Fear of the law

Update on free trade agreement with Mexico

Social violence: the challenge for 2000

News Briefs

FEAR OF THE LAW

No human life is worth more than any other. All are equally valuable. In this President Francisco Flores is absolutely right. Where his logic becomes inconsistent is when, once this equality is established in terms of respect and appreciation for human life, it does not follow that none of the violations committed against it ought to be investigated and judged. On the contrary, precisely because all human life has immense value, all human beings ought to be respected equally and defended in the same unconditional way. This is the reason why the Society of Jesus and the Universidad Centroamericana "José Simeón Cañas" insist on a final resolution to the case of the Jesuits. The reopening of the case in order to investigate what was not investigated and to judge what has not yet been judged, that is to say to discover who the intellectual authors are is very important for the universal and unconditional defense of life. Ex–President Alfredo Cristiani recognizes that he did what he could at that time, which is not everything he should have done. The law has not been satisfied; nor has justice been complied with.

The recommendations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights are obligatory for El Salvador given that they are provisions of the American Convention and because the state of El Salvador expressly recognizes the existence of that Commission. Another point is that this obligation must be complied with in good faith. It is not, then, a simple recommendation that the Salvadoran state might possibly obey or not. Not to obey it is to be sanctioned by the Commission and the rebellious state is placed on a list of those who do not obey the dispositions of the Commission. To this should be added the fact that the Salvadoran state rejected a friendly arrangement and did not even bother to respond to the requirements of the Commission.

President Flores does not have the authority to close the case, as this is a matter for the state as a whole, which is the only competent entity to decide; such authority is not the exclusive province of the executive office of government. The president’s declarations give us to understand that he will not respect the Commission’s recommendations. Nothing significant can be expected from the Legislative branch of government. But there remain various possibilities with the Judicial Branch of government for pursuing and obtaining the justice due: one method is to ask the Attorney General of the Republic to continue investigating. If this petition were to be denied, an appeal to the Supreme Court could be presented alleging lack of compliance with the obligatory recommendation of the Commission. Another possibility is to present a judicial appeal charging unconstitutionality of the amnesty law before the Supreme Court itself based on the Commission’s recommendation. Recourse might also be had to the judge for reopening the case, given that this could obviate a national law which might enter into potential contradiction with an international law. It is possible, however, that pressure could be applied to the Judicial Branch not to pay any attention to these petitions, which would place in evidence the lack of independence of the state powers. In any event, given all of these possibilities, recourse might be had to an international tribunal. So it is that the Salvadoran state has had placed before it the opportunity to defend the right to life and gain stature and international credibility thereby.

The sole reason for which President Flores has not respected or observed the determination of the Inter-American Commission is the fear that after this determination, others will follow. It is not the Inter-American Commission which is abridging or interfering with the legal framework of El Salvador. On the contrary, from the perspective of the American Convention, the amnesty law is in flagrant contradiction with its statutes. The real reason is altogether different. It is the fear of the power which committed the assassinations and covered them up.

The generals of the specific high command called the "Tandona" do not have much presence or weight in national politics nor in the military sphere to such a degree that they can impede the investigation of their responsibility in the assassination of the Jesuits and in many other cases. The generals, once outside the army, have little relevance, unless it is the case that their fate is somehow linked to other powerful figures in national life. These generals currently have no power to destabilize the country, unless, in spite of having left the army, they still maintain linkages with the Armed Forces and can apply influence in that institution. In that case, the implication is that the Salvadoran state is highly fragile and weak. It would be hostage to its former generals.

The obstacle to the state of law is not represented by its former generals but rather by the civilians who currently occupy positions of power. This is what transpires in the rejection by the high level functionaries of the Salvadoran state to the recommendations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the case of the Jesuits. Their declarations reveal fear. It is a fear expressed in vague terms which they are incapable of analyzing because it is their own fear. They fear the consequences which would follow upon a serious police investigation. They fear that they might be exposed before public opinion, even when they are conscious of the fact that they could count on a pardon which would keep them from going to jail. The wounds which they do not want to show are their own wounds and they hide them by projecting their own anguish and fear upon the society at large.

They are victims of their own fear. They aspire to establish a state of law, national and internationally recognized; they declare themselves to be against impunity and they prosecute organized crime. But their efforts do not yield the hoped for results. And the fact is that a state of law cannot be raised up on the foundation of impunity and injustice. One of the specious arguments for not re-opening the case is that it would cause trauma and disorder, which is evident. But the only disorder or trauma would be suffered by those implicated in the crime and its cover-up. This would mean, in other words, that those crimes whose investigation would cause problems or which would bother important figures in national life ought not to be investigated This is what is happening in practice.

Power is above the law not only in the realms of criminality but also in the spheres of national life. Examples abound in daily life. Power has kidnapped the law in El Salvador and as long as power is not made to submit, there will be no law; nor will there be a state based upon law. To obey the recommendations of the Inter-American Commission on the Jesuit case would be a historic opportunity to begin to require power to submit to law.

UPDATE ON FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH MEXICO

During recent months, the efforts of the government to promote free trade have intensified to the point that, according to the Minister of the Economy, Miguel Lacayo, the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which is under negotiation between the countries of the northern triangle of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras) and Mexico have progressed to the point that they are "99%" complete. Along these same lines, last October measures were initiated which would lead to the signing of a NAFTA agreement with Chile (Proceso, 875).

The signing of the NAFTA agreement with Mexico would be good news for the Salvadoran government, especially because the negotiations have extended on now for almost nine years without any success, practically since the signing of the Tuxtla Gutierrez Declaration in 1991 between the presidents of Central America and Mexico. This document stipulated the following: "in analyzing the current state of trade between Central America and Mexico, the presidents reaffirmed their commitment to contribute to the creation of a just and equitable national system of trade...[and] underlined the importance of the opening up of markets as a way of moving ahead on the questions of competition, the stimulation of efficiency, modernization and competition". In this agreement the bases for an Agreement on Economic Complementation which would be tantamount to the starting point for the setting up of a free trade zone.

From that point in time until the present, the process has had to confront diverse obstacles such as the withdrawal of Nicaragua from the talks, the suspension of the negotiations because of the Mexican economic crisis in 1994 and, finally, the signing of the bilateral trade agreement between Costa Rica and Mexico. As a result of the foregoing, at present only three countries are engaged in joint negotiations with Mexico and there exists the possibility that in the end, each country could establish separate agreements.

According to Minister Lacayo, the NAFTA accord with Mexico would be ready for signing and even the negotiators would present, on January 12, "the final proposal and the closing of the NAFTA agreement by telephone". Nevertheless, after these declarations, two new elements have come to the fore which modify the scenario in significant ways: first of all, the existence of disagreements about the products to be excluded and secondly, the possibility that the free trade agreement might be signed in a bilateral modality with each country in the northern triangle.

As a result of the foregoing, it is important to review the state of the negotiations and the diverse evaluations which the representatives of private enterprise and the government have to offer about the process.

On January 10 of this year talks were begun between representatives of the business associations and the Ministry of the Economy with the objective of presenting a response to the most recent Mexican counter-proposals: those of not accepting quotas or timeframes for textile and finished textile work nor providing total exclusion for all of the products considered to be sensible. According to newspaper versions, the negotiations had come to an impasse because of the fact that Mexico had initially accepted a list of products to be excluded: cement, automobiles, iron, beer, cigarettes, pork products, sausages, milk products, fruits, vegetables, basic grains, roasted coffee, sugar and poultry products; but then the exclusion of cement and automobiles was requested.

Additionally, the Mexicans drew up a new proposal for the branch of textiles which, although it has not yet been made known publicly, presupposes the elimination of the preferential treatment for textiles of the Central American countries in the NAFTA agreement which initially contemplated tariff exemptions under the condition that they would acquire from Mexican providers the synthetic fabric to make the textiles during a five-year period. It is still unknown if the rest of the products negotiated in the NAFTA agreement with Mexico would also be made from Mexican raw materials.

In the context of the counterproposals it was learned that Mexico had presented an alternative proposal for NAFTA with Guatemala, which would open up the possibility that the NAFTA agreement might be signed bilaterally by each one of the countries of the northern triangle and no longer as a group; this would complicate still more the possibilities for Central American integration. According to Miguel Lacayo, "it may be that some one of the countries might succeed in tying up their agreement some days before the others, but the objective is that it should be among all three". Nevertheless, it was also learned that Mexico has proposed a bilateral agreement to El Salvador, which was also not denied by Lacayo.

Moreover, evident contradictions exist between the functionaries of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador with respect to the state of the negotiations with Mexico. While in El Salvador the Minister of the Economy is optimistic towards the NAFTA agreement, in the two neighboring countries functionaries are of the opinion that the negotiations were bogged down and that flexibility or new alternatives were necessary. According to the Salvadoran government, the NAFTA agreement with Mexico would increase by U.S. $100 million the exports to that country and would create between 5,000 and 10,000 jobs, but for representatives of private enterprise the benefits of the NAFTA agreement are not so automatic and merit an evaluation. In fact, the Salvadoran Association of Industrialists (ASI) have requested that the government present a study of the effects of the impact of the NAFTA agreement with Mexico which would cover two fundamental areas: a study of the fiscal, social and economic impact; and the monitoring of the administrative aspects of NAFTA.

According to the president of ASI, Leonel Mejía, it will be necessary to quantify the implications of the elimination of the trade barriers over and against the fiscal deficit which, he declared, is one of the "most worrisome" aspects of economic behavior. The executive director of ASI, Jorge Arriaza has pointed out that the social and economic study ought to quantify Mexican investment which will enter the country, what kind of investment it is and the capability of the said investment to generate jobs. This is not the first sign of a lack of confidence on the part of the private sector towards the NFTA agreement with Mexico because on previous occasions, representatives of private enterprise had also expressed concern about the lifting of trade barriers in the sense that this should be done with "caution". The ASI had even requested previously that the trade barriers should be increased (Proceso, 884).

The NAFTA agreement with Mexico has been adopted by the government as an end in and of itself, believing blindly in the neo-liberal postures presented in the Tuxtla Gutierrez declarations, thinking that the opening up of markets would provide the panacea for all of the development problems. What is true is that free trade has shown itself, on many occasions, to be a not infallible formula. Examples of this are the free trade agreement between Canada and the United States and the Central American Common Market because in both cases, the lesser developed country (Canada in the first case and Nicaragua and Honduras, in the second case) experienced a deterioration in their trade balance, plant closings, a fall in production and loss of jobs.

Currently the Salvadoran productive apparatus is suffering one of its worst moments owing to the slow growth of non-traditional exports and the contraction of the market for traditional exports (see Proceso, 884), as well as a broadening of the trade and service sectors. In a context of this nature, a NAFTA agreement with Mexico could deepen these tendencies to promote the substitution of national production and provide a greater impulse to trade and services.

SOCIAL VIOLENCE: THE CHALLENGE FOR 2000

The decade of the 70’s closed in El Salvador with a serious political crisis. The government of General Carlos Humberto Romero, for as much as he set in motion measures such as "the Law for the Defense and Guarantee of Public Order" —inspired by the Doctrine of National Security that the South American military governments had implemented in order to contain the social and political participation of the broad sectors of the society— was incapable of controlling the overflow of popular organizations. On October 15 of 1979, a group of progressive military officers carried out a coup d´état with reformist pretensions which was coopted by conservative military officers. Meanwhile, the popular organizations became more radical in their demands and, as a consequence of this, had to deal with the backlash of state repression.

The Revolutionary Junta Government could not deal with the political crisis and responded to the demonstrations of the popular organizations with enormous quotas of state repression. When Jose Napoleon Duarte joined the junta in December of 1980, economic and social reforms were initiated —such as the agrarian reform and the nationalization of the bank and of foreign trade—, but these were accompanied by a strong dose of state violence. The leaders of the popular organizations perceived that there was no other road than to opt for revolutionary insurrection. This option became a reality in May of 1980 with the United Revolutionary Political and Military Leadership (DRU-PM), a joint command which coordinated the military activities of diverse guerrilla nucleus and the Revolutionary Coordination of the Masses (CRM) which took charge of coordinating the political work of the mass fronts. In April of the same year, the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) was formed and this body joined together the large majority of revolutionary organizations and opposition parties, institutions, associations and democratic personalities of the country. In October 1980, the DRU became the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). On January 10, 1981, the FMLN launched its "final offensive" or "general offensive" and the civil war formally began.

During the twelve years of armed conflict, the FMLN deployed all of its potentiality, which had been forged during the previous decade. Innumerable members of popular urban organizations —many of them survivors of the repression which was unleashed in the country between 1981 and 1983— joined its ranks. Innumerable peasant organizations did the same, as in the case of the FECCAS-UTC as well as other peasant organizations who not only joined the ranks of the guerrilla army, but became the basic social base, its source of provisions and the guarantee of its material survival. In these conditions, militarily speaking, the FMLN became a powerful guerrilla, capable of engaging an army of more than 50,000 men, advised, trained and financed by the U.S. in a 21,000-square-kilometer territory without large mountains and surrounded by countries with regimes hostile to the guerrilla struggle (Honduras and Guatemala).

Slowly the FMLN began the process of internal adjustments which became significant changes in its strategic proposals, all of which was not unlike the re-structuring of the international scene caused by the fall of the eastern block, as well as a new correlation of forces inside the country after twelve years of civil war, sunk in a generalized social weariness and the strong national and international impact of the assassination, on November 16, 1989 by army troops, of the Jesuits Ignacio Ellacuría, Segundo Montes, Amando López, Juan Ramón Moreno, Ignacio Martín-Baró, Joaquín López y López and their collaborators Elba Ramos and her daughter Celina Maricet —came between the two sides in conflict.

In that scene, the FMLN moved, not without difficulties and long ideological and political debates, from a revolutionary struggle for the political power of the state to a revolutionary struggle for the foundation of a nation in which social and political democracy came to be the central forces of the social, economic and political life. For their part, the ARENA party, after leaving behind its background as an institution linked to the death squads at the beginning of the decade of the 80´s and supported by its most moderate wing took up the challenges posed by the negotiation of the end of the war with the FMLN. The offensive launched by the insurgents in November 1989 showed not only that a definitive military triumph by whichever side was not close, but that the economic costs of the war made any proposal for economic and social development unviable. Consensus on this point —as well as the good will and hard work by the negotiating commissions— was what unblocked the round of negotiations which ended the war in January of 1992 with the signing of the Peace Accords.

The Peace Accords of New York (1991) and Chapultepec (1992) constituted a fundamental starting point for the new national project of the FMLN made its own during the 12 years of the civil war. It also became the starting point from which the government of ARENA could implement its plans for economic development oriented not only towards strengthening the financial system, but towards the generation of confidence between national and international business groups. Four years after the signing of the accords, the Peace Accords were officially declared to have been complied with. Nevertheless, substantial aspects of the accords—such as the beginnings of new relationships between the workers, the state and businessmen and the democratization of the political parties —were left pending and constitute, currently, sensitive nerve points on the agenda of the democratization of the country.

Definitively speaking, the twelve years of civil war, the triumphs, the defeats, the assassinations, the persecutions, the fear and insecurity, contributed decisively to moderate the most extreme political postures and to accept that if it were not possible to exterminate the enemy, at least it might be possible to live with the enemy. The FMLN decided to sign the Peace Accords, compete in elections for a quota of power, always revocable by means of the polls, and the political system was opened up to the ideological and political proposals of the FMLN converted into a political party. This was one of the most important successes of the Accords, with which the transition to democracy took an unprecedented step. There now exists a broad consensus between the most diverse social and political groups that democracy is better than authoritarianism.

Since the decade of the 70’s and continuing up to the present moment, important transformation have taken place in Salvadoran reality. The socio-political violence which hit the country during the 70´s became open and armed conflict in the following decade, and this in turn gave way to a process of political reforms of a democratic nature. Slowly, a state of law is beginning to be constructed with the subsequent respect for legality which this implies. The balance of powers, even with limitations, little by little permitted the exercise of political power without abuse. In the economic sphere important changes have taken place in the productive structure. El Salvador is ceasing to be an agriculture country in a process which is changing it into a country dominated by the service sector.

The agrarian reform of the 80’s, the civil war and the application of a series of neo-liberal reforms by the two ARENA administrations —and which are being given continuity by the Francisco Flores administration— decisively influenced the transformation of the national economy. As a complement to these processes of economic and political change, an important reform of the state is taking place, which is focussed upon reducing the economic protagonism which it began to acquire in 1931. From an economic model in which the state was the decisive actor, we are passing, in the decade of the 90’s, to an economic model which demands that the state a minimal participation. The Salvadoran state is accommodating itself, by means of its institutional reform to these demands.

In this context, the challenge of 2000 —once the political violence has been overcome— is that of social violence, the most noteworthy outbreaks of which (crime, kidnapping, fights between youth gangs, violence in the family) make the greater part of the population feel unsure of themselves and many of its members, supported by diverse political figures, long for the return of controllably force which predominated during the long reign of military officers. In the century which is ending now, El Salvador, after having left behind the political violence which dominated national life in the last two decades, is being held prisoner of social violence, which presents challenges without precedent not only to governmental authorities, but to the whole of society.

So it is, then, that one of the great challenges of the country for the new millenium is this very same social violence, the presence of which is undermining the basic foundations of the ability of Salvadorans to live together. Many of the cultural schemas which propitiate violent attitudes and behavior at the present time arose during the two previous decades. The idea that force and arrogance are the best way out as much in order to control society (authoritarianism) as well as to change it (revolutionary rebellion) have become deeply rooted in the Salvadoran political culture that even now it constitutes a threat for the advance of the process of democratization. In this sense, the decades of the 1970´s and 1980´s are closer to us that it might seem and it is convenient —if we which to recuperate the best of those years and overcome their worst sequels— not to forget it.

SUPPORT. The legislative faction of the FMLN will insist again on the approval of a decree for amnesty for the 221 employees fired from the Salvadoran Institute for Social Security (ISSS). The head of the FMLN faction, Shafick Handal said, on January 5, indicated that they will attempt to convince the other legislative factions to give the necessary votes. "We, together with the rest of the parties who are in this situation, we are going to insist", he said. The General Coordinator of the FMLN, Fabio Castillo said that the strikes, from his point of view, are "a legal arm". And that legality assures them of the institutional support for the party. Castillo argues that the strike is the most dependable way to achieve social peace. Likewise, he expressed the opinion that the strike of the ISSS union is going beyond private interests in order to become a problem which "affects us all". "This union has proposed something vital and that is the problem of the health care system", said Castillo. The FMLN, according to the Coordinator, is supporting the hope that there will be a solution to the problem of health and the salaries which permit a better quality of life", stated Castillo. Castillo declares that the problem of the strike is getting worse, in part, because of the attitude which the government has taken to deal with it. The solution to the strike being carried out by the workers of the ISSS, according to Castillo, will issue in the achievement of an improvement of health care in El Salvador (La Prensa Gráfica, January 6, p. 10; El Diario de Hoy, January 8, p. 10).

PEÑATE. On January 20 the final report of the special commission which investigated the Ombudsman for Human Rights, Eduardo Peñate Polanco will be made public. In spite of the fact that the investigations of the functionary are not yet finished, everything points to the act that Peñate will be removed from his post. Benjamin Cuellar, Director of the Institute for Human Rights of the UCA (IDHUCA), presented, on January 7, before the aforementioned commission, a brief with 16 proofs against Peñate. In the report is established the fact that the functionary has violated Article 194 of the Constitution, which refers to the attributions which are his legal responsibility. According to IDHUCA, Peñate has used up to 40,000 colones as per diem expenses, he has invited himself, by means of INTERNET, to attend international events to which he was not invited. For the legislator, Kirio Waldo Salgado of the PLD, the situation is clear. "This report confirms that he must be removed from office and, moreover, it confirms that he has committed crimes which ought to be brought to justice". It would seem that the deputies have already taken the decision to remove the functionary; however, they must listen to other arguments. René Figueroa, of ARENA, declared that, for the moment, they do not anticipate any judgement. "There are enough elements that hang in the balance. Beforehand, however, it is necessary to summarize and evaluate the proofs", he announced (La Prensa Gráfica, January 8, p. 20; El Diario de Hoy, January 8, p. 16).

CAMPAIGN. Salvadoran political parties intensified, on January 8 and 9, their preparations for beginning the electoral campaign which will mark an end to the passivity which marked past presidential campaigns. The two principal contenders, ARENA and the FMLN, held, on January 8, separate conventions with their candidates for mayor and deputy in which they made public the focus they will give in their respective electoral campaigns. ARENA will push for a program of security, which implies "everything which will bring confidence to the country" on the judicial, economic and social levels and not only in the fight against crime, according to Alfredo Cristiani, president of ARENA. Moreover, ARENA has presented, within its political program the platform of new opportunities which include investment in human development as well as economic and social development the FMLN, on the other hand, will offer the population a political policy for the restructuring of the economy of the country, the reactivation of agriculture, the creation of laws which benefit the masses and, at all times a proposal to avoid the privatization of public services. The FMLN will also propose putting a stop to the high cost of living by means of seeking mechanisms which permit price stability for the products of the basic food basket (El Diario de Hoy, January 9, p. 2 y3 ).

EXTRADITION. The reform to Article 28 of the Constitution of the Republic was agreed upon on January 10 by the members of the Commission on Extradition of the Legislative Assembly. The article does not permit the sending of any person outside of the country to be tried. It was agreed to exclude any kind of crime linked to politics, although they might involve common crimes. Likewise, it was determined that the treaty may not be applied retroactively, but that reciprocal procedures could be applied: the criminal will enjoy the rights established by the law of the country in which the person is to be tried. It was also established that a Salvadoran may not be extradited to a country where the death penalty applies. Ruben Zamora, of the CDU, pointed out that, although the content of the amendment has not been agreed upon in a definitive form, it is hoped that a general consensus will be achieved in order to send it for approval by the plenary. "this is the beginning, but we believe that we are on the right road, in such a way that we can approve it and the next legislative can ratify it", he declared. In order to guarantee the respect for these conditions, before any kind of treat goes into effect it will have to be ratified by 56 deputies. For Kirio Waldo Salgado, of the PLD, the reform "reflects the sense of the people and, above all, it contains the basic principal of reciprocity" (El Diario de Hoy, January 11, p. 10 and La Prensa Gráfica, January 11, p. 4).

STISSS. Faced with the caution of the government, the trade unionists of the Social Security Institute refused to add patrimonial advantages to the collective bargaining contract signed with this institution during a meeting held on January 10 with the three arbitrators who are analyzing the conflict. These rejections occurred during demonstrations by trade union spokespersons and the representative of the workers in the arbitration panel, Felix Ulloa. The Workers of the Salvadoran Institute for Social Security (STISSS) asked that "they [ five clauses of the contract currently in effect] be left the same". This is owing to the fact that the three arbitrators will produce, during the coming days, a brief with judicial power in order to require that both parts enter into binding arbitration on the conflict. This means that the trade unionists will renounce new advantages on the payrolls, to raise the evaluation for merit which the workers of Social Security receive and increase the salary rolls and benefits for work carried out. They also refused an increase of 300 colones during this year as they had demanded during the conflict last March. The government took the refusal of the unionists to receive patrimonial advantages as "a positive sign". However they are awaiting new signs so as not "to fall into a trap" as the government spokesperson expressed it (El Diario de Hoy, January 11, p. 2).

DISAGREEMENT. The conflict between the government and the trade unionists of the ISSS continues. while SIMETRISSS announced new protests, doctors of the ISSS advocated putting an end to the problem. Specialists and surgeons held a meeting on January 11 with the objective of seeking an immediate solution to the strike. The specialists revealed that the majority of them no longer support the strike because their initial objective (the non-privatization of the health system) has lost force given the restitution of the STISSS members fired. It is said that the doctors requested permission from the union leadership to begin the surgeries pending since the strike began (El Diario de Hoy, January 13, p. 4).

CAMPAIGN. The electoral campaign for the elections of deputies began on January 12. Some 84 positions for deputies for the Legislative Assembly are to be voted upon and 20 posts for the Central American parliament (PARLACEN). ARENA, CDU, PDC; PLD and PAN held meetings and caravans to make the official beginning of the proselytizing period. ARENA gathered some 5,000 people in Izalco where their campaigns traditionally begin. At the meeting, the President of COENA, Alfredo Cristiani, criticized the work of the deputies of the left party (El Diario de Hoy, January 13, p. 2).

MINORS. International organisms such a the UNICEF and UNHCR proposed, on January 12, that the face and name of a minor who has broken the law may be published in the new media if the judge permits it. "The judge in the case can, at the petition of one of the parties, by means of a resolution, allow publicity providing information about the image of the identity of the minor", according to the text of the reformed Article 25 of the Law. This as part of the 20 amendments that the dependencies of the Organization of United Nations (ONU) proposed to apply the Law of Minors who break the law. Currently the law is clear concerning the prohibition on the publication of the identity of the minor lawbreaker.. "When the topic was discussed with experts and representatives of the institutions who work with minors, they were not in agreement on this point", stated Florentín Melendez, UN representative. Likewise, the penal age will not be reduced. Those under 18 years of age will be processed on the Law covering minor law breakers and not under the penal codes, as was intended. For all of the legislative fractions, the proposals are good ones, however, they will be studied in order to approve them before the current legislative is ended (La Prensa Gráfica, January 13, p. 4 and El Diario de Hoy, January 13, p. 10).