A Conflictive Social Situation

The Ombudsman’s Office for the Defense of Human Rights:

a Parliamentary Mea Culpa

Child Prostitution as a Business

The Sugar Industry and State Protectionism

News Briefs

As the proselytizing stage of the pre-electoral campaign for mayors formally begins, the electoral process as a whole has reached its most intense and heated phase. Obviously, the campaign for mayors began much before the legally stipulated date established by electoral legislation. Nevertheless, it is as of February 12 that it has taken on its decisive force, which is to say that, from that date on, the political parties will experience no other limits than their own resources and creativity in their attempts to win popular favor. During the early period when they were not legally authorized, the campaign for mayor was beginning to demonstrate its central characteristics: saturation publicity, promises to fulfill every kind of taste and manipulation of the citizens: all in all, nothing which would distinguish it from other political campaigns during other periods of time. Likewise, everything seems to indicate that, once again, dirty tricks are the order of the day: for example, the ARENA party, in its efforts to make people believe that Hector Silva has handled municipal resources in an underhanded way, is using —in open complicity with some of the news media— the most questionable resources in order to make the citizenry accept its thesis.

The political parties are now fully involved in political-electoral dynamic. At this point in time, they do not have time for what is not aimed at obtaining the greatest number of votes possible. And, in the midst of so much political publicity, visits to communities and full-throttle offers of any and everything, few citizens are capable of remaining clear about what differentiates one party and its candidates from other parties and other candidates. The conclusion which seems to impose itself on this scenario is that, after all, it is just the same to vote for one as to vote for another or reject both because one party generates no more confidence than any other. This is an unfortunate state of affairs, but here is how it is: the more effort the parties make to attract voters, the less they distinguish themselves one from the other and the more confused the voters become, which gives rise to a situation in which the space for exercising their votes using a minimum of rationality becomes smaller and smaller. If it is all the same to vote for anyone at all, it is all the same, for the same reason, to abstain altogether from voting: here is one possible way of interpreting the high percentage of abstentionism which has characterized the last series of electoral events in El Salvador—to wit: 1994 with 55%; 1997 with 60% and 1999 with 65%.

An examination of national reality from the point of view of a strictly electoral dynamic yields results which demonstrate a marked continuity when compared with previous proselytizing campaigns —as opposed to any marked break, change or novelty— as much on questions of manipulative and saturation publicity campaigns as on the variable of "polarization" between ARENA and the FMLN and this has made the fight for the San Salvador municipality fertile ground for drawing lines, measuring strength and positioning of forces in the most favorable stance with an eye to the upcoming presidential elections.

So then, if the current electoral campaign presents few novelties for our consideration, what is there that might distinguish it from previous electoral campaigns? What is evident is that there are factors which distinguish it but that these distinctions lie outside the purview of the political-electoral dynamics and inside the conflictive social situation of the country, with respect to which the political parties and their leaders seem to have turned a blind eye and a deaf ear, engaged as they are in the political game in the same way as ever. There are two species of logic at play in the current electoral scene and their separation one from the other is becoming ever clearer: (a) that of the social movement expressed in salary demands and resistance to privatization, the most open expression of which is the case of the conflict in the Social Security Institute; and (b) that of the political parties, the efforts of which are concentrated on winning and sharing quotas of power. The points of intersection between these two species of logic are few and far between, if not invisible. On the one hand, the political parties run roughshod over the social and labor demands. On the other, the social movement does not see its interests represented or defended in the activities of the political parties.

Said in another way, in El Salvador there is a rupture between society and politics because the political system is incapable of complying with its function as intermediary between the demands of the society and the state institutions responsible for responding to them. The situation is that there is no way that the political system can channel its demands to the diverse social groups if it does not, beforehand, make them its own and process them —which is precisely what it has not been able to do. It is this lack or failure of the political system— a failure for which the political parties and their leadership are directly responsible in that some of the most difficult social demands to deal with —i.e., jobs and salaries— have overflowed into violent channels which threaten to make them fertile ground for posing demands and seeking solutions. This is contrary to a democratic way of doing things, which favors peaceful solutions to conflicts. And it should be noted, on this point, that the institutional instruments for this way of doing things exist.

It is obvious to all that in the context of the current electoral conjuncture, the initiatives of the social movement —more than anything else, when these manifest themselves in a violent way— can be read as a result of political manipulation. This is precisely what the government has done. Nevertheless, without discarding any kind of manipulative pretentious of a political kind, it cannot be doubted that the social malaise caused by privatization and by the political and economic biases in favor of the financial elite rises head and shoulders above the electoral campaign and if the political system continues to function as it does in the status quo, this state of affairs will continue to obtain. Not to see the serious nature of the rupture between the political system and society (which is owing to the failure of the political system) is to close off the possibility for resolving social conflicts by means other than threats and force. It is to close off, as well, the possibility of renewing —through internal democratic processes— the parties and their leadership bodies.

In the social scenario in which the current electoral campaign is occurring there are strong and serious conflicts and the political parties and their leaders still have not dealt with them in serious and responsible ways. So it is, then, that in order to take the pulse of national reality, one must also look to what is happening outside of the political parties, their platforms, their music and posters. Up to this point in time, the rhythm of the country has been measured by political demands. Perhaps it is now time to measure politics by the rhythms of the country, especially by the rhythms demanded by the necessities of the great number of its inhabitants.

Last February 8, Eduardo Peñate Polanco decided to resign from the post of Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights (PDDH). In so doing, he avoided falling lower than he had already fallen in his inexplicable adherence to that post, but, above all, he saved the Legislative Assembly from continuing to be bogged down in one of the greatest demonstrations of incompetency since the signing of the Peace Accords. And so it is that, in spite of all the nefarious doings of Peñate Polanco during his term in the post of ombudsman, the final responsibility for the fact that such a person came to occupy one of the most important posts in the country lies with the deputies who gave their votes so that this was possible.

This is because, before he was elected, the black credentials which Peñate touted had already been placed on the table. It is known (see PROCESO 814) that on the shoulders of Polanco while he was still a judge there were open files against him in the Supreme Court and in the PDDH itself and there were denunciations even of sexual harassment and corruption as well as irregularities in the application of sentences against those found guilty which at various points in time required the intervention the Interamerican Commission for Human Rights of the OAS.

In an effort to justify the unjustifiable, the deputies of the FMLN —which was the only party from which one might have expected a minimum of thought and commitment on the issue of the PDDH— got to the point of arguing incoherently that all in all Peñate had never been condemned and that it was only a question of one of many judges who had committed similar small crimes. But this was not enough. When, a very short period later, doubts began to plague them as to the nature of the decision that they had taken, they continued, even then, to have the nerve to argue that, all in all, someone had to be put in charge of the Ombudsman’s Office and that Peñate should enjoy the benefit of doubt.

It was that benefit of doubt that was finally translated into the worst term in office to which the PDDH could have been victim. Doubtful handling of funds, unjustifiable firings and salary increases, the incorrect use of the goods of the institution, confrontations with the international community (which provoked the withdrawal of cooperation from Sweden), lying to the Legislative Assembly sub-commission who investigated him and his violations of the Constitution...these are only some of the accusations which, up to the moment, have made up the dark history of Peñate.

It is the certainty that, at one point in time, it was perfectly predictable that the ex – judge was not going to be able to carry out his functions in even a minimally satisfactory way as Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights which holds the deputies of this failure responsible, and responsible, as well, for the serious setbacks which such a failure presupposes for the institution. Certainly Peñate turned out to be a rogue and a cheat, even more cynical and shameless than he was originally thought to be, but his activities in the PDDH are not astonishing because nothing else could have been expected from a functionary with a background like his.

His shady behavior as a judge was disquieting from the beginning but this is not the most grotesque aspect of the situation, when all accounts are laid out in the end. What is the most grotesque of all is that the Legislative Assembly, with the FMLN’s votes and support, deliberately caused the PDDH to suffer the greatest risk and harm. The deputies knew who Peñate Polanco was before they elected him and, worse still, they had an extra month more to finish the investigation and ratify his appointment in a definitive manner. They knew, therefore, that with him at the leadership, the PDDH was in danger. What can they say now in order to justify or make amends for such an error?

It does no good that the FMLN members have torn their hair and rent their garments in recognition of having committed this mistake. It is not a bad thing to recognize one’s errors. What is, bad, however, is that they do so after having demonstrated a clear lack of interest in one of the most valuable achievements at the end of the armed conflict. And it is also, above all else, a bad thing because what they now call an "equivocation" was in reality an unethical overlapping of priorities: Peñate was named to head the PDDH on the basis of a filthy deal in which political interests played a clear role. What was predominant, then, was not the concern for the survival of the entity, but a concern for striking a deal which would benefit the party. After this, it was simply a matter of waiting and hoping for the best for the PDDH and that the questionable character of the Ombudsman they had chosen would not turn out as badly as it at first seemed.

Repentance and mea culpas in this matter now serve for little when all is said and done because the plenary of the Legislative Assembly took almost four months to decide who would take up the reins of the Ombudsman’s Office. True it is that in this sad chapter in the administration of the Assembly, the right-wing parties obstructed many of the best options in the process of choosing the Ombudsman. But this does not provide relief for the fact that the FMLN made possible the election of a person who was the least ideal for the post by arguing that someone had to be put in charge of the PDDH and that that someone should be given the benefit of the doubt.

If the wait had already been so long, why not prolong it until a good professional could be found who would fulfill the minimal requirements for leading the PDDH? If they were going to take such a prolonged period of time to decide, and while, during this prolonged period of decision, the PDDH was without leadership, how is it that they ended up choosing the most inadequate of candidates. How, then, is the long delay to be explained? Would it not have been better to choose someone by drawing lots even from the beginning?

All of this leaves nothing but ashes in the mouth. It is not just the fact that our deputies took months to place the reins of office of one of the most decisive institutions in the country in the hands of an unscrupulous personality, but that even after having engaged in all kinds of abuse and after having seen and examined all of the evidence against him, it was, on top of all of this, necessary to spend an incredible amount of time, money, informational deployments and waste in general in order to remove someone like Peñate from a post which he had so firmly taken into his grasp. And the worst of it is that, given that he would not resign, the struggle lasted who knows how long after the elections, with the loss of who knows how much in terms of resources. It is not only that the story of a low-life ex–judge who became Ombudsman had become one of the clearest objections to the future of democratic institutionalization in El Salvador, it is that the situation could have been still worse.

If the advance of democratization in the country is placed in doubt with deeds such as this it is because it has been demonstrated that the pluralism achieved with the signing of the peace accords does not guarantee the strengthening of the institutions. It is to be supposed that with the incorporation of the FMLN into the democratic life of the country there would exist a counterweight to the political hegemony of the right. From this and with all of its limitations, the FMLN would monitor the defense of the interests of the majority of the people. But after the Peñate case, the only conclusion which could be drawn is that the Salvadoran left not only lacks an alternative project for the administration of government but that at the point in time which they were called upon the act as an opposition force, they turned out to be terribly vulnerable to the vices which old guard politics have carried along for decades.

The FMLN now openly recognizes that it made a mistake. However, how can we know whether this recognition is authentic when from the very beginning it was obvious that it could have been avoided? Could it be that the systematic mea culpas of that left party might respond more to what is ostensibly politically correct in this set of circumstances rather than sincere repentance? After the political consequences which that "equivocation" has brought with it, what is left but that they declare themselves repentant? Be that as it may, the only thing that cannot be doubted at this point in the game is that as much as the FMLN deputies may rend their garments, the disastrous situation obtaining in the PDDH as a result of their action cannot be changed. The FMLN has a special responsibility in this, but none of the deputies who elected Peñate is exempt.

For some time now it has become evident that in El Salvador the market for sugar shows distortions, which favor the profit margins of the sugar magnates. Basically the mechanism is simple: to maintain sales quotas for all of the sugar refineries, price-fixing to maintain a price higher than what could be established in free market conditions and to maintain high-level tariffs for imports. In this way, a sector of the agricultural industry is favored to the detriment of the industrial sector and the consumers in general, who must buy sugar at a higher price than were it the case that free importation and uncontrolled commercialization to be permitted.

This scenario was significantly modified when one of the smallest sugar refineries of the country, El Carmen, decided not to respect the regulations for commercialization which are to be found in the sector and proceeded to sell 100% of its production, something which theoretically ought not to be done because sales are regulated by a "Sugar Development Commission". This refinery was the same one which was recently involved in possible cases of undue assignment of bank credits from the Banco de Fomento Agropecuario (PROCESO 889). In fact, its owners have no recourse other than to accept the fact that they are proceeding to liquidate all of their production because they have heavy financial commitments with the bank.

This situation caused a quick reaction by the owners of the rest of the refineries that, after experiencing two weeks of pressure, succeeded in getting the Legislative Assembly to intervene in order to regulate sugar sales. With a surprising vote of 78 in favor, the Assembly approved the "Temporary Law for Control of the Agricultural Sugar Industry", which establishes that the sugar supply for "internal consumption of sugar for the country will be covered by all of the refineries operating in the national territory, pro-rated as to their respective production [yields]". The aim of this is to prevent a situation in which one refinery sells its production at prices and in quantities which differ from those stipulated.

It is curious that this disposition was accepted as much by the parties close to ARENA, who are the great defenders of free trade and open market, as by the FMLN, which declares itself to be "opposed to the vices of the [free and open] market". The contradiction between ARENA’s discourse and practice turns out to be more than evident because, with the approval of the law in question, state intervention in strictly economic matters is given support. In fact, the clearest option for ARENA would have been to liberalize the sugar market as was the case in the petroleum and basic grain markets, by means of which measure they could have supported the position adopted by the owners of the El Carmen refinery.

Nevertheless, in this case the option was for intervening in the market because there were business interests which had to be protected from the exercise of public power, concretely from legislative power. In fact, in the process of liberalizing the sugar market they caused prices to be significantly reduced, the costs of the industry which uses it as raw material and which, therefore, caused an increase in competition for its exports. As a counterweight, there would be a reduction in income for the agricultural industries who owned refineries and the sugar cane growers who supplied this raw material (sugar cane). This, considering recent evidence, will not be permitted by the current government administration.

It is difficult to deny that behind the market intervention in the case of sugar is to be found the intention to provide privileges to specific economic sectors close to ARENA, which is not a specifically new practice for this party. What is noteworthy is that the FMLN is also aligned with ARENA in attempting to maintain privileges for that sector, even at the cost of consumer interests. It might even be said to have been a good opportunity for the FMLN to point out the recurrent contradictions in ARENA’s practice as it presents itself as a defender of the free market while at the same time refusing to liberalize the markets.

In addition, there are additional and multiple cases in the sugar market which clearly reveal that the ARENA administration is protecting the economic interests of business groups which hold a large measure of economic power. Proof of this is ARENA’s systematic refusal to discuss legislative bills dealing with free competition and anti-monopolistic practices —bills designed as tools for correcting deeply rooted market imperfections in the case of Salvadoran monopolies and oligopolies.

There are three categories of evidence of the government’s tendency to favor big business: the beer, cement and air transport markets. Beer is distributed in El Salvador by one single company, which, from the beginning, has functioned as a monopoly obstructing every possibility for the existence and functioning of other brewery businesses distributing in beer, which de facto concentrates all income generated by the industry. In the case of cement, the industry is maintained by means of a clear projectionist policy towards the sector (made up by two businesses which belong to the same business group), to the point at which it has become one of the "sensitive" topics in the negotiations for a free trade treaty with Mexico, given that the intent of the Salvadoran government is to maintain trade barriers for cement in order to protect the interests of that industry even at a cost to the consumers and to those requiring raw material.

Just as in the two previous cases, air transportation of passengers is operated by a single company based in El Salvador. TACA controls the greater part of the Central American market and enjoys government protection from ARNEA because the implementation of an "open skies" policy has been blocked. Such a policy would have permitted competition based on equality of conditions with other airline companies. In fact, the TACA rates were higher than normal, and there have been cases in which, according to tourist managers, for example, the price of a flight from the U.S. to Europe is less than that of a flight between El Salvador and Mexico.

An economic model in which, in its efforts to achieve economic growth justifies and promotes monopolistic practices does not foment development because it strongly limits the possibilities for an equitable distribution of income. It is for this reason that it is of vital importance that these practices of instrumentalizing the state for profit be strongly opposed. The behavior of the legislative faction of the FMLN in dealing with the case of the sugar market gives rise to questions concerning whether the upcoming electoral platform will include the topic of fomenting free competition, opposition to monopolies and, of course, the encouragement of small and very small enterprises. These are topics which must necessarily include the elimination of privileges for economic groups which finance, lead and belong to the ARENA party.

"Boys" and "girls" are words which bring to mind a world of play, recreation, fantasy, innocence and school. The world of childhood is very special, apparently distanced from social responsibility, worries, job and stress. Childhood is a stage in which one can live, legitimately, in a fantasy and depend on the decisions of adults. It would seem that here life does not correspond to knowledge and understanding of social reality, but to playing at discovery and learning. At least this is what it ought, theoretically, to be at the beginning of existence. Nevertheless, although many children are part of this "happy world", there are thousands of others who must grow and learn in the hard world of adults.

These children have few if any opportunities to develop fully and naturally because their days are taken up in work, asking for charity, mistreatment, abuse, exploitation. A large portion of children in the world is used by adults as sources of income and as instruments of exploitation. In this sense, one of the most inhumane and aberrant cases of child abuse is sexual exploitation. Child prostitution is, today, no flourishing and well-organized industry. The Human Rights Commission of the United Nations has reported that some ten million children in the world are regularly involved in sex for money. The United Nations Fund for Children (UNICEF) has estimated that annually at least one million minors, the majority of whom are girls, live in a state of prostitution.

In countries such as El Salvador where poverty is one of the most serious problems, the laws suffer from serious vacuums and programs and measures against child prostitution are terribly scarce, this business operates with a great deal of facility. Here child prostitution is practiced principally in places which have signs calling themselves "bars" ("cervecerías"), they deal in minors who have no home and who live in conditions of extreme poverty. The National Civilian Police, in collaboration with the Attorney General’s Office of the Republic and the Salvadoran Institute for the Protection of Minors (ISPM) have carried out, in recent months, a series of search operations in this kind of places and in the majority of them have rescued minors forced into prostitution.

During May of 1999, 10 clandestine brothels were discovered and 3 minors engaged in prostitution were discovered. Of these one was pregnant and was transferred to the ISPM. On November 20 of the same year, 17 adolescents were rescued from 12 brothels and five persons were detained for the crime of inducing, promoting and favoring the exercise of prostitution, contemplated in Article 169 of the Penal Code. Another piece of news informed readers about search operations in 14 "bars" held on November 28, 1999 in which three minors were found: a Nicaraguan, a Honduran and her child, a minor two years of age. On many occasions, the owners of these businesses offer false identification to the minors in order to set the authorities off track.

Trafficking in child prostitution has gotten a great deal larger. Currently this crime (together with the trafficking in women) occupies third place on the list of the most lucrative illicit businesses in the world, with drug trafficking and arms trafficking occupying first and second place. UNICEF has pointed out that "this business of prostitution produces some 20,000 million dollars per year" ("Child Prostitution IV, Noticieros Televisa, 1998). With the knowledge that 40% of Salvadoran minors live in extreme poverty, it is not to be wondered that El Salvador is a country with a high level of child prostitution.

Sexual tourism, child pornography and pedophilia are three faces of this phenomenon. Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras are countries in which so-called "sexual tourism" is practiced: that is to say "that persons from other countries come into the region to satisfy themselves sexually with minors". The relative facility with which the laws can be escaped in these countries is one of the major attractions for foreigners who seek "sexual favors" in the region, an action which, generally, they do not dare practice in their own countries ("Prostitution in Guatemala", Siglo Veintiuno, 1998).

Child pornography is an industry apart, but dependent on the sexual exploitation of children. Throughout the world, there exists a market of considerable solidity for this kind of child abuse. The most immediate and feasible way to have access to it is by means of Internet, the use of which is popular and cheap at the same time. Internet also offers information on services to locate and establish contacts concerning the sources of sexual tourism. On the net, there exist more than 450,000 sites with sexual content, of which 10,000 publicize this kind of pornography.

Finally, pedophilia is a topic that is not very much investigated in El Salvador, but the practice is more common than might be imagined. It is a question of adults who maintain sexual relationships with minors. Pedophilia is, in many countries, considered to be a crime and, as such, laws exist for the application of penal sanctions given the logic that a sexual relationship between an adult and a minor is a relationship of exploitation. So now, Salvadoran legislation does not typify this activity as a crime even when the problem is very common. Generally, relationships of this kind tend to take place between men and girls, especially when there is a relationship of economic dependence. It is traditionally believed that when a girl is sexually dependent on an adult it is because this is a "good" alternative to poverty, need and scarcity, above all when the family of the minor is the causal factor in this exploitation.

Finally, the sexual exploitation of children is even more alarming than it would at first seem because it grows rapidly in silence and networks exist which guarantee its function in a highly organized way. Fortunately, Salvadoran legislation is not totally blind to this situation. Articles 167, 168, 169 and 173 of the Penal Code sanction crimes of exploitation, promotion, inducing and favoring child prostitution. Likewise, the sanctioning of persons who engage in child pornography is contemplated. The penalties for these crimes are, nevertheless, laughable. The maximum punishment is twelve years in prison when the crime is extreme, but, in general, the sentence does not go beyond four years in prison.

"The Network Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Boys, Girls and Adolescents in El Salvador" is almost the only institution which prevents and investigates child prostitution. It monitors and promotes the respect for the rights of children provided for in the Convention on the Rights of Childhood in the UN and publishes and promotes the application of the Agenda Against Sexual Exploitation in a Commercial way, signed in 1996. Continuation of search operations by competent institutions is a hopeful sign, but it is not sufficient. What is needed is a law specifically against child exploitation, reforms to current codes and more effective, global and preventative actions.

OMBUDSMAN. Following the resignation of the Ombudsman for Human Rights, Eduardo Peñate Polanco last February 2, the matter in hand is the election of a substitute to take over the post. This will be decided upon the basis of the agreement by means of which the leader of the FMLN faction for renewal, Facundo Guardado, and the ARENA whip Walter Araujo, negotiated the election of the Attorney General of the Republic. The ARENA party members succeeded in reaching an agreement that all the left deputies would vote for Belisario Artiga in exchange for support for the removal of Peñate from office. And although Peñate resigned, ARENA appears to be willing to pay its part of the bargain. Araujo will meet with Guardado to discuss the choice of a substitute for the Ombudsman position. It has been learned that the reformist tendency of the FMLN is advocating for the appointment of UCA sociologist and professor, Zoila de Inoccenti, who, it would appear, is acceptable to ARENA. This party, nevertheless, will wait until after the elections in order to make its position public. On February 9, it was learned that the minority factions and ARENA would vote in favor of Mauricio Meyer, founder of the defunct LIDER party, for the post of Ombudsman. This coalition of parties will give Meyer 57 votes, which are sufficient for his winning the post. Meyer would occupy the post for the period of time sufficient for cleaning up the image of the PDDH. When he finishes his term, he will be substituted for by the left tendency candidate and so the pact will achieve its goal (El Diario De Hoy, February 10, p. 12).

POLEMIC. Once again, the plenary of the legislative body became the scene in which the deputies are carrying out their proselytizing campaign for election and re-election. The two heads of faction of the principal parties, Walter Araujo of ARENA and Shafick Handal of the FMLN "engaged mutually in a war of accusations and counter-accusations". "I have never killed, Shafick, but you have. You have kidnapped a minor and all the world knows it", Araujo stated in a euphoric manner after Handal stated that Araujo had no moral right to stain the prestige of the left party because he was involved in the assassination of Siegfied Guth Zapata. Araujo then accused Handal of having paid 50,000 colones to the essential witness so that he would incriminate him [Araujo] in the assassination. "I have the courage to tell you to your face", Araujo shouted to the FMLN deputy. The shouts and insults came to such an extreme that the legislative factions of the Christian Democratic Party and the National Conciliation Party decided to leave the plenary as a message of rejection of the attitude demonstrated by the legislators. "We are going to leave, we leave them fighting and when this circus is over we will return", stated Aristides Alvarenga of the PDC. The President of the Legislative Assembly, Juan Duch, called for a recess so that the heads of faction could be called together to calm them down (El Mundo, February 3, p. 6).

VIOLENCE. According to the National Civilian Police (PNC), during recent months crime has diminished by 31%. Nevertheless, the data presented by the Attorney General’s Office and the police statisticians reveal that the indices of violence are similar to those of the war period. This is how the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES) evaluate the situation. The Attorney General’s Office received, during 1999, a total of 12,276 denunciations related to domestic violence. This is to say that some 33 cases each day of violence against children and women in the family. The majority of the crimes are rapes, paternal irresponsibility and verbal or physical mistreatment. But violence in the family is only one of the facets of the problem "which is almost at the level of war" in this country. According to figures provided by FUSADES, violent deaths at the current time are almost at the same numerical level as that which prevailed during the years of the civil war. "We have an average of 129 deaths annually for every 100,000 inhabitants", stated the Director of the Department of Economic and Social Studies, Roberto Rivera. On the other hand, according to the General Direction of Statistics and Census, this year there were 21 violent deaths each day. During 1999, the PNC reported 2,278 homicides which are equivalent to 6 assassinations each day. Only half of that number result in arrest and detention of the perpetrators (El Mundo, February 3, p. 5).

SUGAR. The Legislative Assembly approved, on February 9, by 78 votes, a temporary decree authorizing the Ministry of Economy to regulate internal sales of sugar by the refineries operating in the country. The Temporary Law for the Control of the Agricultural Sugar Industry was proposed initially by the FMLN and ARENA. The agreement, which was supported by the rest of the parties, was reached after the owners of the sugar refineries and producers accused the El Carmen refinery of selling 100% of its production on the local market, which was considered by these groups to be "unfair competition", according to the leader of the sugar cane producers, Gustavo Chiquillo. For the deputies, the temporary law approved, which will regulate production until October 31, 2001, will establish market regulation on an equitable basis but will also apply harsher penalties on those who engage in abuse. Jorge Villacorta of the CDU, held that the approval of the law shows that "we are going to oppose any monopoly, we are against the vices of the market". Orlando Arevalo of ARENA declared that "our objective is to respond to the confidence of the sector and achieve equity in sales". Roberto Lorenzana of the FMLN, insisted that "with this law we will put things in order, in the midst of disorder, with justice..." (La Prensa Gráfica, February 10, p. 39).

COSTS. Industrialists of the Sweets and Snacks of El Salvador (DULBOSAL) complained of the high cost of sugar on the national market because internationally the product is sold at lower prices. The businessmen solicited a reduction in the price of sugar used to make sweets and chocolates. Industry data reveals that the local price of sugar is higher than 20 dollars per quintal, on the world market it sells for six dollars. This situation id not to the liking of El Salvador’s businessmen. The vice president of DULBOSAL, Carlos Melgar, stated that prices currently paid for sugar do not allow the sweets makers to compete. "We buy at the same price as every businessman at 200 colones per quintal, for which reason, in order to compete on the national or world market costs are very high", declared Melgar. In this sense, he indicated that in order to compete on the market in acceptable conditions the sale price of sugar must be lowered by at least 40% (that a quinta should cost less than 120 colones). "In Mexico there are high level subsidies for the sector and they protect themselves with high tariffs against importations and this is a situation which is favorable to them", stated Melgar by way of example. Figures on the market indicate that, in recent years, importation of sweets has increased by 62% (La Prensa Gráfica, February 14, p. 49).

TRADE UNIONISTS. Magistrates of the First Chamber of the Labor Circuit Courts clarified, on February 14, that the resolution issued last February 11 on the question of the workers fired from the Social Security Industry does not order a reinstatement of the 221 workers of the leadership of the Salvadoran Institute for Social Security. One of the magistrates, Wilfredo Sánchez, declared that "the Court ruled that there has been a violation of several clauses and norms of the Labor Code, but this does not signify reinstatement. What the court ruled is that there was a lack of compliance". Julio Fernández, also a magistrate of the First Chamber of the Labor Circuit Court, explained that "in Salvadoran legislation there is no right to reinstatement". On the basis of such an asseveration, the worker affected will have to go to the competent court to demand his rights for having been fired. The Court made a pronouncement on the violation of clause 36 (referring to the stability on the job) and 73 (which refers to the collective suspension of the workers) of the Collective Bargaining Contract; and articles 29 (on the obligation of the bosses to pay the salaries) and 30, clause five (that this is related to the discrimination of the worker because of membership in a trade union) of the Work Contract. It would seem that the workers will have a period of time comprehending 10 days in order to demand compensation for unfair firing (El Diario De Hoy, February 15, p. 3).