councils for Apopa and Soyapango received averages of 6.18 and 6.1 respectively while the leadership bodies of Mejicanos, Santa Tecla and Ciudad Delgado received averages lower than 6 (in the following order: 5.95, 5.85 and 5.69).

According to the results of the poll, the majority of the municipalities were evaluated positively, but those receiving the highest evaluation are Antiguo Cuscatlán, with 70.2% of those polled expressing the opinion that her work was good or very good and the average for San Salvador, with 66.1% of the citizens expressing a positive opinion. The rest of the municipalities received positive evaluation at approximately 42%, with he exception of the mayor of Ciudad Delgado which was evaluated positively by only 32.8%.

On the other hand, in the municipality of San Salvador, close to 50% of those consulted think that the current municipal council has developed better work than the previous council (1994-1997), while 42.4% consider that the work has been the same and only 5.6 hold the opinion that the work of the current administration is worse. In the rest of the municipalities, the greater number of opinions were that the work of the current administrations has been the same as before, and a little more than a third indicated improvements in the work of the municipal government and approximately 10% indicated that the municipal administration had gotten worse.

The poll asked the metropolitan residents about the successes and failures of their municipal governments. In the municipality of San Salvador, the successes most cited are the decoration of the city and the improvement in the infrastructure; in the municipality of Antiguo Cuscatlán, the population values the improvement in public services and also the decoration of the area. In Soyapango, trash and garbage collection and the improvement in the infrastructure were qualified most frequently as successes, although an important percentage of the population mentioned that there had not been any successes. In Apopa and Ciudad Delgado, the improvement of the infrastructure was the point receiving the highest points most frequently, but in this last only after 40% had mentioned that there had not been any important successes in this mayor’s administration. In other municipalities the decoration of the city and trash collection were cited also.

With regard to failures in the municipal governments, the responses by the communities were still more disperse, given that the greater part of those consulted had difficulties in identifying failures or said that there had been none. In San Salvador, the aspects most mentioned as failures were the trash collection service, the disorder in the markets and the increase in taxes. In Antiguo Cuscatlán, as well a in Soyapango and in Ciudad Delgado, those consulted mentioned lack of compliance with promises made by the respective mayor. In Apopa, the residents resent the disorder in the markets and, again, the lack of compliance with promises made. In Mejicanos, apart from not complying with promises made, the population mentioned lack of administrative capability. In Santa Tecla, almost a fourth of the inhabitants criticized the lack of order in the markets.

On the other hand, in general terms, the greater part of the citizens of San Salvador and Soyapango believe that municipal services have gotten better; in Antiguo Cuscatlán and Mejicanos, an important percentage but less than 50% share that same opinion; but in Apopa, Ciudad Delgado and Santa Tecla, 40% of those polled stated that they thought that municipal services had gotten better.

The FUNDAUNGO-IUDOP poll dedicated a specific section to the municipality of San Salvador. Within it, the capital city residents laid out what they thought were the fundamental challenges which the municipal administration would face in what remains of their administration. According to the results, a little more than a third of the capital city dwellers stated that they thought the fundamental challenge was to establish order on the question of street sellers. Some 12.9% consider that the trash collection service should be improved; the rehabilitation of the historic center and the improvement of public services were mentioned by 12.3% and almost 9% stated that there should be more citizen participation.

The poll included political preferences of the population with regard to the elections for the year 2000. Basically, community members were asked if the same party ought to consider governing the municipality in question or if another party should be elected to the government of their locale. Some 53% of the capital city dwellers stated that they would like to see the same coalition of parties continue in power in San Salvador as opposed to 38.4% who stated that another party ought to govern and the rest did not respond to the question.

In Antiguo Cuscatlán, support for the same party rose to 49.2% while in Soyapango it was 45.7%. In the rest of the municipalities, the percentage of support to continuing the same party went from 33% to 36% as opposed to a good percentage who were divided in saying that another party should enter office or they did not answer the question.

With regard to political preferences, in the greater part of the municipalities of the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador, the balance of political support inclined, for the moment, in favor of the ARENA party with the exception of the municipalities of San Salvador and Soyapango, where the first intention to vote is for the FMLN. Nevertheless, in the municipalities of Mejicanos, San Salvador and Soyapango, the differences between the first preference and the second were very close and, taking into account the margin of error established by the poll for each municipality, this could indicate a virtual tie in the intentions to vote expressed in June of 1999. The rest of the parties appear with marginal percentages. In the majority of the municipalities, the CDU appears as a distant third place followed by a close preference for the PDC.

Finally, the poll consulted the inhabitants of the municipality of San Salvador on the question of whether they would vote for Hector Silva if he were to present himself for another period in office as the capital city mayor. Some 54.8% answered affirmatively, that is to say, that they would vote for him, while some 33.7% stated that they would not vote for him and 11.5% did not respond to the question or answered that they did not know fi they would vote for him or not.

The poll to evaluate some of the municipal governments of the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador reveals that, in general terms, the population has rated the performance of the mayors in their second year of administration in a differential way. This effort at researching public opinion shows notable differences in the opinions of one municipality with the other. While the mayors of cities such as San Salvador and Antiguo Cuscatlán stand out on the majority of aspects evaluated and the majority of their inhabitants qualify them in a favorable way, there are municipal governments which did not receive the same amount of support such as Santa Tecla and Ciudad Delgado. On the other hand, the municipality of San Salvador seems to be better evaluated in general terms and on its image. Inasmuch as the local government of Antiguo Cuscatlán received more positive opinions on concrete aspects related to services and projects implemented.

On the question of political preferences, the IUDOP-FUNDAUNGO poll indicates that ARENA and the FMLN continue to hold the major party sympathies as we reach 2000. Although ARENA maintains a notable advantage on the majority of the municipalities of the metropolitan region, the FMLN holds —although precariously— a certain pre-eminence in the capital, in some measure as a product of the political capital garnered by the current mayor, Hector Silva. For his part, Hector Silva appears to have broad support among the capital city inhabitants but it must be taken into consideration that at the point in time when the poll was carried out, he is the only formal candidate for mayor of San Salvador.

ANDES. Teachers affiliated with the National Association for Salvadoran Educators (ANDES 21 de Junio) suspended their labors today as a measure to apply pressure for salary increases. "ANDES will return to the negotiating table when the Minister has concrete proposals on distinct points which we have proposed", declared ANDES representative Arnoldo Vaquerano. With these words he ratified the decision of the teachers’ union to suspend classes in order to demand compliance with article 33 of the Law for Teaching Personnel, which establishes a salary review every three years. The proposal presented by ANDES demands a general increase of 30% over and above the base salary. Moreover, they asked for a freeze in hiring, that bonuses for quality education be issued in order to prevent students from returning to the practice of holding raffles, coronation of queens and other activities in order to supplement the needs of the schools. Nevertheless, the Minister of Education, Evelyn Jacir de Lovo expressed to the deputies of the commission on culture that "it is not a question of offering more or less as they do in the Tiendona [market in downtown San Salvador], where one bargains because one has money in one’s hand". The Minister asked ANDES to present arguments publicly concerning where the 30% would come from (El Diario de Hoy, July 13, p. 4 and La Prensa Gráfica, July 13, p. 8).

DISCOUNTS. The day following the work stoppage carried out on July 13 by teachers affiliated with the National Association of Salvadoran Teachers (ANDES 21 de Junio), the Minister of Education stated that it would make discounts from professors who supported suspending classes. According to the Minister of Education, Evelyn Jacir de Lovo, the preliminary figure for the amount of discounts rose to one million two hundred thousand colones. Which is equivalent, according to the Minister, to the purchase of 25 thousand books of the "Cipotes" collection or the acquisition of 9000 desks or the construction of 33.5 schoolrooms. The ANDES work stoppage affected classes in 414 of the country’s schools, according to figures made public by the Ministry. The work stoppage was said by Jacir de Lovo to be "partial" because she considers that only 12.5% of the schools presented "slowdowns in classes". "The stoppage is being called partial and the teachers who went to work demonstrated their commitment with education and their willingness to continue with the dialogue", stated the functionary. For their part, the secretary general of ANDES, Felipe Rivera, declared that 95% of the schools and national institutes suspended classes. For this reason they reaffirmed their decision not to return to the negotiating table until there is a specific proposal from the Ministry (La Prensa Gráfica, July 14, p. 4 and 5).

LOAN. The line of credit that the Central Reserve Bank (BCR) finally issued will not be in the amount of two thousand million colones but rather in the amount of 290 million, according to explanations proffered on July 13 by the President of the BCR, Rafael Barraza. Called to the Legislative Assembly in order to explain the details of the loan, before the Economic and Special Financial Commissions, Barraza revealed that this will require annual interest payments of 1% to be paid monthly for a period of two years from the time of the disbursement. The bank functionary explained that the money still has not been issued to CREDISA owing to the fact that the guarantees that the banking institution will make to cover the loan. The guarantees which CREDISA have presented are mortgages on shares and items with values specified in titles and credit portfolios which add up to one thousand 575 million colones. Initially Barraza said that the work done so that CREDISA could establish the figure of some two thousand sixty-nine million colones. But on July 13 he declared that it will be in the amount of one thousand two hundred and ninety million colones. Moreover, he explained that the total would be reduced because CREDISA mortgaged close to 780 million colones at the moment when the line of credit was issued. The money for paying back the loan would come from funds with which CREDISA has in cash and bonds (El Diario de Hoy, July 14, p. 30).