On the road to being ungovernable

More of the same

A dead letter

News Briefs

ON THE ROAD TO BEING UNGOVERNABLE

Diverse intellectual and political sectors have called attention to the imminence of a crisis, as a result of which, El Salvador may become ungovernable. In fact, the most pessimistic have declared that the country is already finds itself in a situation in which it is ungovernable. Beginning some time ago and continuing up until the present time, the expressions "ungovernable" and "in a situation in which the country cannot be governed" have once again become stylish. And this without these phrases being understood as to their conceptual limits and their practical implications. For all the rest, those who assert that the imminence of a situation of being ungovernable do not seem to understand that a country becomes ungovernable only when the social demands, because of their breadth —i.e., diverse social groups present growing demands upon the state for goods of some kind— and in their particular methods and modalities of posing these demands —i.e., by means of generally violent actions— exceed the capability of the state to respond to these and channel and accommodate them within the context of order and legality.

There is no doubt that in El Salvador, during recent weeks, a not very encouraging state of affairs has been in the making. Social conflict has been sharpened without reasonable and realistic situations having been simultaneously visualized. But to interpret the current situation of the country as being definitively marked by a condition of not being governable is to force and tease the concept of governability out of its clearest sense and meaning. No one can say that, in the medium range, social and labor conflict cannot be decanted into climates making it impossible to govern. For the moment, however, neither the social demands have come to such an exaggerated pitch —rather, it might be said that the terms of these conflicts are very well defined— neither the manner and shape in which these have been posed is ultimately uncontrollable by the authorities. It is certainly true that, during the course of recent weeks, dynamics, which point to the possibility of a lack of governability, have appeared, for which reason the movement of these events should not be taken lightly. If a change of course is not implemented, the country runs the risk of falling off the cliff of social overflow and open state coercion. Both phenomena, carried beyond certain limits, could ultimately undermine the fragile democratic institutional configuration which is, with great difficulty, only just emerging in El Salvador.

In the same manner, an incorrect or casual use of the term denoting a state of not being governable could lead governmental authorities to wash their hands of their responsibilities guaranteeing fundamental rights for its citizens, especially their right to a job and a decent salary. This state of affairs could come about if the country should grow to a state of not being governable as a result of excessive demands presented by social groups, together with the modality in which these are posed: i.e., in the current situation of the country, by the demands of the workers employed by the Salvadoran Social Security Institute or the judicial branch of government. Should this become the case, then, guarantees that the country could continue to be governable —a situation being raised, from one day to the next, to the status of a supreme good— must be applied by the means deemed necessary. This is to say that from governmental levels, the following message might emanate: there are some bad citizens who have dared to make attempts against what is understood to be democratic governability in that they are creating disorder and confusion and thus attacking national unity. These bad citizens merit punishment without mercy, not only with police nightsticks but also through discounts from their checks and even collective firings. When all is said and done, the poor government is doing nothing more than defending itself and guaranteeing the governability of the country. Can it be that the Flores administration is showing signs of moving in this direction? If this is not the case, how are we to understand the threats of his Minister for the Economy, Manuel Lacayo, concerning the firing of as many public employees as show their lack of conformity with the economic measures of the government? How are we to understand the use of the term "nationalism", which President Flores uses in such a cavalier fashion in some of his speeches?

Perhaps such expressions as "governability" and "crisis of governability" or "governability made impossible" make sense to those who speak them and repeat them as if they were people who know a great deal. This might explain the frequent appearance of such expressions in the mouths of politicians and governmental officials. But such terms poorly or incorrectly used or poorly understood, could lead not only to the commission of serious errors in the interpretation of a particular social and political conjuncture, but to dangerous practical consequences. In the specific case of El Salvador, to read the current situation in terms of its actually constituting a state of not being amenable to governability could issue in two possible scenarios. On the one hand, it could create a situation in which the conceptualization of social and labor problems as being manageable within the context of pacific agreements as untenable. On the other, it might lead to a state of affairs in which the government believes itself to be relieved of its responsibility for clearing the way for coming to such agreements and its compliance with them. Both situations are dangerous for the advance towards the transition and consolidation of a democracy.

The foregoing should not prevent us from recognizing the current situation as a very serious one —one in which there exists a very real risk of the country becoming trapped in the meshes of not being amenable to being governed. To move precisely in that direction requires nothing more than to continue to proceed along the lines of the dynamics currently being followed: the growing demands of the workers (which are being presented in aggressive ways), the arrogance of the government and the absence of sensible and flexible proposals for permitting the resolution of conflicts through peaceful agreements and pacts. This is the surest way to arrive at the much heralded state in which the country cannot be governed, which, should it become a reality, will not only be the fault of the social and political sector, but of the of the concatenation of the efforts of many forces —especially of the government, the workers and the political class, whose lack of capability for mediating between the social demands and the state entities has been revealed in the most brutal clarity.

It is amusing to contemplate Salvadoran politicians making a great deal of how much they know when they speak of the situation in which the country cannot be governed. They are entirely unaware of how ridiculous they make themselves look not only as a result of not understanding what they are talking about when they use the concept incorrectly, but also because they do not understand that if the country were really ungovernable —or should it come to be so— this, in itself, would place in evidence not only the failure of the political system but also the failure of those who uphold it: the political class itself. But to ask Salvadoran politicians to understand this is to ask more than they are capable of giving. This, because their talent and calling serve them so poorly in their attempts to understand the dynamics of their country and in their efforts to fulfill their role in a responsible way, as it behooves them, as intermediaries between civil society and the state.

MORE OF THE SAME

At some weeks now before the year ends, the national political panorama continues to be submerged in the same caustic and asphyxiating routine as ever. It is not that Salvadoran politics are given to the same routine because events are lacking. What is happening is that the same events repeat themselves ceaselessly, again and again, without exhibiting a glimmer of escape from this dynamic which has now taken on the shape of a vicious circle. One might have thought that the pre-electoral period would brighten up the political scene. When all is said and done, elections are the occasion upon which the political parties engage in a special kind of protagonism and, as a result, the ideal moment occurs in which they can make themselves known to public opinion. The discouraging thing is that the political parties, far from taking advantage of this opportunity to consolidate their ties with the populace, seem to be polishing themselves up exactly on these dates in order to exhibit the dirtiest wranglings of internecine warfare, carried out not only between the parties but within each party.

As always, ARENA openly began its electoral campaign months before the regulations stipulate, before which the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), as always, has stolidly turned a deaf ear. As always, the orthodox and revisionists flanks of the FMLN are fighting over candidacies, power quotas and administrative capacity within the party without the slightest care for the fact that in acting in this way they are turning themselves into the favorite hobby horse of the news media. As always, the media gives itself up to picking over the corpses in the news cemetery and finds, to no one’s surprise, the arms cache in Nicaragua. All this to satisfy the political interests of the "editorial line" of the owners of the media. As always, the right wing manages to blame the left wing for the serious social situation of the country and this with the objective of taking the wind out of the sails of the workers’ struggles and evading the responsibility of having to deal with the country’s problems in a serious and honest way. As always, the deputies of the Legislative Assembly throw themselves into negotiations to elect, remove from office and re-elect functionaries to their taste and benefit. As always, the political parties of the center divide and regroup themselves as the winds change in the most disparate ways. As always, various "fathers of the fatherland" find themselves facing problems with the justice system...

It is on this long —and still incomplete— laundry list of "as always" that the political spectacle of the week is to be found: yet another internal split in the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). The reasons are, of course, the same as always: power struggles, disrespect for the institutionality of the party, the desire to take over the party structures for private and particular interests. Thus, evaluating this act without slipping into commonplace mediocrities is almost impossible. One might even say that the country’s politicians place their own interests above those of the interests of the citizenry in that their actions succeed in nothing more than contributing to the profound discredit into which the political class has fallen. And in such a way that the doings of the political parties is considerably less than transparent and not in the least democratic. This, in turn, generates suspicions as to the relationship between their capability for governing when they find themselves faced with the problems of the people and the fact that the political center may never cement its proposals and offerings as long as the ideological north has not been clarified. But we already know all of this and we know it because it has been said so many times on the many occasions upon which the same events have transpired.

What is happening now is that Ronal Umaña wants to recuperate what he considers his feudal holding: control of the PDC, which was taken away from him by René Aguiluz after several years of internal power struggles. Some PDC members are with Umaña and others are with Aguiluz, although it is still not clear who is with whom because both arrogate unto themselves the same names. The Umaña followers accuse their adversaries of wresting party candidacies away from the PDC and turning them over to the party-in-formation, the Christian Democratic Unification (UCD), in which the "old guard" PDC members have grouped themselves. Their argument is that "the old guard" is trying to take over the PDC.

Aguiluz holds that Umaña’s dissatisfaction and that of his followers is owing to the fact that they do not figure on the lists of candidates for deputies on the rolls. The Umaña followers threatened to ignore the leadership of Aguiluz, current secretary general of the party. Aguiluz threatened to ignore them. Umaña as well as Aguiluz has said that they can count on the support of the majority of the PDC legislative faction and on the support of the rank and file of the party as well. Aguiluz thought that he had won the battle by taking away all of Umaña’s rights as a militant of the PDC party —including that of third vice-president of the Legislative Assembly. But the thing is not so easily done because ARENA is not willing to lose one of its most valuable pieces: together with the PCN, ARENA announced that it would not support Umaña’s removal from office.

And so things stand, but that they are standing that way is the least important point. What is important is that what hangs in the balance of the Salvadoran political game is always the same. Today there are some names and some accusations; tomorrow there are others. What is seriously important is that they always respond to the same twisted motivations and produce the same dynamic anti-democratic and backward developments. It is not improbable that the new crisis in the PDC, as well as having to do with the electoral conjuncture, is related to the presumed negotiations between the FMLN and ARENA to elect the Attorney General and remove from office the Ombudsman for Human Rights. Let’s take a look at how.

The reasons why the FMLN gave its votes to Peñate Polanco as the current Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights have never been understood; and neither has it been understood why they did so in full knowledge that Peñate Polanco’s doubtful background stood in direct contradiction with the professional requirements and profile required for occupying the position as ombudsman. The FMLN deputies have shown signs of repenting of something which, by any standard, was a serious error. Since that time the recuperation of the Ombudsman's office has been constantly on the FMLN’s mind. It would seem that the entanglements surrounding the elections of the Attorney General became an ace up the sleeve for the FMLN: the votes for the Attorney General which ARENA proposes could be cast in exchange for ARENA votes to remove Peñate from office. It is presumed that this was the deal and the facts do not contradict such an hypothesis.

The problem was that nothing made sense as long as a key piece of the puzzle was left out of the game as to who, during the accidental and finally mistaken election of Peñate, had played the key role. And it was precisely the person who had proposed his candidacy: Ronal Umaña. And if he had indeed ceased to the PDC "strong man", he was surely not willing to give up the quota of power which he still had as deputy and as vice–president of the Legislative Assembly. As Aguiluz’ victory over his dominance of the PDC became imminent, Umaña had to resign himself.

But to expel Peñate Polanco from the Ombudsman’s Office implies pushing aside the Umaña wing of the Christian Democratics, with which act Umaña’s power was reduced to a minimum. It should not be forgotten that Umaña put Peñate at the head of the Ombudsman’s office on the strength of a dirty deal with ARENA. The unconditional support of the Umaña faction of the PDC for ARENA gives pause to believe that these under-the-table arrangements are not mere suppositions. On the other hand. Aguiluz is willing to play his last card if necessary —from supporting Peñate’s removal from office to promoting the removal of Umaña from the vice – presidency of the plenary— as the price for becoming the new head of the PDC. It was logical to expect a reaction from Umaña as well as from ARENA as a result of Aguiluz’ maneuverings. Both may lose something if Umaña is relegated to the political sphere.

Definitively speaking, we are observing here one more demonstration of the astounding egocentrism in which Salvadoran politicians are immersed up to their necks. Completely twisting the role which the political system ought to play in the construction of democracy, they have played politics for the militants and their interests, not for the people and their needs, as it should be. And this contrary to all logic. The political parties are sunk once again in their private in-fighting, widening, thereby, the gulf which separates them from the citizenry, instead of struggling to exercise their political acumen in its favor.

A DEAD LETTER

It was announced; there was nothing left to expect from him: Francisco Flores vetoed the decree which earmarked 292 million colones to cover the salary increases of the Social Security workers. In addition, he announced to the press that some of the services of the Roma and Amatepec hospitals will be given in the form of a concession to private enterprise. This represents a checkmate for the trade unionists of the ISSS and a checkmate to the possibility that a government would seek a negotiated solution to a conflict which has been expressed in almost a month of uninterrupted strikes. Flores moved his pieces and again made it clear that he will not cede before the pressures being exerted by the trade unionists (for him, they are simply "agitators" and "rebels") and that the conflict will only be resolved when they bend to his rules of the game.

And the President’s rules of the game are obvious: there will be no salary increases and the possibility of taking a single step back from the privatization of the health system will not be discussed. The perspectives, evidently, are dark; principally for the patient-subscribers who have been left caught in the crossfire between the government and the doctors and workers of the ISSS. The phase of the problem in which the positions have reached a maximum degree of polarization has been reached and a reasonable solution to the conflict cannot be envisaged, at least unless it is put forth by the only one of the two sides which has shown any sign of openness, as minimal as these may be: the trade unions, especially SIMETRISSS.

Nothing more can be expected from Francisco Flores —and this is a fact, not a supposition— neither rationality nor concern for the situation of the patient/subscribers who suffer the effects of the strike can be expected from this president. On the one hand, because his extreme ideologization impede his dealing with the problem in an open and realist manner (pushing forward privatization and not ceding to the trade unionists, whom he sees as being manipulated, are his articles of faith). On the other hand from his particular logic the responsibility for the strike lies only with the trade unionists because they began it and their radicalism is moving it along. In this sense, for Flores, the only people responsible for the malaise of the patient-subscribers are the trade unionists. Moreover, for the president, the task of his government in order to alleviate the effects of the strike would not be to negotiate with the trade unionists in order to end the strike, but rather to seek alternative mechanisms to offer service to the patient-subscribers in spite of the work stoppage.

So now, in spite of the fact that SIMETRISSS and STISSS have launched intrepid threats (the most serious of which is to abandon the hospitals, although there are now signs that this option is being discarded) and that they have threatened, as well, to seek to draw private doctors and public hospitals into participation in their cause in order to increase pressure on the government, incipient demonstrations of openness and rationality can be found. As this is one of the central points to the problem of privatization of health services, it is important that the trade unionists discuss, openly and clearly, their position on this point. For this reason, it is a hopeful sign that members of SIMETRISSS have declared that they are not —as the government would have it— completely closed on this topic. The task at hand is to clarify public opinion on which points, specifically, and in what way they are willing to implement the privatization of the health system or not. Should they take this up, they might have at their disposal the minimal elements for negotiation with the government something which up until this moment has not been at their disposal.

On the other hand, it is necessary for the trade unionists to recognize that while they stay out on strike they will continue to be acting inside the logic which is most convenient for the Flores administration. Contrary to what they hoped, the labor stoppage has only served to strengthen the president’s posture and he has, therefore, been able to implement his policies in a manner which has not been consulted. SIMETRISSS should recognize that to maintain the strike is to maintain themselves outside the formulation of policies for the health sector. The union should understand that Flores is actually being helped by the strike in that, as long it is maintained, he is free to act without his options having been consulted and, as a result, his decisions are not bound by any agreements which might arise from such consultations..

As has been stated above, the trade unionists must take the first step towards disentangling this problem. The suspension of the strike, even on a momentary basis, would require Flores —indeed, oblige him, to enter into the dialogue he has been avoiding at all cost. Once negotiations have begun, with the presence of high-level mediators and broad credibility, the degree to which the president is willing to reach a solution to the question through the use of reason will become verifiable. For the moment, it is difficult to envision any other way out of the situation than what is presented here: at this point in time, the trade unions do not have much more with which to pressure Flores (they have come to a dead letter) and Flores has shown no visible signs of being tired or worn down by the strike.

VETO. The executive and judicial branches of government have come to loggerheads as a result of President Francisco Flores’ veto of a salary increase for the employees of the judicial branch. Those affected hold that the veto is unconstitutional. The crisis begun on November 22 when the President rejected the increase, arguing that this would cause a situation of inequality to exist between the salaries of the employees of the judicial branch and the salaries of the rest of the governmental workers. The president of the Supreme Court (CSJ) held that Flores has attributed to himself powers which the constitution does not concede to him. Those who oppose the veto cite Article 182 of the constitution, which provides the judicial branch with the power to draw up its own budget, which must then be approved by the Legislative Assembly. They add that the constitution does not establish as one of the president’s powers, the authority to modify the budget of the judicial branch. On this point, Flores declares that the constitution creates a democratic structure of checks and balances in which no part of the state may act with absolute autonomy. "In this way the judicial branch has the power to administer its budget, but it is the Legislative Assembly which approves it and sends it to the executive branch for approval", he stated (El Diario de Hoy, December 2, pp. 2-3).

BOND The Supreme Court decided to issue close to 4 million colones in order to achieve a situation in which its employees would pull back from continuing the strike in the courts. On December 3 the workers and magistrates reached an agreement which will permit the employees to receive a bond for 500 colones, according to statements by the trade unionists themselves, on December 6. For the coming year, the salary increase will be applied beginning in January, in accordance with the budget approved in November by the Legislative Assembly. The funds used to create the increases belong to the internal budget of the court and not to the nation (La Prensa Gráfica, December 7, p. 4).

TRADE UNIONISTS. On December 6 the trade unionists of the Salvadoran Institute for Social Security (ISSS) met with the Labor and Social Benefits Commission of the Legislative Assembly. The meeting was of an informal nature, the objective of which was to inform the deputies if the arguments being put forward by the trade unionists. In addition to presenting the details of the conflict, the trade unionists presented to the deputies a petition that the 221 employees fired from the ISSS be reinstated in their jobs. They added that their entering into negotiations is conditioned by the compliance of the authorities with this demand. The unionists also denounced the supposed retention of 7,000 workers' checks (La Prensa Gráfica, December 7, p. 6).

STRIKE. Thousands of patient-subscribers to the Social Security system have been without appointments and medicine at a national level as a result of a work stoppage, as a result of which the hospital network has been closed to the patient-subscribers, with the exception of "extreme emergencies". The unions of the doctors and workers of the Social Security Institute, SIMETRISSS and STISSS, announced that the measure would be of an indefinite character. With the closing down of service, the unions aim to achieve a situation in which the government would appoint a high-level commission to negotiate their demands. "Today a decision was taken to attend only emergencies...this situation will be stepped up if we do not [within the space of one or two days] receive an answer", stated SIMETRISSS secretary Rene Zapata Nieto. He did not, however, specify the measures which the unionists might take. The Director of the ISSS, Ana Vilma de Escobar, for her part, revealed that she would extend and amplify the system of private consultation for the patient-subscribers. This implies contracting private services for elective surgeries after December 6. Nevertheless, the Medical Guild did not discard the possibility of closing private clinics as a measure of support for the ISSS doctors who are engaged in a struggle which, according to that entity has as its objective, "the strengthening of health care for the population". Jorge Nieto, Minister of Labor, stated that the government would evaluate the labor situation of the strikers (La Prensa Gráfica, December 3, pp. 4-5).

PEÑATE. On December 1, all political parties of the Legislative Assembly agreed to begin a political trial against the Ombudsman for Human Rights, Eduardo Peñate. Should he be found guilty, they are willing to remove him from office. "It must be demonstrated that he has not complied [with the obligations of his office]; if not, we will have left a negative precedent", stated Rene Aguiluz, of the PDC. "I am in agreement with the removal of Peñate from office, but under the terms of the law", was the opinion expressed by Kirio Waldo Salgado of the PLD. A joint subcommission of the Political Commission of the Legislative Assembly will investigate the work performed by the functionary in order to determine if he is apt or not to continue in his post. The idea of the investigation arose on the basis of a bill presented by the PDC, in which Penate committed the presumed failures in personal conduct and administration of the Ombudsman's office. He has mistreated the workers and there are anomalies concerning the use of national vehicles", stated the politician. He added that since the arrival of the functionary to the institution, "he has not complied with the objectives which the law requires of him". "The institution has lost credibility", he argued (La Prensa Gráfica, December 2, p. 16 and December 3, p. 30).

FIDEL. On December 1, Fidel Castro, President of Cuba, denounced links between the Salvadoran Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mario Acosta Oertel, the ex-Minister of Public Security, Hugo Barrera, and ex - Head of the National Civilian Police, Rodrigo Avila with an international group of terrorists. The Cuban daily Granma published, in its December 2 edition, the text of a press conference presented by Castro to Venezuelan journalists in which he denounced the existence of a plot to assassinate Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez. Castro also alluded to an anti-Cuban campaign orchestrated by exiles from the island which, according to his statements, operates out of Miami and San Salvador. According to Cuban intelligence, the plot against Chávez was presented by Eusebio Penalver, head of a radical group of exiles, which maintains close relations with Luis Posada Carriles, who was pointed out by Cuban justice as the one responsible for the dynamite attacks against tourist centers in Havana in 1997. For these reasons Salvadorans Cruz Leon and Otto Rodriguez were arrested and condemned to death. Castro stated that Posada Carriles has been constantly travelling through several Central American countries in order to avoid being located and that, fundamentally, "he lives in El Salvador". The Cuban newspaper stated that the persons from whom Posada Carriles receives the greatest support are Barrera, Acosta Oertel and Avila (La Prensa Gráfica, December 7, p. 8).