Predominant models in economy, politics and culture

The FMLN is not convincing

The dispute between CEL and Nejapa power

Evaluation of Héctor Silva’s term in office according to public opinion.

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PREDOMINANT MODELS IN ECONOMY, POLITICS AND CULTURE

What is meant by the word "paradigm"? A paradigm is a context of concepts, value judgments and norms —all coherent with each other— which serves as a point of reference for the interpretation and explanation of a specific environment in reality. Of course, when faced with the same set of circumstances, diverse paradigms may be available in order to comprehend and provide an explanation of it and all may be of equal conceptual, evaluative and normative value, with which opposing paradigms and paradigms in competition one with the other are also available. Opposition and competition among paradigms, in general, is resolved in favor of one of them, which becomes the dominant one —because it explains more phenomena, because it is more convincing, etc. This is to say, it is more widely accepted by social groupings involved in the understanding and explanation of this or that set of circumstances. The remaining paradigms do not disappear, but remain in a position subordinate to the dominant paradigm. Likewise, there are as many paradigms as there are circumstances requiring explanation and comprehension. Here we will be concerned with the predominant paradigms in the economic, political and cultural spheres. This is to say that we will be concerned with conceptual, evaluative and normative contexts which dominate these three spheres today.

In the economic sphere the dominant paradigm is the neoliberal one. The components of this paradigm are: a) capitalism is not only the economic model which has triumphed over other economic models (this can be seen in fact), it is the best, the most in accordance with the needs and preferences of the individual human being (moral evaluation); b) the economy functions better, it is more efficient and generates more wealth if it is ruled by the market forces of supply and demand: c) there should be no interference of any kind in the market —all to the contrary. This means that the role of the state in the economy ought to be reduced to a minimum —by means of the privatization of public enterprises and the elimination of jobs in the public sector—; d) for the economy to really take off, after a situation of stagnation, it must first pass through a period of cleansing. The most adequate mechanism for this is "structural adjustment"; the elimination of price controls, reduction of social spending and the freezing of minimum salaries in the public and private sectors; and e) the market is the regulating mechanism in world-wide economic relations, for which reason it is necessary to suppress any obstacles which stand in the way of this in each country. It is a question of economic liberation, which is aimed at "opening" local economies for the arrival of goods and services coming from outside.

In the political sphere the dominant paradigm is that of democracy. Its basic outlines are the following; a) political parties are the ideal institutions for channeling demands of the diverse social sectors in the context of legality and order towards the state entities charged with responding to them; b) periodic elections which are transparent, plural and competitive are the best resource for making contact with the positions of governmental leadership. Where there are periodic elections, democracy can consider itself to have been established; c) the separation of powers (executive, legislative and judicial) is necessary in order to avoid one of them concentrating too much power in its hands, in which circumstance despotism comes into play. This is to say that the separation of powers permits control and balance between the fundamental entities of state decision. Where there is only one power —civil or military— there is no democracy; d) individuals enjoy certain rights which may not be violated under pain of violating human nature. These rights are, basically, the following: freedom of expression, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of associations and freedom to enjoy a political order which guarantees those rights; and e) democracy is a political democracy and not a social democracy. As such, political democracy has been designed to avoid despotism and guarantee that the political order does not act against the individual, depriving him or her of liberty or obliging the individual to do things against his or her human nature. This is called "social democracy" and refers to economic equality and distributive justice, which are not central points in this concept of democracy and do not, moreover, necessarily have to be associated with it (although they might be).

Finally, in the cultural sphere, the dominant paradigm is the neoconservative model which is characterized by the following: a) human beings have no other pretext than faith to orient them and to aid them in making fundamental decisions about their lives. This faith is nourished by religious sources among which are to be found, almost to the fullest, not only responses to problems which grieve them but good and correct norms of behavior; b) the ills which permanently besiege humanity, expressed in wars, greed, drugs, heavy music, excessive relaxation of customs, etc. These ills and evils must be fought against by the "good people", those who have had contact with "divine" sources and who are disposed to launch a crusade for the conversion of those who are not among the faithful; c) it is not any person who can struggle against evil. For this, they must have the "gift" of being selected by a superior being. How do we know who has been selected (elected)? First of all, by his or her "dominion" of the sources. Secondly by his or her style of life: austere, upright, prudent, a member of a stable family and a partisan of order. Third, by his or her determination to actively struggle for the propagation of values and styles of life distinctive from those followed by the good people: those who have disorganized families, who have promoted (or discussed) abortion, lesbians and homosexuals, feminists, divorcees, those who like heavy music, etc.; and d) in some religious points of view, neoconservatism is expressed as a turning inward to the life of the interior, a moralism and exaggerated puritanism. Respect and submission to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, a defense of family harmony, internal peace, respect for political authorities, and condemnation of all that undermines social stability.

In conclusion, the dominant paradigms in the world at the present time are: on the economic plane, the neoliberal view; in the political sphere, the democratic; and in the cultural sphere, the neo-conservative. One must inevitably deal with these paradigms, or models, when one commits him or herself to a specific project of social, economic or political change.

THE FMLN IS NOT CONVINCING

On July 24, the FMLN held its Ninth Extraordinary National Convention, the objective of which was to elect the leadership of the party. As was expected from the beginning of the process, it was the "orthodox" grouping which won the most positions in the internal contest. Shafick Handal and his followers knew how to capitalize on the electoral failure of the revisionist group in the recently past presidential elections —not a difficult task— taking into account that they can depend on the exemplary loyalty —even to the point of fanaticism— of half of the party.

After the outbreak of internal struggles in the FMLN almost two years ago, the dangers which the dominance of the orthodox wing could bring with it over the so-called revisionist wing were mentioned here on these pages. It was not the case that it was believed that the Handal group would lead the FMLN to the dark caves of Stalinist thought. It was simply a matter of indicating that for a considerable number of voters —either for ignorance, fanaticism or both— that the color red in the political realm automatically means communism-Castroism-authoritarianism-privation of individual freedoms. So then, the media, in its simplistic and tendentious handling of the terms "orthodox" and "revisionist" have managed to equate orthodoxy with what so many people fear, "communism" and have equated "pragmatism" with heterodoxy which any left party whatever believes to be up with the times.

Commenting upon the convention referred to above, in his column in El Diario de Hoy for July 24, Salvador Samayoa affirms: "those who think that we are now going to have a more radical and more confrontational FMLN do not know the psychology, nor the sense of politics, nor the emotional wellsprings nor the apprehensions which frequently influence the conduct of some of the FMLN leaders". He is right. The problem is that, in great measure, those who fear a more radical left party because they are not informed about its internal functioning belong to a very significant sector: those who vote.

One thing is the questioning which takes place among analysts and another —a very distinct matter altogether— the perceptions of the electorate concerning politicians. It is important not to lose sight of this at the moment when conclusions regarding the last FMLN event are drawn. Let us remember that it continues to be Shafick Handal —and not Facundo Guardado— who, together with the other personalities of the Communist Party, who are, in one way or another, implicated in the investigations concerning the kidnappings. Unfortunately, our media promotes this more than the "psychology", "political sense" or "emotional wellsprings" of the FMLN party members.

So it is then, that if we take into account that, on electoral matters, the great challenge facing the political parties is to win 60% of the vote of those who abstained and, among these, to find those who did not vote for the FMLN because of their equivocal concept of that party. The idea that things will be far from easy for an FMLN dominated by a ""radical"" tendency seems to continue to be current. Doubtless, one of the major challenges facing the new party leadership will be to seek the way to resolve the image problem which daily makes some of the FMLN members appear to be fleeing from justice, to be friends of violence or accomplices in extremely serious crimes.

Nevertheless, attempting to analyze this delicate situation in which the FMLN finds itself in all of its complexity, the truth is that things will not be at all easy for the party in any of these possible circumstances. It has already been seen that the predominance of the "revisionists" in the party was not a solution because the internal disputes ended up damaging the FMLN’s image and considerably lessening the number of votes. From the point of view of the perception of the citizens, the consolidation of the party requires diverse ingredients which are not at all easy to acquire.

It is not enough to create the impression of aiming to "modernize" the country —and not impede that process—; additionally, a demonstration that the party is cohesive must be presented together with the capacity for leadership and administration, with competent members.... In short, the FMLN must appear to be a party that knows who it is, what it wants and where it will lead the country. All of this, of course, is difficult for the FMLN, the current characteristics of which could easily constitute the profile of an adolescent: identity crisis, conflicting tendencies, confusion, lack of short-term objectives....

But over and above the perspective provided by public opinion, let us go to the topic of the FMLN’s internal problems. Of course, it would be nefarious to think that the party would attempt to raise up its image on the basis of something that does not exist. But in order to become what it must be come, it is indispensable to begin to sort out, once and for all, all of the obstacles which impede that process. Continuing, again, with Samayoa, suffice it to say that in the FMLN convention basic questions were not even touched upon —questions such as "the ideological dilemma of the party", its position concerning "some urgent and complicated aspects of the political and economic problematic of the country", "political and personal relationships among members of the different tendencies" and the determination of the true "leadership of the future". Moreover, the candidacies for mayors and deputies do not enjoy very solid bases and the cadre elected do not hold more than a formal leadership, "stuck together with chewing gum to the rest of the party scaffolding".

It is true that in this recent event, the fellow travelers demonstrated greater maturity and rationality and that the mixed configuration achieved by the leadership bodies gives evidence of a joint concern for the future of the party. This is a success that should be recognized. But the analysts coincide in declaring that the pluralism achieved in the convention is provisional, which means that as long as the differences do not begin to deal with —and the best way to begin is by talking about it— the coexistence between groups will not be pacific for long.

In this sense, it is a matter for concern that the new General Coordinator insists upon denying the existence of tendencies within the FMLN. Fabio Castillo has joined the FMLN members who prefer to adopt the easy way of censoring the word "tendencies" with an eye to replacing it with concepts such as "lines of thought", "divergences" or others. In this way they aim to reduce the problem to a semantic discussion, laying to one side the fact that, whatever they may call themselves, in the FMLN there exist groups of persons whose ideologies are so opposed that the situation has risen to the degree that they consider themselves enemies, making of each other more fearful adversaries than those of ARENA itself.

According to Castillo, the FMLN militants have reached "complete conciliation on fundamental questions.... there is no militant who will say ´I am trying to push forward a neoliberal project, there is no militant who is going to say something which contravenes fundamental principles and objectives. This is identity, it is unity". One might ask the new coordinator, in the first place, why, if they are so conciliated, does one group accuse the other of being neo-liberal?; and then, what is meant by "fundamental issues"? What are these fundamental principles and objectives with which everyone identifies and with which they remain unified? Is it not the case that this is exactly what needs clarifying?

THE DISPUTE BETWEEN CEL AND NEJAPA POWER

One of the supposed benefits of privatization is that it would permit movement from a state monopoly way of handling services to a schema of free competition, where the prices would be fixed by market forces and where the state would employ fewer resources from the public treasury in order to offer services and produce goods. In the case of electricity, this proposition turns out to be highly questionable if we consider the recent polemic emerging between the Executive Hydroelectric Commission of the Lempa River (CEL, for its initials in Spanish), the entity charged with supplying part of the electrical energy consumed in the country, and Nejapa Power, a private entity which currently sells electrical energy generated by thermal means to CEL.

The principal discrepancy in this case lies in the fact that CEL wishes to pull out of the initial contract because it feels that it is buying electrical energy at prices which are too high. This dispute draws attention to the inconvenience of the processes of reducing the state and of privatization, given that these are not, in and of themselves, the solution to the problems of inefficiency and excessive public spending. In fact, a state of affairs has not even been achieved in which the privatization of basic services has been translated into a reduction of rates; on the contrary, local telephone and electrical rates have, in fact, increased (Proceso, 863). These rate increases are even based on legal dispositions such as Article 90 of the General Law of Electricity, which establishes that the distributors will be able to make adjustments in their rates every three months.

According to representatives of CEL, the problems resulting from rate prices have risen practically since the first months when Nejapa Power began to function. Only six months after this began, CEL pointed out that it was already buying kilowatts of electrical energy at a price which was, by all accounts, excessive. While it was estimated that the market price of the kilowatt was found to be close to 40 cents on the Salvadoran colon in the case of Guatemala, CEL was buying at a price of between 70 and 80 cents per kilowatt from the company in question. This situation, inexplicably, has been in effect for almost five years and it is until 1999 that CEL has decided to take action to revoke the contract.

According to the recently named General Superintendent for Electricity and Telecommunications, Ernesto Lima Mena, to continue with the contract with Nejapa Power would imply paying a surcharge close to 33% per kilowatt (which represents a total of 25 million dollars annually). Considering that the contract could remain in force during a period of 15 years more, this would imply close to 375 million dollars extra and, according to the same source, would provoke a situation in which "CEL would go bankrupt in the long run [because]...even if CEL were efficient concerning the generation of hydroelectric energy...that benefit cannot be transferred to the people because [energy] must be bought from Nejapa Power".

CEL has appealed the contract on the basis of an international arbitration which determines which actions should be taken in order to save additional costs in the amount of 25 million dollars annually which would be the case should the relationship with Nejapa Power be continued in the same terms stipulated in the current contract. According the Lima Mena, in October, 1998, this business offered to revoke the contract in exchange for 135 million dollars. This was rejected by CEL.

Faced with these initial indications, the reaction of Nejapa Power was to deny the imputations of overpricing alleged by CEL in a comuniqué in which it declared "that the price of the supplying of energy is fixed by a formula stipulated in the contract, which can go up or down, depending on the variables over which Nejapa Power has no control, and for which it receives no benefit —these being variations in prices of petroleum and the total capacity of the plant being used".

According to the same comuniqué, Nejapa Power made the investment "in spite of the risks involved" and, as always, its relations with CEL have been "excellent", to the point that during the years 1997 and 1998 it raised its sales to CEL by close to 33% (700 [from a n average of Gigawatt hours to 930). Nevertheless, one should not overlook the fact that during those years, the generation of electrical energy by CEL, by hydroelectric means diminished noticeably as a result of the drought of 1997.

When one examines the behavior of international petroleum prices during the last four years, it is obvious that the Nejapa Power arguments are questionable because the prices of petroleum have not always shown a tendency towards increase. During 1995 the average price of a barrel of petroleum was $18.55; for 1996 it was $20.1; for 1997 it was $20.3; for 1998 it was $14.1 and for the first trimester of 1999 it was 12.9. The foregoing implies that the price of petroleum, after it suffered an initial increase of 8% and of 1% for 1996 and 1997, respectively, has been falling stiffly to the tune of 30% and 9% for 1998 and for the first trimester of 1999.

This means that during the first three years of operation (1994–1997) an increase could have been justified because of the increase in the prices of petroleum, which, as has already been pointed out, were light (close to 10%). Nevertheless, the prices increased by 33% and for the following periods Nejapa Power, although it ought to have reduced its prices by a considerable amount, given that the prices of petroleum declined considerably, did not do so.

Laying aside the possibility of poor handling of the prices of electricity, in reality, the Nejapa Power-CEL contract poses a problem of overpricing which must be paid for buying energy by means of ways of generating electricity which are relatively more costly. The energy generated by hydroelectric means, apart from the fact that it can provoke adverse social and environmental effects because it implies the construction of big dams, is relatively cheaper than the generating by thermal means, but has a limit to its capacity for generation which obliges it to obtain energy by other means. In fact, during the last 20 years, CEL has expanded its capacity for generation basically by means of the generation from thermal sources, but in recent years it has thrown away the opportunity for buying energy at practically half the price from Guatemala.

This is one more instance of a situation in which private enterprise, as well as the state, does not necessarily imply efficiency. Moreover, this last has not proceeded rationally in the adjudication of contracts, which is evidently the case here. This has meant an annual loss of $25 million, the equivalent of close to 0.24 % of the GNP and 10% of the total fiscal deficit. Moreover, unpardonable omissions have begun to exist given that, since 1995, inflated prices have been paid to Nejapa Power and, this notwithstanding, four years have passed under these conditions, a change of government and a change of General Superintendent of Electricity and Telecommunications so that a contract and a reconsideration of the contract with that business must be reconsidered.

This could be a good opportunity in which the new government might demonstrate its willingness to handle public affairs for the benefit of the majority sectors of society because, up until now, the handling of privatizations is not bearing the fruits of efficiency, reduction of prices and greater economic dynamism which were hoped for. A better negotiating effort by the state is recommendable in order to prevent international private enterprise from benefiting from the abuses arising from price fixing on basic services and preventing, as well, the obtention of government favors.

EVALUATION OF HECTOR SILVA’S TERM IN OFFICE ACCORDING TO PUBLIC OPINION.

At first glance, and from the point of view of an optimistic reading, the results of the last poll by the University Institute for Public Opinion of the UCA (IUDOP), entitled, An Evaluation of the Second Year of Administration by the Municipal Governments of the Greater Metropolitan Area of San Salvador, are a demonstration of the fact that the population has —finally?— recognized the value of the work accomplished by the mayor of San Salvador. The fact of his having obtained the highest marks of all his peers and that his mayor’s office has received the second best evaluation of the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador could be sufficient motives for supposing that the political future of Héctor Silva might be promising.

But, is there room for optimism and rejoicing when a mayor who has distinguished himself up to now for launching projects unheard of in the history of the country (the restoration of the downtown historical area and the beginning of a waste-processing plant are two of these) and for an attitude qualitatively different from the miseries rampant in the national political life obtains a grade of 7.16 for his work (only two points higher than his closest ARENA competitor)? And is it not a matter for concern that a mayor’s office composed of professional staff people who have made an effort to carry out an honest and crystal clear administration should not win a positive evaluation when facing off an administration such as that of Antiguo Cuscatlán —accused of fraudulent handling of green areas and excessive politicization of its decisions?

The results of the poll are surprising and worrisome. At the first level, because they indicate how volatile and paradoxical the opinions of citizens are when evaluating their government leaders. That Héctor Silva, for example, has been named personality of the year for 1998 or has succeeded in sitting down at a table —overcoming ideological barriers— with Calderón Sol and private enterprise to sign agreements for citizen development, seems not to make a very big impression on the population or, at least, not sufficiently to impress the citizenry or at least impress them enough for them to not to give a rating a rating, by all standards mediocre to the mayor and his team. The poll results oblige us to ask ourselves, then, what could Silva have done to merit a higher rating?

It is logical that in a context such as ours, in which a large part of the population lives in poverty and lacks the most basic necessities, immediate action is more acceptable than long-term projects and small-scale projects on level seem to be better received by the electorate than large-scale projects. In this sense, Silva’s sin —which keeps him at the level of mediocrity in the eyes of public opinion and situates him at the same level as other functionaries who do not have his virtues— seems to be his having thrown his lot with the future and with big projects with great impact. Measures such as extending municipal administrative services, setting up a municipal tax reform system or taking on the re-ordering of the city, as important and transcendental as these may be, seem to pass unnoticed by citizens who can scarcely subsist on a daily basis.

At a second level, the poll demonstrates that not even with what analysts have touted as the most professional and much praised municipal administration, has the FMLN been able to achieve higher evaluations than ARENA for its political achievements. It is significant that the correlation of forces between the most important parties of the left and right have not undergone substantial modifications, even when the FMLN competed in the evaluation with its political crown prince and ARENA with municipal administrations characterized by traditional cheap political maneuverings. So, then, in the eyes of the citizens, not even the most capable municipal functionaries of the FMLN merit a better evaluation than those of ARENA. That Héctor Silva obtained an intent to vote for his re-election of 54.8% of the sampling neither says nor indicates anything definitive, especially if one considers that ARENA still has not put up a candidate to challenge the mayor in next year’s upcoming elections.

With this data, does Silva’s electoral future continue to be rose-colored? It all depends. In the first place, the mayor and his team must demonstrate that the professionalism and capability they obviously have can be set in motion in such a way as to satisfy the most pressing exigencies of the population. Silva was elected to office by presenting himself as a candidate distinctively different; next year he will have to demonstrate that the characteristics which make him different have translated themselves into efficiency for resolving minimum and immediate necessities. Although Silva merits praise —and with reason— for having achieved important goals, for the upcoming elections he must become streamlined in such a way as to achieve efficiency which will be recognized by the voters for its bringing to pass the projects which are closest to them and which affect their lives in the short range.

In second place, the political future of the mayor depends, of course, on the kind of opponent ARENA puts up. To continue along the same lines as expressed in the poll, facing off a competitor with similar characteristics, Silva will not win re-election by arguing that his projects need a longer period to come to fruition nor by basing his candidacy on long experience, because this experience and these projects do not seem to awaken great emotion among the electorate. If the population does not understand the implications, for example, of the renovation of the historical downtown area of the capital city in their daily lives, Silva will find himself in difficulties when competing against a candidate that will also come from a professional background and will also be well-known by the voters (for example, Elizabeth de Calderón Sol and Rodrigo Avila are two names that ARENA has suggested for the candidacy, both possess these qualities).

Finally, considering that, for the population, Silva’s achievements do not differ in any great degree from the municipal team for Antiguo Cuscatlán —a typical ARENA administration which presented projects which were even more ambitious—, the definitive push for his re-election will depend more on party alliances which support him than on the political weight and capital which he, as a personality, possesses. Following this line of thinking, then, Silva and the group which supports his re-election —in which Héctor Dada is the shining light—seem to have won some terrain. At the moment, the FMLN —wracked with problems— has shown no signs, as it has in the past, that there exists a tendency inside the FMLN with sufficient strength to block the candidacy of the mayor —which, should this come to pass, be tantamount to a new electoral suicide. On the other hand, the conditions imposed by the CDU for participation in the coalition which supports his re-election are not insuperable and, indeed, some of them are guaranteed ahead of time because they are part and parcel of Silva's leadership style (plurality in the Municipal Council and participation in the drawing up of the local government program).

But there is not the slightest doubt that the competition for the San Salvador mayor’s office will be a neck and neck race. What Silva still has not succeeded in convincing the inhabitants of his municipality on the question of the quality of his achievements is a point in favor of the candidate which ARENA will propose. Another point against him is that only half of those consulted in the poll plan to vote for him in an uncontested race. Instead of provoking a rush of victory in the Silva rank and file, the IUDOP poll ought to move observers to reflection upon what kind of administrative strategy could positively influence public opinion. What has been perceived up to this point is that Héctor Silva is a good mayor with important projects guaranteed in hand, but he is not a good politician of the kind who knows how to sell himself to the voters by throwing his lot with short-range populist projects. Unfortunately for the country it appears to be the case that the second, and not the first, is what wins elections.

NACARA. On August 5, U.S. president Bill Clinton presented a proposal to the U.S. Congress that would guarantee thousands of Central Americans the possibility of applying for legal residency if they had entered the country in 1995. The proposal consists in the fact that the beneficiaries of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Alleviation (NACARA), which are already conceded to Nicaraguans and Cubans might be offered in the same manner other Central Americans. Currently, some 240,000 Salvadorans can solicit the benefit of permanent residency in the U.S. under this legislation if, among other requisites, they came into the country in 1990. With the proposed modifications, Salvadorans who arrived illegally up until December 1, 1995 may also receive the benefits. According to Clinton’s declarations on August 6, he asked the Congress for a rapid "ratification of the Law for Equality for Central Americans and Haitians for 1999". He added that this initiative reaffirms his administration’s commitment to progress on democratization and stabilization in Central America and Haiti, as well as the equal treatment under the law for immigrants of those countries. According to the president’s statements, as opposed to the situation of the Cubans and Nicaraguans who have laid claim to the benefits of NACARA, Salvadorans, Hondurans, Guatemalans and Haitians have received inferior treatment (La Prensa Gráfica, August 7, p. 5).

EX–CIVIL PATROL. It appears as if the ex–members of the Civil Patrol are disposed to engage in violent actions if their economic demands are not met. On July 9, they announced that they would give the government 72 hours to name a high-level commission charged with resolving the problem. Should the contrary be the case, they declared that they would have recourse to "drastic measures". "We are waiting for the president to tell us with whom we are going to negotiate He must take responsibility and name a commission with power to take decisions which can resolve the problem", stated José Luis Gálvez, legal advisor to the Salvadoran Association for Agricultural Producers (APROAS). The ex–Civil Patrol members maintain their presence on the highways owing to the breakdown in negotiations with the government. "We have mobilized 30% of our people and, on August 10, [this number] will be doubled. And so, successively, to where it is necessary", added Gálvez. Currently, there are, at least, 45,000 persons demobilized who support this struggle. The leader of the ex–Civil Patrol movement, Marcial Meléndez, declared that from this moment on they held President Francisco Flores responsible for whatever violent action might occur. The demands of the ex–Civil Patrol members are directed towards the approval of a Law for the Protection of Persons Demobilized from Territorial Service, which is suspended for lack of funds (El Mundo, July 9, p. 3).

ARENA. On August 15, the ARENA party will define its 48 pre-candidates for deputies for the Department of San Salvador. The departmental director, Rodrigo Samayoa, stated that the mandate for the authorities of the party will continue to be respected and that they ordered current deputies to incorporate themselves as pre-candidates. "Forty-eight names will be proposed in order to have 16 proprietary and 16 substitutes, and that the National Executive Council (COENA) might have a margin within which to be able to select the most convenient people", he explained. COENA will hear the names of the pre-candidates and will select final candidates after consulting the curriculum vitae, professional and political backgrounds of the candidates. ARENA has already held conventions in the Departments of Usulután, Morazán and La Unión. Sonsonate, Santa Ana and Ahuachapán followed thereafter. The last convention was celebrated in La Paz. Nevertheless, ARENA members will hold their next Department Convention without having elected the candidate who will stand for election for the Mayor’s Office of San Salvador. Antonio Elías Saca, indicated as a possible pre-candidate for the Mayor’s Office of San Salvador, did not accept the pre-candidacy. "I have other priorities which are not political", he stated. Rodrigo Samayoa also declined to accept his being named as a candidate because he declared that he preferred to continue as Deputy for the Central American Parliament (La Prensa Gráfica, August 10. P. 16).