Morality and the city

Luis Cardenal in ARENA

Disasters and development planning

Central America: the storms do not end when winter is over

MORALITY AND THE CITY

Throughout its history, El Salvador has had presidents for all seasons and every taste. Some, as in the case of General Fidel Sanchez Hernandez and Colonel Arturo Armando Molina were, at a given moment, a topic for popular teasing and maliciousness. In a way, Armando Calderón Sol continued with this tradition of presidents who invite jokes, caricatures and juicy commentaries. On the other hand, the presidential profile of Calderón Sol was more than ambiguous because he never succeeded in consolidating an administrative style that would permit him to present a clear idea of where he wanted to lead the country.

Calderón Sol’s counterpart is, doubtless, Alfredo Cristiani, whose businessman’s mentality has left its imprint not only on governmental leadership, but also on the exercise of politics and the electoral projection of ARENA. Cristiani was, before all and above all, the businessman’s president. He made of his administration a businessman’s sphere of activity and sought to obtain the greatest private gain and individual profit from it. As things go, it should not amaze us that, according to the popular way of doing things, Cristiani is seen as a president who, even as he signed the peace, did everything possible to enrich himself and his friends.

With the arrival of Francisco Flores to the presidency of the republic, a new style of government administration seems to be in the making. Flores has given sufficient reason —rhetorical and curricular, among others— to be considered a "philosopher president". Nevertheless, more than his academic credentials, what has up to now permitted us to characterize him as such were his public pronouncements, rich in phrases and expressions which demonstrated the metaphysical substratum of his thought. Some of these phrases and expressions already make up part of the collective imagination, for which reason it is expressly important to remember them. Flores, then, has not done much more than to speak in a sublime and esoteric way, and for this, giving rise to his being considered to be a philosopher president. Up to this point, it was all left over rhetoric.

All of the sudden, then —without there being a clear reason for it— this leftover way of speaking seemed no longer sufficient for cultivating his presidential profile, and it appears to be the case that he had to begin to take his role as the philosopher president seriously. In order to demonstrate the seriousness of his enterprise, Flores has decided to make real an ambition which kept philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle awake and dreaming: that of succeeding in imposing the good life upon the city (the polis); that is to say, that the citizens might become just and virtuous. The president seems to share the same dreams and waking nights as those philosophers of Hellenic antiquity. He wanted to make Salvadoran society a moral society and cry out to the four winds that it is now high time in El Salvador for throw off the old tricks of the trade and deceitful intrigues used as mechanisms for climbing up the social ladder.

Concerned as he is that Salvadorans should become moral people, nothing has made President Flores more indignant than learning that some high school students, presumably with their parents’ knowledge, purchased the Learning and Aptitude Test (PAES) [a species of Stanford Achievement Test used in high schools nationally in El Salvador] so that they might have a little more luck with the challenge that this examination presented. It is here that the philosopher-president uncovered evidence of the ills that plague Salvadoran society. And because it was the worse of all things he could have encountered —that some parent-accomplices together with some unscrupulous adolescents had participated in the illicit purchase of the printed exams beforehand— his wrath knew no bounds: such a moral crime had to be severely punished, because a message had to be sent to society that immoral actions such as these would not be tolerated. Given this, what, then, shall we say of other immoral actions? What shall we say, for example, of illicit acts committed by members of the ARENA party? And what might be said of the deceitful intrigues and dubious sleights of hand performed by businessmen and politicians in general? Curiously enough, the champion of social morality has not a word to say about these phenomena.

In order to make things clearer yet, it should be said that is a good thing that the president of the republic is concerned about the deterioration of citizen virtues and that he is indignant when basic moral norms are seen to have broken down. Likewise, no one in his right might can justify an act such as the buying of an exam (be it the PAES or any other exam) by students and parents. By any judgment, this was a very bad thing and those who were involved, ought, from a moral point of view, to become aware of their error and try not to repeat it.

The problem, then, is not that Flores is worried about the moral dimension of the buying and selling of the exams but, first, that he believes himself to be vested with the authority to demand that those involved engage in moral rectification —after being condemned—, forgetting that, as a graduate of philosophy, he ought to know well enough that moral rectification is an individual matter, and not the province of the state or of government functionaries. Should the contrary be accepted, they would be opening the door to authoritarian practices in and of themselves contrary to democracy. A second point is that President Flores has blown the topic all out of proportion, and made of it the worst expression of moral deterioration in the country today, and, as a result, propitious ground for beginning a crusade of moral cleansing. Both things are serious causes for concern; the first, as we pointed out, because of the authoritarian implications of some of the state practices oriented towards correcting the morals of the citizens; secondly, because it focuses the president’s moral concerns on an act which is not even close to being the principal expression of the moral deterioration of the country and that, for all that, ought not to be made into privileged terrain for demonstrating his commitment to the empire of civic virtue in El Salvador.

If he is really concerned about moral degradation, Flores ought, above all, to stop and reflect upon what the principal foci of ethical deterioration are at the present time. If he were to think a little about this, he would take note of the fact that many of the worst vices and practices are hatched and propagated within the state apparatus, in the political class and in the business sector whose goal is to make themselves as rich as possible. This is to say that President Flores ought to take note of the fact that moral cleansing should begin at home. And nothing would be more instructive for society than to see the president of the Republic dismiss high-ranking functionaries who divert public funds into his party or to witness the rejection by their president of an arms law which is destined to increase insecurity among the citizenry.

LUIS CARDENAL IN ARENA

On October 5, La Prensa Gráfica dedicated its editorial entitled "Fair Competition", to supporting the much touted ratification of the candidacy of Luis Cardenal. What leaps out at first sight is how healthy it is for democracy that parties present to each other "high caliber" candidates. In this the writer of the editorial is not mistaken. Certainly, that those who are going to compete for the administration of the capital city should be upright professionals, with no antecedents involving them in acts of corruption, and that they should be outstanding in their respective fields and demonstrate, more or less, a calling for service and concern for public affairs These attributes might presuppose an advance in the process of democratic institutionalization. All of this is elemental and rudimentary in what could be desired, but would finally represent an advance in the sphere of public life.

Later, in the same text, it is pointed out that, faced with the difficulties which the good work of Hector Silva posed for ARENA, there were two options: either conformity or the search for a rival capable of working at the level required by the circumstances. The evaluation of La Prensa Gráfica with regard to this is the following: "ARENA chose the second option, giving, with this, a worthy example of what ought to be a responsible attitude in conditions not particularly promising". Anyone might think, if they were to pay attention to this reading of the latest political maneuver by the government party, that what moved its leadership to choose Luis Cardenal to fight for the mayor’s office of San Salvador was the result of taking "seriously their responsibility to the citizenry".

The question is: Was the person who wrote the editorial right? It seems not. It appears, rather, difficult to believe that someone with a minimum of intellect could continue sustaining the position —after the last toss of the dice to choose an acceptable and weighty candidate for ARENA, who would be capable of bringing about important changes in the country, would evaporate rapidly between the pseudo-poetic and philosophical rhetoric of the president— that the motivations of ARENA are owing more to a commitment to the citizenry than to its own party interests.

The truth about the naming of Luis Cardenal as a candidate to compete with Silva is--and this ought to be a secret for no one, with ARENA’s intention to recuperate the most important mayor’s office in the country, not in his desire to behave responsibly to the Salvadoran people. The ingenuous postulation of Luis Cardenal as ARENA’s candidate for San Salvador´s mayor arises, perhaps, from the 1997 post-electoral conjuncture, a conjuncture in which the official party was obliged to make certain modifications. The changes in COENA and the rise of Francisco Flores as ARENA’s pre-candidate for president were the only visible modifications, but it they were enough to make some believe that ARENA had arrived at the point in time in which it would renew itself and take on a new attitude. The image of Flores contributed to strengthening that myth.

Nevertheless, after two years of raising such expectations, how might one objectively think that something has changed in that party?, to what point could one be sure that the ARENA of today is different from the ARENA of five years ago?

The first thing to take note of is that ARENA continues to be led by the same people. The same people with the same ideas. In fact, the lack of conformity that some sectors of the middle-level leadership with the higher-ups in the leadership appears to be rooted, among other things, in a situation characterized by fatigue arising from the authoritarian way in which they lead the party. These latest developments in the ARENA scenario are clear signs of the little that ARENA is willing to really renew itself. In the last analysis, plurality of ideas, democracy and dissent in the party are empty concepts.

So then, this would not be so serious if the only ones affected were their colleagues in the party. All in all, it is a question of adult people who, through the exercise of their own free will —or moved by who knows what interests— have decided to submit themselves to the verticalism of party leadership and blindly obey its orders. Those who are not in agreement with this method of operation in the party have no other alternative but to leave.

The problem is that these internal mechanisms appear to be a reflection of the real intentions of the ARENA leadership, how it appears to operate in order to determine under what motivations, objectives and criteria the functionaries who have come out of the party to lead the country are operating. Together with millionaire announcements by ARENA presidents who promoted themselves as the great defenders of democracy and offered a prosperous and beautiful country are to be found beligerant, authoritarian attitudes, the playing of favorites, practices which characterize ARENA, along with exclusive attitudes and opportunist ideology characteristic of those who make of the practice of politics the ideal medium for making their own private interests prevail while giving privileged place to a minority.

So it is, as the second manifestation of the little that ARENA has changed, we currently have a government which differs only in that it differentiates itself from previous administration by having an executive official at its head who has a larger and more florid vocabulary at his command and who comes out on television so that that particular advantage over his predecessor might shine a little more each week. For all the rest, much in evidence are the same indications of corruption and impunity, the same outbreaks by reactionaries such as the Minister of the Interior, poisoned by his conservatism, the same social and economic policies which appear to ignore hunger and the vulnerability in which the greater part of the people of El Salvador live...

Again: what led ARENA to seek a good rival for the current capital city mayor was not its commitment to democracy nor even its sense of social responsibility. These could not be the reasons because the party has no such commitments. What is really at stake above all is the minutely detailed process of choosing a good candidate. It is the struggle to take back a politically decisive space, from which the left could catapult itself more easily into the presidential office. Should this happen all of the privileges currently enjoyed by ARENA party as the party holding power would be taken away from them.

Luis Cardenal might be honest and efficient. He might even enjoy a good reputation and moral authority among those of his social class. But these attributes are no proof of ARENA’s good intentions, nor do they guarantee that its exercise of administrative authority in the mayor’s office will overcome or even equal that of the Silva administration and allow him to defeat Silva in the municipal elections. Cardenal has, moreover, gotten off on the wrong foot by imitating, without variation, the practices of his new party comrades: he has set himself the task of contradicting the greater part of public opinion in the country who declare the administration of the current mayor to have been satisfactory —finally, after years of corrupt and inefficient municipal administration.

This invalidates another of the editorial affirmations mentioned above, according to which "it is very significant" that the ARENA candidate might be willing to debate Hector Silva. In fact, a debate would be rich and interesting for the citizenry. But if the millionaire publicity campaign which ARENA is preparing in order to promote Cardenal is going to be exclusively centered on finding false errors in the current administration of the capital city and in denigrating one of the few prestigious public functionaries, the small advance which the choosing of Luis Cardenal as a candidate for municipal office presupposes in the process of democratization will be reduced to what his name represents now, before the initiation of the electoral process has even begun.

DISASTERS AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

During the decade of the 1990´s the problem of flooding on the coastal zones of the country had become so acute that it occurred practically every year. In 1998 —because of the tropical storm "Mitch"— the flooding was categorized as heaviest in the twentieth century. 1999 has not been an exception. Since the middle of September, with the beginning of the rainiest winter of all, disasters began to occur once again.

From September 9 up through the first days of October, agricultural and livestock losses have been growing along with damage to homes and degradation of the ecosystems, especially in the lower areas of the Lempa and Grande Rivers in San Miguel, at the mouth of the Paz river, in some sections of the Goascorán River and in at least seven communities of San Salvador located at the edge of rivers and streams. According to data made public by COEN and the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG), there have been, since October 5, 3 deaths and 2,604 refugees because of the flooding. Moreover, agricultural and livestock losses of up to 25 million colones have been documented. Basic grain harvests have been most affected. It is to this category that 80% of the losses, or, close to 20 million colones, have been assigned.

It is estimated that a total of 50,498 manzanas have been affected. Although, according to MAG, that damage represents only 2% of all agricultural and livestock production, in reality there are losses of from 70% to 100% with the aggravating factor that the majority of the cases of the families affected were already living in situations of poverty. So then, disasters that some catalogue as "small", are very serious for those affected.

This dynamic might lead one to consider the possible ways in which the problem of the growing impact of the flooding might be confronted, discounting the fact that disasters are not only "natural" but also the product of factors involving threat and vulnerability which, in the majority of the cases, are caused by social reasons. Unfortunately, up until now the problems caused by the disasters are not being dealt with using a medium and long-term system of evaluation. Nor are they focussed on prevention and mitigation, but rather on the organization and preparation for confronting disasters when they have already occurred.

It is, in fact, not difficult to demonstrate that the activities of the entity charged with protection against disasters, the National Emergency Committee (COEN), are carried out, in general, during and immediately after a disaster. This can be proved by reviewing the year-end reports of the Ministry of the Interior corresponding to COEN and by observing actions carried out during flooding of 1999. This way of focussing the problem has demonstrated very clearly that it contributes nothing toward avoiding or reducing the impact of future disasters.

Faced with this vision, a new strategy for dealing with the problem of disasters indicates, rather, the need to review what the real causes are in order to articulate a plan for transforming the conditions which propitiate such disaster, basing these projections on just such a plan. It might be, then, that flooding is not a result of heavy rains but a result, rather, of a reduction in the capacity to absorb them without major trauma. In addition to these imminently natural phenomena (the case of heavy rains), human activities are involved which in and of themselves become social and natural causes for threats, such as the excessive felling of trees, pumping to dry up swamps and the construction of infrastructures without taking prevention of disasters into account, such as, among others: weakness in state structures, relative disorganization of communities, characteristics of housing and impromptu communities, kinds of crops, low educational levels and low income constitute factors contributing to the vulnerability of the population.

The foregoing suggests that disasters ought not be dealt with using traditional ideas and points of departure. They require the intervention of various actors. Therefore, not only those who take part in search and rescue operations should participate but also those who plan land use and the use of natural resources as well those engaged in the construction of infrastructure.

According to President Flores, "as soon as winter is over, we will begin reconstruction of the riverbanks, dredging of riverbeds and repair of damaged roads and highways". Along this line, the most polemical offer made by Flores has been to "depopulate" [evacuate] the lower Lempa River area and relocate families in areas of less risk because for the representatives of community organizations in the area the solution to their problem would be more correctly oriented to the development of infrastructure.

The topic of disasters transcends the capability of the COEN in large measure as it does with the more simple actions for confronting emergencies such as those implemented by the current government. What is needed is the integration of a national system for disaster prevention which would take into account an evaluation of the problem in its true dimension and incorporate the prevention and mitigation of disaster into consideration in the planning for development. Unfortunately, up until now the government continues to turn a blind eye to reality and continues, as well, to believe that its own activities for development are the most reasonable ways of doing things. Nevertheless, it is easily demonstrable that the many "development" activities have been completed in such a way as they actually contribute to social and environmental conditions which favor vulnerability to disasters as, for example, in the case of the construction of dams and repopulation settlements after the war.

It is no secret that the overflow from hydroelectric dams —especially from the September 15 dam— is directly related to flooding in the lower Lempa River area, which is the area most affected by the flooding. Paradoxically, the dams were constructed not only with the objective in mind of generating electricity, but also with the objective of preventing flooding, which has, however, been a fact of life since the 1930´s. There exists here, evidently, a failure in long-term planning which requires corrective actions.

Moreover, many of the resettlement communities located along the banks of the Lempa River were deliberately located there as part of an agreement between the government and the FMLN which included the Peace Accords. This implied the populating of an area vulnerable to flooding, a high-risk zone resulting from massive deforestation carried out during the 1950´s with the objective of intensifying cotton-production in El Salvador and, of course, also owing to the overflows from the dams.

The activities for confronting the problem of disasters which the state ought to implement require a new vision of planning for disaster. But in the short-run they also require that a methodology be defined in such a way as to deal with disasters not only by dealing with the disasters themselves but by adopting the necessary measures for prevention and mitigation of disasters as well as for the elimination of conditions which propitiate damage caused by disasters. If this is not done, we will be dealing with emergencies and confronting unjustifiable losses each time a disaster occurs.

CENTRAL AMERICA: THE STORMS DO NOT END WHEN WINTER IS OVER

Once again, Central America becomes a news item on the front pages of newspapers around the world. A little less than a year ago, the needs of the most vulnerable countries in the region became the focal point for debate in the international community, which has been concerned about the aftermath left by the passing of hurricane "Mitch" through the region. For the first time in many years, the region was presented with the urgency for drawing up an integrated plan for development which not only dealt with economic and/or material needs but would also make possible qualitative improvements in the opportunities for self help and improvement among the most needy sectors. At that point in time, the region could count on the world powers (tied to our countries by exorbitant debts owed to these powers by our countries), the international press and pressure from different social groups which, from inside the very nations most affected, directed their efforts towards the definition of that new progress which the region hoped for and expected.

Now, scarcely eleven months after the tragedy of the hurricane, once more the machinery of global information has received grist for its mill. But this time the differences between this situation and the other , previous situation, have been decisive in tracing the route to be taken by activities aimed at repairing the harm caused, in the first place, by a tragedy which is not of the same magnitude as that of last year. On the contrary, we are now dealing only with the effects of severe rainstorms caused by El Niño. It should, therefore, not be cause for alarm that international support has not been forthcoming in the same measure as it was last year. The responses of the regional governments has been, in some measure, more organized and have, at least, distanced themselves from the publicity strategy which was brought into play when the hurricane hit, which had as its objective the filling of state chests with international funds for aid until it could be said that the current situation could count on sufficient reserves to deal with the crisis which these "rainy days" provoked —but only in the short and medium-range, at most.

Nevertheless, a detailed examination of the effects of this crisis on the countries of the Central American region will not but underscore the same ills which came to light in the atmosphere of devastation and despair left by "Mitch". It would seem that the hurricane-force rains never stopped falling on these countries and that the ruin which entire country sides became, along with the ruin suffered by crops of vital importance to the economy of the region, and the blind force which battered thousands of lives and the hopes of millions of inhabitants for the region, did not disappear when the prolonged 1998 winter season ended. At this point in time, the combined data of the five countries of the region present the following statistics which are, indeed, cause for concern and alarm: 69 deaths (a figure which could increase as the days pass); 39,994 evacuations made necessary by heavy flooding have been documented; accelerated outbreaks of cholera, hemmorhagic and classic dengue fever, malaria, respiratory and gastrointestinal illnesses. This situation could be complicated by the possibility that the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua and the northern area of Honduras will experience even more rain because of a new tropical storm depression.

A general panorama of the diverse situations of this new crisis and the forms it has taken will be presented below for the cases of the countries most affected throughout the region: Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Guatemala. The intent here is not so much to map out tragedies as it is to underscore the importance of engaging in a serious discussion to determine along what lines future strategies should be developed for the economic and social stabilization of Central America.

Guatemala and Costa Rica were the least hit during the 20 days of constant rain over the isthmus. The efforts to identify the most affected areas and the evacuation of the victims was most difficult in Guatemala because the high-risk zones were located in the rural areas of the countries, in isolated indigenous settlements in the provinces located in the central areas of the country. It is estimated that more than 13,000 people were evacuated from rural as well as metropolitan areas of the country. At the beginning of the week, the number of deaths rose to 12 and official data on disappeared and homeless still have not been issued. This has become a constant factor for the region’s governments to deal with. In spite of the speed with which reliable and up-to-date statistics are required concerning the depth and breadth of the situation, these have not been forthcoming with the same rapidity as they were during the situation provoked by "Mitch".

Those who have been working rapidly to evaluate losses are the representatives of Guatemala big business, a situation which, has, in general, been reproduced as well in the rest of the countries of the region. In fact, the data on losses for the agricultural sector which have been presented at an international level come from the balance sheets drawn up by landowners and farm associations. According to their estimates, close to U.S. $1.9 million in losses are the result of losses of various different kinds of crops. The true extent of the losses in transportation infrastructure are still not fully known, but there is talk of having to spend hundreds of thousands of quetzales for repair and rehabilitation.

Costa Rican authorities began, correctly, evacuation and relocation activities of families threatened by the danger of heavy rains. All in all, 60 shelters throughout the country received some 5,600 people as the death toll rose to 10. Worried authorities of the Public Works and Transportation Ministry calculated that the losses to infrastructure could reach U.S. $3, 460,000. To date, the government of Miguel Angel Rodríguez has offered only U.S. $1,556,000 for beginning the reconstruction of roads made impassible by the rains. In any case, detailed figures on damage are still not known and will not be known for several more weeks.

Unfortunately, these two countries have been the most affected by the intensifying of heavy rains last week. Without having been able to implement an immediate plan of action to prevent eventual crisis situations in high-risk zones, Nicaraguans and Hondurans have suffered new losses to properties, businesses, croplands and, in the worst of cases, the loss of loved ones. The inhabitants of these regions who, last year, remained at the mercy of nature, today live in fear of a repetition of the disasters. At least up until October 4, Nicaragua suffered 13 deaths from mud and landslides, flooding and other accidents provoked by the rains. And 7,105 people were mobilized in evacuation operations which, as opposited to the situations obtaining in the two countries previously mentioned, had not stopped.

Governmental authorities have not been able to establish accurate figures for losses in strategic sectors such as agriculture, which buried the country in an uncertain state of affairs almost as dangerous as the climatological conditions threatening to appear in the next few days. Data published by the National Union of Agricultural and Livestock Producers (UNAG) was the only information available and his data showed that close to 38,850 manzanas of land under cultivation had been completely lost. This represents some 34% of the total harvest for the current year. In both cases, much as it was last year, the areas hardest hit by the torrential rains were Leon, Rivas, Chinandega, Masaya, Jinotega, Matagalpa and Boaco. In addition, preliminary figures presented by the Transportation and Infrastructure Ministry presented damage in the amount of U.S. $2,135,000. Given this situation, President Arnoldo Alemán has apportioned U.S. $7,118,000 to this ministry so that it can begin repair and reconstruction work.

Meanwhile, in Honduras the number of dead surpassed all previous speculation: 23 people died and the whereabouts of 6 more are unknown. Up through the beginning of the week, 12,194 people had been evacuated and several communities quickly became cut off as the roads leading to and surrounding them became impassible, rivers overflowed and bridges were destroyed by the heavy rains. Some 26 roads and highways are partially damaged and 2 are inoperable. Twelve bridges are in bad condition and 12 are totally destroyed. 5000 hectares under cultivation with African palm, sugar cane, corn, sorghum, banana and plantain have been lost, which implies an important diminution not only in cash crops for export but also food crops for Honduran families.

Faced with the rapidly changing situation, the government of Honduras has given the quickest and most organized response of all of the governments of the isthmus. President Carlos Flores Facussé did not hesitate to reorient the remnants of aid collected during the past year for reconstruction work directed by local governments. Apart from what each branch of government ought to invest in the rehabilitation of the areas they govern, the municipalities will have some U.S. $6,968,000 with which to begin urgent reconstruction projects. Small business owners with markets in areas affected by the rains will have U.S. 1,393,000 for refinancing. As a short-term measure, the rescue teams of the Permanent Emergency Committee (COPECO) have been reinformed so that emergency programs for the most affected areas will not be held back.

Taking into account that the climatological situation in the next few days will tend towards normality, it is possible to affirm that there will not be disasters of such serious dimensions as before —at least not of the dimensions left by hurricane "Mitch". However, there is no doubt that this winter presented the necessity of calling the regional governments as well as the governments of the community of friendly nations to pay attention. It is no longer a question of just "taking into account" the fragile nature and condition of the countries of the region, and of the absence of resources and the lack of capability of dealing in a serious and continuous way with situations of this nature. This was more than underscored last year. Now it is a question of putting the cards on the table with regard to the abandoned process for reconstruction of the countries of the Central American isthmus.

This means nothing more nor less than to begin to deal fully with an analysis of the conditions previously obtaining in order to implement a real project for making possible the perfecting of the weak productive systems with which the region must confront the new century. And this process implies a determined redefinition of the role which strategic social sectors such as civil society, private business, the international community, the government, sectors of working people, etc) must play in the maintenance of a new model, for the establishment of better control over the future and the use of international aid, for making local development with social participation possible, and, as several analysts have insisted, for the need to be committed and not be submerged in humanitarian analyses inspired by emergencies which, after all, are only passing events. Rather they should work on the bases of long-term projects with a social vision.