The Legislative Assembly that El Salvador needs

Mourning in the UCA

Opening the doors to authoritarianism

The financial implications of the pension reform

News Briefs

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY THAT EL SALVADOR NEEDS

The elections of March 12 are approaching and the pre-electoral period is reaching the hottest stage of the electoral campaign, which is to say it has reached the moment when the parties and their candidates do everything and offer everything with the objective to winning the greatest number of votes in their favor. One thing, however, is what the parties and candidates offer and another, very different, is what the citizens and the country propose as ineluctable challenges for the political class. In this editorial we will offer up a presentation of what might be expected of the new Legislative Assembly in 14 key topics concerning Salvadoran society. There are two questions which articulate the group of topics presented below, and they are the following: What kind of Legislative Assembly do the Salvadoran people want? What kind of deputy is most amenable to the citizens’ interests?

1.- Such a deputy ought to have a broad vision of the fundamental problems facing the country: ecological deterioration, insecurity, poverty, impunity, corruption.... Are the candidates competent in sufficient degree to deal with these problems? Are they willing to listen to those who might illuminate them in this respect? Will they close their eyes to the evidence which reality poses for them or will they maintain old loyalties?

2.- Such a deputy ought to have a frank commitment to trying to resolve these problems: Will the new deputies be willing to lay aside their own private interests in favor of national interests? Will such a deputy renounce simplistic analyses of such problems? Will they be willing to commit themselves as much to an understanding of the complexity of these problems as well as to the tasks which they must confront to solve them?

3.- Such a deputy would be sincerely willing to take up the demands of the citizens and channel them in an adequate way: Will the new deputies be conscious of their roles as people who process demands coming from the citizens? Or are they going to be satisfied with being just another functionary who lives on a salary from the public treasury with no other proposal than to obtain greater personal benefits and benefits for his or her party?

4.- Such a deputy would demonstrate a decided commitment to democracy as a way of life and with democracy as an instrument for the resolution of conflicts: Do the candidates for deputy have sufficiently democratic credentials? Is there a clear guarantee that they will be the first to defend the privileges of democratic institutionality? Are they conscious of their responsibility in the advance (or backward movement) of democracy in the country?

5.- Such a deputy would demonstrate a clear commitment to the strengthening and empowerment of institutionality: Will the new deputies be willing to struggle against their own and others' exercise of discretion? Do they know the importance of enjoying a solid institutional framework as a sine qua non for the democratization of El Salvador? Are they themselves going to be willing to promote —against hell and high water— the institutionality of the country?

6.- Such a deputy would be willing to struggle against corruption not only inside the Legislative Assembly but against the corruption within the whole state apparatus: Will the new deputies renounce the buying and selling of favors and blackmail? Or will they succumb to the traditional vices of national politics in El Salvador?

7.- Such a deputy would be willing to accept public criticism for their acts and mistakes, which will be a demonstration of their democratic calling: Will the new deputies be open to being monitored by society? Or will they continue to consider that society is a servant which may make no claims or demands? Will they be more transparent in their decisions or will they continue taking such decisions behind the backs of the citizens?

8.- Such a deputy would decidedly reject authoritarianism in all of its manifestations: Will the new deputies renounce arrogance and arbitrary attitudes of decisions not consulted and the imposition of laws decided upon as they see fit? Will they struggle decidedly against any manifestation of authoritarianism forthcoming from the state apparatus, whatever may be the rank and authority of the person behaving in an authoritarian manner?

9.- Such a deputy would be committed to the strengthening of a state of law: Will the new deputies defend legal rights, not only against the abuse of the rest, but against their own potential abuses of them? Will they work for the improvement of existing laws and for the removal or reform of laws which do not uphold human dignity? Will they encourage laws which have the common good in mind and not the interests of private groups?

10.- Such a deputy would be committed to the well-being of the majority of the Salvadoran people: Will the new deputies be capable of placing the interests of the masses above the interests of the elites with economic power? Will they be willing to work for a more equitable distribution of wealth? Will they work to strengthen by law a new economic model which is less harmful to natural resources and which exhibits less of a tendency towards the concentration of wealth?

11.- Such a deputy would be willing to work for an integral model of citizen security; that is to say, for a model which does not support only coercive mechanisms in the fight against crime: Will they be willing to offer a counterweight against the quasi-authoritarian decisions which the leadership of the PNC takes? Will they work in such a way that they pose might fully the assume democratic principles upon which they were founded?

12.- Such a deputy would be willing to assume the role of mediator between the other two branches of government, avoiding specious submission to one of them as well as gratuitous confrontation between the branches: Will the new deputies resist pressures applied by the presidency? Will they continue supporting a schema of presidential command and authority which goes beyond the permissible limits in the process of democratization?

13.- Such a deputy would be willing to assume and defend his or her independence on the question of party interests and depend upon the wishes and interests of the citizens? Will the new deputies continue along the lines of the tradition requiring obedience over and above the will and interests of the citizens and the dictates of their parties? Who will the new deputies represent: the leadership of their party or the citizens? Will they place the interests of the first over and above the interests of the second or will they break with that tradition?

14.- Such a deputy would show a willingness to work seriously for the integration of Central America, laying aside narrow nationalism and the interests of private economic groups: How will the new deputies line up on the question of regional integration? What initiatives will they encourage? Will they continue to leave a task so crucial for the development of the country in the hands of the executive office?

MOURNING IN THE UCA

Just as on November 17, 1989 with the news of the assassination of six Jesuit fathers and their two collaborators, on Wednesday, January 12, 2000 another tragic piece of caused shock and consternation in the university community: Carlos Cerna, ex-student and ex-professor of the UCA was brutally murdered in his apartment close to the university campus. Ten years ago the motives were political; today the causes of the crime are hidden behind the waves of violence which break over the country. Just as at the moment when the guerrilla offensive the deaths of those martyrs made all who had known the goodness and wisdom of the weep with rage, pain and impotence, today, during a perpetual social offensive, this death causes us to weep a similar kind of tears.

For the second time, the UCA sees those of the highest human quality and the highest intellectual courage which belong to it die at the hands of psychopaths. People who dedicated their lives to the cultivation of the intellect, the exercise of teaching together with good and generous works. Persons whose only error at the time of their death was to have trust and confidence: Ignacio Ellacuría was confident that the leadership of the armed forces would not dare to give the order to kill them, knowing that it would be military personnel who would be the first to be tried; Carlos Cerna trusted everyone, he was the friend and counselor of all, to everyone he opened the door to his house, convinced that such openness was the guarantee of his security. Now it is known that the person who killed him had to have been someone very close to him and the motive is presumed to have been robbery.

Precisely because the intellectual and human credentials of the martyrs and of Carlos Cerna, who held a Master’s Degree in literature, were known to all, the impunity in which the first case has remained and the cavalier attitude of the judicial system in the handling of the second and the tendentiousness and irresponsible attitude of those in the news media have been characteristic of both. And this cannot but cause indignation. Indignation that after ten years still —when it is to be supposed that the written press has become professional in an exemplary manner— El Diario de Hoy has published, on the occasion of the commemoration of the martyrs, an editorial disguised as a news article in which, completely falsifying the truth, the UCA martyrs are identified as the leaders of the insurgent movement. It is cause for indignation, as well, that in the same style, diverse news media have taken up the self-imposed task of publishing a hypothesis concerning the sexual preferences of Carlos Cerna and the possible linkage of these preferences to his murder when there has been no proof and no real basis for these declarations.

And both falsehoods and imprecise vagaries dished out by the journalists and news reporters cause indignation, not only because they show that the presumed commitment to truth which they tout publicly is deceit because, above all, in one way or another they seek to justify and minimize the gravity of the crimes. "The Jesuits got involved in politics" is the phrase which is hidden under the falsehood of their organic link with the FMLN; "and this linkage justifies their death" is what they are fundamentally saying. "If he were a homosexual", is what they are implicitly transmitting in their judgmental statements about Cerna, "who knows what kinds of things he was involved in which finally resulted in his death".

In the case of the martyrs, El Diario de Hoy published a news article based on lies, appealing to the political ignorance and extreme right-wing attitudes which certain sectors of the population indulge in. In the Carlos Cerna case, the prosecuting attorney in charge of the investigations speculates —without benefit of proof or convincing arguments— beyond the "opinions of the neighbors" about his sexual practices (and the media, in open violation of journalistic ethics, echoes them, without even bothering to corroborate the facts offered by the source), appealing to the false morality which predominates in the minds of many Salvadorans. In both cases, given the horrendous criminal nature of the assassinations, extra-judicial considerations are placed first, as if there were reasons which might justify such acts of barbarity. Finally, it turns out that on the question of the deaths of Ellacuría and his colleagues, what is more important is that they may have participated in politics; or the possibility that Cerna might have had sexual preferences which go beyond the strict limits of the moral intolerance in this country, might weigh more heavily than the simple, perverse act by means of which they were violently deprived of life.

In this year, the year 2000, which symbolically inaugurates the entrance into a new millenium, should begin for the UCA with the sadness of the death of one of its members and with the revulsion which such an act as his death causes indicates how many things have not changed, how much is lacking in order to bring about a transformation, and how many more victims the history of El Salvador will take before these transformations can take place. But the year begins, as well, with some hopeful signs.

On one hand, the recommendation that the International Commission on Human Rights made to the Francisco Flores administration concerning the necessity of opening the Jesuit case again indicates the possibility that the assassination will not forever remain in the realm of impunity. On the other, the unusual protagonism of the justice system has taken on thanks to the pressure of civil society and the non-governmental organisms gives cause to think that, in spite of the lack of prudence and the incompetence of certain functionaries and the majority of the news media, the investigation of the crime against Carlos Cerna will be brought to a truthful closure.

The Institute for Human Rights of the UCA [IDHUCA] is currently working on the viability of presenting a demand against the prosecuting attorney who, without the least respect for the memory or dignity of Carlos, declared to the most sensationalist newspaper in the country that he suspected that his being a homosexual had some possible relationship to his death. The ideal stance would be that this complaint might be made extensive in the sense of a class action suit against the media which printed word for word what the prosecuting attorney said and which even now (see, for example, La Prensa Gráfica for February 3, p. 29) reprint those declarations as if they were the truth —to which other distortions were added— are true and link the assassination to other acts of violence. This in spite of the fact that the judicial authorities have discounted those linkages because they were never supported by proof and evidence of Cerna’s homosexuality and it is now said that the most probable cause of the crime might be robbery.

It does not cease to be paradoxical that a university which has always defended life might, at the same time, be so profoundly marked by death; that a university which has set itself to ever be at the service of truth and justice, might have taken from it in such a brutal, unjust and arbitrary way the most noble and best of talents; that a university focussed on the exercise of reason and the intellect has been dragged once more through blindness and barbarity. But of such paradox is made the cause of life which the university defends. To take this up and confront it is what we as a Christian university community must do. In the last mass celebrated in memory of Carlos Cerna in the UCA chapel, Father Jon Cortina insisted upon the imperious necessity to combat impunity. To wage that battle is part of the commitment to the values by which we are characterized and which we uphold.

OPENING THE DOORS TO AUTHORITARIANISM

In an unusually pessimistic article, David Escobar Galindo reflects upon the mood of the nation and draws conclusions with which it would be difficult not to agree. For this analyst, society is in a state of profound disorientation and disenchantment because of the deception it feels for the political class. Galindo recommends that the state and the political parties should carefully consider how to avoid the dangers inherent in the search for authoritarian solutions to the national maelstrom; and this especially when the political events of Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador are considered.

The importance of this reflection lies in the fact that, for the first time in a long time, one of the personalities closest to the governmental circle relates the disenchantment of the population, its sense of uncertainty, with the inefficiency of the political class in responding to the expectations and needs of society at large. Moreover, he recognizes that in this context the doors are being opened in such a way that the ghost of authoritarianism is raising its head. Nevertheless, Galindo’s analysis falls short in not pointing out that the political system is currying the rise of authoritarianism not only in a passive manner (in not taking responsibility for national problems) but it is also doing so in an active way.

Public opinion polls and the sharp criticisms of analysts and newspaper columnists of the country coincide in the fact that the Flores administration and the political class in general is bankrupt (that the peoples’ confidence and the credibility deposited in them is in the red). Wrapped in themselves and their own interests they have turned their backs on a country which is visibly writhing and threatening complete prostration. The uncertainty, disorientation and desperation about the future of the nation rise up against the absence of an honest and determined political leadership. In this, then, lies the first path by which authoritarianism might enter the national scene.

But this is not the only way. The Flores administration and the political system in general supports authoritarianism not only in not doing, not only by means of its absence from the national scene, but also in an active way. If the power vacuum (the lack of leadership and direction: the virtual abandonment of its functions) is the seed of authoritarianism, the systematic negation of dialogue, the option for dogmatism and conservatism are the fertilizer which will make it germinate. And in the causing of these vices in the state entities as well as in the political parties they have done so in a generous way.

It is obvious that the refusal to engage in dialogue favors authoritarianism inasmuch as it lobbies for a unilateral imposition of decisions; inasmuch as it breaks with the basic rules of democracy when it underestimates consensus and the open discussion of mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts. On one side, dogmatism (from which conservatism —be it moral or political— is the direct progeny) supports authoritarian postures in the measure that it declares the pre-eminence of one posture over the rest, inasmuch as it does not take into account and persecutes any point of view contrary to that which it believes is correct and adequate. Dogmatism does not negotiate, it imposes. Dogmatism and a refusal to engage in dialogue are, then, the two faces of authoritarianism.

Examples of these two attitudes in the political class abound. The government administration's handling of the problem of the Social Security Institute is one of these. At this stage in the game it is already clear that Flores' refusal to negotiate with the strikers is the direct result, once again, of his dogmatism given to privatization to which is joined the improbable intention to rescue the institution from the slough in which it is suck for decades now in corruption and poor administration. Only Flores' dogmatism explains why these pilot programs in the privatization of the institution are being carried out in spite of the rejection by the population, the indications that the contracting out of services would be tantamount to a financial coup de’ etat in the ISSS (Proceso, 887) and that these measures will only intensify the magnitude of the conflict. As an outstanding model of authoritarian solutions, Flores is not interested in results, only in being faithful to his dogma.

Another example of the causal relationship resulting in authoritarian attitudes can be found in the peculiar way in which the political class understands the question of morality. Authoritarianism is promoted when political parties, echoing ultra-conservative postures emanating from ARENA and friends, condemn casinos and systematically refuse to listen to any voice with more realistic postures. Authoritarianism is promoted when the Minister of the Interior, violating citizen rights to free expression and opting for his own preferences, orders specific songs and movies which are not to their taste to be removed from circulation —although the fact that they are not to the liking of reduced sectors does not mean that they are less influential.

A good sample of intolerance which this authoritarian imposition of moral conservatism has caused is the value of the test which has been given to the alcoholic and supposedly drug dependent Carlos Miranda, the principal suspect in the rape and murder of his granddaughter Katya Miranda Only in a society profoundly dogmatic in its catholic and moral principles would the accusation against an individual find a major basis for its legal findings in what an angry pastor might condemn from his pulpit. It is one thing that alcohol and drug consumption should be censured by a certain kind of morality and another altogether that this should become proof of guilt against the accused. The leap from one thing to another could only take place in a climate marked by intolerance and an excessive leaning on dogma. (It should be stated that, in saying this, we do not mean to imply that the rest of the proofs against Miranda should be underestimated, nor that his innocence or guilt is being alleged).

Another serious example of the climate of authoritarianism which is being propitiated is to be found in the polemic arising around the plebiscite which Hector Silva intended to implement in order to decide the situation of the casinos. On one hand, there was the politically authoritarian exercise which took place in that the population was obstructed from deciding on the question of the matter of the casinos which directly affected it. On the other, a moral authoritarianism was exercised in the a priori condemnation without recourse to defense or dialogue of any kind, the effects which the operation of the gaming houses would bring with it for the community and populace at large. "Do not decide because this is evil" was the simplistic formulation, the most terribly harmful formulation for democratic dynamics, with which the matter was brought to closure.

The authoritarian leader is he who rises up to impose "order" upon a society which underestimates or annuls any critical voice or institutional mechanism in order to exercise power in an absolute way. The authoritarian leader is always right, is the repository of the final truth on national matters. In this country the red carpet is being rolled out to allow for the triumphal procession allowing for the entry of authoritarianism in the same measure that the political class remains absent from national affairs and creates the sensation of a climate in which society cannot and is not subject to being governed. Society does its part inasmuch as it permits a situation in which the voices from the state and the political parties which ignore tolerance, refuse to engage in dialogue, which wrap themselves in the robes of dogma, which persist in verticalism and understands society as a conglomerate of children who must be led by force if necessary along the thorny road of good and evil.

THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PENSION REFORM

One of the little noticed aspects of economic evaluation is the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of privatization in achieving the objectives which justified its implementation, especially on the question of rate reduction of basic services and pressures on public spending.

This is probably owing to the fact that the accumulation of negative effects resulting from the process of privatization is considerable. This is seen in increases in public service rates, the loss of income for public enterprises (as in the case of telecommunications), arbitrary charges by telephone businesses and even greater pressure on the fiscal deficit. It is not strange that privatization has been rejected by the majority of the population consulted in public opinion polls (Proceso, 870) and that a recent public opinion poll conduced by the University Institute for Public Opinion of the UCA reveals that the majority of those interviewed (or, more than 70%) indicated their lack of agreement with he possible privatization of the Salvadoran Institute for Social Security (ISSS) or some of its hospitals.

In the case of the reform to the pension system, it can be affirmed that this drove the state to heavy financial commitments for the coming decades because with the privatization of the pension system all payments from the deductions from paychecks made previously must now be transferred to the Administrators of Pension Funds (AFPs). According to governmental data, this debt rose to close to 64,000 million colones (almost four times the national budget for the year 2000), which must be paid in growing annual payments which, to begin with, are estimated at 453 million colones for the year 2000 and 3,355 million colones for the year 2004. These figures represent 2.5% and 20% of the national budget for the year 2000, respectively.

As must be obvious to anyone, this payment will have a sure impact on public finances which, although important, is not the basic problem to be perceived when the situation of pension reform is examined. The real problem is that of using the privatization process to benefit a small group of Salvadoran businessmen. This has been especially true on the question of the privatization of the bank and the pension system where the same families who have acquired ownership of the most important banks (Agrícola, Comercio, Cuscatlán and Salvadoreño) participate in the entities now administering the pension funds.

The clear benefits of these two reforms are still not clear because the bank has not improved its macroeconomic efficiency and has not become a dynamic factor for production. As for the pension sector, it is still not know what the effects of the pension reform will be on the amounts to be paid out in pensions for old age which the workers will receive or what the effects will be on savings and productive investment. At this writing, what is clear, in addition to the already mentioned fiscal burden, is that with the reform, workers will now pay more for their pensions.

Before the reform, workers paid 1% as a quota to the common pension fund which was administered by the state; while, with the entering into effect of the new pension system, the majority of workers affiliated went from paying 4.5% of their salary, of which percentage 3.5l% was for a commission to the AFPs and only 1% for the individual savings account. Currently, workers pay 5.75% of their salary towards the pension fund, of which 3.25% goes to the AFP commission and the remaining 2.5% goes to the individual savings account. This is to say that the AFPs are doing a good business given that more than 3% of the total salaries of their affiliates taken as a whole go to administer their funds.

Starting with this year, the AFPs will also begin to receive large state payments, which, although they must be capitalized to the individual accounts of those paying quotas, must not be paid immediately by the AFPs. This allows them to use them as working capital. This kind of operation represents, for the state, a very questionable advance payment at a time when it is confronting high fiscal deficit levels of 3% of the GNP.

In spite of the fact that it cannot be denied that these funds will have to be disbursed even though the pension reform has not been implemented, it is obvious that because of the way in which this has been programmed, it locates and applies more pressure on public finances, especially because the reform of the pension system was contemplated a situation in which all persons over 50 years of age were be maintained on the old system. This implies that, during its first years of functioning, the AFPs will not have to disburse pensions for old age and, all in all, the will have to respond to the complaints by pensioners for compensation for disability or death which, in any case, are the responsibility of the insurance companies which those making payments must pay.

The mortgaging of the pension funds will be very convenient for the AFPs because they will be capitalized with state funds and will continue receiving from the workers they commissions for administering their individual accounts. Although the law of the pension system establishes a situation in which the AFPs must handle social capital and the capital of their affiliates separately, the truth is that these last funds constitute their principle working capital.

So, then, the pension reforms will not necessarily translate into relief from the state's financial commitments; on the contrary, it is obvious that greater pressure on public finances will result as the process is implemented. A vacuum in this has been, moreover, that of not having had the advantage of a study which would define what option existed for reform with lower fiscal costs.

In general, privatization has negatively affected consumers because it has provoked increases in telephone and electricity service rates, as well as the imposition of the payment of commission to the administrative entities of pension funds and, after the year 2000, growing amounts will be assigned to public finances for the payment of pensions. On the other hand, some businesses have obtained greater benefits from this process to the point at which many family groups belonging to the economic elite have found in privatization a new arena where they might broaden and diversify their possibilities for accumulation.

In this context, the process of privatization is justified if it is reviewed in order to reorient, for the benefit of the broad masses of population of the country, and not only to benefit a select minority allied to the circles of political and economic power. One way of achieving this is to promote the installation of a regulatory mechanism which would guarantee that the pension reform would lead to a situation in which the workers would receive a dignified pension and which, moreover, the funds in the individual workers' accounts would be used in order to finance productive investments and increase production, employment and income. In addition to the review of privatization processes already implemented, it is also necessary to carry out objective cost-benefit studies of the new privatizations suggested by the government in the future.

PROFESSOR. Carlos Salvador Cerna, ex–professor of the Universidad Centroamericana "José Simeón Cañas" (UCA) was found in an advanced state of decomposition on January 12 inside his apartment. A maid who discovered the cadaver reported that she came into the apartment to clean it and noticed the smell coming from one of the rooms. It was then when she found the professor on a bed, with evidence of having been strangled and several pieces of furniture and objects on top of him. The sister of the victim, who was not identified, said that her brother was divorced and that his ex – wife and children lived in France. She indicated that she did not know if her brother was having problems with anyone. The authorities began the investigation of the crime the same day. On January 16, the National Civilian Police found Cerna’s vehicle in Santa Tecla. A detective pointed out that "the vehicle had not been reported stolen and, that it would appear that it had been left there by those who assassinated the professor". Meanwhile, police scientific laboratory technicians continue their investigation (El Diario de Hoy, January 13, p. 18 and La Prensa Gráfica, January 17, p. 24).

DIRECTORS. Directors of eight national hospitals in the metropolitan area of San Salvador were removed from office on January 28 by authorities of the Ministry of Health. The Minister of Health, Francisco Lopez, confirmed the removals, but attributed them to "normal and routine changes". "It is not a removal from office, that should be made clear. They are completely normal changes which ad administration will carry out", he explained. He said that the causes were not a lack of medical capability or because of complaints against them. The Vice-Minister of Health, Herbert Betancourt was clear that the changes had nothing to do with negotiations with the Medical Guild or with pressure from the trade unions. Although, according to statements by the vice president of the Medical Guild, Mauricio Ventura, the guild had requested the expulsion of several directors from national hospitals. Betancourt also stated that the measure was not a sanction against the directors. He highlighted the fact that the modifications had been considered since the beginning of the new administration as part of the process of reform of the hospitals. For the Vice Minister, the modifications are not firings but administrative changes, given that the professional personnel will continue working for the ministry as specialists or heads of other units (La Prensa Gráfica, January 29, pp. 4-5).

CHANGES. On January 31, four women and five men were named by the Ministry of Health to direct the metropolitan hospital network and that of Chalatenango beginning on February 2. From the list of former directors, only one person stayed on as director in other medical center. The Minister of Health, Jose López Beltrán, insisted that the changes were not improvised changes and that they were in accordance with planning for the reform of the health sector. He admitted that the changes had been planned for months, but that the conflict in the Institute for Social Security had held up their implementation. "In view of fact that it [the crisis] has dragged on, we could not continue waiting", he commented. He stated that the modifications had not come about as a result of petitions from the Medical Guild. He emphasized, moreover, that the changes were implemented without any indication from or consultation with the President of the Republic. López also discounted a situation in which the changes involving directors were linked to any plan to privatize the national hospital network. "What we want is to implement a new model of administration which facilitates the process of development by means of a participate administration", declared the functionary. The President of the Medical Guild, Guillermo Mata, stated that he had no knowledge as to whether the new directors were affiliated with the institution or not (La Prensa Gráfica, February 1, p. 5).

CENSURE. The Directorate of Public Spectacles, Radio and Television issued a document on February 1 declaring that the film "Stigmata" was "an attempt against public order", according to declarations by sources speaking for the distributors which did not wish to be identified. According to Morena Serpas, head of the Directorate, the order to withdraw the film was a result of complaints received from the public who declare that the film is dangerous for Christian values. The functionary added that the complaints had been presented by institutions such as Lumen 2000, the Artists’ Union, parishes, etc. "The distributors and those in charge of exhibitions of the film have already received the order which, at the peoples’ petition, will suspend the film", stated Serpas. "Stigmata" narrates how a young person who is an atheist suddenly suffers from the stigmata of Christ. The film also questions the current foundation of the Catholic church. According to the national distributors of the film, the Directorate, in the beginning, approved the film and classified it for viewers over e18 years of age, by which the Minister of the Interior would be contradicting itself in issuing the order to suspend the showings of the film. The distributors declared that as long as the Ministry has not made clear in what way the film has altered public order, "Stigmata" will continue on the billboards. (La Prensa Gráfica, February 2, p. 78).

FIRINGS. The Judge of the First Circuit Labor Court, Jose Roberto Medina ratified, on January 26, the firing of 221 employees of the Salvadoran Social Security Institute, in ruling against a petition for their reinstatement presented by the Union of the ISSS, STISSS. The union petition was based on the presumed violation of two clauses of their collective bargaining contract, attributed to the authorities of the institution to fire the said employees during the month of November, 1999. The judge, nevertheless, found no legal basis to decree the reinstatement of the workers. On the contrary, he ruled that the strike maintained since November 15 was an illegal one, as decreed by the Third Circuit Labor Court. Medina based his judgment on Articles 369, 474, section 2, 417, 418 and 419 of the Labor Code at the same time as he declared null and void the violation of Clauses 36 and 73 of the collective bargaining contract. These clauses refer to the right to stability on the job and the collective suspension of workers, respectively. The functionary reinforced his resolution basing it on the fact that "the situation persists in which judicial requirements issued by the Judge of the Third Circuit labor Court, are being ignored since November 16, 1999, requiring them to go back to work, continues to be ignored, indicating that there are special aggravating factors which would affect essential services to the community" (La Prensa Gráfica, January 27, pp. 4-5).

CAMPAIGN. The candidate for the office of Mayor of San Salvador for the ARENA party, Luis Cardenal, continued his proselytizing campaign on January 30 in one of the townships of the capital city where he spoke with more than a hundred members of the community. Those attending the meeting expressed their concerns and petitions. According to Cardenal, it is preferable to hold "small meetings" to come closer to the communities in order to establish an open dialogue with its inhabitants, instead of organizing large meetings. The candidate explained to his listeners why he continues to hold activities to promote his image. "What we are doing is giving messages to those whom we believe have the right, making use of our freedom of expression", he stated. Moreover, he added that the denunciations of his activities are owing to the fact that his political adversaries are fearful that his message is getting to the population. "They want only the mayor to be able to spend millions in promoting the municipality and that I should be quiet", he stated. For his part, the candidate for the FMLN, Hector Silva, had his own image brought forth in a proselytizing campaign the day before. He presented himself to the community of San Luis where he inaugurated a community center. Additionally, he introduced the system of potable drinking water into the community as well as sewage drains in the community of Tutunichapa (La Prensa Gráfica, January 31, p. 14).