1999: an uncertain year for democracy

Political summary and evaluation

A summary of the economy

Summary and evaluation of the social situation

1999: AN UNCERTAIN YEAR FOR DEMOCRACY

1999 was an enlightening and instructive year with regard to the kinds of difficulties the process of democratization might incur when the institutions which must support that process from its beginnings through the phases of greater development are not sufficiently stable and solid. In El Salvador, this transition, or stage, in which the basic mechanisms for the construction of a democratic order of things have not prepared the terrain for the consolidation of that process, or, the phase of recognition and actual implementation of the civil and political rights of the citizens. Between these two moments a kind of rupture has taken place which feeds attitudes of pessimism and uncertainty about the future of democratization in El Salvador.

One of the reasons for this breakage, or lack of connection, between the transition and consolidation of the process of democratization is the weakness of the institutional fabric, which has resulted in a situation in which institutions which are key for the democratization of the country, such as the Ombudsman’s Office for the Defense of Human Rights (PDDH) and the National Civilian Police (PNC), among others have ended up being inoperable or have deviated from their original and fundamental objectives. Nor can it be said that institutions which arose as a result of provisions of the Peace Accords such as the Comptroller’s Office and the Judicial organism: these have neither succeeded in overcoming solid difficulties and vices such as inefficiency and corruption, nor have they succeeded in fully assuming the responsibilities which are their province in the current phase of socio-political development in El Salvador.

A summary evaluation of the year 1999, then, cannot ignore one of the aspects characteristic of national reality, and that is the serious institutional weakness which corrodes entities fundamental for the construction of a democratic society. It is this institutional weakness which has obstructed the culmination of the democratic transitions and its advance towards consolidation now seven years after the signing of the Peace Accords. In other words, it is a question of an incomplete transition, the foundations of which —in the form of basic institutional underpinnings for democratic life— have not been set with the requisite firmness and clarity. As a result of this state of affairs, democratic consolidation cannot be said to have been completed, nor can it be said —and this is the worst of it all— to be secure.

A first point —that of not having yet achieved a democratic consolidation—although worrisome— is not the worst of what could happen to the country, given that what follows from this is the imperative requirement to work towards overcoming those obstacles which, up until now, have obstructed such a consolidation. Other societies find themselves faced with similar challenges and that does not eliminate their democratic calling in the least. Secondly —that progress towards consolidated is not a given—, on the other hand is a serious matter on two counts: all things being equal, because institutional weakness is of such magnitude that the establishment of an authentic state of law cannot be guaranteed as such, in the sense that all the law prevails over and above private individual and group interests and that a humane and dignified life is guaranteed to all citizens without exception. So, then, a state of law is a fundamental condition, a sine qua non for the declaration of a successful democratic consolidation. As long as the institutional foundations and interconnections have not been established, this will continue to be a task yet to be completed.

But in second place, institutional weakness opens the door to authoritarian attitudes and behaviors of the most diverse sort, which emanate from groups or individuals who are rooted in the state structures and who feel themselves to be above legality. In other words, the weakness of the institutional framework opens the doors to an uncontrolled use of discretion at high levels of the state apparatus with all of the risks which this brings with it: to wit, arrogance, impunity, uneasiness and social envy.

1999 has been an instructive year for both situations: high level functionaries, including President Francisco Flores, have made a great show of attitudes and behavior characterized by uncontrolled use of discretion —supported by his willful dictates which, as the law states— but with a clear authoritarian —which are bent, moreover, on threatening, have taken measures against those who do not share the political and socio-economic credo of the third ARENA administration. Key figures in this authoritarian scenario in the state apparatus have been the Minister of the Interior, Mario Acosta Oertel, with his pretensions to control everything, to his comings and goings from the national territory up to and including the music which young people listen too —and the Minister of the Economy, Miguel Lacayo, with his threats to fire all employees who do not accept the political economy of the government.

The counterpoint to these authoritarian tendencies arising from the state apparatus has been a certain malaise and social distrust. Faced with some of the economic measures designed and implemented behind the backs of the masses of the country —those hardest hit by their effects—; faced with unfair practices born at the heart of the government —for example, the diverting of funds destined to help those affected by hurricane "Mitch" to the buying of votes favorable to ARENA—; and faced with the fast and loose practices of some political parties incapable of complying with their function as intermediaries between the society and the state, the first consequence has been the disenchantment and lack of confidence evidenced among the population. Broad sectors of the population have held fast to the conviction that neither laws nor policies can give them a better life, a situation which has fueled the political apathy of the citizens —a harmful state of affairs for the creation of a politically democratic culture—, without which, moreover, attitudes and behavior outside the limits of legality have been supported, with the understanding that he who first violates the laws enjoys more advantages with respect to those who do it afterwards or do not dare to do it at all.

In a context such as has just been described, the possibility has taken life for a charismatic leader to emerge who might be able to offer, outside democratic mechanisms, a definitive solution to the problems of El Salvador. Many political, military and business and commercial figures do not hide their sympathies for a solution of this type; and it is even not beyond the bounds of imagination to suppose that more than some of these are thinking of raising themselves up as the savior of the country. That possibility has become a real possibility says quite a lot about how wayward the process of democratization in El Salvador has become. That there are those who are disposed to make of this possibility a reality says much about the scant faith in democratic values prevalent in our country. These last should be reminded that authoritarian solutions, for as praiseworthy as they appear in the presentation of their goals and objectives and in their will to change, always end up being bad solutions, even though they may awaken great popular enthusiasm, as in the case of authoritarian leaders such as Hugo Chávez, Fidel Castro or Alberto Fujimori. No one controls him and, as a result, no one can make or unmake at a whim what he wants to do, placing himself above the rest —including those who up until yesterday were his allies—and violating their rights.

On the other hand, the authoritarian risk is only this: a risk that, in good measure, is explained by the institutional weakness which this country is suffering at the present moment. Another of the reasons which explains this is the shallow roots which democratic values hold among broad sectors of the society, which, moreover, are aggravated by the diffusion of authoritarian values and attitudes emanating from governmental spheres. From this to a stance which confronts the authoritarian threat, in the first place, it will be necessary to work to strengthen the institutional framework of the country; in second place, work must be done for the creation and diffusion of a politically democratic culture which allows for options and values contrary to authoritarianism; and in third place, the state and the governmental apparatus must be cleansed of all of those functionaries whose commitment to authoritarian solutions cannot be hidden.

1999 leaves many doubts about the future of the democratization of El Salvador. The shadow of authoritarianism looms as an undoubted threat over the incomplete democratic transition. The year 2000 poses an unavoidable threat to completing the transition and advancing decidedly towards the democratic consolidation. Nevertheless, this cannot be done without the commitment of society as a whole —or at least broad sectors of it— to democratic values and options. This commitment is the best antidote to authoritarian options of whatever kind.

POLITICAL SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

The summary and evaluation for 1998 presented in the editorial of Proceso for 1998 ended with the less than hopeful words: "The most worrisome part is that nothing indicates that in 1999 these dynamics will be eradicated. The same personalities and parties will continue to hold sway over politics, the same business interests will continue to engage in the same disputes for what is left of the country, and it would appear that the same party will control the executive office for five more years. There are sufficient reasons for not being too enthusiastically happy about the future of El Salvador. A substantive change in the way of doing politics, of taking up business challenges and of orienting the state efforts cannot be perceived on the horizon". As the year which began then now draws to a close, it can only be said that that editorial was, lamentably, quite accurate.

In fact, ARENA continues to head up an executive office and president who governs in order to benefit the party and a group of privileged persons who surround him. This same group of privileged people continue their limitless concentration of the country’s goods and riches. These are the same figures and political parties who continue to rule in politics and, definitively, 1999 has not been other than a repetition of the same dynamics as ever. There are not only sufficient reasons for much happiness in the evaluation of this year, but there are, moreover, weighty reasons for feeling deceived and crestfallen at what the political class has done during the year. The political situation of El Salvador, far from having set out on the road to improvement, continues stagnating in the same vices from which it has suffered for many decades. If there have been changes, these have been mostly only cosmetic changes and, consequently, irrelevant to what matters fundamentally.

What facts uphold the declaration that an evaluation of the behavior and work yield of the political system in 1999 shows a negative balance by any stretch of the imagination? This is what we will examine below. And in this evaluation we will analyze three aspects: the political conduct of Francisco Flores, the development and work patterns of the FMLN in their internal party movements as well as in their legislative activities (an analysis of the municipal administration has been left to one side for reasons of space and because we consider that the case of Hector Silva is more of an exception that the rule in the overall evaluation of the FMLN), and the most outstanding characteristics of the small political parties. The idea is to demonstrate through an examination of some of the most relevant acts and facts of the year, how it is that the political parties, in general, have contributed to closing the vicious circle into which Salvadoran politics have fallen.

Francisco Flores is the living image of an attitude which characterizes the politicians in El Salvador: cynicism. His mouth is filled with words about a democratic country with opportunities for all while he liberally applies vetoes to legislative bills which would favor the social development of the country. He declares that he is worried about the terrific problem of public security while he, at the same time, gives his support to a Firearms Law aimed at legitimizing the arming of the populace; aims to set himself up as a standard for honesty and morality but is not concerned to verify whether it is true or not that he came to power as a result of the purchase of votes in his favor. He considers it especially relevant to invest state money in burying a "time capsule" with a photograph of himself included, while at the same time biasing the dialogue with the workers of the Social Security Institute who have been engaged in a work stoppage for more than a month.

And so it goes with "Paquito’s" administration throughout his first six months in the presidential office. Without exhibiting the slightest embarrassment, he offers flowery speeches, the content of which is in flagrant contradiction with his political practice. More than a serious and responsible president, Flores turned out to be a pseudo-intelectual whose poetic airs and flourishes and resounding actions could well pass for a shameful parody when compared with the situation of misery and violence in which the population of El Salvador is sunk.

From the moment of Francico Flores’ inauguration as president one could begin to see that what in the beginning had been sold to the populace as a model of moderation and commitment to the country’s problems turned out to be a lemon. The spectacle mounted to celebrate his coming to power was eloquent of fraud. The new president and his publicists turned the inauguration into a celebration of a shabby cult of personality. On the other hand Flores presented himself to the public as a resounding intellectual who presented himself to the public in a lengthy speech spoken from memory —a real trick and a resilient show which really impressed audiences used to the limitations which characterize Salvadoran presidents. And then there was —who knows if it was a put-up job planned ahead of time— the public who hailed him with uninterrupted waves of applause. What ought to have been an occasion for presenting for public consideration a serious and measured government policy platform, became a spectacle of deceit and glittering adulation.

An examination of what had been, up to this moment, his behavior in the presence of public opinion permitted one to see the big show which passed as a presidential inauguration as just one more of the events which would characterize the Flores administration. The first was the launching of his pre-candidacy. The optimism generated as a result of the supposition that because Flores had come from the new generation of ARENA members, not linked, thereby, to any of the inner circles of the governing party, Flores would bring with him an internal renewal of the ARENA party came quickly to a halt. It turned out that "Paquito" was indeed linked to some of the hard-liners of his party: that is to say, with the Armando Calderón Sol group.

This was the first indication of his astute political maneuvering —that of proclaiming himself a pre-candidate with the support of the "new generation" of ARENA party members—, more than having arisen spontaneously in the "freshness" of a young and outstanding ARENA party member, could have been the result of a fully orchestrated plan prepared by the higher-ups of the ARENA party with the objective of leading his party forth from its fallen state and obtaining the presidential office once again. Nevertheless, with all of the commentaries about the links between Flores and the Calderón Sol family, a image was constructed in which he was perceived by the Salvadoran populace as a daring and intelligent aspirant to the presidential office.

This contributed to the creation of a second moment, months before the electoral campaign and in the course of the campaign itself, the now-president would begin to pass himself off as an exemplary tolerant and democratic leaning model for president. Then the optimism began to grow anew and "Paquito" began to be recognized for his qualities as an intellectual conciliator. But this was nothing more than yet another mirage. But the mirage disappeared when, during the last phase of the campaign, Flores set up every kind of objection and obstacle to the presidential debate and, finally, clothing himself in all the regal arrogance characteristic of ARENA members —refused to participate in it.

Once Flores was president, he fired his third coup de grace against the naivete of public opinion, announcing that the naming of the cabinet members would be a process open to all social sectors who might be interested in participating in it. A new wave of optimism: the president broke with ARENA tradition represented by his "enemy" Alfredo Cristiani and began his term of office exhibiting signs that his intention to re-formulate policies in El Salvador were sincere. New deception: the polemical naming of cabinet members was far from what had been hoped for. One fact is enough to construct an idea of how far the process of selecting the government team was from being democratic as promised: not even private enterprise was taken into account in it. ANEP itself —whose voice always finds an echo beyond the safe limits of the democratic transition— complained that neither Flores nor any members of his "technical commission" for choosing the cabinet officers deigned to respond to his telephone calls. Can the rest of the social sectors expect to be heard by Flores and his circle?

Other evidence of the process of choosing cabinet members ended up being just another of Flores’ maneuvers for spreading about an image of himself as a friend of democracy, the coincidence of which with reality is doubtful given the result of the election. Six of the ten elected ministers (Treasury, Public Works, Interior, Public Security, Health and Education) have occupied posts in past ARENA administrations or have been members of the "technical commission"—which means that they elected themselves— or were active members of the official party. The novel cabinet, it turned out, was an emperor with no clothes.

Moreover, the fact that Flores had accepted Mario Acosta Oertel as continuing Minister of the Interior and that Mauricio Sandoval should assume the leadership of the National Civilian Police gave the lie to his much touted and ostensible impetus towards renewal, his interest in becoming independent of party lines, and his wish to be an agent for democracy... Nothing in the background of these functionaries who today hold decisive posts in the transition towards democracy would lead anyone to believe that his ideals coincide with anything that Flores ostensibly defends. That personalities tied to the death squad past of ARENA should continue to hold such quotas of power cannot but awaken serious doubts on the question not only of Flores’ possibilities for complying with his promises but, above all, of his true intentions of doing so.

At the beginning of his administration, Flores figured as the most well-intentioned of the country’s politicians and as the one most willing to translate these intentions into acts and deeds. So then, examining the deeds and acts of these last six months —of those presented above, others must be added: the negligence of this administration to respond to the intense labor conflicts of the period; the stubbornness, characteristic of ARENA governments, of their intention to sell the country to foreigners by offering them a bouquet of virtues which the masses in general do not enjoy; and the lack of any clear orientation as to where we are going, beyond the impulse to privatize, the benefits of which process cannot be perceived—, Flores’ work and behavior, far from renewing anything, seem to presage a blind following in the footsteps of Calderón Sol.

That his behavior is liberally sprinkled with words which go beyond the bounds of the baroque monotony of Calderón Sol’s insistence on the benefits of a "state of law" does not change any of this. In the end, he continues to attempt to see the country from the point of view of the simplistic conquest of "democracy" and the relative success of macro-economic indices.

There are those who have insisted on the point that it would be prudent to give Flores "the benefit of doubt". Flores has, however, from the beginning, shown signs which invite suspicion more than confidence. Flores began his mandate reproducing the shadow play and propaganda in which he has always dressed himself. Now the year draws to a close in the same style as ever: with another "show" involving a "time capsule" in which he misses not a single step in adorning his image. The President’s ambiguous and hypocritical personality ends up being brought out into the light. It is a personality in which florid discourse and the ever-present smile do not manage to cover the tares among the wheat which characterize those who are ARENA members in their hearts: hermeticism, authoritarianism and arrogance. At this point in time, what cannot be doubted is that there will continue to be the calculated pose, spectacle and applause fomented by "Paquito", but little or nothing is seen of political, social or economic changes which a poor and violent country such as ours need.

The electoral disaster of the FMLN in the March, 1999 elections was a predictable consequence of a race for the presidential office waged in a conflictive and haphazard way. The FMLN paid with interest for having held its multiple national conventions in the form of a battlefield for the exhibition of the perpetual strife between the "orthodox" wing and the "revisionist" wing of that party. The Facundo Guardado-Nidia Díaz formula for president and vice-president did not even make it to the second round, not only because the formula was so unattractive in and of itself, but also because it so clearly exhibited the problematic nature of the process of which this formula was the result. The adversaries of the revisionist line made Guardado into the individual scapegoat responsible for the electoral failure as an easy way of washing their hands of any responsibility. They conveniently forgot that it was precisely in the context of the unresolved conflict between the orthodox tendency and the Facundo Guardado group that Guardado was put up as a candidate. Both groups wanted to impose their presidential formula excluding each other mutually. Both were guilty of the sin of ambition and both maneuvered in much the similar way to satisfy their ambitions.

Far from acting in a professional manner so as to fulfill expectations which tended to be generated by the FMLN after the elections of 1997, the electoral behavior of that party revealed a party lacking in clear ideas and without the capability to convince, and by presenting a political offering communicated with the left foot. The poverty of ideas and activity of the electoral campaign made it clear that instead of marking the way to triumph —something that could hardly be expected at this point in the game— the FMLN marched confidently towards disaster. And that made things easier for the orthodox wing, who very rapidly concocted a way to take control once again of the party while Guardado slipped out of power by the back door. But the reasoning which prevailed throughout this change —"it was not the FMLN, but Guardado himself who lost"— an analysis not even close to the truth which moreover contributed not at all to carrying out the internal transformation which the party was demanding —a transformation which presupposed a renewal of its leadership and a profound discussion of the divisions which continue to hound the principal left party. That was one of the most important tasks left pending for the FMLN after the election and before the end of the year.

And, in fact, the FMLN made an effort to work its way out of the crisis. In its National Convention in July, which had as its objective the official election of the leadership of the party, the rank and file showed greater maturity and rationality. As could be expected —given that they continue to capitalize upon the failure of Guardado— it was the orthodox group who obtained the most positions in the internal voting, but this did not stop the conformation of a combination of forces in the leadership body which does show joint concern for the future of the FMLN. Fabio Castillo won the position as General Coordinator of the party, all the while denying the existence of counterpoised "tendencies". According to his evaluation of the situation, the FMLN members agree on fundamental issues and differences have more to do with a problem of patience than with ideological disagreements. For Castillo, the heart of the matter is that some demand immediate changes while others believe that those changes have to come about slowly.

Such declarations are cause for concern, given the long-standing tradition of the FMLN rank and file to deny the existence of any divisions in the party. The question arose when Castillo made these first declarations as to whether the new General Coordinator wanted to reduce the issue to a semantic or temporary problem what is really one of the biggest limitations of the FMLN?

Certainly 1999 has been for the FMLN a much less convulsive year than 1998. Everything appears to indicate that the "tendencies", "lines of thinking", "groups" or however one would prefer to call them, are learning to deal more democratically and pacifically with their divergent points of view. Even so, diverse analysts coincide in pointing out that the pluralism achieved in the convention was provisional, which signified that, as long as the differences do not become entrenched, the coexistence of the two groups will be peaceful for a long time. As much as the FMLN authorities aim not to give any importance to the internal conflict, what is certain is that the form that this conflict is taking on has direct repercussions as much on the sympathy of the electorate towards the party as on the capacity of the party to offer be able to offer a satisfactory performance at a governmental level. But on neither of these two counts did the FMLN come out well this last year.

That the FMLN lost qualified party members was obvious in the March elections. That its governmental behavior at the level of the legislature left much to be desired is something that Shafik Handal himself recognizes when he declares that the work of the Legislative Assembly has been mediocre. That, of course, is not the exclusive responsibility of the FMLN, but it is that, as has been said on other occasions, this party is the only one which could hope to bring about some type of positive change in the country. But far from achieving this, the only thing that the legislative faction of the FMLN has been able to accomplish throughout the year 1999 is its customary practice of (1) offering opposition, lacking in solid foundation, (2)because of the belligerence of the veteran Handal in the plenary and (3)in order to show that it is adapting itself to the old vices of Salvadoran politics. Of the three, the first and the last are especially serious.

The evidence that the FMLN is letting itself go the way of traditional actions and practice —traditional and dirty, as well— of doing politics is to be found in the process of choosing and electing the Attorney General. What happened in this is the same as happened in the election of the Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights: it was the fruit of an deal made with party interests at play. That the deputies waited months for the naming of the functionaries is of similar importance, in order to end up electing persons who were not appropriate at all for the posts which they hold, only allows one to affirm that it is an error to place in their hands this kind of decision-making process —these decisions so crucial for the construction of democracy.

With regard to the question of the Ombudsman for Human Rights, the arrangement was between ARENA and the PDC. What was never understood were the motives which led the FMLN to lend its consent to what in every way, shape and form was a mistake. This mistake brought with it negative consequences not only for the FMLN and the Legislative Assembly, but, over and above all else, for the citizens of El Salvador who suffered and continue to suffer the negative consequences of such actions because, as a result, today there is no state institution really committed to the defense of their rights. The FMLN deputies have shown themselves to be repentant, but their attempts to undo the mess has caught them up in the dirty games of our political system.

With the Attorney General’s Office, the arrangement was between the FMLN and ARENA. With the Ombudsman situation in mind, the FMLN saw in the stalemated election for the Attorney General a card that they could play in their favor. It would be a question of the red votes for the Attorney General which ARENA proposed as against the ARENA votes in favor of the destitution of Eduardo Peñate Polanco. The fact that after months of stalemate, the negotiations of the two major political forces of the country succeeded in reaching an agreement in a matter of hours —a state of affairs which does not precisely disprove the hypothesis presented here.

With respect to the lack of a solid foundation which defines and makes sense of the opposition activity of the FMLN, it must be said that this lack or void is directly related to the ideological void which has come to distinguish that party's political doings. It is true that the FMLN problems cannot be reduced to a simple debate of ideas, but it is the case that they are shot through with iron-fisted internecine warfare. But so also is the definition of their basic line of thinking on the question of conflict resolution which substantially reduces the party’s political and electoral potential.

Before the agreement with ARENA on the election of the Attorney General, the legislative faction of the FMLN placed itself at the head of a new divisive maneuver: the revisionists declared that they supported the naming of the controversial deputy Arturo Argumedo as Attorney General while the orthodox members manifested their rotund opposition to this candidate. Finally, the leadership of the party succeeded in making the unity of the faction prevail above the internal differences, but these had already surfaced again. In view of this kind of behavior, the FMLN should be urged to define an ideological platform to which recourse might be had in the case of this kind of confrontation.

As long as these misprisions continue to occur at the discretion of the political leader on duty the day they occur, the internal struggles for power within the party will not be settled in any stable or long-lasting way. Moreover, as long as the FMLN has only a skeleton of basic principles around which to draw its members together, it will not be able to exercise its role as an opposition party with any firmness. As long as it does not have these matters settled, its denunciations and options to turn back decrees and measures will be diluted in successive confluences of events and will easily be come opaque when faced with any upbraiding for a lack of unity. The declaration by Fabio Castillo mentioned above in which members of the FMLN have reached a conciliation on basic questions continues to awaken doubts. What was he referring to when he spoke of fundamental issues? Is it not precisely such fundamental issues which require urgent clarification?

Any small mustard seed of confidence which one might hope to have that a greater presence of small parties in the Legislative Assembly might contribute to improving the functioning of this state legislative organ found, during 1999, the best of reasons to simply disappear. Let us examine the whys and wherefores of this statement. The CDU, which was a coalition of the CD, the PD (now the PSD), and the PPL, filled itself with hopes in March when the voters gave it third place on the political spectrum. But the CDU was tardy in showing signs of becoming a center option which might be truly independent and bring with it a reasonably good legislative administration and the coalition fell apart. The reality is that the cohesiveness of these three parties was always doubtful. In fact, a year now closes after a bitter dispute between the Democratic Convergence and the Social Democratic Party (the new name of the PD) on the one hand and the PPL on the other. The insignias which led the coalition to become the third political force in the recent elections constituted the motives for the dispute in question.

At the end of a conflict which took place as much in the media as in the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, it was Ruben Zamora, head of the CD, who came out looking the best because it was his party, in coalition with the PSD, that won for itself the colors of the CDU. But the new break in the political center had already seen the light of day and with it came the consciousness of the small parties' lack of capacity for consolidating lasting alliances.

The PDC, the fourth political party in importance in the country according to its standing after the March elections, continued to be sunk in the bitter internecine warfare which has come to characterize it. The first scandal of the year exploded in May when Ronal Umaña, then Secretary General of the PDC, was accused by his detractors of having helped himself to a political fund of 4.8 million colones, a product of the 1997 elections, and of being a shareowner in several businesses —a university and a motel, among others— for which he had not filed income tax statements. As might be expected, the investigations which the Attorney General’s Office and the Supreme Court initiated began after the denunciations were buried and forgotten. So it was that, if certain accusations had been true —a not improbable state of affairs— the entities charged with carrying out justice left Umaña in a condition of absolute impunity.

A new scandal in the PDC took place when the National Convention, held in June with the purpose of electing the leadership of the party, became the scene of what had been impossible and unthinkable up to that point: that Ronal Umaña should abandon the position of Secretary General. This act occurred in the midst of the most outrageous turbulence involving blows, shouts and insults, all reproducing what, in Umaña’s words, constituted the "culture" of the PDC: that is to say, rude and divisionist behavior. And in spite of the fact that the exit of the nefarious person of Ronal Umaña could be considered a kind of success for the political system in general, nothing gave cause for harboring many illusions about the new Christian Democratic leadership body. The fact that it was the allies of Umaña themselves who at that point in time were maneuvering behind the head of the party gave cause to believe that nothing new was going to occur inside the filthy waters of that fishbowl [In the Spanish original, this metaphor involves a pun on the name of the PDC and its emblem which is a fish. Translator's note].

Within the ranks of the PDC, the possibility of having trustworthy friends is an impossibility. The leaders of the party appear to remain inside it for the sole objective of spending time in the leadership body in the hopes of a minimal opportunity for making a rush at the Secretary Generalship. The change in the leadership, far from bringing benefits to the Christian Democrats who do not merit the privilege of so calling themselves, implied continuing along the road to internal strife and conflict. The PDC closed out the year embroiled in yet another internal feud —this time between Rene Aguiluz, the current Secretary General, and Ronal Umaña, who, it appears, will cause a few more headaches for a while.

There is not much to say about the PCN that has not already been said. The return of "El Maneque" to the ARENA rank and file in February weakened the party to the point of its disappearing from the presidential electoral race. It succeeded in surviving, but its only participation in the political game outside of the traditionally blind support it always offers to the ARENA initiatives in the plenary, consisted in becoming the pillow upon which dissident ARENA members could cry. If the PDC appears to exist only for the tearing of hair and rending of garments —behavior to which its leadership is traditionally given— the PCN serves this purpose for dissident ARENA members who are unhappy and unsatisfied when COENA does not give them the quota of power they demand, and it is in the PCN that they find a place to express their pique and anger until they decide to return to their party of origin. This practice among the ARENA rank and file of jumping about from one party to another grew to such a pitch during 1999 that Alfredo Cristiani and Mario Acosta Oertel are at the point of making declarations prohibiting such dissidents from returning to the longed-for ARENA homestead.

If the truth be known, the PCN is not truant on the question of dissidents. In addition to those who abandon the party to return to ARENA, there are those who decide from one day to the next to become independent deputies. One such person is Horacio Ríos who has founded his own political party, the PAN, whose rank and file consist, in part, of ex - Civil Patrol Agents —taking advantage of the fact that a small group of such voters chose the PCN in 1997. PAN will surely swell the ranks of diminutive political parties which will either disappear without a trace or which might survive by clinging to laughably fragile and ephemeral alliances. PAN cannot hope to guarantee its own independent existence —as is also the case, by the bye, with independent deputies of late.

In spite of the fact that this analysis of some of the most outstanding deeds, facts and acts of 1999 in the political realm is only a summary, it may suffice to lead us to the same sad conclusions arrived at as 1998 drew to a close: things are bad and getting worse. The only hopeful difference this year with respect to the foregoing Jeremiad, is that the populace is showing signs of wanting to step forth from its lethargy and react against corruption, negligence, opportunism and incompetence which have infected the political system and in turn obstructs its sole mission: that of serving the population and correctly administering its resources for the good of all concerned. It is from the citizenry that the only forces capable of movement can arise because the political parties and the entities which depend on them have shown no signs of finding their way towards rising out of the Slough of Despond into which they have fallen and advance towards the consolidation of democracy.

Of the "new way of doing politics" which Francisco Flores announced during his campaign there is no sign upon the horizon. His intellectual talent is reduced to a mere taste for the pretty phrases with which he fills his many speeches. His abilities for conciliation have metamorphosed into a pose of imperturbability and silence redolent of the most absolute passivity. His wish for renovation and change evaporated after it was pressed in the mold of the classical ARENA leader. And, in fact, of all of the promises Flores has made, nothing but deception remains. The FMLN continues to be the only possibility for replacing ARENA in the executive office. But as long as the resolution of that party's internal conflict continues to be a pending task, that possibility seems to be remote. On an even more serious note, doubts about whether the FMLN —should it come it power— could turn the tide and improve the Salvadoran situation continue to grow.

Far from offering an alternative to the electorate as it faces the run-down condition of the two "extremes", the small parties have become the real obstacles to the institutionalization of democracy. They have become the vortex which frivolously attracts the attention of public opinion instead of making an effort to shift and direct their activities towards the most deeply felt needs of the population. As things go, as this year ends, one cannot look towards the year 2000 with much optimism. On El Salvador's political scene ,the dynamic continues, unfortunately, to be the same old routine.

A SUMMARY OF THE ECONOMY

1999, on the question of the economy, has presented the worst yield of the decade because —in addition to the typical increases in the balance of trade deficit— 1999 has also been the year to present one of the lowest growth rates of the whole decade together with a substantial increase in the country's fiscal deficit. Fortunately these severe economic reverses have been dealt with without major trauma thanks to the ever faithful arrival of family remittances which, as has been the case throughout the decade, provide the principal explanation for the low inflation rate together with the stability of the exchange rates.

Supported by the foregoing, the recent government administrations have not taken action to achieve the effective modernization of the economy, which implies diversification of production and agricultural and livestock exports along with a process of industrial conversion which would allow an improvement in the ability of that sector to compete. The behavior of the authorities responsible for the economy during the decade of the 90's has been limited to administering the resources coming in from abroad in order to balance the balance of payments and maintain a restrictive monetary policy for the purpose of controlling inflation. Nevertheless, during 1999 there has been clear evidence that economic stability is not an end in and of itself and that in some cases such stability can become an obstacle to increasing the growth rates.

Although economic statistics at the end of 1999 are not available, some isolated data presented by the cabinet members for the economy already reflect a situation in which inadequate leadership of the current economic policies has negatively affected supply and demand. Even so, the cabinet members for the economy point to a series of external factors as the cause for the poor functioning of the economy and do not hesitate to declare that, for the year 2000, the economic situation will improve. For them, the factors which have affected the country's economic behavior are related to external problems such as low prices for export products and a reduction in intra-regional trade. For example, according to Miguel Lacayo, the Minister of the Economy, El Salvador is one of the countries with the greatest real growth in Central America for this year, although the reduction of the prices for coffee and sugar could have provoked a loss of two percentage points in the Gross National Product.

The President of the Central Reserve Bank, Rafael Barraza, declared that he hoped that the year 2000 would show a recuperation of the levels of economic growth which, combined with the current low inflation rates, would permit a more favorable prediction for the economic situation. He added that during 1999 the financial institutions have enjoyed a great deal of liquidity, owing, in large part to the reduction in legal cash reserves and the maturing of bonds and securities. He did, however, accept the fact that, because of the lowered economic activity of 1999, a reduction in the demand for credit also occurred and this affected the growth of the financial system.

The summary presented above seems to suggest that the whole problem lies in external factors. But the truth is that, as one reviews the scant economic statistics available for 1999 and reviews, as well, the evaluations presented by the representatives of the various business associations, it is clear that the problem also involves fiscal and monetary policies. Although a low inflation rate was achieved, the exchange rate remained stable and net international reserves increased, one must point out that the general economic situation got worse. In this section, the principal macro-economic results for 1999 will be reviewed together with the situations arising from the process of privatization so that the principal challenge of achieving higher sustainable growth rates might then be examined.

On the topic of the Gross National Product, the most outstanding fact is that it grew by only 22.1% in 1999, which represents only half of the GNP projected by the Central Reserve Bank and it is the second lowest annual growth rate for the decade of the 1990’s. The lowest rate was 1.8% in 1996 when the current period of economic deceleration began. As the year closed, the desired results for production had not been attained in spite of the fact that they matched the goals projected by the BCR, which began with a growth rate of 4% and afterwards fell to 33.5% and then became stable at 3%. Even so, the calculations turn out to be too optimistic because, as was mentioned, at year's end the growth rate reached only 2.1%. Most of the economic sectors experienced a reduction in their growth rates, although those which most contributed to the reduction were the business and construction sectors which grew to 1.7% and 2.2%, respectively.

The low growth rates for the business sector draw attention to the reduction in demand, given that it is precisely in this sector where the first instance of this phenomenon occurred, which, in turn, translated into a fall in production and supply for the rest of the economic sectors. For example, the manufacturing industry, although it grew at a greater rate than the total GNP (3%) , evidenced a new decrease in its growth rates: between 1997 and 1999 there was a decrease of from 4.2% to 3%. According to the Executive Director of the Salvadoran Association of Industrialists (ASI), Jorge Arriaza, the foregoing is owing to a reduction in demand, but also to the growth of competition because of the removal of customs tariffs implemented by the government, because of contraband and because of infrastructural deficiencies.

Another noteworthy case is the construction sector given that the growth rates went from 4.4% in 1998 to 2.2% in 1999, which, according to the Executive Director of the Salvadoran Chamber of Commerce for Construction (CASALCO), Hector Vidal, is a result of a reduction in the demand for housing together with the high costs for financing the acquisition of housing because of the high interest rates. Vidal added that, owing to the late approval of the national budget for 1999, there also existed a delay in the implementation of public investment and in the implementation of infrastructural construction which impeded contracting the services of numerous construction businesses.

Beginning in 1998 a marked tendency towards the reduction of the rate of inflation was detected, to the degree that for this year inflation had reached a percentage of 4.5%. For 1999, the tendency towards reduction of this rate was even more marked, to the point that the rate had dropped to -0.5%. This implies that the Consumer Price Index decreased rather than increased. This behavior could suggest that an overly strict monetary policy was being pursued which could even have been provoking a reduction in the aggregate demand with a subsequent reduction in the general price level.

Owing to the reduction in the Consumer Price Index, hopes grew that, for 1999, real minimum wages would experience an improvement and, in fact, data from the Economics Department of the UCA establish a situation for the period between January and August, in which real minimum wages increased from 27.04 to 27.37 colones. One should not, however, lose sight of the fact that this recuperation does not compensate for the enormous loss of acquisitive power during the decade of the 1990's because, between December, 1991 and August, 1999 real minimum salaries went from 28.18 to 27.37 colones.

The monetary policy in place for the decade of the 90's has been, fundamentally restrictive. But in 1999 this tendency deepened as a result of increases in legal cash reserves which, although they began to diminish during the last trimester of 1999, negatively affected liquidity and pressured for the reduction of credit and an increase in interest rates.

At the same time, there was a marked reduction in the demand for credit which also contributed to a state of affairs in which the credit assigned by the bank to the private sector would grow by only 4% (or, 700 million colones), which implies that it did not even come close to the goal of 15% proposed by the monetary and financial program. On the question of deposits, these went from 48,733 million colones in December of 1998 to 50,454 million colones for last September, which implies an increase of more than 1,700 million colones, very much above the absolute growth of credit. In accordance with the foregoing, the behavior of liquidity, according to data cited by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of El Salvador, shows that in November, 1999 there was an annual variation of 9.9% documented, or, an evident improvement over the 5% for January.

The reduction in the growth of credit is directly related to the fall in the growth rate for the economy and this has been clearly observed since 1996 when the expansion of credit in the private sector began to be more and more modest, exhibiting growth rates of more than 30% to rates of only 20%, until it reached an extreme of 4% for 1999. Coincidentally, the growth rates for the economy have reached levels higher than 6% and others of 4%, 3% until they reached the current 2.5%.

On the question of distribution of credit, data from the Salvadoran Banking Association (ABANSA) show that the construction industry received 27% of the total credit, business 25%, industry 14%, the agricultural and livestock sector 8%, personal credit 8% and other credits 19%. This is to say that, on the whole, industry and agriculture received less than the business sector.

Another aspect which should receive attention here is that, during 1999, an important increase in bank delinquency was reported and this had been practically in evidence since mid-year. For the month of last September it was estimated that the balances for that portfolio had reached a level of 3,400 million colones in a state of delinquency, a figure which represents an increase of 58% in relation to the amount obtained for the same month for the year 1998. At the same time, goods received as payments or as a result of adjudication increased from 693 to 1,168 million colones for the same period, which implies an increase of 68.5%. As a result of the foregoing, a program for rescuing businesses was announced, by means of which the problem of growing delinquency in debts was to be alleviated and a reclassification of credits for some businesses was to be contemplated. For the end of the year, no sign of implementation for this program was in evidence.

Finally, on the question of interest rates, it should be pointed out that these stayed at levels of between 15% and 16% on the average, in spite of the fact that legal cash reserves began to fall beginning in August of last year as a result of a BCR determination and because inflation dropped radically to the point of becoming deflation. These interest rates have been questioned on repeated occasions throughout the year by representatives of the agriculture, livestock and construction sectors because they were considered restrictive for economic growth. Even members of commercial associations for these sectors have pointed out that a significant reduction in these categories is fundamental.

The balance of trade deficit showed an increase which led it to a total of 1,654 million dollars, which, in turn, represents an increase of more than 9% as compared with 1998. Fortunately, during this year, the situation of the external sector has once again been saved by the affluence of family remittances, which, in the end, permit the Net International Reserves to increase by 100 million dollars, to reach a total of 1,865 million dollars.

For its implications for production, imports and the trade balance it is important to point out that the goal of removing customs and tariff barriers were reached in 1999 and, therefore, tariffs of 0% were applied on raw material, a rate of 5-10% for intermediate goods and a rate of 15% for finished goods. The industrial sector focussed on the elimination of tariff restrictions as one of the elements which have provoked a reduction in growth rates, for which reason they have publicly solicited an increase in tariffs at the following levels: 20% for finished goods; 15% for intermediate goods and capital; 10% for raw material produced and 0% for capital and raw materials not produced.

On the other hand, it is estimated that the family remittances for the month of November 1999 arched 1,232.7 million dollars, a figure which represents an increase of 25.3 million dollars as compared with the level for the same period in 1998. For the end of the year, the BCR estimated that family remittances reach 1,400 million colones, with which sum the balance of trade deficit was being practically financed in full (1,654 million dollars) although there continues to be a negative balance of close to 254 million dollars. Previously, when the deficit in the balance of trade did not surpass 1,200 million colones, family remittances were sufficient to cover the balance of trade deficit.

The public sector deficit is estimated in round numbers to be close to 3% of the GNP for 1999, and this surpasses the BCR’s projection for this year, which was 2.5%. These indicators reveal that the growth of fiscal income is not sufficient to confront the spending levels in spite of the fact that since June there had been announcements that a strict public spending policy would be adopted and that tax collection would be increased.

President Francisco Flores announced, in his inaugural speech, the implementation of a program which would tend to correct the lack of balance in public finance and would contemplate measures such as the reduction of public spending (no trips, a freeze on hiring and the purchase of vehicles and gas rationing); the creation of a tax code; the simplification of the Value Added Tax (IVA) for the informal sector; the elimination of the tax exempt base of 75,000 colones for the payment of taxes and, finally, a campaign against contraband. Additionally, in his program for the reactivation of agriculture he also announced measures with implication for taxes such as the application of IVA to basic grains, milk, vegetables, fruits and medicines.

More recently the Ministry of the Treasury announced that with the adoption of an austerity policy a savings of 400 million colones could be achieved for the budget and that for the year 2000 it was to be hoped that the same policy would continue and in this way a situation in which the fiscal deficit expressed as a proportion of the GNP could be reduced by 2.6%.

All in all, it is obvious that the tax reform policies as well as the announced reduction in public spending should be reviewed because, during recent years, the fiscal deficit has become uncontrollable and this reduction, together with the balance of trade deficit, has come to represent the greatest weakness in the economic policy of the country.

During 1999, the process of privatization did not advance greatly as compared with 1998, especially because during this last year the privatization of telecommunications, the pension system and the distribution of electrical energy was carried out. Even so, more sales of public businesses continued to be documented, such as the sale of the electrical energy distributors and several thermal plants for the generation of electricity while, at the same time, measures aimed at permitting the participation of the private sector in the provision of health services offered by the Salvadoran Institute for Social Security (ISSS) were announced. This possibility has carried with it strong implications for labor stability in the public sector as was demonstrated by numerous and prolonged strikes throughout the year.

Some elements which draw our attention as we review the dynamics of the processes of privatization are the policies of fixing tariffs defined by the very law for privatization and, on the other hand, the ambiguous posture of the Calderón Sol and Francisco Flores administrations as they took up the topic of subsidies for public service charges. In the first place, in observing the dynamic of perspectives for rates, once the privatization of the telephone service and the distribution of electrical energy was implemented, it was noted that these charges do not tend to diminish as the apologists for privatization had predicted. They have, rather, increased. The most recent examples are increases in telephone rates documented for the month of March and the announced increases in the rates for electrical energy for big consumers. These increases are legally based in the provisions of the Law for the Creation of the General Superintendence for Electricity and Telecommunications, in the Law for Telecommunications and its Rules and in the General Law for Electricity. In these legal instruments the possibility for telephone operators to adjust their rates in accordance with the inflation rate was announced and this applied as well to the distributors of electricity who could review their rates every three months. Fortunately, for the year 2000, a reduction in telephone rates of 0.5% might be expected as well as a deflation rate at the same level as for 1999.

On the other hand, it is also pertinent to review the situation obtaining in the process of privatization carried out in the pension system during 1998 which, to date, also demonstrates that the reality of privatization is that it provokes increases in the costs for services. During 1999, an increase was seen in payments by workers of approximately 15%, while for the year 2000 an increase of the same proportion may be expected.

Increases in electricity rates have even placed in doubt the continuation of subsidies to small consumers of electrical energy and have led President Flores to declare publicly that "we will continue with the subsidy", only weeks before vetoing the legislative decree for maintaining the subsidies. Just as his predecessor, Armando Calderón Sol, President Flores continues to be ambiguous on the topic of subsidies: although his neo-liberal discourse does not consider them to be an option, his political practice continues to show evidence that in reality he considers them to be useful.

In general, 1999 has been a year in which economic performance has, on the whole, been negative, even when figures for inflation and the accumulation of Net International Reserves suggest the contrary. Growth rates for production have fallen drastically, even to levels far below the most conservative estimates, coming to the point of affecting sectors which previously were highly dynamic, such as business. The balance of trade deficit has increased and the dependence on family remittances deepened; the fiscal deficit increased in spite of fiscal austerity measures and an increase in tax collection; monetary policy strangled any growth in credit and keep interest rates high; debt delinquency in the financial system increased substantially and, if this were not enough, the processes of privatization are provoking increases in rates for basic services and a high level of labor conflict in the public sector.

Throughout almost the entire decade a very poor level of activity aimed at taking advantage of the bases for economic stability which family remittances offer for the modernization of the productive apparatus. Along with the economic results for 1999, this advisory warning takes on greater validity because in the past growth rates of at least 7% were reached.

The government of Francisco Flores has indeed offered timely measures for the reactivation of agriculture, but it has not publicly accepted the necessity for inducing substantial changes in the productive apparatus and in economic policy to the extent that his ministries have analyzed the results for 1999 more as a result of the international context than in acknowledgement of deficiencies in the economic policy.

This posture implies accepting that a favorable insertion of El Salvador into the international economy does not exist because the country continues to depend, in good measure, on primary products and, for this very reason, it suggests the necessity for designing and implementing new economic policies. The international context is not the only factor which explains national economic behavior. In fact, other countries in the Central American area, such as Costa Rica and Nicaragua, have achieved growth rates of more than 8% and 6%, respectively, in spite of being under the aegis of the same international context as El Salvador. This reality ought to move those in charge of designing economic policy to evaluate the necessity for promoting a modernization of the productive apparatus, given that it appears to be evident that the Salvadoran economy is not up to snuff as it faces the challenges posed by globalization. Given this challenge, economic stability ought to remain on the back burner, more as a measure than as a goal. Additionally, in the short range it is vital to adopt measures to correct the negative tendencies in the different areas by means of measures such as the reduction of the legal cash reserves, increase and reassignment of credit, review of the removal of tariff barriers and the re-engineering fiscal policy.

SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF THE SOCIAL SITUATION

1999 was a disconsolate year for several reasons: in the first place, a president took office promising a renovation in the way politics was to be done and declared himself, as well, to be favorable to dialogue and citizen participation. But even before the electoral campaign ended and Flores was declared the winner, all could perceive the reality that the new president was not all he said he was. Throughout the year proof positive that the real Francisco Flores was a hard-line and intransigent politician —even more than his predecessor— was presented. This, doubtless, set the social dynamic, in great measure, for the country during 1999 because far from bringing about changes in the relationship between politics and society, he exacerbated attitudes which were already unfortunate as well as dangerous. He showed himself to have a negative attitude on the question of dialogue with social sectors, he used and took advantage of citizen participation and consensus —making in the formulation of state policies was lost sight of altogether.

Secondly, the year saw a resurgence of trade union activity, which found no echo from the new administration in terms of reasonable and intelligent responses to labor demands. As a result, the unions radicalized their postures and made use of practical measures, principally strikes, to express themselves and make their views felt. The great loser in this situation was, without doubt, the populace which was deprived of the services offered by government entities where unions engaged in labor stoppages. Although at first blush, it would appear to be obvious that in the almost permanent state of confrontation between the Flores administration and the unions joined together in a labor coalition denominated MOLI, the scales tip in favor of the Flores administration, nothing seems to point to an affirmation that the unionists were definitively defeated and that the labor conflicts would not repeat themselves with even greater intensity during 2000.

Thirdly, the process of privatization continued, but the ostensible benefits to the populace using the services being privatized were not evident. Even worse, many of the irregularities which took place when the state administered the telephone and electricity distribution services were repeated step by step by the private providers. This was the case without there being entities created for regulating the sector who could do something to set things in order and guarantee services at fair prices. The populace found itself many times victim of the arbitrary behavior of the businesses responsible for the telephone service and the distribution of electricity distribution, both of which set the rates and charge them for their services. Free of the supervising role of the state, private telephone and electricity companies can act as they like on the basis of their own discretion.

In a summary and evaluation of 1999 we will deal with these three topics because they provide a sketch —somber as it may be— of what, in good measure, can be expected for the social dynamic of the year 2000. So now, it is necessary to recognize that not everything was so bleak last year. Credit must be given to the follow, among others: (a) the continued work of Mayor Hector Silva to modernize and make more habitable the greater metropolitan area of San Salvador. Among the measures taken during 1999, the following should be noted: the plan for "citizen tranquillity" (which provided norms which, with relative success, regulate the installation of night clubs and other similar businesses and activities in residential areas); the process of decentralization of the municipal services; the implementation of a refuse treatment plant in Nejapa; the campaigns for civic education and the agreement reached with the Calderón Sol administration and the Vice Ministry for Transportation to regulate the movement of public vehicular traffic and move the bus terminals outside of the capital city area. (b) The decided but failed attempts by the Vice Ministry for Transportation to make the provisions of the law prevail in regularizing the anarchic public transportation sector. (c) The efforts of the PNC agents to respond to the crime wave with professionalism and efficiency even in the context of a Legislative Assembly which demonstrated not the slightest clarity as to what adequate legislative measures would be to provide support for the efforts of the PNC in this regard guided by an institutional leadership characterized by a tendency to be erratic and too dependent on media spectacles. (d) The critical monitoring work of some of the professional associations and the NGOs began to work in the face of the institutional crisis of entities such as the Ombudsman for Human Rights, the Comptrollers' Office and the Attorney General’s Office.

This year, the disenchantment with politics reached considerable heights, perhaps the greatest extremes since the signing of the Peace Accords. From the enthusiasm and hope which these generated in the past arose a generalized attitude of pessimism and a profound lack of confidence towards the capabilities of the political sphere to represent and be coherent with the interests and needs of the masses. In a highly contradictory dynamic such as has not been frequently seen in the recent history of the country, there has been an insistence on the participation of civil society in politics, while at the same time, members of civil society (political parties and the government) have turned inward and become involved in a radical way only in their own personal interests.

Not unjustifiably, an editorial of this weekly publication concluded, in speaking of the process of electing an Attorney General, that "it is not worthwhile...to participate in the power games of the legislative Assembly" ("An Attorney General Cut to Measure", Proceso, 878). The problem is that in 1999 nothing provided any hope that it was worthwhile to participate in the political dynamics of the country. On the contrary, it is clear that the invitations to collaborate with the political parties and the state entities which lead civil society sought more to paint their private parties in democratic colors than to participate effectively in decision-making.

Examples to illustrate this allegation abound. The "popular consultations" which, as a candidate, Francisco Flores engaged in for the elaboration of his government plan (a policy which Luis Cardenal, ARENA candidate for the Municipality of San Salvador, has not hesitated to take up) and the call from the Legislative Assembly calling for society to present a list of candidates for the election of an Attorney General are two facts which exemplify to perfection the distancing of politics from society. In both, the supposed minimizing of the distance between the politicians and civil society was completely sterile: neither the President nor the Assembly reflected in their daily behavior and actions any effect of their intention to take the populace into account.

The reasons which explain this failure of civil participation in politics are several. In the first place, the possibility for the civil society to participate has been provided by public actors: it is the candidate of the day or the state entity which has condescended to permit the participation of the social sectors in its political practice. In second place, and as a result of this vertical relation between the politicians and the populace, it is the former who have decided the when, the how and the who of the participation. So it was, then, for example, Francisco Flores the candidate who designed the modality by means of which he would listen to a sector of the population during the course of the electoral campaign. With this, obviously, not only was no one listened to, but also were the few who participated were treated in the same way.

A third reason is that although politics has moved closer to society —for the purpose, however, of utilizing those sectors most convenient for it— there is still, nonetheless, a noticeable absence of mechanisms by means of which politicians' compliance with the commitments and promises (as minimal and limited as these may be) which arise from that participation might be monitored and guaranteed. Finally, the determining factor in the failure of citizen participation in politics is that the citizens and populace at large see it in terms of a simple process of consultation and not in terms of a joint formulation of projects. This year, the political sphere has limited the participation of the populace at large to permitting that society to speak and propose, while impeding the possibility that society itself might effectively make decisions. The consultations with citizens day by day have served more to divert attention than to make less traumatic the desires and demands of the society in the practice of politics. One of the most difficult examples of this was the culmination of the process which took place around the document Bases for a National Plan.

In summarizing and evaluating 1998 we affirmed that the process generated through the document Bases for a National Plan, a seed was sown for the population to participate openly in the formulation of projects and lines of action for the country. The dynamic initiated with Bases for a National Plan was important in the measure in which it aimed to bring the discussion of the direction of the nation to the populace, whatever their professional level or social extraction. It was also interesting inasmuch as it posed, for the first time in a long time, the task of creating and encouraging a national project in a participatory and pluralist style. By this is meant that the success of the enterprise depended on the effective participation of the citizens in the process, on the one hand, and the commitment of the government and the political class with the final results of the consultation and discussion of the document on the other.

In October, after 29 months of work, and after the publication and promulgation of the partial results of the process of consultations with the populace around the document Bases for a National Plan, the National Commission for Development handed over to the three powers of the state the document "Initial Actions of the National Plan". The discourse with which President Flores received the document could not have been more disheartening. With his usual rhetoric, the president made two things clear: that his government would not adopt the lines of action —would not involve itself in the implementation of— "these things" proposed in the document and that, therefore, those responsible for carrying them out would be individuals and not institutions. So it was, then, that Flores recognized the importance of the document but avoided giving it the institutional character necessary for pushing it forward.

To determine what his motivations were in responding in this manner to such a prolonged effort and into which such effort had been put by such a large number of citizens concerned about the future of the country is the least of the problem. What is important is that this act confirmed what had already been said: that politics (the government and the political parties) call upon the citizenry to participate but abstain from taking on solid commitments with the results of the process; that citizen participation is used more as a resource for governmental propaganda than as a motor for change and progress; in effect, that the invitation to the citizenry to participate in the formulation of their projects for life is today more a likeness of social democracy than a sign of the coming together of society and politics. If, presented with such a large process unprecedented in the history of the country, Flores only responds in an evasive way, what commitment can be hoped for from the government on the results of smaller and more limited processes of citizen participation?

A few years ago, it would have been difficult to make any bets on the country’s trade union activity. Since the signing of the Peace Accords, with the conversion of the armed left into a political party and its relative distancing of itself from its social base organizations, the trade unions have gradually been losing strength and cohesion. The sporadic trade union demonstrations become lost in their lack of connection and in the immediacy of their demands. The privatization of some of the most important autonomous state entities (the clearest case being ANTEL) seemed to announce an end to some of the organizations which appeared to be in open decay and decomposition, incapable of renewing their proposals and action in response to the demands of the new times.

Nevertheless, in a break with this tendency, the Medical Workers’ Union of the Salvadoran Institute for Social Security (SIMETRISSS) entered into a dynamic of social action during 1998. SIMETRISSS is a distinctive trade union because of its professional make-up and because of its demands: the reform of a health system in crisis which is sunk in excessive bureaucracy and corruption. The long and difficult struggle which this union began against the authorities of the institution marked the birth of a new kind of trade union movement: an independent union with a clear and coherent platform of demands, not limited to merely bread and butter labor issues. And something still more important: the trade union struggle of the SIMETRISSS was successful, established a precedent by obliging the Calderón Sol administration to negotiate on the basis of equals and obliged him, as well, to grant many of the union demands.

Moreover, SIMETRISSS identified the most serious problem at issue: it showed the ISSS to be an inefficient institution which was highly disorganized, in urgent need of drastic changes in its leadership, structure and proposals. With this it raised to the level of an agenda open to public discussion for the institutional problems which affected it —and in spite of all, which continue to affect it— and it affected many who up until then rested in the shade of apathy and governmental complicity. Nevertheless, the important trade union activity of SIMETRISSS was exceptional: the breadth of its bread and butter demands, its continued work and the relative success of its trade union struggle contrasted with the sporadic activities of other unions during 1998 and, above all, with the limitations and lack of creativity which characterize other unions.

During 1999, the panorama of trade union activity changed substantially. It changed as much to declare, without a shadow of a doubt, that this has been the year of the trade unions of the government sector; that it was the year in which the public employee unions maintained a permanent presence in the social dynamics of the country (they carried out 18 strikes in such diverse areas as the post office, the jails, social security, education, public health and the airport, among others). In all of this activity it became clear how the government will respond from here on out to the demands of the public sector workers.

What was really new and different about trade union activity during 1999 as compared with that of 1998 was not that its demands achieved greater success (in spite of the many strikes and demonstrations, the unions only obtained government promise for future dialogue and vetoes against the legislative decrees which aimed to resolve —or at least alleviate— the conflicts in social security, education and the judicial branch); neither was it the diversity of their demands (with the exception of the case of SIMETRISSS and STISSS. fundamentally all of the unions coincided in raising salary demands); even less so was it the creativity set in motion with the strategies for achieving their goals (the recourse to strikes was, in the majority of the cases, the first and only option to pressure the government).

In 1999 what was really new about trade union activity was the creation of the Movement of Integrated Labor Organizations (MOLI), which joined together the unions for the workers in education, health, public works, jails, courts, and customs workers, among others. MOLI permitted the trade union struggle to fill two of the biggest vacuums: on the one hand, the lack of a body to lead and coordinate the unions in the public sphere and, on the other, the absence of inter-union solidarity. With the creation of MOLI, the government workers' unions, who were, up until its formation, easy to silence because of their isolation, joined together in platforms involving bread and butter labor issues and supported each other mutually. In this way the institutional barrier was overcome: a strike in one governmental body was not late in generating a chain reaction involving ministries which had nothing to do with the initial problem.

The creation of MOLI and the intensification of strikes and union activity formed the context in which the Flores administration began and developed its first few months of work. In Flores' view and that of his cabinet concerning discontent in the public sector, two stages can be distinguished: in the first, the president was, for all practical purposes, absent. He avoided direct participation in the resolution of trade union conflicts and in the cabinet (with the exception of the Ministry of Education) his lack of capacity and willingness was notorious in that he could not deal with the unionists nor did he engage in pertinent negotiations. During the second stage, which began in September with the presidential vetoes, Flores assumed a leadership role and defined his strategy with regard to trade union activity: there would be no concessions, the law was to be strictly applied (evidenced in firings and discounts for strike participants) and he implemented a policy of leaving the trade unions to wear themselves out, turning public opinion against them.

In the passage from one stage to the next, the postures of the trade unionists as well as those of the government administration exhibited a tendency to become hardened and entrenched. With the slow distancing and polarizing of the positions, both groups threw out any possibility of seeking negotiated solutions to the conflicts. In this sense, the ending of the greater part of the strikes was due more to the especially hard-line and stubborn positions taken by the Flores administration than to the success of the trade unions and their demands. Fundamentally, the government and trade unionists shared a common prejudice: each side found it impossible to engage in dialogue with the other. On the trade union side this was because —not without some cause— they supposed that the government would only deal with their petitions if forced to (the error being that of thinking that in the end the government would end up ceding to their demands).

The government administration did not take the recourse to dialogue seriously and had recourse, instead, to the hackneyed cliche that it was all part of a conspiracy: for the Flores administration the strikes and demonstrations were all part of a destabilization plan led covertly by the left. Moreover, the unionists were always regarded by government as just a bunch of agitators and lawbreakers, and the government dealt with them as such, never as equals in a process of dialogue and negotiation. That the FMLN had decided at various points in time to support the strikes only served to reinforce the government thesis on the trade union movement and refused even to consider their demands.

The case of the Social Security strike merits, because of its implications and because of the length of the strike consideration over and above of the general lines which up until now have been presented. What caused the strike was the failure of negotiations between the Director of the ISSS, Vilma de Escobar, and the Union of the ISSS Workers (STISSS) on the question of a salary raise which had been agreed to by the previous administration and included in the collective contract for 1997-1999. What, in the beginning, was an administrative work stoppage limited to the metropolitan area, with the passage of time and owing to the intransigence of both sides, ended up becoming an almost generalized work stoppage. To this action, almost from the beginning, SIMETRISSS entered and was supported by a large number of trade union organizations.

On the question of the intervention of SIMETRISSS in the conflict it is important to point out two things: on the one hand, its decision to participate in the STISSS strike did not simply come out of the blue: since the beginning of 1999, the union had been pointing out the stagnation of the process of reform of the health sector and had made repeated calls to the Comptrollers' Office to practice an external audit which would clarify once and for all the financial situation of the ISSS (something key for determining the possibility of restructuring the institution and publicly exposing the administrative irregularities which were weakening it). In their numerous communiqués, SIMETRISSS appealed to the government administration's responsibility to comply with the agreements previously entered into and declared that only as a last recourse would they begin specific activities to push reform forwards. Before September (the date on which the doctors joined in with STISSS) it was clear that Flores had no intention of complying with the accords reached by the previous administration and would not negotiate on the issue with the union.

On the other hand, taking the foregoing into account, it is obvious that the participation of SIMETRISSS in the strike did not seek to win only bread and butter and salary demands, as the government would have it. They placed their bets on negotiated reform of the health sector. In this sense, and as has been pointed out before, it would not only be SIMETRISSS which would win should its demands be complied with, it would also be the institution itself as well as the patient-subscribers to Social Security who used the services. Understanding this is vital for a just and serious evaluation of the trade unionists' demands, their actions and the response to both by Flores and the directors of the ISSS.

The government administration responded with arrogance and cavalier attitudes to the strike and to the trade unionists' demands. It was cavalier of him to order the application of discounts to the workers who participated in the October strike; it was provocative of him to call for the presence of the PNC in the Social Security buildings; it was absurd and incoherent to ignore the salary demands of the union by arguing insufficient funds and an austerity policy while earmarking 1000 million colones to bail out CREDISA, creating new jobs for advisors to the first lady and giving considerable wage increases to government functionaries who already received salaries higher then 30,000 colones; and it was irresponsible of him to call on the unionists to desist from their actions while he set in motion a pilot plan to privatize the health services which were not discussed with the unions and which violated accords previously reached with SIMETRISSS.

SIMETRISSS and STISSS also did their part. Basically, in digging in their heels and continuing the strike without allowing for good will gestures and some openness—gestures which urged the government to enter again into negotiations. Obviously both sides took advantage of the patient-subscribers to Social Security, using them as levers to apply pressure. If the basic reason which led SIMETRISSS to support the STISSS was noble and reasonable (i.e., the reform of the health sector), the measures used were not so noble and reasonable. To date, at this writing, the services of the Social Security system have been reduced to a minimum, Oncology had been closed and only tended patients with cases of greatest urgency. So it was that thousands of appointments and operations were cancelled without making any inroads in the government position. As 1999 ended, Social Security was almost completely paralyzed and the only measure left for the trade unionists to take was the abandonment of the hospitals.

Evidently, faced with a complete labor stoppage, the ISSS authorities will not be able to find human resources necessary to attend the population needing service. Although it might be accepted as a premise that this was the only way to make the government see reason, this is an overly extreme and pernicious recourse which ought to be eliminated at once on principle. The doctors and workers of the Social Security system appear to have lost sight of the simplest and obvious point: the nobility of their cause does not imply extremism or irrationality as a means to achieve it. It is ethically unacceptable —and socially irresponsible— to push forward the necessary structural improvements in the ISSS, while running roughshod over the conjunctural needs of a large sector of the population. Those who say they wish to defend the health of the future patient-subscribers sink into absurdity when they are willing seriously to compromise the immediate health of the people in the process.

At this point in time it is obvious that the process of privatization of the state entities charged with offering services is unstoppable. Neither the trade unions nor the opposition parties —with the most ambiguous and lukewarm postures— have been able to stop the privatizing impulse of the ARENA administrations. The bank, electricity and telephone services are already in private hands and everything points to a situation in which the health service and the distribution of potable drinking water will suffer the same fate. Francisco Flores has been moving along in this vein and has shown signs that, like it or not, the process of privatization will continue.

As is well known, the governmental policy of privatization rests upon various axiomatic premises: (a) the state is per se inefficient in the administration of public services; (b) given this inefficiency, which turns out to be onerous for the state treasury, it is necessary to confide the offer of services to the private sector, which is to be understood as a synonym for good service and quality; (c) that the free play of the market and open competition between businesses charged with offering a specific service have, as a side effect, the lowering of rates for service; and (d) the principal beneficiary of privatization is the consumer; the citizenry who, given the spectrum of offers presented, may choose the best quality for the best price.

Aside from ideological finger-pointing, a good way of evaluating the process of privatization taken up by the ARENA administrations is to contrast the specific results with the supposed benefits they would bring with them; that is to say, to contrast the reality of privatization with the objectives which have caused it to be pushed forward. 1999 has been the idea year for this task. On the other hand, because the privatization of the telephone services and the distributors of electricity were achieved in their definitive form during this year (for which reason it has been possible to measure the effects of these processes on the population); on the other hand, because the capacity of the state has been made sufficiently clear in order for the relationship between the society that demands the service and enterprises which offer it might be satisfactory for both.

In September, the results of a poll carried out by the newspaper La Prensa Gráfica-UNIMER was translated into the hardest and most apolitical criticism of the process of privatization in a long time. According to the poll, for 94.9% of those polled, the privatization of the telephone service has not been translated into more economic rates; 77.3% held the opinion that the service was not of the best quality and 80.4% held the opinion that the coverage of the service has not improved. The percentages were even greater among those polled about the electricity service (96.4%, 81% and 89.6%, respectively). The population, definitively speaking, did not receive any benefit nor was there an improvement in the telephone and electricity services after their privatization. This in spite of the fact that both areas entered into competition with a significant number of businesses for which reason the telephone company rates for cellular telephones and international calls were significantly reduced and both sectors responded by visibly improving the technology of their services.

What is the explanation for all of the discontent, then? Basically, two things: the irregularities in rates and the lack of protection for the citizenry as they face abuses by the companies for both services. On the question of the first, it is clear that the reduction in rates per call by cellular telephone and international calls did not have a great impact on the citizenry, principally because they are small market sectors and because they are services which are, in some degree, absolutely necessary. It is on the question of fixed telephone rates and electricity where the problem occurred, because there was not and is not any possibility for choice and their prices, far from going down, keep going up.

The discontent with privatization has turned into a rejection of the measure in that this increase in rates (in spite of all, supported by law) was accompanied by serious irregularities in the charges for services. The long lines of customers complaining about the unjustified charges on their electricity bills and their fixed telephone and cellular bills (on the modality of "he who calls, pays") were sufficiently eloquent. Privatization of the services is not only not translating into a reduction in rates, it is, worse still, the companies who offer the services who are repeating the same irregularities which characterized the disappeared ANTEL and CAESS.

Given these excesses (riddled with illegality), the response of the General Superintendence for Electricity and Telecommunications (SIGET), the only entity to which the customers could have recourse in order to make their claims and complaints valid, could not be more disappointing. Aside from the weak complaints and wrist-slapping against the companies which have been found to have committed irregularities, SIGET limits itself to recommending patience to the customers and advising them to have recourse to available mechanisms (highly difficult and confusing mechanisms) designed by the very companies responsible for the service in order to deal with customer complaints. The customer, then, is without defense.

But the problem does not end here. The faint willingness of SIGET to obey the law and regulate healthy competition in the offering of services also affected, during 1999, the telephone companies who entered late onto the market. TELEMOVIL and TELECOM, using their privileged position in the market (on the question of capacity for competition so decisive for interconnection) did not hesitate to obstruct—but also boycott—its competitors. The initial refusal by TELEMOVIL to permit the cellular interconnection on its market with the TELEFONIC and PERSONAL and the suspicious delays with which TELECOM resolved the difficulty of access to other services such as international calls, are only two examples which illustrate the modality in which privatization of telephone service was implemented which not only resulted in harm to the customers, but also to the enterprises which invested in the sector.

The absence of rate benefits for the customers and the lack of guarantees for the existence of free and transparent competition are the lessons for 1999 and the legacy of the process of privatization. It is from this point of view, and not only on the basis of ideological opposition to the socio-economic policies of neo-liberalism, that solid objections might be formulated against the intentions of the Flores administration to privatize the health services and the system for distribution of potable drinking water. In 1999 it was clear that privatization did not comply with the promises made and that there is no governmental willingness to make the available legal mechanisms prevail for the benefit of the customers as well as for the businesses which offer the services. The process of privatization, then, is called into question once again.

During 1999 it became sufficiently clear that the government is ending up in an isolated position in order to does it pleases. The social actors which could have provided an effective counterweight to governmental social policies have flung themselves against the wall of Francisco Flores' refusal to negotiate with them, especially if their demands have to do with salary increases for the public sector or with the privatization of the few services which are still under the aegis of the state. It is not a question of declaring that the trade unions will not continue with their activities during the year 2000, it is, rather, a question of pointing out that their strategies have shown themselves to be incapable of extracting concessions from Flores and that he, continuing to act on a plane parallel to the strikes, has continued along with his government projects.

Paradoxically, the unions returned from exile in the social dynamic of the country and carried out frenetic activities and called public opinion to attention, but without succeeding in almost anything. The most serious case —and cause for concern— is, without doubt, that of the Social Security Institute. 1999 ended with a strike which had been going on for more than a month and the unionists have been left with only the recourse of entering into a process of arbitration which, even should it be able to resolve the question of the collective contract in their favor, will not deal with what was really transcendental in their struggle: the reform of the health sector. SIMETRISSS was ended up ensnared by the government: incapable of deepening their means of applying pressure without abandoning the patient-subscribers to their luck and having to confide in a mechanism for resolution of the problem that will not deal with their demands for years, it has been an impotent witness to the partial privatization of the Lamatepec and Roma hospitals, of the setting in motion of an alternative system of consultations and witness, as well, to the opening up of the process of receiving bids for the contracting out of surgeries which throughout 1999 were left pending because of the strike.

What can be expected, then, in this year, 2000? On the question of the trade unions, there are two possibilities: either recognize that nothing is to be won by continuing with the same line of action as in 1999, or by intensifying the strikes until the situation becomes untenable. Obviously, it would be reasonable to take the first road and not the second. It is not necessary to point out that with this the possibility for violent confrontation will open up of which, in spite of all, there was little during 1999. The challenge is, then, to look to the creativity and lucidity of the trade unions, given that Flores and his administration appear to have little to offer on this score.

Symbolically, the failure of the trade union struggle to stop privatization of the health sector is also the failure of the society to influence public policy. If neither MOLI nor SIMETRISSS succeeded in turning the tide of the privatization of the Social Security Institute, there will be very little that the future customers of the privatized service can do to show their discontent. This year has placed in evidence more than ever the fact that the government is deaf to the voice of civil society; that it is not interested in citizen participation more than for its own ends —which are generally electoral— and that in this country things could go wrong, terribly wrong, without anyone being able to do anything to remedy the situation.