Proceso 894
March 15, 2000
ISSN 0259-9864
 
 

INDEX

Editorial An election without representation
Economy Preliminary results of the March 12 election
Society Lessons to be drawn from the strike
            in the Salvadoran Social Security Institute (ISSS)
 
 
 

EDITORIAL

     If the result of the March 12 election is not surprising, how are the long faces of the ARENA leaders and some governmental functionaries to be explained? Certainly, they knew beforehand, from their own polls, that they were not going to win the Mayor’s Office of San Salvador; but, doubtless, they hoped to continue to be the first political force in the country. Nevertheless, the results confirmed by the pre-electoral measuring of the University Institute for Public Opinion of the UCA (IUDOP) are the following: the 18 advantage points of Silva over Cardenal in San Salvador, the tie at the national level between the FMLN and ARENA, ARENA’s loss of votes and a higher abstention rate than in the last elections. >From this perspective there ought to be no surprises. But Salvadoran politicians do not tend to analyze political reality with any serenity. The long faces in the ARENA ranks are more than justified: the party has fallen from grace among the electoral preferences: it lost the most important Mayor’s office by a wide margin, it has two deputies less than its major contender and, although it won more municipalities this time around, it will be governing a smaller portion of the population at the local level. The municipalities with the highest population levels are in the hands of the FMLN.

     But these results ought not to cause us to lose sight of one basic fact. The majority of the Salvadoran population of an age to vote did not even go to the polls last Sunday. Approximately 65-70% of the population eligible to vote did not go to the polls. Abstention is even greater than last year for the presidential elections. The deputies and the municipal councils, therefore—although legitimately elected—represent fewer people. The intense, constant requests for the population to vote issued during the days preceding the elections and on election day itself, by the political party leaders, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the disc jockeys of various radio and television programs and others had not effect.

     Moreover, the majority of the citizenry —or, 80% to be exact— had already decided what party they would vote for on March 12, two months before —that is to say, before the electoral campaign began. This means that the political parties, and ARENA in particular, have spent millions of colones almost exclusively for the benefit of the owners of the big news media, without obtaining even a minimal alteration in public opinion. But worse still, the ARENA campaign, instead of encouraging the voters to vote actually kept party sympathizers away from the polls in no small numbers. This was their death knell. ARENA ended up with only its hard vote —very much equivalent to the hard vote of the FMLN. This is to say that the campaign not only did not produce the expected results, but also was actually harmful. Given the enormous investment made, from the management point of view, these elections were bad business for the party led by the big businessmen of El Salvador.

     The direct beneficiary of this poor leadership by the ARENA party is the FMLN. But the FMLN should not have any false illusions or expectations about this victory which, however, is not open to dispute. The FMLN triumph is owing more to the failure of the ARENA party than to any important growth in number of FMLN militants and sympathizers. The FMLN still has (1) to convince a good part of the populace that it actually has the ability to govern, (2) to identify much more with the needs of the Salvadoran majority and so increase its credibility as a party as well as create confidence in the population. These are challenges that a victory such as that of March 12 tends to occlude. The discontent of the ARENA sympathizers with their party as well as the rejection of a good part of the population of the political practice of this party are clear, but it is not at all clear, as yet, that the FMLN is the option of the majority of the population. It is clear that the ARENA party could lose control of the state, but it is not decidedly clear yet if the FMLN will administer the blow in the near future.

     The local government of the greater part of the Salvadoran populace and the majority of the Legislative Assembly represent a historic opportunity for the FMLN, which has before it a peerless possibility for making at effort at good municipal and legislative government, for consolidating its political position and winning credibility and, in this way, the confidence of the people. In order to achieve these goals, the unity and social and political lucidity are strategically important for the FMLN. The term in municipal office for the municipality of San Salvador is an experience which ought to be reproduced in all municipal governments in the hands of the FMLN. If the FMLN does not take advantage of this opportunity which has opened up for it, its own future might be seen in the image of ARENA as it currently exists —as through a looking glass.

     Neither the bitterness of defeat nor the illusion of triumph should make them forget that the majority of the Salvadoran population of voting age did not vote for either of these two parties. Their greatest challenge lies in demonstrating that they can, in fact, govern for the majority, that their interests are primary —even above the interests of the party or of certain interest groups— that the elections are a valuable instrument for producing changes because such changes actually occur in reality. Without going any farther, this process of change could begin with the radical reform of the electoral system: it is evident that the current model is obsolete, that the mechanisms for casting a vote, monitoring the process and counting the vote are primitive and that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal does not have the capability for controlling such a process. The irregularities —confusion in the model, double voting, buying of votes, substitution of voters, inadequate material, lack of information in a complicated system, lack of respect for the voter, etc.— all of this has appeared again, but this time in a more generalized way. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal can hardly handle the voting of some 30% of the population. What would have happened if 60% of the population, for example, had gone to vote?

     The political parties tend to deal with this topic as if it were a problem exclusively of their own, ignoring the population itself, which should be the protagonist. Up until now, the political parties have demonstrated that they have very little regard for the voting populace when they do not facilitate the exercise of their right to vote. This is a good opportunity for the parties to begin to stop thinking only of themselves and think more about the citizens whom —as is repeated untiringly— they should serve.

ECONOMY

     Although the final results of the municipal council and legislative deputy elections of last March 12 are not yet available, one can note, on the basis of some preliminary data, that some tendencies foreshadowed in the 1997 elections are taking shape: i.e., a relative stagnation and wearing away of the electoral base of the ARENA party and, on the other hand, a moderate, but persistent, increase in the FMLN electoral base. According to the preliminary results, the FMLN will win 31 deputy seats (two more than ARENA) and 78 municipalities (30 more than they won in 1997). ARENA, for its part, will hold onto its 29 deputies, but will obtain only 124 municipalities (36 less than in 1997). This implies that the big upset for the ARENA party took place basically in the elections for municipal councils.

     On the other hand, it is evident that the Salvadoran political system is coming closer and closer to a two-party system for two reasons: (1) the abysmal differences in the electoral bases between the second and third political forces and, moreover, (2) the party which was beginning to take shape as “a third force” has showed itself, historically, to be nothing more than an appendage to the big parties, especially ARENA. Preliminary data on the elections of 2000 is presented below comparing it with the results of the two foregoing elections for deputies and municipal councils held in 1994 and 1997.

     For the year 2000 elections, and with 87% of the rolls for the polling booths processed, ARENA will have obtained a total of 381,906 votes in the elections for deputies, which implies that, in the end, it will receive the same number of votes as it did in 1997. The political falling by the wayside of the ARENA party was more evident in the 1997 elections when its electoral base eroded to such a degree that the elections for deputies garnered only 396,301 votes, when in 1994 they had received a total number of 605,775 votes.

     In the case of the FMLN, the tendency demonstrated by its electoral base in the elections for deputies is towards an increase because, since its first participation in 1994 the number of voters in its favor went from 287,811 (for 1994) to 369,709 (for 1997) while preliminary data for elections this year (2000) gives the FMLN 375,258 votes which is already sufficient to go beyond the number of votes for 1997, although it should be mentioned that such a significant increase as between 1994 and 1997 has not taken place.

     In practical terms, the foregoing presupposes that what is most probable is that the FMLN will keep 31 deputies and ARENA the 29 it currently has. The FMLN will obtain a small advantage in spite of the fact that it had a lower absolute number of votes as compared with ARENA (375,258 as opposed to 381,906), given that in the assignment of seats in the Legislative Assembly the department where the votes were cast and the electoral quotient assigned to each department were also determining factors. For example, in order to win a deputy position for the Department of La Libertad, 23,730 votes were needed, but in order to win the same slot in the Department of Cabañas, 8606 votes were sufficient. This is to say that it could be the case that a party with 26,000 votes might win 3 deputy positions in Cabañas, but the other, with an equal number of votes would only win one deputy slot for La Libertad.

     Unfortunately, consolidated summary data for the voting in the municipal councils are still not available. However, preliminary data gives the FMLN 78 municipalities and ARENA 124, which implies that the gap between the two parties has been closed because if ARENA currently has 112 municipalities more than the FMLN, during the upcoming period this figure will fall to 46. Doubtless, here the principal electoral shakeup for ARENA is to be seen side by side with the strengthening of the FMLN. The most significant electoral campaign was, doubtless, that of the Municipality of San Salvador which eclipsed all other electoral races at the municipal level and even those of the legislative candidates. Once again, it was the FMLN which came out the best given that its candidate won with a comfortable margin over the ARENA candidate (18%).

     Apart from the results obtained by the two major parties the fact that both continue to maintain a strong and safe distance from their nearest contenders is a significant fact. For the elections in 2000, it was the PCN which came to occupy third place in the electoral preferences. After having obtained, according to the same preliminary data, 92,925 votes, which do not represent even a fourth of the votes won by ARENA or for the FMLN and which keeps the situation close to the number of votes obtained in 1994 and 1997. Once again, because of the characteristics of the process of assigning deputies, this figure was sufficient so that the PCN might win 14 deputies slots—almost half of what ARENA won.

     All in all, one cannot help but notice the electoral base obtained by the PCN, although it could win it third place among the political forces, it is not sufficient to consolidate it as a viable option which could place in danger the position of either of the two major parties. Another characteristic which removes it from the leadership space of “third force” is that the party which has occupied that position during the last three or four elections —the PCN— lacks an independent political project and practically limits it to obtaining votes for its deputies for power quotas.

     Additionally, another element which arises from the figures of the year 2000 elections is the lack of capacity of the new parties to stay within the electoral system. The PLD and the CDU seem destined to disappear for the reason that they have not obtained the minimal number of votes required for political parties and coalitions in the amount of 32% and 6% of the valid votes, respectively. According to preliminary data, the PLD would have obtained only 1.29% of the valid votes while the CDU obtained 5.3%. Other parties destined to disappear for the same reasons are the USC and the PPL. Nevertheless, at the same time as these political parties disappear, the new PAN party appeared with 3.7% of the valid votes and won two deputies and a municipality and, of course, the right to participate in future elections.

     All in all, the extraordinary note in the results of the elections is centered essentially in the fact that the FMLN has substantially increased the number of municipalities while ARENA’s quota of power was reduced. Other results do not significantly change the political spectrum: the municipality of San Salvador continues in the hands of the FMLN and the legislative assembly is practically in the same situation because the FMLN majority is symbolic and will have little or no implication for the correlation of forces which continue depending upon alliances and negotiations with small parties, a field which is surely dominated by ARENA.

     Finally, it is curious to note how ARENA has succeeded in maintaining its electoral base in the elections for deputies in spite of the political wearing away which a decade in the executive office implies. This reflects a situation that, in spite of everything, ARENA has come out well in the elections. What can, indeed, be regretted is that the number of total voters has not increased and that a goodly number of municipalities was lost.

SOCIETY

     An electoral period such as El Salvador has not experienced in some years marked by a measure of social conflict has just ended. The doctors and workers of the Salvadoran Social Security Institute (ISSS) and the government took to extremes positions with regard to a conflict unleashed when President Flores did not honor agreements signed during the Armando Calderón Sol Administration. The declared intention to impose one of the two postures that hung in the balance came to the point of becoming the new profile of the motor force maintained by both sides. The progressive application of pressure became the perfect mechanism for making the will of the government as well as that of the trade unions felt. And the upshot of it all is that this produced a crisis involving working against the clock for some of the more important elections involving the contending parties.

     In this context, a pressure-filled unfolding of events —in which the intransigence of the Flores administration was laid bare— ended the conflict and, at the same time, unleashed a series of questions about the political revenue which the two parties with the strongest leverage among the electorate obtained: to wit, ARENA and the FMLN. So it was that while some attempted to unload onto the left the responsibility for activity which was political in character and which also involved destabilizing effects, others moved the clock ahead towards the punishment that the population would give to the right wing and to its traditional way of ventilating criticisms and protests among the population. In both cases, the intention was clear: it was to unleash public censure and attract the greatest number of those not in agreement to the polls on election day. Nevertheless, the results of the electoral race of March 12 which, at this point do not seem to reinforce the hypothesis that they were generated as a result of such a tense electoral scenario.

     Things were this way because, far from yielding some unexpectedly benevolent results for some and implacable results for others, the recent elections made it clear that the moment has not yet arrived in which absolute victory by any of the existing political forces might be possible. In general, the reigning party has not succeeded in stopping the leakage of voters which affected municipal and legislative elections in 1997. On the other hand, neither has the FMLN succeeded in going beyond the margin of faithful voters which it has had practically since 1994. Moreover, although the left party has obtained benefits with a certain increasing the number of voters since that date, the behavior of its “hard vote” is not entirely stable. As opposed to the ARENA bases, the FMLN bases showed a certain tendency to shrink during the presidential elections of 1999 (the number of voters favorable to the FMLN went from 369,709 in 1997 to 343,472 in 1999).

     Given a panorama such as this, it is worthwhile to closely examine the place occupied by the development for the ISSS conflict in the configuration of the electoral scenario with slight variations in the power quotas managed by the two principal contending forces. From the outset, to assume that the way to resolve the problem among the doctors and workers of the ISSS and the government could be sufficient motive for mobilizing the voters to reject or support the FMLN or the ARENA party would be to limit the breadth of the vision concerning the facts and activities. Had this been the case, the shrinkage of ARENA’s hard vote would have been much more significant. Likewise, this perception of the facts could easily lead to thinking that a displacement of voters from one extreme of the spectrum to the other might take place. So it is that the voting populace would be a mass which would renounce its electoral preferences without much reflection and whose identification with current political offerings is only superficial.

     If the ISSS conflict exhibited any possibility for influencing electoral results, these would have to have been on the level of producing the level of abstentionism obtaining during the elections (which approached 67% of the electoral rolls). The situation is that the way in which the events unfolded in the final days of the strike made one thing clear: the responsibility of the extreme to which the tension between the unionists and the government was shared at various levels with the state apparatus. In the first place, upon learning that Fabio Castillo, General Coordinator of the FMLN, secretly pushed for a coming together of the parties involved and that that initiative was rejected by the authorities lays bare the fallacious aspects which form the basis for the principal arguments offered by the government: to be open to any negotiation for seeking solutions to the conflict.

     The Flores administration publicly underlined that its willingness to resolve the strike situation was determined by compliance with the terms which they were already putting forth: i.e., (1) the concessioning out of health services and (2) the contracting of “good” doctors who were unemployed and lacking in experience together with (3) the sanctioning of the strikers who were causing the destabilization in such a way as to make an example of them. Likewise, the conception that Flores had of “dialogue” —which he insisted upon from the moment that he assumed responsibility for the highest state office— became clear. These were, then, negotiations in which there were some who were on the side of reason, commitment with the population and with the possibility for governance and others who could only opt for pressure, sectarianism and the politicizing of social demands. In this way, if someone who was not a trade unionist —among them, potential voters— was not in total agreement with the posture of the government, this person would automatically be placed in second position and would, therefore, be against the values which the ARENA administration was embracing.

     In second place, the role of the PNC in the sharpening of the confrontation between the two sides was presented, as well, as a reinforcement of the lack of confidence towards those who make decisions in our country. The contradictions which surrounded the PNC’s intervention in the dissolution of a protest action in front of the Medical-Surgical Hospital were made patently clear: the police force is, today more than ever, amenable to political manipulation. In the actions involving force supported by the maximum head of the police, Mauricio Sandoval —a man with the hardest of hard line ARENA mentalities, who sees in these demonstrations of authoritarianism a calling to attention of his fellow party members— and who clearly believes that these make up the majority —and all of this with an eye to confirming the government’s willingness to maintain at arm’s length those who are perceived as representing a possible danger to the stability of the country. If this were not be the case, how else could the excessive use of force be explained —force used not only against trade unionists but also against the civilian population at precisely the a moment when the hegemony of ARENA appeared to be in danger?

     A third point is the presence of Fabio Castillo in the negotiations. Far from appearing to be the “objective and disinterested” collaboration of a citizen in an effort to seek the solution to the conflict, he confirmed the fact that, in questions of national interest, many of the fundamental decisions are discussed exclusively at high levels and on terms not available to public opinion. On the question of the participation of the FMLN in the organization of the strike in the health sector not much can be said. There is no data which might provide definitive proof upon which to base such suggestions or indications. But the flavor of the political pact which required Castillo’s intervention in the conflict and, moreover, the way in which the same ARENA party tried to take advantage of this revelation, confirmed that both parties sought benefits for themselves from any and all solutions which might be forthcoming.

     Doubtless, the degree of mobilization of which the political parties are capable of did not issue in demonstrations of massive support —that is, majority support as it tends to be called in a pre-electoral situation— of the voters. Instead, the distancing of the political class from the problems that affect the population becomes even more palpable. Although it is possible that the ISSS conflict could not have affected the hard vote of the major parties in a decisive way, it does appear possible to affirm that it had the affect of enlarging that portion of the population which does not see elections as an instrument of change.