Proceso 898
April 12, 2000
ISNN 0259-9864
 
 
 

INDEX

Editorial      Cristiani leaves COENA
Politics         Will ARENA undergo a process of renovation?
Economy     New increases in rates and subsidies un electricity
Society         Kidnapings, constitucional reforms and social control
 
 
 

EDITORIAL

    The results of the last legislative and municipal elections have obliged the leadership body of ARENA to come to terms with the topic of institutional change. And everything, from various points of view, seems to indicate that they have decided to begin at the point where concentration of power impeding the advance of party renovation has been perceived. In reality, the weight, which Cristiani wields in the party, is a secret from none, as is his capacity to impose lines of political and economic action, together with his capacity to abort any initiative which is contrary to these lines. It is no secret that the economic power wielded by the ex-president of the republic, riding the crest of the wave of a voracious financial system, has amassed an enormous fortune. Cristiani, then, is not just another neighborhood boy either within the party or within groups holding economic power. He is, rather, on the contrary, a full member of the hierarchy which knows and recognizes his power in national and international business circles. But, for all of this, he must leave the presidency of COENA. And if this happens, it is because, for the ARENA leadership body, the electoral results are more worrisome than would appear at first glance.

    That Cristiani must leave COENA does not mean that this right-wing party will automatically embark upon a process of change along the lines people hoped for when Francisco Flores assumed the presidency of the republic. At that point in time, the most optimistic believed that, with Flores at the helm, a dynamic would be unleashed which would lead not only to the internal redefinition of ARENA leadership bodies, but would also imply rising above the influence of impresarios linked to the state party. Neither one thing nor the other occurred. The state has continued to be the echo chamber of the most voracious business interests while in ARENA the old guard continues to prevail. Certainly the principal member of the old guard has been Cristiani and, in consequence, the fact that he has been removed does not mean, in and of itself, that large changes in party structures will take place as a result. So it is that, given the enormous concentration of power in Cristiani's hands, it is clear that changes and renewals at the heart of the ARENA party demand, as their initial premise, his removal from the principal leadership body of the party. But this removal guarantees nothing, above all if Cristiani, with the abilities for which he is characterized, succeeds in handling and leading the party from behind the scenes.

    Doubtless, Cristiani will do everything possible to hold on to a quota of power which will allow him to continue influencing the fundamental decisions of ARENA. From this it follows that those who aim to move the party forward by means of internal renovation —if they seriously aim to do so— will have to square off and face Cristiani and his group, and perhaps reaching inevitable concessions with the aim of party unity always in mind. With Cristiani's exit from COENA, then, the beginning of the process of change in ARENA will hardly have begun. This process can either advance or be aborted from its very beginning. This will depend on the way in which diverse power groupings which are active expressions of power in that right-wing party might position themselves.

    Meanwhile, Cristiani has not bothered to hide his distaste and deep sadness at leaving the post of president of COENA. It is curious that the most embattled ARENA leaders —the hard-liners who do not give in and who always impose their will— are ready to shed a few tears at such a minor political reversal. It is a curious fact that, being so hardened they still cry —as a Mexican song says, boys cry too— or cry for silly things —such as losing an election or having to leave the presidency of the party—; in the end, everyone who wants to weeps. What is curious —or worse still, shocking— is that these men who have not shed weep for such a small thing when they have not shed a single tear for the thousands of their countrymen who were brutally assassinated. On the contrary: some of those who now cry as a result of votes or party posts are happy and congratulate themselves for the death of other human beings. They cheered and congratulated themselves for the suffering —many times ordered directly by they themselves— of the victims and their family members.

    One of the new-style journalists was said to have seen a full expression of Cristiani's humanity in his tears. Weeping openly, the ex president has shown to all that he is also a sensitive man who suffers and is saddened just like everyone else. This is a complete gesture of humanity which is worthy of being recognized as such by everyone and, above all, by those who frame public opinion, the young Turks of national journalism whose sharp analytic sense is placed in check when they detect the “human side” of Cristiani. But did Cristiani weep when the security forces assassinated —with full impunity— students, workers, peasants, nuns and priests? Did a single gasp or sob break from his heart when he learned that members of the Atlacatl Battalion had assassinated the Jesuits of the UCA and their two employees? Did his voice as much as tremble when he participated in those macabre meetings in which the life and death of other human beings was decided? Most assuredly, he did not. It can be assumed that Cristiani took part in those situations with resolute firmness, such as behooves a well-born anti-communist. It is clear that it was the life of others which hung in the balance; it was the life of a few “enemies” whose destruction had to be celebrated.

    With this as a backdrop, Cristiani's tears are ridiculous. But more ridiculous are those who see in them an expression of the ex president's humanity. The deep humanity of a person only makes sense in situations which have reached their limit —those which involve life and death. Up until now people such as Cristiani have only expressed inhumanity. And if he had wanted to give assurances of his humanity more than weeping for a post he had lost, he ought to assume the responsibility that goes along with it in the assassination of the Jesuits and their two employees. Certainly, the ex president has all the right in the world to weep for what he considers important. Not all tears, however, express the same profound humanity. There are those who weep for the most superficial things, things which are important, perhaps, for their lives alone, but irrelevant for the lives of others. There are those who weep at the suffering of others for which they feel directly or indirectly responsible. And these are the tears which express profound humanity.

    At a meeting of the National Executive Council (COENA) of the Nationalist Republic Alliance (ARENA) held last April 6, Alfredo Cristiani announced his decision to resign from the post of president of COENA, the maximum leadership of that party. There are those who speculate that this decision is the result of wanting to begin a process of “profound renovation” in that political party. Cristiani's resignation has been a major news item in the principal news dailies of El Salvador, even to the point of showing the ex president with his head bowed, eyes reddened in gesture to be interpreted as an expression of “profundity” in the sense that “this great man is capable of weeping”.

    The way these tears have been interpreted might vary according to the analysis of each person. What should, however, be avoided is falling to the level of vain and conceited fantasies which tend to be the occasion for adulation of a person, presenting him as a prototype of humanity, to the point of forgetting acts and decisions taken at specific moments in his life for which he will, perhaps, have to respond before the justice system, as in the case of the massacre of the six Jesuits of the UCA and their two collaborators. Leaving aside the sensationalism and the clear intention of some of the media to orient public opinion regarding this act, one must ask —with no holds barred— what is really happening inside the ARENA party. Are they really initiating a process of true renovation or are they applying a cosmetic makeover to the truth? What could be the consequences of a deep transformation in this political party? Are specific interests hanging in the balance? What advantage could ARENA reap from a truly profound renovation of the party?

Background
    In 1997, after the municipal and legislative elections, in which the government party experienced a diminution in their electoral preference —it came out of those elections with 22 deputies less than in the previous legislature and lost the capital city mayor's office— the “lesson of the elections” was spoken of. The then president of the republic, Armando Calderón Sol, had interpreted the message of the voters as a call to carry out changes in COENA which were justified because ARENA was “a party of openness in constant renovation” or “a party of the future with unorthodox positions” (LA PRENSA GRAFICA, April 15, 1997, p. 4ª). At that point in time the need to include in the party leadership body elements of all sectors of economic life was spoken of and this, in order to respond effectively to the problems of the population. In that context, the entrance of Carlos Borja Letona into COENA was promoted. Of this man it was said that he “came from the agricultural and livestock sector, [and that] his presence will allow for a deepening of the reactivation in agriculture” (Ibid., p. 5ª). Today, after learning of the results of the March 12 elections the appears to be a desire for democratizing the party, reactivating the economy and look out for the well-being of all Salvadorans. But, why were these decisions, announced since 1997, held back? Were they simply empty words, the product of a conjunctural calculation? Facts indicate that there was no willingness to advance in that direction.

    To date, the topics of the reactivation in agriculture, the opening up of ARENA and its democratization, are still topics pending on the agenda and this invites us not to take very seriously the declarations spoken by leaders of the ARENA party at this point in time.. These have always been characterized by the manipulation of public opinion when renovation is spoken of; but the changes announced never came close to touching the structures open for questioning and have been “mere words and not proposals”. Nevertheless, current reality seems to be calling upon the ARENA party to undertake a deep reform.

What is at stake?
    Recent declarations by the current Minister of the Interior, Mario Acosta Oertel, known for his activism and small political prudence as well as a hard-line defense of the ARENA party, makes one suppose that things are hot inside ARENA, for all the talk of complete cohesion and homogeneity inside the party. Proof of this is that Acosta Oertel seemed to be willing to “mount a palace coup”. One does not, perhaps, have to await such a decision from the Minister of the Interior, but rather from departmental leaders and the rank and file. Beginning with the process of selection of candidates for past elections there has been talk and denunciation of verticalism and imposition by the leadership body. And, on more than one occasion, the denunciations reached large proportions and degenerated into violence. There is a growing malaise among the rank and file with regard to the despotic attitudes o their leaders: some are held responsible, as a result of their undemocratic attitudes, for electoral failures. And so it is that, should a real openness and democracy not come to prevail, discontent among the rank and file will grow and ARENA will pay dearly.

    On the other hand, Acosta Oertel says that “the party must seek its roots among the middle class because many people believe, at various points in time, that we ought to defend the financial system. They have confused us. ARENA is not the bank. And if anyone uses ARENA to defend the bank, they are mistaken if they think that ARENA and people like us are going to be their shield, their defense” (El Diario de Hoy, April 8, 2000, p. 12). One might say to Acosta Oertel that his party has governed for the bank and many of its leaders have large interests and holdings in the banks. But what is most important is to underline the fact that Acosta Oertel is obliged to accept the fact that ARENA cannot continue to service exclusively the families with strong interests in the financial system. It is one of the visions of the government party that have come under criticism: El Salvador is more than a financial sector which represents the interests of a minority. If the desire is to reactivate the economy and find a solution for the crucial problems of the nation a change of course is absolutely necessary.

    The need for a change in governmental policies takes place along the lines of a renovation that not only takes place within a political party but also as it comes face to face with the voters and not only party militants. In general, party militants are the most critical of the party. It is they who do not participate in the elections or who do not vote for ARENA because they do not believe in their proposals, or do not perceive improvements in their own economic status and conditions. For this reason, ARENA is not going to be convincing only in speaking of primary elections or changing the old faces which stand for verticalism and authoritarianism in its ranks. It will be convincing in the measure that it is willing to review its economic policies and place them at the service of the majority of the population. Should the party not implement these changes, ARENA will be compromising its own permanence in power in the measure that the left becomes, day by day, a more attractive and less to be feared option whose capability for governing has been made manifest in the administration of some of the municipalities under its control.

    If, given the conjuncture, it seems that ARENA can no longer put off its renovation, nothing indicates that the interests of its leaders will cease to be given priority over and above the common good. To bring about a transformation in the direction in which the focus has been aimed presupposes the carrying out of deep changes in the leadership of ARENA, the same as are focused on a re-founding of the party, which does not seem possible given that the ARENA leaders have interests to protect which overshadow any illusion for change. In this sense, this right-wing party can continue to defend the same interests as always, but also that the Salvadoran people can choose the option which best responds to its aspirations.

ECONOMY

    The new rate increases for basic services are probably the most sensitive aspect on the whole topic of privatization and “modernization” of the state. Other privatizations do not have such a visible impact on the majority of the population, as do basic services such as water, electricity and telephone service. Nevertheless, one should mention that, although its impact may not be so visible, some privatizations have had a significant impact on the population. In the case of the financial system, for example, it is clear that its privatization opened up doors to a group of bankers who keep interest rates and bank commissions unnecessarily high (with an inflation rate of hardly 4% in 1998 and a deflation rate of 1% in 1999). This has left salaried employees and businessmen not engaged in the financial sphere at the mercy of the maximalist criteria for profits exercised by bankers, which, in reality, is an expression of conduct typical of almost every business sector of El Salvador.

    The fact that privatization has been the wave to engulf the world does not mean that, by definition, privatization automatically means increases in levels of welfare. Cases such as England and Chile show how the privatization of basic services without a corresponding policy for rate subsidies have resulted in catastrophe for the well-being of the population: rates could rise by as much as 300% and provoke, moreover, a situation in which families fall into a state of heavy indebtedness with the water and electricity companies, with which state of affairs they automatically lose access to these vital services. In El Salvador, the second ARENA administration (1994-1999) took the first steps towards the privatization of basic services such as electrical energy and telephone service. Currently, the distribution of electrical energy and telephone service is the province of private businesses authorized by law to increase their rates in accordance with the behavior of operation costs and inflationary rates, respectively.

    The impact of these privatization’s on the majority of consumers still has not been made manifest because of the government subsidy to users of less than 200 kilowatts each month. Users with consumption over that amount are no longer subject to subsidies and, for this reason, rates vary periodically. During the first eleven months of the third ARENA administration, the topic of subsidies for electrical service rates has come to the fore with greater force, first of all because of rumors circulating to the effect that such subsidies would be eliminated and then because the government declared its intention to maintain its subsidy policy. The most recent announcement took place in the context of the new adjustments to rates proposed by the distributors of electrical energy, as a result of which the government reiterated the fact that it would maintain subsidies and even that they would be extended to absorb the larger part of the increase suffered by the commercial and industrial sectors which —up until now— did not take part in the subsidy policy.

    The topic of electrical sector subsidies came to light publicly with the projects of privatization of the distribution of electrical energy, which began with the supposition that, in order to privatize, electrical rates would have to increase significantly in order to allow for the profit margins which made private investments attractive. Nevertheless, the impact that this rate increase would have on the costs to homes obliged the government to become involved in one of its most evident contradictions: become involved with the necessity for implementing economic liberalization measures while at the same time keeping up —and even deepening— the subsidy policies in this case of the electrical energy rates.

    During the Francisco Flores administration not only has there been an insistence upon the permanence of the subsidies but recently the inclusion of new beneficiaries has been announced: industry and commerce. According to the Executive Sub-Director of the Electrical Energy Company of San Salvador (CAESS), Armando Ojeda, the electrical energy distributors are about to implement an increase of 52% in rates to commerce and industry, of which the government will cover the major part. Finally, commercial and industrial sectors would experience an increase of only 15% while the remaining 37% would be absorbed by the government, which, through the Executive Hydroelectric Commission of the Lempa River (CEL), will offer the lowest prices in electricity generated and sold to the distributors.

    The aim of this measure is to avoid additional increases in prices to consumers which would result in the incorporation of major costs of electricity to the prices of products offered by commerce and industry. All in all, as a result of the fact that there will be an increase of 15% in rates to these sectors, a price increase cannot be ruled out for products produced by these sectors.

    In the case of the residential sector, no change is expected in rates to the users although, in practice, this does not mean that distributors are not going to increase them. What is most probable is that the government will increase the subsidies which it normally gives to the residential sector. According to the Minister of the Economy, Miguel Lacayo, the mechanisms whereby increases in electrical service rates to homes will be subsidized , but it will be a question of “at least one million consumers not having to pay the increases in energy”.

    Nevertheless, on that same occasion Lacayo raised doubts as to the duration of this governmental “gift” when, in order to justify the subsidies, it declared that “we do not wish energy rates to increase until the prices of hydrocarbons have tended to decrease”, in a reference to heavy increases in the prices of gasoline which have been felt during recent months. On this question, rate increases to the residential sector cannot be ruled out even in the short run.

    Recent dynamics in the electrical energy market, as well as clearly revealing the presence of strong pressures towards increasing electrical service rates, show that the government is not prepared to face the heavy political costs which “the free play of market forces” will incur together with the immoderate consequences and increases in rates which will precede it. Doubtless, this will be a new element which will undermine even more the political capital of ARENA because, although official declarations state that the rate increases are owing more to the deepening costs of generation than to privatization, it is impossible not to notice that the increased prices of electricity services will not be so high if it were not the case that business profits to electrical energy distributors were not a question. State businesses, on the other hand, are not necessarily obliged to include profit margins in the rates.

    As much in this case as in that of telecommunications, the bank, the importation of hydrocarbons or pension administration, experience demonstrates the need to harmonize privatization with the generation of social benefits because, just things have developed up until now, only benefits for a select minority have been generated. For the moment, the government has assumed the costs of privatization of the distribution of electrical energy, but sooner or later consumers will have to pay more in order to cover the electoral energy sector businessmen’s “necessities” of accumulation.

SOCIETY

    The commotion provoked during the electoral campaign on the question of delinquency in El Salvador is still fresh. Practically speaking, all of the political parties took up the banner to promise a reduction in the levels of criminality that our country is suffering, which has been progressively growing since the signing of the Peace Accords. Several public opinion polls held in the midst of the electoral campaign period placed this phenomenon at the center of the Salvadoran population’s concern. In fact, the topic came to be part of the political proposals of candidates for public office whose attributions had very little to do with the treatment of the problem. Such is the case of the businessman Luis Cardenal, candidate for the Mayor's Office of San Salvador for ARENA, which even took up the task of presenting his own anti-crime plan for the capital city.

    In this sense, it is clear that there is a generalized consensus that as long effective instruments for fighting crime are in place, many of the problems resulting from it will only be partially resolved. And this is the case independently of whether this idea tends to ignore the structural problem the levels of which confirm the contradictions and effects of a system which does not benefit everyone in an equal way. Structural or not, crime and its consequence require urgent responses —responses which are integral and effective as implemented by the authorities in office. Precisely as a result of that generalized consensus which came to life during the weeks prior to the elections, recently we have seen how various sectors and relevant personalities have begun to push forwards their own proposals for follow-up of the promises made during the heat of the electoral campaign. Nevertheless, attention has been centered on one of the manifestations of the problem: the kidnapping industry.

    In general terms —each from his point of view and given his possibilities—, these voices which have been raised around the problem following the schema which traditionally applies each time a national situation allows them to gain a central leadership position: their position as civilian police and guards given the helplessness and suffering of the population. Among these, those who tend to sharpen their discourse against the so-called “social sickness” have been representatives of big business. A few days ago, the National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP) made public announcements regarding the declarations made by Mauricio Sandoval the head of the National Civilian Police and the group of functionaries dedicated to the category of public security and the application of justice. According to official balances, crime levels have experienced a significant reduction during the first months of the year as compared with the same period in 1999. In this way, the work of government in terms of crime control appears to be bearing fruit according to hopes and expectations. The arbitrary actions committed by the security forces in cases such as the ISSS strike could be lightened thanks to the effectiveness of the PNC in its fight against crime.

    Nevertheless, ANEP's reaction was not as optimistic. According to the calculations of the business guild, in El Salvador there are, on the average, three kidnappings each day. Moreover, the profitability of the kidnapping industry is increasing given the weak response by the police and justice system which are capable of opposing, and, if that were not enough, the level of organization of the groups engaged in committing these crimes —whose actions are linked to traffic in vehicles and falsification of documents— makes difficult their searches and arrests. None of this appears in the evaluations by public security authorities. Discredit of police actions and administration, questioned since it began, was the least to be expected after the revelations expressed by businessmen.

    But Sandoval and company can relax. These manifestations of rejection towards the criminal phenomena in our country do not tend to speak out against bad or deficient public administration. In this case, the denunciation by businessmen fits in perfectly with the proposal for constitutional reforms made by the Director of the PNC, which aims at supporting telephone wiretapping in order to fight organized crime, lengthen the period during which suspects detained are held without any communication and set up judges to investigate cases of kidnapping (that is, without the need for support by the victims). The PNC Director's proposal enjoys support by various public officials —among them the President of the Supreme Court—, but it has also had to deal with criticisms from those who oppose the installation in the country of a state of social control as the only way to fight crime.

    Precisely for this reason the mentality of those who see in high crime rates the action of social parasites has been criticized as the expression of a detestable social sickness to the extent that there can be no other solution than excessive monitoring by the state. In this sense, the consensus which exists on the question of crime is a problem of worrisome proportions for the population as a whole which neither visualizes in the interests of all Salvadorans nor aims at implementing mechanisms for dealing with it —in the sense that they aim to combat the structural causes which produce it. The Sandoval proposal, together with the commentaries approving of it by justice and public security authorities fit in perfectly with this perception of the phenomenon. In this way, authorities are privileged more and more by being allowed the implementation of mechanisms of coercive control to the detriment of encouraging the prevention of crime. And what is even more worrisome is that this control easily degenerates into repression.

    These “gendarmes” who monitor the suffering of the citizenry and their allies within the state apparatus are trying, even at the expense of the social stability of the country, to confuse a part of the problem of criminality with all of its social dimensions and implications. What they consider to be a worrisome increase in the activities of the kidnapping industry and systematic extortion against prominent national businessmen, aims to mobilize the resources of a country in the defense of their own interests. Given this point of view, it is not a priority to benefit by means of their clamor and pronouncements, others who also suffer from the crime wave. If this is the case, and welcome may it be, but the benefit of others affected —others who do not belong to the sector represented by ANEP— it is not a high priority for them. In its place, the problem of crime aims to be saddled with some few cases which become paradigms of its gravity, but which do not cover the whole complexity which characterizes it.

    The task of awakening the consciousness of the population to a phenomenon of this nature, then, is not exhausted by thoughtless pronouncements, million-dollar campaigns in the big media nor in concerts and public demonstrations of repudiation. These activities, doubtless, have a multiplying effect in terms of courage and effectiveness in the measure in which, on the one hand, they do not contribute to falsifying the reality of crime in our country, inclining it towards some few determined interests. And, above all, they can generate a major impact inasmuch as they serve as vehicles for clarifying the true causes of the problem and oblige the state not only to act but to take into account the reality behind crime when it proposes solutions.