Electoral news?

The debate called into question

Increase in the Price of Gasoline

The last two weeks in El Salvador have been weeks dedicated to electoral polls. Several polls aimed to throw light on the way the voters will ostensibly act on March 12. So it is that in the race for the municipality of San Salvador, the reports waver between an overwhelming victory for Hector Silva over Luis Cardenal, which would find some explanation in the notable performance of Silva as mayor more than in his image. Then, on the question of the seats up for election in the Legislative Assembly, the more serious polls —that is to say, those which do not come from the political parties themselves— indicate a virtual tie between the two strongest parties (ARENA and the FMLN) while the three following positions occupied by PDC, PCN and CDU are, at the same time in close dispute. On the question of abstentionism, everything seems to indicate that there will be a level of between 55% and 60% at the polls for the upcoming election.

These are the raw data of the public opinion polls conducted just before the March 12 elections. An exhaustive analysis is not necessary, nor is a minute comparison of the data obtained from past pre-electoral processes in order to understand that they show a persistence of a well-defined tendency in the national political process, to wit: inside the political system, electoral preferences are concentrated in ARENA and the FMLN, the survival of the PCN and the PDC as political parties as well as a growing marginalization of small parties, with the exception of the CDU. Looking in from the outside, levels of abstentionism oscillate between 55% and 65%, which is explained by the marked lack of confidence on the part of the population towards politicians and politics. Recent electoral polls have shown well-defined tendencies in the national political dynamics. In this sense, there is nothing really new to be learned; but, at most, they serve to reinforce the evaluations of the national political process which begin to provide evidence on the basis of political analysis.

Why, then, if it is a know fact that party structures have not changed since the last presidential elections and we can go beyond this evidence, beginning with the first elections after the war to show the following: (1) that political leadership has been maintained almost without alteration, (2) that the political system has failed in its function as intermediary between the citizen demands and the state capability to respond to them, (3) that incompetence and irresponsible attitudes and behavior are the most outstanding characteristics of Salvadoran politicians, and so on. One cannot expect anything new or different. All in all, they are the same parties and leaders with the same vices and lack of capacity that are leading this new electoral race. If all this is already a known fact, it is not a surprise that documented levels of abstentionism are maintained —or even grow to a higher level— than before, just as it comes as no surprise that ARENA and the FMLN —followed by PCN, PDC and CDU— hold the first two slots in the general voting. Beginning with the recent elections and continuing up to the present time, nothing so extraordinary has happened in the country which would alter these political dynamisms. The polls reinforce this premise but one does not necessarily have to wait to read the results in order to have a reasonably clear idea about where the country is going on the electoral scene.

At the level of the Legislative Assembly, there will be no important news until after March 12. There will surely, thereafter, be the same balance of forces and the same political dynamic in place as for the outgoing legislative representatives. What is the content of this balance of forces and this dynamic? Basically, given the preponderance of ARENA deputies —proposing and setting in motion coherent initiatives with the social-economic model, the banner of which is held high by the party elite—, some FMLN deputies react to these proposals and initiatives and with serious limitations for disputing the legislative leadership with the ARENA deputies and an almost unconditional commitment with the PCN and PDC deputies with initiatives and proposals put forth by the ARENA party representatives. As things go, all things point to a stage setting repeated with only slight variations. This data will perhaps have to do with the virtual tie between numbers of FMLN and ARENA deputies, which will allow for greater room for the applications of pressure which the PCN and the PDC —and even the CDU— can then exercise over both of the big parties in order to support them with their respective votes.

This is to say that the closer to a tie in the number of deputies between the ARENA party and the FMLN, the more necessary it will be for both to win the favor of the parties who can offer them the opportunity for breaking this tie. These latter will, obviously be the winners but they will demand (and obtain) positions of power and —why not say so— cash payments in exchange for their votes. Seen from the angle of those who need their support most, ARENA will have it easier than the FMLN because not only does it have resources with which to buy souls and votes, but it has experience in this kind of dealing together with more than notorious affinities with the PCN and the PDC: Of course all will go better for ARENA without having to pay others off for favors, but perhaps it is better that way: they can win their shots while, at the same time, dressing themselves in democratic robes.

And the CDU? It is not known how this party will evolve, given that its evolution will undoubtedly depend upon the number of deputies it can win and upon the perceptions and interests proper to Rubén Zamora himself in each specific conjunct of events and affairs. What is meant in alleging this? Quite simply, that the FMLN will not have an easy time of it even if the CDU ends up in third place because unconditional support for the FMLN is in now way forthcoming from the CDU. Laying, then, to one side, the possible ascension of the CDU, the FMLN will have to negotiate with the PCN and the PDC, which will, from any point of view, place it at a disadvantage vis-à-vis ARENA. And should this not be the case, as it was not with the outgoing legislative body, the FMLN will have to deal directly with ARENA to reach agreements which will many times be contrary to its most deeply felt ideals.

The panorama sketched out here on the legislative scene is a dark one when seen from the optic of the advance in the democratization of the country. The situation could, most certainly, take an unexpected turn. Or it might be possible that there could be a sudden leap of enthusiasm which would alter the 60% level of abstentionism among the voting public which resists going to the polls. Then again, there could be a radical turn-about in expressed voting intentions which could, for example, lead the FMLN to an all-out victory. And then again, a sudden rise to second place by the CDU could alter the general voting panorama. This, that and the other could happen; but this would all be beyond the mark of the politically historic tendencies to be perceived upon the horizon as they are delineated by analysis and validated by experience.

Politics 

From among the three debates organized by the diverse national news media during this final leg of the electoral campaign with an eye to clarifying the municipal platforms of the candidates for the capital city mayor’s office, perhaps the most recent of which raised the greatest expectations among the population at large. This would be the debate entitled "Decisión 2000", promoted by TV 12 and led by the well-known talk show and news interviewer Mauricio Funes. But "Decisión 2000" did not provide room for criticisms and alternatives as had been hoped.

With that debate the possibilities for interviewing the principal contenders for the mayor’s office of San Salvador on certain essential issues finally evaporated. For example, no one could ask Luis Cardenal if, should he be the winner, he would continue the projects left unfinished by Hector Silva—projects which have been widely recognized—nor could he be questioned about his shallow and inefficient electoral campaign. Neither was there space for allowing Silva to clear up doubts sown about his handling of the municipality’s resources. Nor could the wealth of topics which the panelists handle be delved into so that the current mayor could speak up about the specific projects which he offers to begin or simply continue.

Definitively speaking, "Decisión 2000", with the exception of certain changes in the mechanics of the program and the panel members, this debate was nothing more than the repetition of the previous debate. It even revolved around the very same topics. So then, once again the public saw Hector Silva held up in public, offering as many concrete projects as solutions to problems, face to face with Luis Cardenal, a demagogue who promises vagaries and sleights of hand such as "the decontamination of the Acelhuate River", "the empowerment of the self-esteem of the capital city residents" or to make San Salvador a "more human" city. A mayor expert in the problematic state of affairs obtaining in greater metropolitan San Salvador and resolute enemy of face to face confrontation with the ARENA party’s aspiring candidate who, in covering up his ignorance of the situation under debate, pulls criticisms out of his sleeve at the drop of a hat and wanders into generalities in order to avoid a thoughtful discussion of what he is proposing.

To the disenchantment which the last debate provoked can be added the notorious level of superficiality and poverty of the coverage of the event by the written press, more interested in describing the clothing of those present and in counting up the errors in diction committed by the candidates than in presenting the ideas expressed by the participants and assuming a critical posture in dealing with the event.

So now, beyond the specific evaluation of "Decisión 2000", it might do us well to analyze the way in which the systematization of the debates was perceived by public opinion. The fact that the candidates of the capital city mayor’s office had agreed to participate in three debates and had prepared themselves to make of this participation a successful part of their respective campaigns has given pause to diverse analysts who see in this process a moment to analyze the content of the process of democratization. The generalized posture vis-à-vis the debates is that, thanks to these events, i.e. this electoral process defined before and after on the question of democratic institutionalization. This analysis holds that in El Salvador has finally included a "culture of debate" and that the winner has been democracy itself.

Such a perspective finds an echo in the writings of international analysts. José Juan González, on the question of the electoral process scheduled to begin in Spain, published, on March 2 in EL PAIS a column entitled "Elections without Debates", in which Spanish politicians are sharply criticized for having refused to hold a debate in public and alleging that debates, and not votes, are what define authentic democracy. For this Spanish columnist, as well as for the greater part of Salvadoran public opinion, debate is a facet of civilized societies, an unequivocal sign of rationality, proof of the democratic and professional qualities of candidates and a show of respect for an electorate considered to be competent.

In the context of his apology for the debate, González Encinar makes a pertinent distinction with regard to this national state of affairs. It is a question of the difference between democracy and mob rule. The first finds its legitimacy in the people, in the majority of its citizens. The second, on the other hand, seeks to legitimize itself under the wings of the most ignorant minorities. According to this author, to engage in debate would be the antidote to mob rule and would constitute a privileged way f keeping a democratic regime alive. The conviction that underlies the awakened optimism is a just one when one considers the recent debates staged in El Salvador.

But political reality is not so simple. In the case of El Salvador, the optimists seem to have forgotten certain things. First of all, that Luis Cardenal participated in the debates because he was obliged to do so by circumstance. Francisco Flores had already made it clear, during his campaign, that ARENA party members do not debate because of their own convictions. Secondly, that the debates centered exclusively on the candidates for mayor of San Salvador, again because this is the way the exceptional situation demanded —given the fact that the FMLN was at an advantage over the ARENA party in the electoral race for making this stage of the game a catapult towards the presidential office. Thirdly, that the news media, more interested in running a good show than in strengthening democracy, completely biased the candidates for deputy, whose administration will be much more decisive, because of its national impact, than that of the capital city mayor's office. And the fourth consideration is that the country finds itself in the midst of a serious social convulsion which the state has not been able to deal with.

On a general level, the unconditional friends of debate forget some of the details as well. First of all, that a debate does not always serve to learn more about the proposals of the candidates at a deeper level —"Decisión 2000", which was only a repetition of the same, is a good demonstration of this. Secondly, that the demagoguery or tendency towards mob rule cannot be avoided by placing the candidates in a situation of public debate. It is precisely in the "civilized" countries which González Encinar holds up as examples that the candidate sells himself as a product and has learned to use the debates as just one more publicity strategy —here ARENA goes down this same road. And thirdly, that the acid test for democratic regimes is not whether or not they engage in debate or not, but whether or not the majority of the people believe in them or not.

Much could have been debated in this campaign, but this cannot be considered an absolute triumph of democracy as long as doctors and patients of the Salvadoran Social Security Institute are abused by the anti-riot police of the National Civilian Police. Likewise, and reserving the differences of the case, much can be debated by Spanish politicians who aspire to become president this year, but this will not stop the violence committed by ETA, nor will it convince its leaders to put down their arms and sit down to engage in discussions in front of the cameras.

Debates can be healthy for a system which aims at being democratic, but they are not the panacea for the political problems of a country nor are they the basic elements for deciding when a democracy is a democracy or not. They are, definitively speaking, an instrument, the use and usefulness of which are subject to specific interests. What provokes the questioning of a democratic regime are precisely the forces which doubt that democracy, as it is experienced at present —with debates and all— might be the best of all possible political systems.

One of the first economic reforms set in motion by ARENA was the liberalization of prices for hydrocarbons and petroleum derivative products begun in 1990 with the privatization of the importation of petroleum crude oil and its derivatives. Up until then, and since 1980, CEL has been in charge of the importing and sales of hydrocarbons —a process which has profited in the amount of close to 130 million colones on an annual basis.

At that point in time, then, the Ministry of the Economy considered that the privatization of the importation of hydrocarbons would generate "greater competitivity between the diverse agents who wish to import such products". Nothing is farther from reality because ten years later what can be documented is a greater concentration of property in big transnational businesses which reduce the participation of small distributors of petroleum derivatives. So it is that two transnational —EXXON and SHELL— are in charge of the three cycles of production: importation of petroleum and hydrocarbons, refineries and distribution.

One of the measures which accompanied privatization of the importation of hydrocarbons was the establishment of a mechanism for price fixing which was called the Parity in Imports System and that, basically, consists in adjusting prices in a way which is directly proportional to the fluctuation of international prices. The first effects of this schema were felt with the Persian Gulf War at the beginning of 1991, when international prices shot up and caused as a consequence an increase in internal prices for unsubsidized gasoline and diesel. It should be pointed out here that, fortunately, consumer prices for liquid gas and diesel for public transportation are subsidized by the state and so were not affected in the same way as prices for remaining hydrocarbons.

Since last June (1999) through March of 2000 international prices of petroleum have reached similar levels or even levels higher than those felt in 1991 because of the policy for reducing prices for the drilling of petroleum implemented by exporting countries. As a result, internal prices as well of hydrocarbons have felt proportional price hikes and have been practically uninterrupted.

From May 26 through 01 June of 1999 and from March 8 through 14 of 2000, the prices of gasoline for distributors have passed from 7.75 to 12.94 colones for special and 7.33 to 11.39 for regular, which implies increases of 67% and 55% respectively. To these prices must be added the costs and profits of the distributors in such a way that prices to the consumer for the second week of March reached 20 colones for special gasoline and 17.50 colones for regular. At the present time, it is hoped that prices for petroleum will continue towards the high point in such a way that exporting countries will not increase their production.

Curiously enough, constant increases prices of combustibles did not provoke an increase in the Consumer Price Index nor did they interrupt what between December of 1998 and December of 1999 was a period of negative inflation of 1%, in spite of the fact that these increases affect the costs for transportation. During the same period, the prices for petroleum derivatives experience strong increases, to the point that special gasoline increased its value by 85%, regular by 67% and diesel by 80%.

Two aspects might draw our attention in this context, to wit: the price fixing mechanism for hydrocarbons and the construction of the Consumer Price Index. Price fixing for hydrocarbons aims to regulate the market, with which measure a situation can be avoided in which distributors fix prices to consumers at excessively high rates, and, at least in this aspect, the mechanism does function and prices do not depend so much on profit margins which the businesses desire to obtain but rather on the behavior of international petroleum prices. In spite of the foregoing —and very much in spite of those who favor liberalization— it should be pointed out that under this new system, consumers confront prices which are much more volatile and unstable than those which prevailed before the reform of the hydrocarbon market.

On the question of prices, it is especially interesting that prices for combustibles seem not significantly to affect IPC, in spite of the fact that the category of "private transportation" has a weight of 7.68% within this index. Although the "miscellaneous" category, where "private transportation" is located was the category which experienced the greatest inflationary rate for December, 1999 (at 3.6%) —although this cannot be compared even remotely with the high inflationary rates were experienced on the hydrocarbon market. Moreover, prices for combustibles seem not to significantly influence prices for other categories such as food and clothing because, in the first case, prices which showed a reduction of 5.2% between December 1998 and December 1999 while for the second, they were reduced by 1.5%.

Evidently those who have been most affected by the liberalization of the hydrocarbon market are the consumers while those who have most benefited from the process are the transnational businesses, which have found El Salvador to be good business as is evidenced by the proliferation —excessive in some cases— of service seasons and the eminent arrival of new petroleum enterprises.

Unfortunately, these tendencies seem to be the spirit of the reforms implemented by the three ARENA administrations: to liberalize markets in order to broaden the range of entrepreneurial accumulation even when this presupposes higher prices to consumers. The emblematic cases are the privatization of the telephone system and the privatization of the distribution of electrical energy, which presupposes a periodic review of prices in order to maintain profit margins for operating businesses intact.

Doubtless, having maintained the previous system of price fixing for hydrocarbons, the government has found itself bound by the necessity of increasing prices or, if not, to assign growing subsidies in order to maintain them stable and, with this, to increase the already swollen fiscal deficit. The doubt which persists is the following: what would have happened if the state had maintained control of the importation of hydrocarbons already under its control and adopted a system of parity of imports in order to fix prices? It might be said that the possibility exists that the state would receive fiscal income as a product of the profits for operation or that these would be transferred to consumers by means of lower prices.

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