The electoral period

An examination of the proposed government plans of Luis Cardenal and Héctor Silva (I)

The socio-economic situation of the agriculture and livestock sector

Salvadorans face the elections

News Briefs

THE ELECTORAL PERIOD

The electoral period in El Salvador began as 1999 ended. This means that the activity of the political parties internally was marked by arrangements and disputes about who were to figure as candidates for mayor and deputy while, externally, it was characterized by the effort to make their presence felt in the society. The first supposed, on a new note, that the political rivalries would become one of the principal centers of the political parties’ activities. This was particularly notorious in the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), inside of which the disputes which accompanied Ronal Umaña from the moment he became one of the key figures in the PDC leadership body. But all in all the parties which aimed to join together around the ever problematic "political center", the internal disputes were the order of the day, given that on the topic of the single banner or the attempts of any of the allies —or their leaders— to become the principal spokesperson for the confused centrist project.

Meanwhile, in the two big political parties —ARENA and the FMLN— rivalries have been quieted by the force of internal discipline, something in which both parties are sufficiently well versed. In this way, once the electoral period was unleashed, neither ARENA nor the FMLN place their respective party projects at risk, for as much as important battles were waged between the old guard and their allies and those who hold up the real or presumed banners of renewal and renovation. The necessary truce achieved, both parties have been able to dedicate their energies and talents to the design and implementation of the strategy which, according to the calculations of the most lucid minds, will permit them to win the greatest number of votes for their candidates. The rest of the parties have already taken advantage of this situation, the majority of which have neither overcome their internal conflicts nor seem to be clear as to what platform they might present in the up-coming March 12 elections.

Concerning the social presence of the parties and their figures, it is clear that one of the basic lessons in political practice is that in order to win votes, it is necessary to fix the faces and emblems of those who have become the daily referents for the citizens in the collective imagination. This lesson can well be translated into saturation publicity —television and radio spots, wall-paintings and poster propaganda, visits to the population—, just at the point in time when the electoral law declares the campaign open until it closes.

Not all of the parties limit themselves to the time period stipulated by electoral law. ARENA, which is in and of itself a political machine, has not placed its bets only on what could be won during the formally established campaign. It has bet on what can be done beforehand; and much that can be done consists in making their candidates into peoples and faces known by everyone, even to the most far-flung township in the country —even though they may be completely unknown by large sectors of the population: consider, for example, the cases of Francisco Flores and Luis Cardenal. Here, as in other matters —for example, in terms of economic resources and internal discipline— ARENA is far ahead of other parties. Can the rest of the parties place themselves neck and neck with ARENA and fight to place their bets the winning horse in the race which ARENA has up until now always enjoyed the victory? In terms of economic resources, this is a particularly difficult situation. In terms of internal discipline, perhaps only the FMLN could compete.

So, seen from the inside, ARENA has major strengths which the rest of the political parties, except the FMLN, in key areas such as party discipline and the capacity for mobilization of the party’s militancy. Seen from the outside, the social presence of ARENA and its candidates is polished in advance with regard to the formal initiation of the electoral campaign. This permits the party and its candidates to appear in the collective imagination, which is basic for the orientation of electoral preferences. Few wish to give their vote to a candidate about whom they know very little or not at all.

The question de rigor is the following: Is ARENA unbeatable? Up until now, its internal forces and its ability to promote its candidates in the social arena have garnered good results for this party. Nevertheless, this cannot be an eternal state of affairs, at least for two reasons: the first, because to engage in the activity of governing is an exhausting task, above all if social and economic policies lacerate the interests of the broad sectors of the populace. And when these mistakes, far from being corrected, have been repeated time and again, they cannot be erased even by the most ingenious marketing strategy. In second place, the political parties —especially the FMLN— are not going always to be on a par with ARENA on the question of knowledge and abilities concerning techniques and strategies for electoral publicity. Once the FMLN— or any other party which might emerge and gain some presence— seriously assumes the marketing component of politics, ARENA will be in real difficulty.

Inasmuch as it is presumable that in the March 12 elections ARENA might win the advantage because of the inertia which up until now has permitted it to maintain itself in power, although possibly not where it would most like to be in power, which is in the municipality of San Salvador, the reconquest of which has become one of the fundamental centers of the ARENA political campaign. Perhaps the strategists of Hector Silva’s party, should he be re-elected as mayor, might become the most important figure with the potential for becoming presidential material. From this, for ARENA, the recuperation of the San Salvador municipality may not be an end in and of itself, but a means to keep itself from suffering a possible political reverse in the following presidential elections.

The FMLN reading seems to be the same as that of ARENA, only in reverse order: a Silva victory would set the FMLN on the road to fulfilling its aspirations for obtaining the executive office in the not too distant future. As things go, the Silva-Cardenal race has moved the municipal and legislative elections up to a second level, at least with regard to the perspective of democratization of the country: i.e., the possibility for restructuring the prevailing centers of power in the Legislative Assembly and the possibility for strengthening or re-focussing the work of the local governments.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROPOSED GOVERNMENT PLANS OF LUIS CARDENAL AND HECTOR SILVA (I)

Beginning with the presidential elections of last year a curious fact began to emerge: the speeches and electoral promises of the FMLN and ARENA tended to converge. Anyone who has reviewed the government programs which Facundo Guardado and Francisco Flores presented had to have noticed that they were more notable similarities and coincidences than differences (see Proceso, 842, 844 and 845). In spite of coming from the antipodes of the political and ideological spectrum, the candidates of the two biggest parties presented almost identical government plans, even exhibiting the same weaknesses and generalities.

They changed the titles and names of the politicians which they offered to the population, but, fundamentally, the spirit which animated them seemed to be the same. Nevertheless, if this notable convergence between the two government plans existed, the figures of the candidates for the presidency could not be more different the one from the other: between the academic and almost unknown Francisco Flores and the ex-commander and poorly educated Facundo Guardado there was an abyss which impeded any comparison or similarity. Finally, the astute campaign which Francisco Flores waged ended tipping the balance in his favor. It was the image and not the word which was finally decisive in the presidential election.

This tendency of ARENA and the FMLN towards a convergent similarity in their electoral campaigns has reached its highest apogee in the context of the competition for the Mayor’s Office of San Salvador. Although officially the campaign for the principal municipality of the country still has not begun, what has happened up to this point in rim shows two parties competing with each other with candidates (Hector Silva and Luis Cardenal) with profiles and promises which, as the election date comes closer and closer begin to resemble each other more and more. At first sight, with regard to image, it is Luis Cardenal who has set the pace for this similarity in the kind of campaigns being waged.

Up until the point in time when ARENA and their campaign advisors caused conservative family values to become the mainstay of Luis Cardenal’s image, Hector Silva had demonstrated little interest in mixing his image as public functionary with his image as father of a family; nor has he made a public exhibition of his moral beliefs. Now, as with Cardenal, Silva displays his wife at every public act and has become a stalwart defender of the values of matrimony and family. So it was, then, in the advance takes of the electoral campaign of Cardenal and Silva, as opposed to the campaigns waged by Guardado and Flores, their campaigns have converged in picturesque and superficial aspects (those related to the question of the image of the candidate). What should be said about the speeches and government plans, the really basic and central points of which could come to imply either a good or bad municipal government?

For now, the government plans, as much those of Silva as those of Cardenal, are fragmented and incomplete. Nevertheless, and in spite of this limitation, their basic lines can be distinguished. Below, the most important points of Luis Cardenal’s government plan will be reviewed so that, thereafter, in a second article they might be compared with those presented by Hector Silva.

It cannot be said, in the strictest sense of the word, that Cardenal has his own governmental plan: it is, rather, the case that, together, the ARENA candidates for mayor of the Greater Metropolitan San Salvador (GMSS) have drawn up a joint plan. Here is to be found the first great weakness in the Cardenal proposal: he has no plan. Or at least he does not have a plan of his own. Obviously, for example, the municipality of Mejicanos and that of San Salvador belong to GMSS, and for this very reason they have common problems. But it is difficult to assume that these problems (the magnitude and characteristics of which vary from municipality to municipality) and their solutions might be placed in the same category as Cardenal and his colleagues seem to aim to do.

So it is that the first weakness of this government plan consists in the fact that, if it is true that it provides general lines of action for the problems of GMSS, it does not come down to earth regarding the particularities of each municipality in terms of their most concrete and distinctive questions. For this reason, for example, some of the typical problems of the municipality of San Salvador are not discussed nor even taken up. Such is the case of the El Espino or the question of how to disentangle traffic congestion in downtown San Salvador. In this way, Cardenal speaks of "his" plan but without being concrete in anything in particular in any detail at all.

Leaving aside, for the moment, this first big limitation, the government plan of the ARENA candidates for the GMSS, whose logo and organizational scheme are blueprint copies of the New Alliance, it takes up four areas: security, ordering of the downtown area, human development and new opportunities. In the first area the following are proposed as the lines of action: organization of the "united neighborhoods"; coordination of the PNC with the Municipality of San Salvador; programs to rescue and rehabilitate street people and drug addicts; sports and recreation programs; emergency programs and plans for the prevention of disasters and a special security program.

On the questions of getting the downtown area in "order": traffic pattern ordering and that of massive pubic transportation, the question of the metropolitan transportation system, projects to rescue and renew the historic downtown center, an integrated solution to the situation of street vendors, integrated treatment of trash and garbage, traffic infrastructure and accessibility and fluidity of the markets. The third point is that of "human development", and on this point, the following is proposed: basic services for all, legalization of properties, vocational and training workshops, the creation of childcare centers and health clinics, community infrastructural projects and a program for rescuing values and strengthening the family.

Finally, in "new opportunities" the proposal is to focus on: municipal investment in special projects, job pool (or, connection between employees and employers on the question of jobs), educational programs, marketing programs, an effort to foment tourism, the creation of commercial centers for small businessmen, communal banks to serve small and very small businesses, a program of more trees and parks in city planning and the modernization of the Municipality (ISO 900 and ISO 14000).

Of these four areas, only the second —that referring to the reordering of traffic patterns for the greater metropolitan area of San Salvador—, is found to be developed, although in a very peculiar way. In the document dealing with this issue, a little more than a page is dedicated to outlining some of the activities to be taken into consideration (implementing massive public transportation, rehabilitation and straightening out of the vehicular flow of public transportation, continuing with the construction of the highway overpasses, decongestion and re-ordering of the GMSS area markets and the relocation of bus terminals, among others); but the rest is a repetition and summary of some of the diagnostic proposals for the transportation problem implemented for the GMSS.

Diagnostic appraisals and generalities, then, abound in the document. But nowhere is there any precise detail provided on the question of external financing in order to implement the proposed measures which the plan proposes. Nor is there any hierarchical relationship established between and among these projects. Moreover, it is necessary to highlight the fact that the plan avoids dealing with the topic of municipal taxes, the internal source of financing for the municipal projects. In this sense, the ARENA government plan for the GMSS says nothing new and cannot save itself from the perception that it exhibits the deficiency characteristic of previous government plans: much is proposed, but without any clarity as to specific mechanisms which would guide these desires into reality.

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK SECTOR

The topic of economic policies and their effects on the agriculture and livestock sector has been a polemical and contradictory one in almost all countries. In fact, the industrialized countries maintain protectionist policies which surround their agricultural and livestock sectors while at the same time recommending the application of economic liberalization measures for these very sectors in the developing countries. In El Salvador, the agricultural and livestock policy is not clearly defined and moves, according to the case in question, between protectionism and economic liberalization. This lack of definition persists in spite of the fact that on diverse occasions ARENA administrations have announced plans and measures to promote the development of this sector.

In 1966, ex -President Armando Calderón Sol announced his "Plan for Agricultural and Livestock Development"; in June of 1999, President Francisco Flores announced his proposal for the recuperation of the agricultural and livestock sector; and, more recently, representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG) announced that it was adopting measures for the drawing up of another "Plan for Agricultural and Livestock Development".

At the same time as these options are presented, the agricultural and livestock sector continues in a clear tendency towards the reduction of production and income, which makes the rural area the one where the greatest concentration of poor people in the country is to be found. It is precisely in the rural area that poverty has not been reduced, as opposed to the urban areas where the official figures document reductions in the growth of poverty. The foregoing requires immediate action to be taken for this sector.

Between 1990 and 1998, the production in this sector went from 22% of the GNP to representing 12.8% (at constant price levels in 1990); while in terms of participation in the total exports its total amount moved from 55% to 19% during the same period. Concomitantly, poverty in the rural sector is found to be close to 60% and has shown no signs of being reduced during recent years, in spite of the strong flow of family remittances received.

President Flores’ proposal for the agricultural and livestock sector takes as its premise the supposition that problems in the agricultural and livestock sector are limited to the topic of profit gain; it contemplates, therefore, the development of physical infrastructural programs, promotion of associations, fomenting rural small credits and the promotion of channels of information. More than six moths after its announcement concrete and specific measures to provide follow-up for this offer were still not known, except for a census of zones where infrastructural public works are needed.

The problem of the reactivation of agriculture is intimately related to the possibility for reducing rural poverty, which constitutes one of the principal historic problems of the country and which has sharpened with the process of stabilization and economic adjustment which have been implemented by the ARENA administrations during the decade of the 1990’s. Any agricultural and livestock development plan ought to focus on a two-track policy of fomenting agricultural and livestock production and improving the living conditions of the poorest sectors of the country’s populace. Lamentably, the timidity with which these administrations have taken up the topic has led to the already mentioned loss of importance and status for the agricultural and livestock sector.

The development of agriculture requires, before the establishment of the priorities for the economic policy, that the government define the following question: whether it will continue with the process of liberalization as it has proposed to do or will it implement measures tending towards protection and the fomenting of agricultural and livestock production. It is evident, even for the apologists of these programs themselves, that economic liberalization leads to a reduction in the importance of the agricultural and livestock sector, to the point that it is considered "a normal byproduct of the economic development of a country".

This explains, in part, why the majority of the industrialized countries have subsidized their respective agricultural sectors with the profits generated from other economic sectors in order to maintain the living conditions for the rural population at an acceptable level. Even at present, when their importance for the liberalization of economic development is at stake, the subsidies of the agricultural sector continue to be utilized in countries such as Japan, the United States and members of the European Union. In fact, it is estimated that the subsidies provided for the agricultural producer in these countries are greater than the equivalent of 60% of total production; this is to say that the consumers and/or the state provide subsidies for a total amount that is greater than 60% of their total production.

In the case of El Salvador, it is clear that limitless liberalization is not appropriate, given that it would reduce production and jobs in the agricultural and livestock sector without there having been brought into existence other economic sectors which would make production dynamic and absorb the labor force which could be laid off or displaced. On the other hand, in the hypothetical case that a decision might be made to adopt a policy of subsidies, the consumers of agricultural and livestock products would not be in any condition to offer the necessary resources in the form of higher prices, for which reason, the measure ought to be taken up by the state, which already —beforehand— presents an elevated fiscal deficit which would reduce the margin for movement and maneuvering. This does not imply that short-term measures cannot be implemented while a long-term strategy for the development of agriculture and livestock is discussed and designed.

Likewise, the agricultural and livestock policies offered by the government do not deal with basic issues such as prices, customs and tariffs, which, together with credit, ought to be the basic premises for the development of a promotional strategy for the agricultural and livestock sector. The strategy for designing a "Development Plan for Agriculture and Livestock", taken up recently by MAG, is not to be frowned upon, but it ought not to imply that the necessary short-term measures by means of which it might be implemented should be overlooked.

Definitively speaking, the reinstatement of the group policy for prices for basic grains, the fomenting of non-traditional exports and the adoption of a credit structure in accordance with the kind of producer, are some of the measures which ought to be implemented as soon as possible. The price group showed itself, at one point in time, to be a useful instrument for maintaining prices for some basic grains within the established rubrics and, for this very reason, could well be an instrument for regulating the prices of essential agricultural and livestock products such as basic grains and others.

Fomenting non-traditional exports could be achieved by means of the creation of an economic incentive for specific activities such as the cultivation of fruits and vegetables, and the increase in the investment in infrastructure, international promotion and technical assistance. On the other hand, access to credit should be improved by means of the creation of three different credit areas: the private bank for commercial producers; the Banco de Fomento Agropecuario for farmers with productive potential and a "solidary credit program" for financing producers with overdrawn accounts and without productive potential.

The socio-economic situation of the country requires the rapid adoption of emergency measures which, in the last analysis, must to be oriented towards fomenting agricultural and livestock production but not only by means of the criterion of fomenting commercial agriculture, but also through focussing efforts on the search for the well-being of the poorest farmers.

SALVADORANS FACE THE ELECTIONS

At mid-1999 and as a follow-up procedure for the electoral process of that year, the University Institute for Public Opinion (IUDOP) of the UCA carried out a national poll with the purpose of evaluating the presidential election process. The poll not only explored the reasons for the electoral behavior of the citizens who went to vote some months before, but also of those citizens who decided not to vote or who, for some reason, could not go to the polls.

Almost a year later, and at a stage in which a new electoral process was close at hand, the IUDOP of the UCA believes it is important to take the political discussions of the pre-electoral period into account, including some of the opinions expressed about the past elections and the situation of the country; opinions which, in spite of time, continue to have a great deal of relevance and currency for understanding political concerns of the Salvadoran people and to respond in an appropriate way to these concerns.

The poll under discussion here was carried out with a national sampling of 1,247 adults from throughout the entire national territory, with a sample error of +/-2.8% of the global results.

In the poll, almost 50% of those consulted admitted not having voted in 1999. These people were asked to state the reasons for their absenteeism or abstentionism. Some 39% of those who did not vote did not do so because they did not have an electoral card; 8% could not vote because of problems at the moment when they were to go to vote (they could not find their names on the rolls, because they were not allowed to, etc.). The rest of the citizens who did not vote, or, 53%, had a card but did not go to vote.

The reasons they gave for not going to vote were varied, but the majority of the responses seem to point to a lack of interest in the electoral process. In fact, some 28.9% of the persons who did not go to vote said that they had personal things to do which impeded their going to vote; some 17.2% held that they were not interested in the elections; some 12.3% stated that they did not like any of the political parties; 12% said that voting was worthless because the same people always won and 10.7% argued that they could not vote for work-related reasons. The rest of those consulted gave other reasons which revealed a low-level of confidence in the process (stating problems such as fraud, etc.)

The lack of interest and confidence in elections was not only expressed by those who did not go to vote, but also by a portion of those who did not have an electoral card. The same poll revealed that the group of persons who did not have an electoral card, 57.4% did not solicit one because "they did not have time to go and get it"; some 30.4% stated that they did not wish to solicit one and 7.4% declared that they did not know how to get one. In other words, many people did not have an electoral card because in reality they did not wish to have one.

The results of the polls suggest that the lack of participation in the elections was more linked to indifference of the people towards the electoral process than to difficulties inherent in the system for exercising the right to vote. A good part of the population, as much that part which voted as that which did not, attributed the low level of participation in the election to the lack of confidence in the process and to a lack of interest and disenchantment with the political parties. Even more, when these persons were asked if absenteeism could be attributed to fear on the part of the populace for involving themselves in politics, some 52.6% responded that it might be more a matter of people not liking politics; while some 36.9% agreed with the idea that people were still afraid. These results suggest that, as opposed to past situations, there was still a prevailing attitude of apathy towards politics and, obviously, towards electoral politics, given that there is no longer any fear that something might happen to them if they participate —at least not as it was before— but rather a prevalence of the sense that party politics don't make much sense to them.

It is, then, an analysis of these results which indicate that the bases of these opinions in which indifference is the outstanding factor is to be found, as well as the feeling that political parties have not succeeded in representing the interests of the citizens. According to data yielded by this poll, some 69% of those consulted —that is to say, seven of every ten Salvadorans— felt that their interests were not represented by any political party; this, as compared with 23% who felt that their interests were represented by a political party. The most recent polls indicate that this perception has not improved.

This feeling of distance between the populace and the political parties seems to be the one which finally has more weight for many citizens at the moment in which they make the decision as to whether to participate in politics and, as a consequence, in the value which they attribute to the electoral processes.

Close to 40% of Salvadorans considered that the elections contribute little or nothing to the process of democratization of the country, as compared with 25.7% who declared that elections were somewhat useful and 31.8% who held that they were very useful for the democratization of the country. A good part of the citizens cannot find any sense in the electoral processes because, for many of them, the political parties are not close to the population and do not, therefore, deal with their most fundamental problems.

Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the greater part of the people point to more structural aspects such as the principal causes for the low level of citizen participation in electoral politics, Salvadorans —or, at least two out of three— do not overlook the fact that the electoral system needs wide-ranging reforms before it can stimulate participation. After the past elections, 61.7% of the citizens considered that the electoral system ought to be reformed as opposed to 32.8% who thought that it should simply remain the way it was.

The reforms which receive the greatest level of support from the citizens are the following: closer polling places or home voting, a single identity document, the cleaning up and ordering of the electoral rolls, voting privileges for those Salvadorans living abroad and proportional representation in the election of municipal councils.

Nevertheless, as El Salvador readies itself to celebrate another electoral event, and after a great deal of investment in the implementation of some electoral reforms, nothing has happened. This contributes to the climate of frustration felt towards the political electoral system, which feeds the apathy towards the electoral process demonstrated by the polls.

In order to comply with their promises, to be honest with the population, to listen to them and deal with their demands, to work for the country; to improve the campaigns, the candidates and the proposals: these —among other considerations— are the things which most people ask of the political parties in order to increase peoples' participation in the elections.

The greater part of such petitions refers to the work of the political parties, to their responsibility towards the people and the country and to the need to comply with their duty to represent all of the population.

Eight years have passed since the signing of the peace accords which laid the foundation for the institutionalizing of democracy for the country and the Salvadoran people feel deceived more and more by the system and its political institutions. The upcoming elections run the risk of become in the electoral process less consonant with Salvadoran history, in a cycle marked by apathy, disenchantment and frustration.

The great part of the populace, more than half, still believe that this country merits the political system it has, although they think that it ought to be more transparent. The challenge for the politicians and the citizens lies here. The first in complying with their work of representing the interests of the citizenry and the second calling their representatives to account.

THE NATIONAL CIVILIAN POLICE (PNC). The National Civilian Police announced the "most important" restructuring of its organization and forces since the creation of that institution. This process includes the functioning of five new divisions. Among these novelties is the creation of the Financial Crime Unit, which will be headed by Sub-Commissioner Rafael Garciaguirre, who was, until January 15, head of the Metropolitan Region. The announcement was made by the police in the context of a change of orders which enters into effect starting on January 16. This order stipulates that the highest level police chiefs must be involved in the patrolling of the streets and be involved with the population. Another unit created is that of the Mounted Police Division, based in Nejapa and it is hoped that within a brief period of time such units might be extended throughout the country. Their area of responsibility will be the rural areas and areas to which access is difficult, although the possibility for urban zone patrols are not ruled out. The Scientific Police Division was also created, in which international experts will participate. The PNC is also prepared to receive the sub-regional center for INTERPOL in the country. On the other hand, the Internal Affairs Unit will be charged with investigating police involved in criminal acts. For the moment, these new divisions have not yet begun to function, because there are details still to be ironed out, such as the internal organizational structure and the naming of personnel (El Diario de Hoy, January 16, p. 12).

CAMPAIGNS. The electoral campaign of the FMLN began on January 16 with a meeting in the Gerardo Barrios Plaza. Shafick Handal gave the principal speech, in which he reiterated his support for the labor strike being maintained by the Social Security workers. On the other hand, he added that they would ask for a reform in the area of customs for import products because this, according to the FMLN, will help to eliminate unfair competition. Together with this activity, the FMLN will encourage measures to prosecute and combat contraband. The second speech was that of Mayor Hector Silva. "We have begun a campaign to win a victory in order to govern better," said the mayor. The FMLN asked each of its militants to become a propagandist in order to win the majority in the Legislative Assembly. That left party hopes to win 43 seats in the plenary and 150 municipalities in the upcoming elections Meanwhile, ARENA held meetings in the rural areas of the country on January 15 and 16. Accompanied by their president, Alfredo Cristiani, the candidates visited some communities in Lourdes, Colon and the Puerto de la Libertad, among other areas. As on previous occasions, the content of the speeches did not vary: the candidates presented the four central points which make up their legislative platform: security, citizen participation, new opportunities and a vision of the future (La Prensa Gráfica, January 17, p. 14 and El Diario de Hoy, January 17, p. 6).

PEÑATE. The Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights, Eduardo Peñate Polanco met, on January 17, with the deputies of the sub-commission investigating his work. The objective: to defend himself against the accusations that the employees of the Ombudsman's Office and the Director of IDHUCA and the representative of the UNDP have turned against him. "I feel that I am not only innocent but that my rights have been violated," said Peñate. Among other things, he accused the representative of the UNDP, Bruno Moro, of having illegally taken documents which proved that he had spent money that the international community channeled to this organism. According to Peñate, that information demonstrated that the money received never reached the financial control center of the Ombudsman’s Office. Likewise, he denied the declarations made by Moro about the firing of some of the workers. According to Peñate, he never fired anyone from his job; he simply did not renew their contracts. "Given his situation of being a foreigner, Bruno Moro ought not to give this kind of declaration. His offensive position is very delicate", stated the Ombudsman. Nevertheless, at the end of the meeting, the deputies declared that they were not satisfied, nor were they convinced by the arguments presented by Peñate. The deputies analyzed the report which will be sent to the Political Commission (La Prensa Gráfica, January 18, p. 4 and El Diario de Hoy, January 18, p. 24).