MONOGRAPH FOR THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MARTYRS OF THE UCA

Ten years after the assassination of the Jesuits of the UCA

The martyrs of the UCA and the media

Ellacuría’s contribution to peace in El Salvador

The question of the third force

The liberation psychology of Ignacio Martín-Baró

TEN YEARS AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF THE JESUITS OF THE UCA

Ten years ago a horrendous crime was committed in El Salvador: a group of military personnel, following orders of the high command of the Armed Forces, assassinated six Jesuits and two of their collaborators. These deaths must be added to the thousands of Salvadoran men and women —peasants, workers, religious people, professionals, students— who, from the mid-1970´s up until the signing of the Peace Accords in 1992 were victims of irrationality, arrogance and hatred. The pre-meditation with which the crime was committed, as well as the context which made it possible —the offensive "Hasta el Tope" of the FMLN, the violent reaction of the army and the national synchronized radio broadcasts which called for the extermination of those suspected of attempts against the established order— made manifest the extreme levels of social and ethical deterioration to which the country had fallen because of the empire of authoritarianism and to the intransigence of those who had no other option than to produce changes in the society by means of armed revolutionary struggle.

To remember the Jesuits and their collaborators, to honor their memory, demands and presupposes remembering and honoring those thousands of compatriots who died before they did. This, far from diminishing the significance of the assassination, makes it more real, situates it in its true context: the violent death of those who worked untiringly and many times in anonymous ways for a more just and solidary society. The death of the Jesuits of the UCA —Ignacio Ellacuria, Ignacio Martín-Baró, Amando López, Segundo Montes, Juan Ramón Moreno and Joaquín López y López, as well as Elba and Celina— was not a mere accident, a slip, an error. It is a question of an assassination inscribed in an institutional logic of terror and death from which the Jesuits were considered another enemy which must be exterminated, along with Monsignor Romero, the leaders of the FDR and the trade unionists of FENASTRAS.

Ten year after that terrible crime —a crime which ended the life of men who were honorable with themselves and with reality—, it is necessary to insist upon the institutional logic which led to the acting out of the assassination, as well as the responsibility of those who set it in motion. It must be left clearly established that it was not a question of an error of some few, but one exercise more of terror supported by members of the highest political and military hierarchy. There existed an apparatus of institutional terror and death and people existed who directed its functioning from the highest state entities.

To ignore this, that is to say, to see the assassination of the Jesuits as the result of a moment of pique experienced by a group of military personnel confused by the situation, is to lose sight of the most important thing that that crime placed in evidence: that those who held the political and economic power in El Salvador concentrated in their hands —i.e., the military and the oligarchy— were willing to annihilate anyone who questioned that power. To annihilate, exterminate, to give the order not to leave survivors: that was what they did with the Jesuits, with Elba and Celina. Stated in another way, with the Jesuits and their collaborators was set in march, once again, the mechanisms of annihilation managed by those who had served for decades the groups of economic and political (military) power. These were the same mechanisms which gave rise to the period of genocide at the beginning of the decade of the 1980´s.

In this sense, one must struggle to understand the assassination of the Jesuits in its true context. On the one hand, this crime leads us to the thousands of Salvadorans assassinated during the last two decades because they wanted a different kind of country, a country where justice and solidarity might reign. The Jesuits, although they expressed this desire in a singular manner —through their intellectual abilities, through their Christian calling, through their giving of themselves to this country which they had adopted as their own—, they were not alone in their efforts and their sacrifice. Others preceded them in the effort to construct the foundations of a more human society, and for this there were many assassinated, tortured and disappeared. On the other hand, in their assassination was made real an institutional logic which aimed to bend those who proposed alternatives to structural, institutional and terrorist violence in El Salvador —and they attempted to do this by means of terror and death. Certainly, this logic was brought to bear implacably on the Jesuits, but it had already demonstrated its effectiveness with thousands of defenseless Salvadorans.

After the death of the Jesuits, many things have changed in El Salvador and in the world. Even in the case of those who hold high the banner of the most audacious ideas, of the most radical proposals for social change have been supplanted through positions of commitment with those who were their mortal enemies in the recent past. So, the differences between those who up until a while ago defended socio-political projects which were distinct from those which had been sketched out, closing the options for those citizens who were more and more beaten by economic precariousness and insecurity.

Stated in another way, the conversion (recycling) of the armed left has not been only in the direction of democracy, but also towards neoliberalism in its most perverse manifestations. In this process, the left as a whole has ended up being something less than a passive actor in the socio-economic order controlled by the groups with economic power. Meanwhile, the right-wing, without encountering important levels of resistance, has dedicated itself to doing what it most likes to do: gather large fortunes, making use of all of the means within its reach. Some of its members who are responsible and/or accomplices of the assassinations, disappearances and torture during the past two decades, present themselves in the most bold-faced way as supporters of democracy. With the help of a corrupt judicial system they have made a clean sweep of their past, as if their crimes had not caused irreparable harm to the social fabric. There is no doubt that they have debts pending not only with the families directly affected, but with the whole of society. And it is that the Salvadoran society will only be able to recover its dignity if those who wounded it in so many ways are sanctioned as they ought to be.

After the signing of the peace, the institutional mechanisms of death and terror have been altered, although not with sufficient radicality as to assure that never more are they going to be set in march again. There are still institutional spaces which are not totally submitted to legality and control by society. The comings and goings of institutional democracies —from the political parties up through the justice system— are still very weak, presenting a situation which favors the continued existence of niches of illegality inside the state structures.

Likewise, individuals and groups who before lived on the extermination of others —subversives, communists, "piricuacos"— have a much more decisive presence in the public sphere as they do in the dark circles which have remained as the heritage of the recent past. They do not cease to speak of the democratic credo, they are political analysts, commentators, conductors of radio and television programs, even businessmen. But when their activities are scratched every so slightly, they are not clean and honest though they would like to appear so, in the same way they were not so in the past. They long for the times in which they reigned with absolute impunity and wish for the past to come back again. They believe that the laws are not for them, but only for the rest; they defy the judges, hide information, blacken their adversaries. All in all, they are a threat to democratic institutionality.

There are an overwhelming number of those who shout to the four winds that we should no longer look to the past because if we continue touching the old wounds they will never heal. In a superficial way, perhaps things might be this way. Nevertheless, there are historical dynamisms from the past which shape the reality of the present as much on the structural plane as on the symbolic plane. Many of the institutional perversions of today —for example, those which have the National Civilian Police tied down— maintain a close relationship with the perversions of the recent past. Many of the criminal practices of today —groups of kidnappers, narcotics traffickers, extortionists— are not separate from the practices which proliferated among military, political and business sectors during the past decade. Many of the values of the current national culture— arrogance, force, a tendency to go about killing —were incubated during the long reign of military authoritarianism. In other words, the past cannot be eliminated by decree or the good will of a few well-intentioned people who want to protect the present and future generations from phantasms which plagued their parents.

To remember the Jesuits of the UCA —and with them all of those assassinated because of their commitment to justice— is to critically confront the current reality of El Salvador. Although the war ended and important democratic guarantees have been established, there is still much to be done. Dark areas must be brought to light and responsibilities must be established. There are scores to be paid and rectified. And all of this in order to dignify a society which has been raped and mistreated for a long period of time without justice having been done.

THE MARTYRS OF THE UCA AND THE MEDIA

On November 11 of this year, El Diario de Hoy published a special on the guerrilla offensive of 1989. Half way down the page the editors added a phrase under the subtitle "The Assassination of the Jesuits". It had no relation to the topic which was being developed in the article but nevertheless appeared in the biggest and darkest letters. It read this way: "Ignacio Ellacuría, considered as "the ideologue of the left", and another five Jesuits were assassinated on November 16, 1989 on the campus of the Central American University (UCA), called one of the "FMLN sanctuaries" during the armed aggression".

This special coverage was dedicated to presenting the version of its writers on the motives which led the FMLN to take important zones of San Salvador by arms. It dealt with, definitively, how the journalists would comment upon —because it was not a news report, but a commentary, in spite of the fact that it appeared in the news section of the newspaper and not on the editorial pages— the ten years of the "failure of communism". That this biased disquisition upon the assassination of the Jesuits was to be found in such a context cannot lead to anything else than to question once again the commitment to the truth which El Diario de Hoy —and its editors and reporters— so prides itself upon.

It is biased, in the first place, to say, without any clarification or contextualization, that Ellacuría was considered to be the "ideologue of the left" and that the UCA was called an "FMLN sanctuary". It is biased because it does not mention how critical Ellacuría always was of the FMLN, to the point of causing himself problems and irritations from the insurgent movement. It is not for nothing that the newspaper "special" specifies for which sectors in particular Ellacuría and the UCA merited such descriptions. In the way in which it was written, such a formulation could lead a reader without sufficient caution to think that these considerations are the fruit of general consensus. This is false.

Any person with the smallest amount of honesty dealing with the facts could affirm that those who expressed such opinions about the Rector of the UCA and the University itself were nothing more than a specific sector of Salvadoran society: the Armed Forces which planned and executed the assassination together with the upper classes of the country who supported and justified the crime. The fact that one of the major news dailies of El Salvador could disguise as news arguments which support no other motivation than to end the life of some the people who were most dedicated to overcoming the problems of El Salvador.

It is biased, on a second point, in that the sentence could have been added as a non sequitur in such an incongruous context in the midst of what ostensibly purported to be a news article on the offensive. We know that the assassination of the Jesuits took place in the context of these events, but, as was mentioned above, the news article was not a valid historic summary of those days but rather a parcialized reflection on the causes which led to the taking of the capital city by the "terrorists". This indicates that the objective of those who elaborated the "special" were to link the FMLN with the assassinated Jesuits as did those who were directly responsible for the assassinations and the intellectual and social authors of the crime. This is another reason for concern.

If the assassination is seen in the context of this way of interpreting the recent history of the country, it turns out to be justifiable. After all —it was said, and is, in fact, said today— that Ellacuría and his staff (as Monsignor Romero did) "got involved in politics" and in doing so, lost not only their essence as priests but their quality as human beings whose lives merit absolute respect. The Jesuits’ participation in the political life of the nation explains —from this point of view— why they moved from being a group of intellectuals irritated by the regime to becoming another group of "terrorists" who therefore deserved a cruel and bloody death.

We are dealing here with the typical way of arguing which characterizes the extreme right-wing and a good part of the higher levels of Salvadoran society on this topic. Sunk in astonishing ignorance about the reality of El Salvador and possessed of a cult of material goods, the majority of the members of these social sectors need this kind of blind, ready-made jargon in order to make sense of the senseless violence perpetrated against innocent people. In this sector is to be found El Diario de Hoy which, instead of informing the population, it twists history; when it gives privilege to one perspective over and above the rest; and even worse, when it attempts to provide, to cover up that perspective with the quality of absolute truth.

It would be unjust not to add here that this was not the only sentence —short but expressive— which the morning daily published about the commemoration of the assassination of the Jesuits. On November 16, there was also a note in the section on "national" news in which the crime was remembered. To the above must be added another page which was not lacking in the "news" section of the following day: the report of one of the mothers who worked with other mothers to demand child support payments who was arrested by the PNC during the vigil at the UCA. Both notes, without missing the opportunity to blacken the name of the FMLN or smear the commemoration of the martyrs, were presented as closely linked to the events.

But the most distinctive note by El Diario de Hoy was presented in Salvador Samayoa’s column, just by chance (¿) published on November 11. In it was to be found palpable proof that the "considerations" of the morning daily about Ellacuría could not be generalized; proof also that those who prepared the news article violated the most minimal journalistic ethic in such an entirely irresponsible way. "He loved everyone very much and his death wounded me to the bottom of my soul... —says Samayoa with much emotion—. As a Salvadoran, the loss of such good-hearted persons with so much talent and generosity hurt me even more as they will undoubtedly represent a lack in the construction of a better and more human society". Especially on Ellacuría, to whom he dedicates these words, he adds: "Ignacio was an extraordinary man...he had absolute independence of criteria. He was a free spirit. His was a superior intelligence...".

To his voice was added the voice of those who found ways of speaking in other media. La Prensa Gráfica published, on November 14, a report titled "One Ignacio", in which various of his ex students expressed praise of Ellacuría in their remembrances of him when they were students. To this must be added the coverage of CoLatino in open sympathy with the commemoration. The daily El Mundo, very scant and neutral and, on the question of audiovisual media, the follow-up and spots dedicated to these dates on Channel 12 and Channel 33.

That we have used so much space in commenting upon this black spot in the work of the written press during this month in which the UCA pays homage to its martyrs and to the martyrs of El Salvador could lead one to think that the final balance of these notes will be negative. This is not the case. What it is the registering of a complaint. To denounce the fact that it is a serious attempt against the truth to create a perverse image of Ellacuría and of the University and that, deliberately commit that error, one of the principal news media of the country is attacking justice as well; it is an attack against the right of the population to know its past from a reliable source. To denounce that it cannot be allowed that reasons for justifying the crime cannot continue to be bandied about in order to justify a crime which, as in the case of any other, is not justifiable. To denounce the small interest which the greater part of the news media has, dragged down as it is in sensationalism and extra-journalistic interests, to inform the population about a specific event in the history of the country.

But these denunciations cannot hide either the solidarity of some towards the commemoration of the Tenth Anniversary of the assassination, nor the seriousness and honest concern for the truth of others, nor the outstanding fact that these very column inches which were closed to non-official voices of criticism are now open and admit dissent. Certainly, and unfortunately, there still persist those who deliberately falsify the truth, but fortunately, as well, there persist those who aim to honor it and respect it. That today both of these voices find a place in the news media is, doubtless, a decisive step forward.

ELLACURIA’S CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE IN EL SALVADOR

On diverse occasions, Ignacio Ellacuría expressed his conviction that the conflict in El Salvador, in spite of having taken on the dimension of an armed struggle, did not necessarily have to come to a military solution or the victory of one of the two sides in the conflict. It is not difficult to find in his political writings ideas which pose the impossibility of a military victory of one or the other side and which proposed a solution which focussed on the eradication of the principal cause of the war: structural injustice.

Paradoxically, sectors of the extreme right always considered him a "comandante" of the FMLN, to the point of even considering him a "sinister personality" who should be expelled from the country. This image of Ellacuría was one which finally unleashed the events leading to his assassination, of his five Jesuit brothers and of Elba Ramos and her daughter Celina. This execrable act did not, in the last analysis, impede the negotiated solution to the armed conflict for which Ellacuría fought and died.

A review of journalistic articles in El Diario de Hoy and in other communications media of the extreme right-wing, published in the months before the massacre of the Jesuit fathers, shows that from that time on the scenario was constructed for them because in these media they were made to appear —unjustifiably— as adversaries of the armed forces and of the extreme right wing. Nevertheless, even a quick glance at the political writings of Ellacuría shows how erroneous was nature of the vision which the extreme right wing had of him. Seen from this perspective, Ellacuría was a pioneer in search of viable solutions for the Salvadoran armed conflict.

From the point in time in which the UCA, led by the hand of Ignacio Ellacuría, pronounced itself in favor of the agrarian reform proposed by the government of Arturo Armando Molina in 1972, he was painted as a "communist" and converted into one of the favorite targets not only of the verbal attacks of the extreme right but also by dynamite attacks which damaged the university press. For the years 1988 and 1989, tempers were even more heated and accusations against Ellacuría were raised to the point of the absurd and hallucinatory as when they referred to number 409 of the weekly publication, Proceso. For some editorial writers for the El Diario de Hoy, Ellacuría was "the greatest enemy we have here against our people and our armed forces" (Alvaro Jerez Magaña, El Diario de Hoy, December 5, 1988, p. 10) or "the most nefarious individual who has ever set foot on Salvadoran soil" (Carlos Girón, El Diario de Hoy, January 25, 1989, p. 6).

In a subjective manner, Ellacuría was automatically related to communist or guerrilla tendencies, given epithets such as "the spearhead of communism in El Salvador" (Alvaro Jerez Magaña, El Diario de Hoy, December 5, 1988, p. 10); "maximum representative of Marxism in the region" (José Hernández, El Diario de Hoy, August 18, 1988, p. 25); "Comandante Ignacio" (Herman Schlageter, El Diario de Hoy, October 4, 1988: 6); "Champion of the left" (Justiniano, El Diario de Hoy, April 4, 1988, p. 10); "principal leader of the armed Christian left", "Basque agitator" who should be expelled from the country for being a "Rebel""(Manual Aguilar Trujillo, El Diario de Hoy, May 25, 1988, p. 6); "murderer of the youth" (El Diario de Hoy, November 18, 1988, p. 15).

The discontent which Ellacuría provoked in the extreme right led them to lose all sense of reason. Some of the members came to affirm that "a little after the Second World War this sinister personality came to the country and it should not surprise us very much if he were a KGB agent in the country" (Waldo Ramírez, El Diario de Hoy, June 3, 1988, p. 16). Nevertheless, the accusation most insistently leveled against him as the rector of the UCA at that time was that he was "the apologist for the land mines which blew off feet" (Carlos Noria, El Diario de Hoy, May 19, 1989, p. 6; Crusade for Peace and Work, El Diario de Hoy, November 15, 1988, p. 41; Tulio Sanchez Segovia, El Diario de Hoy, December 2, 1988, p. 7; Civic Patriotic Committee, El Diario de Hoy, March 18, 1989, p. 38; El Diario de Hoy, May 5, 1989, p. 23; El Diario de Hoy, May 15, 1989, p. 10).

In addition to the personal accusations against Ellacuría there was also finger-pointing against his Jesuit colleagues to the point of calling them "Masters of Deceit" (Ricardo Fuentes Castellanos, La Prensa Gráfica, January 4, 1988, p. 7); "cat’s paw for international communism" (Herman Schlageter, El Diario de Hoy, August 19, 1988, p. 6); "intellectual authors" of destruction and street disorders (Carlos Raul Calvo, El Diario de Hoy, September 21, 1988, p. 2); Crusade for Peace and Work, EL El Diario de Hoy, July 3, 1989, p. 39). Even the ARENA party itself and the High Command of the Armed Forces published paid ads accusing Father Segundo Montes of justifying "terrorist acts by the FMLN" (El Diario de Hoy, April 13, 1989, p. 13 and El Diario de Hoy, April 16, 1988, p. 13).

It was in this context that the university press of the UCA was dynamited on two occasions, and the same happened in 1972 on April 29 and June 22, 1989. For the editorial writer of El Diario de Hoy, the attacks were sufficiently sever to be considered "small bombs which do not cause substantial damage or which simply do not explode, but which are used to cause martyrs and justify terrorism thereafter" (El Diario de Hoy, May 4, 1989). It should be pointed out that this sketch of the accusations against the Jesuit fathers is not exhaustive and leaves a great deal of this same kind of attack left to be documented.

The rabid attacks against Ignacio Ellacuría turn out to be even more ridiculous and incomprehensible if his written work is studied. In these works can be found evidence of a total rejection of the military way of solving the structural problems of the country. Ellacuría even participated in the national debate, knowing all the while the danger he ran, as he recognized when he wrote that "it is evident from the first moment that the problem of the solution to the current Salvadoran question is subject to all kinds of passionate visions, because it has not been in vain and for many it is a question of life or death" ("Political Solution or Military Solution for El Salvador?" ECA, 1981, pp. 390-391: 295-324). Death threats did not stop him from expressing his ideas concerning the solution to the war in his various writings. This was what, in the end, brought the vituperation of the extreme right down upon his head and brought with it his assassination in spite of the fact that at no point did he propose a military victory for the FMLN or use false arguments to present his positions.

His position on this question was that "a military solution by the Armed Forces, by means of an intervention by the U.S. Army, although it would be physically possible, would leave the national problem unsolved and would not permit the annulment of oligarchic and imperialist power which weighs heavily over Salvadoran reality and is the principal cause of its ills". And he also stated that "a military solution by the FMLN, although it might be possible, would not respond to what the revolutionary movement is and would lead it to major deviations in the way the victory could be achieved and in the way of administering it" (ibid.).

Throughout the past decade, Ellacuría pointed out the impossibility of a military triumph of any kind between the two sides of the conflict and he even questioned the legitimacy of the social projects of both. He proposed the creation of a "third social force" which would be possible in the measure that the "people might recover their active leadership without submitting either of the two parts in conflict to their force and possible organization, looking out fundamentally for itself and its interests" ("Posing solutions anew to the problem of El Salvador". ECA, 1986: 447-448: 54-75). According to him, this "third social force" would not permit dialogue to be held back indefinitely under shaky pretexts and ought to denounce and pressure with all possible clarity those whom it considers most responsible for holding things back" (ibid.).

It can certainly be affirmed that Ellacuría was far from being an "enemy of the people" or "the spearhead of communism", as his hackneyed detractors would accuse him of; on the country, he was independent, free of prejudices and in favor of the option for the popular majorities. For example, on the occasion of the inauguration of the first ARENA administration in 1989 he affirmed that "there was not much sense in everyone throwing themselves against the ARENA administration because it could happen that that disposition, far from serving the popular masses, could cause a shakeup and bring new forms of violence, which, without repeating what happened in 1980-1983, could be very similar. And this, certainly, would be a national and popular tragedy" ("Will the ARENA Administration resolve the crisis of the country?". ECA, 1989, 488: 413-428)

Following the electoral victory of the first ARENA administration, the attacks against the UCA increased —intensifying to the point of the dynamite attacks mentioned earlier. Moreover, with the beginning of the military offensive of the FMLN in November of 1989, national radio was synchronized and transmitted the opinions of supposed radio listeners who threatened the Jesuits of the UCA with death; the attacks were directed against Msgr. Arturo Rivera y Damas, Archbishop of San Salvador; and against Msgr. Gregorio Rosa Chavez, Auxiliary Archbishop. On November 12 the operators of the synchronized radio programming had no other recourse than to air declarations such as the following: "Ellacuría is a guerrillero, let them cut his head off!" or "they should drag Ellacuría out and kill him by spitting on him"; at the same time, radio listeners who opposed these kinds of messages were censured.

Four days later, on November 16, a group of soldiers of the elite Atlacatl Battalion under the command of Lieutenants Yusshy René Mendoza and José Espinoza received the order from Colonel Guillermo Benavides, Director of the Military School, to execute the Jesuits of the UCA. Before giving such a sinister and cowardly order, Col. Benavides held a meeting with the High Command of the Armed Forces, including then-President of the Republic and current president of the ARENA party, Alfredo Cristiani and other high-level military officers (Proceso, 414, 426 and 446).

It is surprising how partiality, intolerance and a low level of intellectual capacity and prejudices could come to distort Ignacio Ellacuría’s thinking and proposals to the level of reading his objective proposals for a solution to the armed conflict as inciting civil disorder and social agitation. The attacks against Ellacuría and his colleagues show clearly how the communications media could be used to spread parcialized and prejudiced interpretations which, as in the case of the UCA, could turn out to be the cause of death.

History itself has revealed the truth and vision of Ellacuría for a negotiated solution to the conflict which was finally imposed in 1992, although for this he had to offer his life. His detractors have had to contemplate how the FMLN was integrated into the political life of the country, opening the way for an epoch of relative peace. Nevertheless, many structural solutions to economic and social injustice are still to be implemented as well as the construction of that "third social force" which would support the interests of the popular majorities.

THE QUESTION OF THE THIRD FORCE

Currently, the disenchantment with politics has risen to considerable heights, perhaps to the highest level since the signing of the Peace Accords. From the enthusiasm and hope which these have generated they have moved to a generalized attitude of pessimism and a profound lack of confidence toward the capability of those in the political sphere to represent and be coherent with the interests and needs of the majority of the population. In a highly contradictory dynamic, rarely seen in the recent history of the country, the participation of civil society in politics has been insisted upon, while, at the same time, the political parties and government administration have enshrouded themselves in their own concerns in a radical way.

Not without some justification did the editorial of the last issue of Proceso end, on the question of the process of the election of the Attorney General of the Republic, that "it is not worthwhile...taking part in the power plays of the Legislative Assembly" ("An Attorney General Made to Measure", Proceso, 878). The fact is that there is nothing in the current state of affairs which would give pause to declare that it is worthwhile participating in the political dynamics of the country. On the contrary, it is clear that the invitations to collaborate with the political parties and the organs of the state lead civil society to seek more in the direction of freshening up their private parties by adding democratic hues to their décor than to participate effectively in decision-making processes.

Illustrative examples abound. The "popular consultations" which, as a candidate, Francisco Flores carried out as part of the drawing up of his government plan (a policy which Luis Cardenal, candidate for the office of Mayor of San Salvador has hastened to imitate) and the call from the Legislative Assembly soliciting from society the presentation of a list of candidates from which would be selected the Attorney General are two deeds which exemplify on all points the distancing of politics from society in general. On both counts, the supposed efforts by the politicians to draw closer to civil society were completely stillborn: neither the President nor the Assembly reflected, in its daily activities any movement closer to the citizenry.

The reasons which explain the failure of civil participation in politics are various. In the first place, the possibility of the civil society’s participation is always a given for political actors: it is the candidate of the moment or a state entity which moves towards it in order to permit the participation of the social sectors in political practice. In second place, and as a result of this vertical relationship between the politicians and the citizenry, they are the first to decide the when, how and who of the participation. So, for example, it was Francisco Flores who, as candidate, designed the modality in which he would listen to a sector of the population in the course of his electoral campaign. With this, obviously, he neither listened to everyone nor to the few who participated —both were treated the same.

In third place, inasmuch as it is politics which moves toward —which uses— civil society —of course, the sectors of civil society which are most convenient to its needs— there does not exist a monitoring power which would guarantee the compliance with the politicians with their commitments and promises —as minimal and limited as these may be— which arise from such participation. Finally, it is a determining factor for the failure of citizen participation in politics that civil society conceives of itself in terms of simple consultations and not in terms of the joint formulation of projects. Currently, the political sphere has limited citizen participation in order to permit that society to speak and propose, but obstructing the possibility of its effectively making decisions. The citizen consultations today have served more to divert attention and make less traumatic decisions where projects were taken up beforehand which, in order to make the feelings and demands of society operative in political practice. A hard example on this score has been the process which took place around the document of the Bases for a National Plan (see Proceso, 876).

In this context the lack of connection between society and politics comes to the fore in such a way that the parties and the government administration have not only turned a deaf ear to the most pressing needs of the population, but, moreover and even more seriously, have engaged in intrigue to undercut the mechanisms charged with exercising control over the work and governmental practice. It has become a pressing need to find the way in which civil society might participate openly and effectively in defining the direction of the country. A country with an economy which irritates the crisis, with some discredited political parties and whose only mechanism for institutionalized democratic participation (elections) has lost the way to attract a large sector of the population.

An interesting formulation of a model for the participation of the society in politics is that of the third force, the theory of which was presented by Ignacio Ellacuría in 1985. The formulation of this concept took place in the context of the armed conflict which the author had already foretold could not be resolved by a military victory of one of the two sides in conflict. Below is presented, first, a review of the factors to which Ellacuría sought to respond with his proposal; secondly, the principal characteristics of what would be the third force and, finally, a brief analysis of the validity of Ellacuría’s proposal for the present time.

For Ellacuría, the original ("beginning") cause of the armed conflict was structural injustice, understood as a "generalized state of under-development and misery" unjust in and of itself and in a structural way in that "it depends upon the determination of the interaction of the classes and social groups over and above others and, at the same time, affects the conjuncture of social structures" (I. Ellacuría, "The Reformulation of solutions for the Problem of El Salvador", Twenty Years of History in El Salvador (1969-1989). Political Writings, Vol. II, UCA Editores, San Salvador, 1993, p. 1107). An essential part of this structural injustice is violence: being in and of itself a violent social state —in that it puts a brake on living and minimal living together—, it is maintained by repressive (state) violence generated by and retroactively fed by subversive violence (the guerrilla project). The characteristic of this spiral of violence was, then, that it did not present the possibility of a winner; on the contrary, it strengthened each one of the two sides (the "North American-Salvadoran Government" and the FMLN-FDR) and prolonged the war.

So it was that for Ellacuría, the pacification of Salvadoran society implied not only the resolution of the problem of structural injustice but also the conflict which originated from it. And in this he was clear as day: to find the solution to the second without finding the solution to the first would imply that the armed struggle would not be late in beginning again; while the contrary would be impossible inasmuch as the production and distribution of goods necessary to overcome structural injustice would produce, as an obstacle, a conflict which would only deepen the under-development and misery of the country. The premise from which Ellacuría began in order to formulate the need for a third force (a thesis which the passing of time and events would not be late in validating) was that neither the North American Government- Salvadoran Government nor the FMLN-FDR could offer a plausible solution to the structural injustice as well as the political-military conflict which was generated because of it.

In the first place, because the Salvadoran government as much as the FMLN-FDR, because of the prolonged character of the war, had learned how to make their respective military strategies adequate to the movements of the opponents. And so, the possibility of a military victory by one side or the other was remote: neither the FMLN nor the army had the capability of carrying out a definitive counter-offensive in spite of the enormous amount of U.S. aid, it was capable of achieving decisive victories over the guerrilla. In the improbable case that one of the sides might win over the other (end of the conflict by means of armed struggle) the country’s problems would not be resolved. For Ellacuría, the victory of the FMLN-FDR would only presuppose the repetition of the Nicaraguan experience, with which the conflict would not end and, therefore, structural injustice could not be resolved owing to the logic of a new war. A military victory of the U.S. Government-Salvadoran Government would imply a loss of interest in the solution to the structural cause of the conflict.

Secondly, the logic of the war and its prolongation would make impossible any attempt to bring about economic reforms which could provide a solution to structural injustice. A government with its hands tied as to the possibility of bringing about structurally relevant reforms, an economy which would destine the greater part of its resources to the maintenance of the war, an improbable development as the result of sabotage and the lack of private investment were some of the factors which Ellacuría thought would make the solution to structural injustice impossible unless there was an end to the conflict. Thirdly, in spite of the fact that a military stalemate between the two sides would require a reconsideration of the option for dialogue, for Ellacuría could not wait for positive results. On the one hand, because the proposals of the FMLN-FDR and the government were mutually exclusive and, on the other, because the FMLN submitted negotiation to the exigencies of the armed struggle and private capital would in the foreseeable future exercise the pressure necessary to cause the government’s negotiating efforts to fall apart.

Faced with the double verification that the problem of El Salvador could only be resolved in the measure that structural injustice was ended as well as the armed conflict and that neither of the two powers of that time had at their disposal the possibility of carrying out the task, Ellacuría proposed the conformation of a third force which might untangle the process and make it move forward in a positive direction.

The third force is Ellacuría’s proposal for the solution for the process which had bogged down in the dynamic between the forces which, by themselves, did not have the capacity to untangle the problematic situation without incurring serious economic and human costs for the country. The proposal is based upon the recognition of two facts: one, at that time there existed "a grouping made up of counterpoised political forces...which were engaged in a struggle for political power, the attempt to accomplish a taking over of state power, although they said they wanted this state power for the benefit of the whole society" (I. Ellacuría, "Paths toward the solution to the current crisis of the country", Twenty Years of History in El Salvador (1969-1989). Political Writings, Vol. II, UCA Editores, San Salvador, 1993, p. 1162); on the other hand, "there is a large portion of the population which, without aiming to achieve political power and without possessing the capacity to achieve it, has or could make available a great deal of social rather than political strength which, for the moment, is not being used to help to resolve the conflict" (I. Ellacuría, "Re-Framing the Solutions...", Op. Cit., p. 1127).

Ellacuría’s wager is to give life to that "large portion of the population" which is inactive and whose sectors are disarticulated. "The proposal is that the people should recover their active protagonism without submitting their strength and their possible organization to either of the two parts in conflict, looking out, fundamentally, for themselves and their interests, without delegating them, at least in the beginning, to either of the powers which are in dispute for the control of the state" (ibídem.). So it is, then, to construct itself, this third force would constitute an important element for defending the interests of the large popular majority of the population, to pressure for a negotiated settlement to the conflict and to make possible the solution for the causes of that conflict. Ellacuría will insist fully on two points: that the third force must be apolitical in nature as well as autonomous.

The speciality of the third force is its social and not its political character. Ellacuría proposed an alternative force to the two existing forces which, without seeking political power (obtaining state power) would use its social force to defend the interests closest to the needs of the sectors which would make it up, as well as of the country in general, marking out thereby "the fundamental points of the social project to which the politicians would submit themselves " (ibídem.). The third force would come forth as a force which would mediate between the interests of the groups focussed upon achieving political power (the political parties and the government) and the interests of the individuals. The unique political character which could be attributed by the third force to itself would be a given because of its capacity for decisively influencing the political sphere with an eye to the common good.

To complete its task would necessarily imply that the third force would maintain its autonomy, as a whole as well as in its parts. To be marked by a political group or to come out in favor of the project of one or the other would constitute a loss of its validity as a "third" force, would eliminate its potential for promoting and defending the good of the society and to pressure the political powers to make itself more adequate to the task. This does not negate the possibility, however, that the third force could favor, in terms of elections or by any means whatever, the projects of specific political groups. But this would be the case only when the actions were the results of autonomous determinations based on being close to these political projects in the precise measure which the third force considers might be necessary for the development of the country. If to the permanent search for autonomy is added the concern for preventing and avoiding hegemonistic tendencies, for Ellacuría, the third force would be "a palpable demonstration of social democracy" (I. Ellacuría, "Paths to Solution...", Op. Cit., p. 1168).

For Ellacuría, the goals of the third force were: in the medium range, "to make possible the just and integral development which would take into account as [a fundamental objective] the overcoming of the structural injustice of the state" (Ibid., p. 1165); in the short run, involve itself in the task of ending the armed conflict and means of negotiation oriented towards the interests of the masses (in contrast with his initial declarations, Ellacuría sees, in 1987, that the conflict has taken on a life of its own, for which reason its "coming to a just end" becomes the condition for the possibility of overcoming structural injustice); and, in the immediate situation, "to seek an effective social convergence of the diverse social forces within the "third force] So that this can make itself felt...in the daily state of affairs" (ibídem.).

On the other hand, the criterion for deciding upon the participation of a sector in the third force would be given by the closeness of its interests and objectives with the two first goals already posed. Only those who have a decided commitment to the solution of structural injustice which oppresses the masses of Salvadorans and to ending the conflict by means of solutions without the use of arms could become part of the third force. Although Ellacuría did not propose to make a detailed list of the possible members, he mentions those who, in his criteria, possessed more possibilities of assuming the goals posed: trade unions, the university and educational sector, the professional sector, the churches taken as a whole (above all the Catholic church), the small and medium-sized enterprises and the sector made up of displaced persons, the under-employed, the unemployed and those marginalized by society. Finally, in order to reach these goals, the third force would play a role in the most diverse ways, excluding the violent ones: negotiation, pressure by means of strikes and demonstrations, consciousness-raising and even civil disobedience.

Certainly, the third force was Ellacuría’s response to the serious, but temporary conjunctures of the problems of the country. And with regard to this could consider that its validity would be profoundly limited by the disappearance or cooling off of some of the conditions from which the proposal originated: the war to be ended by means of negotiations (about which Ellacuría always had precise words) and the Peace Accords cut short by some of the most pernicious effects of the war and laid the foundations for the minimal transition towards democracy. Nevertheless, this perspective lost sight of what was structural in Ellacuría’s analysis in which he proposed the conformation of a third force.

It should not be forgotten that Ellacuría focussed on the solution to structural injustice as a task in the medium range when he proposed the conformation of the third force. In this sense, the validity of his proposal would be given in the measure that the structural injustice of Salvadoran society would have been overcome. How much have we advanced in the solution to the generalized state of under-development and misery which Ellacuría diagnosed as the cause of the problems in El Salvador? The response is: too little and too slowly.

On the other hand, the proposal of the third force responded to the necessity of situating the population, the masses as social forces, as "the real subject of their own political destiny" (I. Ellacuría, "Re-Framing the Solutions...", Op. Cit., p. 1128.). The third force, an autonomous force for political power, creatively monitoring the "social project" to which the political force should respond; as a real power which, once it is constituted, could draw the political class out of its egotistical self-involvement; and as the demonstration and exercise of social democracy, would have great validity today. The reasons are obvious when one looks at the panorama which we have been sketching out above: politics has disconnected itself from the social sphere and only has recourse to it (using it) to serve its own particular interests. Moreover, there is a vacuum of control on the question of the state and politics in general which gives no indication that it could be resolved from within, for which reason an answer from outside of politics becomes urgent.

Do the social conditions for the conformation of a third force exist as Ellacuría presented them? Even a quick once over of the current situation of the social forces would yield a positive response. The process which took place on the matter of consultation and discussion of the Bases for a National Plan; the intensification of the bread and butter struggles by the unions of the public institution workers and their gradual confluence towards a large integrated organization (MOLI is the first indication of this); the participation of professional guilds in public life (for which SIMETRISSS is the spearhead and whose demonstrations are the most promising) and the collaboration between the universities of the country in order to discuss and propose solutions to the most important problems of the country are significant, although isolated, indicators of the spirit and sectors which could make up the third force at the present time.

The advantages of taking up Ellacuría’s proposal once again are obvious: the conformation of a third force would permit those isolated forces to influence might become stronger and more resounding in their unity. If it is already difficult for the government of Francisco Flores to deal with the joint actions of a large number of trade unions, it would be even more difficult not to deal with their demands (to the most just among them) if these were to join together all of the other sectors of the social life of the country. Additionally, the participation of the universities and professionals in a hypothetical third force would make more propitious the overcoming of the immediate, spontaneous and blind nature of the measures taken in action which have characterized the most recent trade union actions.

THE LIBERATION PSYCHOLOGY OF IGNACIO MARTIN-BARÓ

There is no doubt that Ignacio Martín-Baró contributed in a decisive way to lay the theoretical foundation of the so-called "psychology of liberation". Through books and articles dedicated to the analysis of the most pressing psycho-social problems of El Salvador and Latin America —the political violence, repression, cultural myths, the subjection of women, ideologies— Martín-Baró brought to life conceptual and methodological baggage which, at that point in time, served to advance towards the comprehension of a complex Latin American psycho-social reality. Today, that conceptual and methodological baggage has become a reference point for Latin American psychology, something to which numberless psychologists have recourse at the moment at which the supposed achievements of their intellectual and professional activities are measured.

Authors such as Amalio Blanco, for example, insist that one of the greatest contributions of Martín-Baró consisted in having laid the bases for a psychology of liberation, which draws out "the primacy of the problems over theories, of reality over concepts; the essential historicity of the human being which requires a theoretical apparatus adequate to its reality and circumstances (...) which distanced from patriotic psychology...the commitment with the change in the social order which provides in-put to the material conditions (...) which attack the diverse manifestations of well-being; the fluid emerging from among the objective and subjective structures, between the social order and the structure of conscience, between the social conditions and the world of personal attitudes and representations (...)" (Blanco, A., "Introduction" to Blanco, A., The Psychology of Liberation, Madrid, Trotta, 1998, p. 33).

As can be seen, we are dealing here with a conjuncture of contributions which, condensed in the citation to Blanco, constituted the major lines of the intellectual activity of Ignacio Martin-Baró: (a) the primacy of reality over theories; (b) the historicity of the human being; (c) a social psychology committed to social change; (e) the existing dynamic nexus between the subjectivity of the individual and the social structure; and (f) the ideology as the motor force providing the configuration of human actions...

This conceptual axis of ethics and politics appears again and again in Martin-Baró´s reflections; in the measure in which he developed them and dealt with them theoretically he advanced his thesis concerning the specific character which social psychology ought to have with regard to Latin American circumstances: a psychology "capable of contributing its positive collaboration to the history of our peoples" (Cabrera, E., "An Interview with Ignacio Martín-Baro". Revista de Psicología de El Salvador, No. 37, 1990, p. 300).

For this, Latin American psychology ought "to reject once and for all the abstract individualism which has dominated it until now and return to focussing on man in his situation from the point of view of real Latin American history which is a social history and situation" (Ibid.). This epistemological turnabout —because it opens new paths to knowledge of what is human— and the methodological turnabout —because it poses and demands other suppositions and searches, and leads to other results— ought to carry with it a new conceptualization ("identity") of Latin American Psychology: a psychology which, at the same time it makes its practice historically related to each concrete reality, carries to its final consequences the theoretical and partial challenges posed by its object of study—action as ideology--, inserts the practice of the social psychologist in the socio-historical midst of its epoch (Ibid., pp. 47-48) and prefers the immediacy of making the individual and society concrete over and above generic affirmations (See Martín-Baró, I., "Introduction" to the book Problems of Social Psychology in Latin America, San Salvador, UCA editores, 1983, p. 10).

If it is consequential with these demands, which, moreover, are not only theories, are a set of ethics and policies, Latin American psychology will be able to respond adequately to three tasks which Latin American reality poses for it: (a) the recuperation of Historic Memory: "to recuperate the historic memory will mean recuperating not only the sense of its own identity, not only the pride of belonging to a people as well as enjoying a tradition and culture but, above all, being able to rescue some aspects which were good yesterday and which will serve today for liberation" (Cabrera, E., Ibid.).

(b) Contribute to the de-ideologization of daily experience: "de-ideologizing means rescuing the original experience of groups and persons and making it into an objective fact, which will permit them to formalize the consciousness of their own reality verifying the reality of the knowledge obtained" (Ibid., pp. 301-302). (c) Give strength to the virtues of the Latin American peoples: "in referring to nothing more than my own people, the people of El Salvador, contemporary history ratifies day after day its consummate solidarity with suffering, its capacity to give and sacrifice for the collective good, its tremendous human capability for transforming the world, its hope for a tomorrow which is continually and violently denied them...How is it possible for us, as Latin American psychologists, not to be capable of discovering all this rich potentiality of virtues in our peoples in which, consciously or unconsciously, we turn our eyes to other countries and to other cultures at the moment for defining objectives and ideals" (Ibid., p. 302).

Psychology, in Latin America, can only contribute to the recuperation of historical memory, to the de-ideologization of daily experience and the potentialization of popular virtues —definitively, to the liberation of Latin American peoples— if it is assumed and and presents itself as a psychology of liberation. "If we want psychology to make some significant contribution to the history of our peoples... we need to re-organize our theoretical and practical baggage, by re-stating basic premises from the life of our peoples, from their suffering, their aspirations and their struggles. If you will permit me to formulate that proposal in Latin American terms it must be affirmed that if we aim for a situation in which psychology can contribute to the liberation of our peoples, we must draw up a psychology of liberation" (Martín-Baró, I., "Towards a Psychology of Liberation". En Blanco, A., Ibid., p. 295). What are the profile and the characteristics of this psychology of liberation?

Firstly it is characterized by a new horizon: "social psychology ought to decentralize its attention on itself, laying aside its concern for its scientific and social status and place itself at the efficient service of the needs of the popular masses" (Ibid., p. 296). This is to say, social psychology ought to come out of itself as a science and deal with a reality which is outside of itself: the needs of the popular masses. These masses of people are the object of its work. Their misery, dependence, condition of being marginalized and exploited is what ought to be the concern of social psychology. The horizon of psychology of liberation is to be found, then, outside of itself, outside of the purely scientific canons and demands; find itself —we insist— in the popular masses and their most pressing needs, among which the priority is their historic liberation from some of the social structures which keep them oppressed; this is the vantage point from which psychology ought to focus its concern and effort" (Ibídem).

Secondly, a new epistemology. "The objective of serving the liberation of Latin American peoples demands a new way of seeking knowledge: the truth of the Latin American peoples is not in its present oppression, but in its tomorrow of liberation; the truth of the popular masses cannot be found: it must be accomplished". If epistemology —as Kant taught—wishes to take into account the conditions, limits and possibilities of human knowledge, for social psychology of liberation these conditions, limits and possibilities are found among the popular masses whose reality is the source and criterion for truth. "Only being from this premise do theories and models demonstrate their validity or their deficiency, their utility or their lack thereof, their universality or their provincialism, only beginning from this premise do techniques learn to demonstrate their liberating potentialities or their seeds of subjection" (Ibid., p. 298).

In third place, a new praxis. "In order to acquire a new understanding [it is not enough] to locate ourselves within the perspective of the people, it is necessary to involve ourselves in a new praxis, activity for transforming reality which permits us to know it not only for what it is but for what it is not, and this, in the measure in which we attempt to orient it, becomes what it ought to be" (Ibid., p. 299). So it is, then, that the Latin American psychologist not only should situate him or herself in the place of the popular masses, but should also insert him or her self into the practice of the processes of social change oriented towards favoring these masses. ""f we do not embark upon that new kind of praxis, which, more than transforming reality transforms us ourselves, we will only with difficulty develop a psychology which contributes to the liberation of our peoples""(Ibid., p. 300). In this sense, the social psychologist must be partial —must take the side of the popular masses—, without ceasing to be objective; this is to say, assuming a parcialization which would be coherent with their own values, which can only be the result of an ethical option (Ibídem.).

In summary, from the point of view of Ignacio Martín-Baró in Latin America psychology can only be liberating if it is centered on itself: turning its attention towards the popular masses; if it nourishes itself from a new epistemological perspective: which seeks the truth about the reality of these masses; which is oriented towards historically liberating the popular masses. We are dealing here with challenges which are not easy, the achievement of which not only require intellectual audacity, but also honesty concerning historical reality. The liberating commitment of psychology is an open matter because the socio-political commitments of yesterday are not those of today nor will they be those of tomorrow.

It is precisely the obligation of Latin American psychologists to discern the horizon of their social responsibility in each historic situation. In this task, there are no pre-established recipes nor are there truths which are above being appealed. Ignacio Martín-Baró made an effort to make of psychological learning a learning situated and dated in time and place. Those who wish to continue his work —his heirs— ought to make the same effort as he who preceded them, with intellectual lucidity and with a deep sense of commitment with the dispossessed. Obviously they will have to assimilate and dominate the premises of the master. This is their first obligation. The second is that they ought to update his legacy, place it in a situation of dialogue with the problems of today.