Re-writing the past

Approximation of the government plans of Luis Cardenal and Héctor Silva (II)

There’s no one to promote the colonel

Once again a proposal to modernize the state

RE-WRITING THE PAST

Flores’ government plan to deal with crime and delinquency has produced uncertain results. Up until now, the measures adopted are rather inconsistent ones, such as placing police in the public buses. Although the Director of the National Civilian Police, Mauricio Sandoval alleges that he has lessened the impact of delinquency by 10%, the police institution which he directs does not have reliable files and documentation which would uphold the presumed lowering of the crime rate. What is currently in force is a plan to centralize in his person the functions of police intelligence and security. The formal reason for such centralization is to contain crime and delinquency in a more efficient way, but in reality what is being sought is stricter control over the population, specifically so that the population will not affect the ARENA administration.

In the installations of the National Civilian Police there is a dependency called the Organism for State Intelligence which combines two functions which up until now had been maintained separate, according to the provisions of the law. This dependency charged with dealing with intelligence operates without any institutional control except that of the current director of the National Civilian Police, who was, up until recently, director of that very organism. So it was, in the person of the director of the PNC functions and power are accumulated in a dangerous way, all because there are no democratic controls. Without having the rank of minister, the director controls, in practice, the ministerial commission charged with carrying out the security plan. At the same time, the National Security Council, an important consultative organism for the President of the Republic, has been left out of the picture by the Director of the National Civilian Police. The vision of security which this Council has, which is doubtless more civilized and democratic one, does not coincide with that of the director of the police. If Sandoval consolidates his position as head of security and intelligence, his power will be almost limitless.

This concentration of powers is not duly counterbalanced by supervisory monitoring and control . Apparently, as much the police as the Organism for State Intelligence depends directly on the President of the Republic, but it is doubtful that the president exercises control or supervision of any kind. The Legislative Assembly, as is usual, has little to do or say in these very important matters, either out of ignorance or out of lack of interest and, certainly, because the Organism for State Intelligence lies outside its jurisdiction. The need for reforming the legislation and proposing that the state and its indispensable instruments for control and supervision of intelligence activities has not even been proposed in a serious way. The more it is centralized, the more necessary are control and supervision, above all when security and intelligence are concentrated in a single person.

In reality, the Flores administration runs away from control and supervision, which it considers to be interference to be avoided at all cost. For him, the basic mechanisms for democracy are obstacles which impede the development of his plans. In this sense, the participation of functionaries and institutions distinct from the National Civilian Police in the field of public security could put the success of the plan in danger. The very Minister of Security, who has delegated all responsibility to this almost all-powerful director of the National Civilian Police, rejects consultation and advice because he considers them contrary to efficient police control. Consultation and efficiency are not at odds. On the contrary, a good mechanism for consultation results in greater efficiency and would even stimulate the participation of a citizenry which is already kept at arm's length from the police. In reality, this attitude shows a tendency of authoritarianism in the government and of Francisco Flores himself Both think that the secret to resolving problems such as security is vertical and militarized authority.

This change of emphasis, towards control more than towards protection, towards repression more than towards prevention is, on the other hand, limiting the possibilities of the National Civilian Police to confront the elevated level of delinquency and crime. The police continue not to investigate crime, to contaminate the scene of the crime, to lose key evidence and proofs, to be unaware of judicial proceedings and, consequently, to be incapable of sustaining the accusations against the presumed criminals. In fact, the police have very little control over public security and investigation.

While this occurs in the civil area, in the Armed Forces, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has ordered, in strong and strict terms, that all military commanders to re-establish intelligence units, which were abandoned, but not completely disarticulated, after the signing of the Peace Accords, in all barracks and detachments. The order and its compliance are openly contrary to a state of law in El Salvador, which would prohibit the exercise of this kind of activity. The reactivation of these intelligence units in the Armed Forces is the first step towards the re-emergence of death squads. Apparently, the high-level commanders of the army feel threatened once again by social forces which would be outside institutional control and they consider it their duty militarily to combat these forces. This is not so easy, because it means turning back the hands of the clock. President Flores wishes to do the same thing.

From this perspective, the results of the security plan are irrelevant. They do not prosecute crime and delinquency, but constitute a security and intelligence apparatus for the government and for the ARENA party. Its leaders seem to count on the idea that their permanence in power is assured for endless years. Precisely in order to assure that is they who mount this powerful machine without control by state institutions and, which is contrary to democracy. It would seem that ARENA and its administration cannot tolerate democracy. It is not only an academic question, but a question of moving slowly and surely back into the past. The Flores administration has not turned back the pages to the past as he assures us; he is only re-writing them.

APPROXIMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT PLANS OF LUIS CARDENAL AND HECTOR SILVA (II)

If on the question of the handling of the image of Luis Cardenal the rhythm of the campaign for the mayor's office has been marked by the fact that the campaign has not even officially begun, with regard to the policies and projects which make up his government plan, Hector Silva has had and will hold decisive influence over his contenders. The reason is obvious: how much could be proposed outside the lines of action which Silva has proposed and implemented during his administration. In this sense, the advantage Silva has over his competitors is monumental.

In a municipal administrative style new to the political history of the country, the Silva team has carried out this projects on the basis of clear and defined lines of action. Lines which have been advanced with precision and which have generated palpable effects on the city and which, even more important (at least at an electoral level) have been received with good will by a good portion of the city dwellers. The true value of Silva as he faces the electorate does not lie in his figure or image or in his projects, but in the fact that these have been carried out in the context of some clear and defined guiding principles. With this, Silva has given the population something which it asks for and has not found in the political class: a sense of orientation; confidence that there is clear movement towards the future.

To overcome improvisation, to string together and give a sense of meaning to the specific projects by means of large projects which attack at the root some of the most serious problems of San Salvador has been the great success of the mayor face to face with the citizens. His great political conquest is to have required that the projects such as the Rescue of the Historic Center and the integral handling of the trash and garbage should come to form part of the government plan of any candidate which seriously aspires to the mayor's office. Silva, by means of his successful administration, has obliged his contenders to imitate him, have obliged them to offer, in one way or another, the continuity of their lines of action.

Given this context, it is logical, then, that the cornerstone of the Hector Silva campaign would be the continuation and deepening of the large projects which his administration has offered. So it is that, in his government plan, there are no surprises. Below are presented the most relevant features of what in some measure is already know by all.

Fundamentally, the Hector Silva government plan is summarized in the document entitled "Social Development and Citizen Security", but it is also necessary to take into account, in order to give a global idea of what Silva proposes, the documents on his internet website (http://www.amss.gob.sv/) and "We speak Seriously of Important Things", an article written by the mayor and distributed by his press office.

Taking as his objective "contributing towards making San Salvador a city which offers conditions for the improvement in the quality of life...and opportunities by means of which [the citizens] become the protagonists of their own development" the Silva government plan contemplates three central strategies: (a) human development, (b) tranquillity, order and citizens living together and (c) citizen participation. Programs related to human development are: revitalization of spaces and urban neighborhoods (which imply, among other things, the construction of communal infrastructure projects, the encouragement of small businesses providing community services and the prevention and protection of disasters); promotion of sports and recreation; promotion of health (in which the deepening of health programs in the markets, information on reproductive health and the conversion of childcare centers into Child Development Centers should be highlighted); the encouragement and promotion of culture and programs for social assistance.

The programs which are proposed for the second strategic round are: promotion of citizen tranquillity (the application of municipal regulations against specific violations, recuperation of the Historic Center, the recuperation of the sidewalks for pedestrian use and the systematic investigation of the presence of minors in brothels); to serve the community from the CAM [Municipal Police]; the illumination of public spaces and the organization and training of the citizenry for the prevention of criminal violence. On matters relating to citizen participation two programs of the encouragement of consensus-making and territorial and sectorial organization (support of the strengthening of social leadership and the documentation and legalization of organizations resent within the municipality are proposed together with spaces and mechanisms for participation (open town meetings, popular consultation, specialized consultative commissions and social monitoring).

So now, on his web site and in his article Silva proposes as priorities for his municipal government five major projects: the integral handling of solid waste materials, the decentralization of municipal services, the recuperation of the Historic Center, policies for citizen participation and citizen security on the basis of modernization and re-structuring of the Metropolitan Police [CAM]. In both documents a brief summary of the successes achieved during the implementation of these projects is presented and some failures and weak points are recognized. Moreover, the social actors who have been key in the implementation of the projects as much on the financial level as in questions of collaboration and participation in the municipality are identified.

At first sight, the coincidences between the government plans of Silva and Cardenal are obvious. Both make citizen security, human development and the ordering of the city pivotal points in their municipal proposals. Even more, in precise policies such as the programs for social assistance and the promotion of sports more than similarities there are exact repetitions. Nevertheless, there are differences, and very important differences. In the first place, what is notable in the Silva government plan is the lack of an apparatus dedicated to the problem of transportation. Perhaps with the intention of focussing only on those areas and policies upon which some advance has already been made, Silva does not deal, in his proposal, with topics such as the problem of parking in the downtown areas of the city and the search for a mass means of transportation (something which was taken into account in the early days of his administration).

The Luis Cardenal proposal does take time to go more deeply into this point, although with the weaknesses already expressed in the previous issue. In second place, Silva focuses his policies on human development principally on the poorest and most unprotected sectors of the population. In contrast, Cardenal speaks in terms of human development in vague terms and only comes down to earth when he deals with the problem of drug-addicts and alcoholics and street children and proposes programs in support of small and very small businesses. In this way the topic of poverty appears as a priority in the first and is absent from the government plan of the second.

In third place, although both candidates understand that the collaboration of the citizenry as a key element in the municipal administration, Silva gives it a pre-eminent place in his government platform. Going beyond mere collaboration, Silva recognizes that the citizenry has a right to participate, supervise and control communal projects which are forthcoming from the municipality. Even more, he clearly proposes in his government plan that the spaces and mechanisms which are necessary in order for the citizens to directly intervene in the development of their communities. Of this there is nothing in the Cardenal proposal.

Definitively speaking, with the exception of the question of transportation and some minor elements, the greater part of the Luis Cardenal government plan is a copy of the Silva proposal, although a copy in which neither the democratic values nor the mayor's concern for the poorest are included. So it is that Cardenal presents himself o the electorate with promises and borrowed plans. This, as has been mentioned before, creates a situation in which his campaign must turn itself towards attacking the prestige of his contender, because he has absolutely no new proposals.

THERE’S NO ONE TO PROMOTE THE COLONEL

At a historic moment in which the leadership of the Salvadoran Armed Forces is in a situation in which it is reduced to its minimum expression, the polemic concerning the promotion of Col. David Munguía Payés has made the Armed Forces a new item. It is probable that the case of Munguía is not particularly extraordinary. No one knows how many others just like him have been unfairly deprived of their hopes for promotion up the ladder of military ranks, resigning themselves to accept confused motives which go beyond the legal framework. What has made this a particularly interesting case is the precedent set with regard to the decisive participation of the then president of the republic, Armando Calderón Sol and the political notoriety accorded the case of the promotion of Munguía at that time.

Munguía Payés has been passed over twice in his bid for promotion to general. The first time he was a victim of the wrath of Calderón Sol, who, became aware of the fact that two of his personal friends —ARENA sympathizers— would not be promoted, decided to break with military tradition to promote at least one person each year to the rank of general and denied promotion to those whom the Promotion Tribunal considered apt for promotion. Neither the malaise and discontent which his arbitrary decision caused among the members of the high command of the armed forces (which even came to the point of rumors of a possible coup d’etat), nor the criticisms which such an attitude caused in the realm of public opinion could cause the ex president to drop his arguments that, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, he had the right to act as he thought best (see Proceso, 838). The authoritarianism and rampant use of discretion characteristic of ARENA presidents was once again in evidence —and this time with absolute clarity.

Col. Munguía waited a year for his promotion, doubtless hoping that the new president, Francisco Flores, would be more reasonable than his predecessor. But on this second opportunity the denial became a general one and came from the Promotion Tribunal itself. Why? There does not seem to be a definitive answer. What is known is that various diverse factors entered into the picture when the decision was taken to put the brakes on the military career of Munguía (see Vértice, the news magazine of El Diario de Hoy, January 16, 2000). In the first place, the excessive publicity which this case acquired because of the entrance of Calderón Sol into the process displeased the leadership body of the armed forces which prefers to deal with these things with the doors closed. The polemical situation of the colonel in this maelstrom and the fact that he had dared to make public statements on that occasion went beyond the strict limits of armed forces discipline, and in this way becoming one of the principal points against him.

In second place, is to be found the fact that Munguía had sent, in June, 1999, a letter to the current Minister of Defense, reminding him that he had already been supported, on a previous occasions, by the Tribunal and that he considered it to be incorrect procedure to be submitted to a second evaluation. The fact that he gone to the Ministry and not to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are responsible for promotions, meant that he had a blot on his file which, in spite of not being so serious as to block his promotion, could have had repercussions at the point in time in which his work during 1999 was evaluated.

In third place, it must be mentioned that the rivalries and in-fighting which the rise of Munguía generated among his superior officers. On this point the report published in Vértice is edifying: "Someone told [Munguía] in June that in the offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff they had already taken the decision that he would never be [promoted to] general". The week before, the colonel figured in a report on "the ideal cabinet" as one of the most outstanding and probable persons to head the Ministry of Defense. "This probably came as a bucket of cold water to the military leadership....His popularity, according to various retired military officers, was causing discomfort. And this even more so in the measure in which the rumors grew that in recent months there would be a change in the Ministry of Defense next June".

In fourth, and last, place, is to be found what many consider to be the definitive factor: the presumed leftist tendencies of Munguía. Some added gasoline to the fire that the colonel did not fit into the mold of a dyed in the wool right winger which tends to be the image of those who choose the military profession. To begin with, his father, Mariano Munguía, was one of the military officers who rose up against General Martinez in 1944. He was, moreover, a friend and comrade in arms during the insurrection with Belisario Peña —father of Felipe Peña Mendoza, one of the founders of the FPL— and of Mariano Castro Moran, author of the book, The political function of the army in the current century. He was, finally, a pre-candidate for the presidency of the republic for the Christian Democrats of the National Opposition (UNO). For this reason alone, it should come as no surprise that the background of Munguía Payés might not be such a welcome addition to the military institution.

Reference points closer in time and more directly related with the characteristics of the colonel are, first of all his participation in the controversial "University Action" of the National University of El Salvador at the beginning of the 1980´s; this participation which, in spite of the fact that it was limited to the area of sports, would necessarily be seen as a black mark against his name by the Armed Forces of that time. Secondly, his presence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Napoleon Duarte administration. From this post he advised the Christian Democratic President on the first steps towards the agrarian reform and in the handling of relations with the armed forces. Certain policies designed by that administration affected many of the hard-line military officials. Munguía Payés awakened doubts among various and important colleagues of his —including those, for example, of the big graduating class from the military academy called the "tandona"— who gave him negative marks for having become one of Duarte’s men of confidence.

Definitively speaking, David Munguía Payés encouraged, some years ago, the nickname "not in line with the cause" and it would be naive to think that this had only a little to do with the undercutting of his military career. It could be the case that one would not be far from the mark to declare that Calderón Sol’s temper tantrum —which did so much harm to the colonel— was the topping on the state of affairs in which Munguía was found "not to be in line with the cause". The ex–president’s line of reasoning could have been to think that if the military officers whom he held in confidence and esteem, and who in great measure belonged to the group sharing his political credo, were not promoted, why should someone who had shown signs of being close to the opposition group be promoted?

Diverse situations obstructed Munguía Payés’ promotion to general but the most decisive among them appear to have been strictly political reasons. To his character which appears to be at odds with right-wing positions, is added his possibilities of becoming Minister. According to the Political Constitution of the Republic, the Armed Forces is apolitical. The Armed Forces is, nevertheless, financed by funds from the General National Budget, its members participate in politics and its high command take part in the consideration of political aspects of the decision-making processes.

It is really true that the Armed Forces is just another dependency of the state and that those who are members of it should be seen just as functionaries of this dependency, it is perhaps a good thing that the Legislative Assembly is involved in the investigation of the case of Munguía Payés. It might be a positive step to break down the hermitic encirclement around the case so that its internal functioning could be evaluated in accordance with criteria in accordance with the law and not let the case be abandoned to the rise and fall of emotions or to the exercise of the discretion of the president who happens to be in office.

ONCE AGAIN A PROPOSAL TO MODERNIZE THE STATE

The topic of the modernization of the Salvadoran state grows out of the Economic and Social Platform of the first administration of the ARENA party in 1989-1994, in which what is proposed is that in order to make El Salvador into a country of "opportunities with equality for all" what was needed was that the state should change its role, moving from "a command function, centralized and executive in a paternalist way, to one run by norms, strategic planning and coordination of development policies". This very document recognized that this process would take more than "one period in office".

The successive administrations followed along with the discourse on modernization, especially the second ARENA administration of 1989-1994, during which a Presidential Commission for the Modernization of the State was created, charged with planning and executing the most significant reforms of the Salvadoran state of the present decade. The current government has also proposed to continue with the state reforms and with the practice of using the conflict of the health sector in order to push through a series of reforms to the functioning of the ISSS which would focus on the privatization of its services.

No administration has carried out reforms which would tend to promote "strategic planning" or the "coordination of policies". Here are some examples: the completion of the process of rapid growth, the worsening of the lack of balance in the trade balance and public finances and the lack of coordination of policies as well a the lack of linkage with the topic of the removal of tariff barriers with the industrial reconversion and diversification of agriculture.

The new ARENA administration has had to deal with the topic of the modernization of the state in the midst of the sharpening of labor conflicts in the diverse dependencies of the public sector such as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, the Judicial Branch of Government and the Salvadoran Institute of Social Security (ISSS). This last has been the most prolonged and the most complicated. Its origins grow out of a period of time of less than three years back and its most peculiar characteristic is that it not only involves specifically labor demands but also questions the program of structural adjustment and, specifically, the reform of the health sector. Contrary to the demands of the trade union of the ISSS for a halt to the process of transference of medical consultation services, the provision of medicines and surgery to the private sector.

The privatization, or liquidation have been two very common factors in the initiatives involving state modernization implemented during the decade of the 1990’s: the reform of the bank; the liquidation the Urban Housing Institute, the Institute for the Regulation of Basic Grains and the Salvadoran Institute for Coffee; the reforms in the distribution of electrical energy, the telephone service and the pension system.

The political practice of the ARENA administrations show that, using this mentality in which modernization is the equivalent of privatization, when in reality the concept is much broader and even offers alternatives for solution to the problems of the lack of balance in public financing, the provision of basic services and, especially, in the redefinition the role of the state in the economy, which aims to reduce itself to the minimal expression, even when there are clear signs that state regulation is a sine qua non.

The foregoing is placed in evidence by the recent cases of irregularities in the charges for telephone services; cases which led even to sanctioning the telephone businesses and refunds to the users. It is also seen in the macroeconomic inefficiency of the Salvadoran bank; this is to say, in its tendency to not assign financial resources to economic activities which would make production more dynamic. Even so, many public functionaries continue arguing that privatization is the panacea for all development problems and eliminate structural reforms of the public apparatus which might benefit the stabilization processes as well as economic growth.

In various cases it has turned out to be evident that public enterprises which have been privatized still demonstrate serious problems of inefficiency, but it cannot be denied that in spite of this income and profit is generated for the state. The case of the National Administration for Telecommunications is emblematic (see Proceso, 817). If, instead of privatizing it they had returned to processes which might improve efficiency in the assignment of resources and in the efficient provision of services, what is most probable is that the profitability of public enterprise might be increased and with it we would have counted upon greater resources of dealing with the growing fiscal deficit.

State reform with an eye to modernizing the state would also permit once again taking up some of the initiatives which were announced by the last three government administrations, but which were not implemented. Among those the following might be highlighted: industrial reconversion, diversification of agricultural and livestock concerns and support for small and very small businesses. Evidently, this would permit an increase in production and exports, stabilizing the foreign sector and improving the perspective for a successful insertion of the Salvadoran economy into the international economy.

Unfortunately, this vision carries little or no weight in the guidelines for the modernization of the state, which have been concentrated into the implementation of the processes of privatization in such a dogmatic way that even opportunities for state development have closed off the necessary policy for social compensation which ought to accompany economic liberalization policies. Privatization of the provision of health services is the most recent example.

The farming out of the ISSS medical consultation services to the private sector or "alternative consultation" is a measure by means of which the government has begun privatization of the health services of the ISSS and this consists in the fact that the working people who make payments which are deducted from their checks are permitted to consult any doctor and then ask for a reimbursement of the average cost of the medical appointment (175 colones). The cost of the medicines is not reimbursable, but the aim is to proceed in the near future to a transfer of the provision of medicines to private pharmaceutical businesses in order then to move this as well towards contracting out of surgery services to the private sector.

According to the Director of the ISSS, these measures will be permanent and will not depend on the results of the labor conflict, which opens the question as to the effects on the ISSS budget and finances. What is most probable is that by means of this system the operating costs for health services will rise sharply. Currently the cost of the average medical appointment in the ISSS is much less than 175 colones and, in general, the average costs of health services in that institution —with all of its deficiencies— consists only in a small fraction of the prices offered by the private sector, given that this inevitably includes the businessman’s profit.

This is a propitious moment for the government to take up the principals of modernization established by its party once again. This with an eye to implementing reforms to the state which would permit the development of strategic planning and overcome big national economic problems such as the drop in export production growth, the commercial and fiscal lack of balance, the persistence of rural poverty, and the precarious provision of social services, or the lack thereof.