Proceso 904
May 31, 2000
ISSN 0259–9864
 
 

INDEX

Editorial The failure of the police
Economy The economy during the first year of the Flores administration
Society Municipal government during the first year of the Flores administration
 
 
 

EDITORIAL

    In a single year, the current government administration could have put an end to all illusions, image constructs, music and publicity slogans and could have emphasized his term in office in terms of administrative criteria; this according to President Flores’ own public declarations. The cabinet could, thereby have conducted an evaluation according to the said criteria. But this cannot be said of the police chief of the National Civilian Police. In this case, Flores evaluates only his intentions and efforts, but not the results. No one doubts the good intentions of these high government officials. But results are what are called for. If results are not required of the police chief —results which he cannot present—, then, he is remaining in this post for other reasons, which shows that public matters are being administered in the same way as they always have been.

    The very day when the police chief was presenting publicity campaigns, as he is wont to do, concerning the capture of a band of kidnappers, two additional kidnappings took place. This time, the victims were two well-known businessmen. Contrite and surprised, the police chief declared that it would appear as if the kidnappers were not afraid of the police. The explanation which he himself provided, all the while admitting that he had "clear evidence" that pointed to a situation in which one of the two kidnappings was committed by the police themselves. Hours later, at least one police assaulted a hotel in the same area. Then, thieves disguised as police —or police pretending to be thieves— assaulted a business, without the police chief being able to provide an explanation as to how the criminals had obtained authentic police uniforms.

    If we evaluate the police by the results obtained during Flores’ first year in office, we will find that they are doing well in the area of publicity, but in their actual work, which is to safeguard the security of the population, the results are deficient. At least on the subject of kidnappings. There are a great many more kidnappings than the Police themself is willing to admit publicly, and so it is possible to speak of a kidnapping industry. This activity creates such insecurity in the society that it has become a very serious and destructive threat —to the same degree as deathsquads represented such a threat in the past. Whom should we call to account for this failure of the police if not the director and the commanding officers of the police force and not the population itself nor its laws? And much less should attention be diverted towards the FMLN. If the bands of kidnappers are linked to any past group, it is with the deathsquads.

    Facts coming to light in recent days have unmasked Sandoval’s publicity campaigns: criminals and organized crime are active within the ranks of the National Civilian Police. The cries demanding an immediate and drastic cleansing of police rank and file have put the Flores administration on the defensive. It is true that delinquent police, or criminals dressed as police, are only a few and most would be willing to give their lives to safeguard the security of the citizens. But it is most certainly also true that these few have terrorized the population, have disgraced the police force and, what is worse, have been the cause of situations in which the little confidence which the police usually enjoy has been lost —to the point that some have dared to speak publicly, calling for civil disobedience. This process of calling police prestige into question, together with an enlivened lack of confidence, is nothing new. But neither past nor present authorities have taken matters in hand because they are more concerned with defending the police force as an institution and accommodating their criminal activities, than with guaranteeing the security of the population.

    Instead of accepting criticism and working to overcome these difficulties, police authorities have opted for protecting the image of the police as an institution, waiving the importance of denunciations and supporting the delinquents. This policy is one that has given rise to a situation in which police leadership has lost control over police rank and file. So it is that an institution which ought to be a source of security has become a source of fear and insecurity. In denying these criticisms and covering up the facts, internal controls have been weakened to the point that the wave of kidnappings actually reveals the failure of the police and obliges —or requires— a clean-up process to begin.

    This failure is owing to the fact that neither previously nor at the present moment has strict control been exercised over the police and their activities and their insufficient technology, intelligence and police capacity. Palpable proof of this are the causes to which governmental authorities attribute the kidnappings. President Flores speaks of political and economic motivation, confounding the cause with the effect. The police chief publicly asks for lists of urban commandos and security houses. Others even express a wish to review the quotas which made up the first police force. In reality, there are no bases whatever for these asseverations because, if there had been, concrete criticisms would have been presented by now. Police authorities are overwhelmed by the wave of kidnappings, are not prepared to confront them and do not know what they are talking about when they try to explain it. Such impotence and desperation create a situation in which voices are heard making insinuations that security should be turned over to one of the specialized police force units of the United States in the same way as attempts have been made to turn over control and investigation of narcotics trafficking to the United States, while the Flores administration aims to turn narcotics issues over to the U.S. Army.

    On this question, ARENA and its administration are mistaken once again. To insist upon the insufficiency in the legislation is a waste of time. To call for special courts is to weaken an already weakened judicial system. To hope for help from a citizenry which does not feel itself to be protected —which, in fact, feels threatened by the police— is useless. To maintain a police force oriented towards publicity is to leave the field open to organized crime. Again, what is required are concrete results.

    On the question of the social cries and clamour on this issue, President Flores has announced a special commission to clean up the police force. However, if the commission really offers guarantees that it will do its work well, the same cannot be said of its director. This man, aware of the problem, during the course of an entire year, has done very little to clean up the police force. It must be added, police officers and agents who denounce internal corruption are being punished, because public and judicial lies are tolerated, and when some honest investigators who got close to some of the heads of organized crime, they were harassed, as a result, to such an extent that they had to leave the police force. In a word, this is because the National Civilian Police has tolerated lies, corruption and impunity.

    One might tend to think, then, that repression is necessary —together with everything that repression brings with it in terms of violating the law and the rights and freedoms of persons. What is lacking is a strong hand against organized crime. But for this to strike where it is necessary, there must exist the intelligence to direct it. This is precisely what is lacking and is, in fact, even more precisely what the National Civilian Police Chief Mauricio Sandoval lacks.

ECONOMY

    During the early months of the administration headed by Francisco Flores, the handling of the macroeconomic policies have undergone no major changes. Meanwhile, negative indicators already in place when the current administration received the mantle of leadership from its predecessor (such as the growth of the fiscal deficit and the trade balance) have remained constant along with a continuing and prolonged period of slow growth begun almost five years ago.

    Changes were begun during the last three months when more significant measures were announced and implemented. These, in some cases, broke with the traditional policies of the two preceding ARENA administrations. On the question of public finances, then, one might point to the reform of the IVA law aimed at reducing tax evasion and eliminating exemptions on agricultural and livestock products together with medicines. On the question of trade policy, some advances were accomplished, such as the free trade agreements with Chile and Mexico. The legislative ratification of the agreement with Mexico is still pending on the Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and ratification is required before the agreement can be set in motion, although the agreement itself has already been negotiated. Monetary policy, on the other hand, shows a clear tendency towards relaxation because it has felt the reduction in legal cash reserve rates and a sectorial program has been announced which is aimed at reactivating the agricultural and livestock sector, including increases in customs and tariffs for some products and preferential credit lines for the cultivation of coffee.

    Faced with this series of diverse measures adopted by the current government administration, it is important to review the behavior of the principle macroeconomic variables, while taking into account, as well, the fact that these variables, in and of themselves, do not reflect the achievement of results by the current government. They are, rather, indices of a wasting away of the economic model in force since the middle of the decade. The principal macroeconomic problems continue today without there being a light at the end of the tunnel in terms of concrete measures for eliminating them: measures, for example, such as insufficient growth of export production, a growing fiscal deficit and continued dependence upon family remittances for maintaining macroeconomic growth and stability.

    Economic growth during 1999 has been documented at 2.6%, a notably lower percentage rate, the product of an evolving cycle of slow growth begun during the last trimester of 1995, and coinciding with a drastic reduction in the growth of registered credit for that period of time. For the years 1996, 1997 and 1998, growth rates were already low, reaching 2.7%, 4.3% and 3.5% respectively. But during the first half of the decade of the 1990´s growth rates of 6% and 7% were documented. For 1999, the GNP growth rate fell to the lowest level seen during this period of slow growth, while the threat of entering a stage showing reduction of production and employment (economic recession) has been kept at bay. And if this were not enough, stagnation has marked efforts at reactivating productive activities while a goodly part of the productive dynamism of the service sector is not seen to have advanced.

    The agricultural and livestock program announced by the current government administration with an eye to reactivating agricultural and livestock production, has not, in reality, dealt with these questions in any basic way, such as in the rational use of the soil, technological transfers, agricultural and livestock diversification, credit for small farmers and foreign marketing of products. On the other hand, there are no efforts at industrial reconversion, which is an indispensable element that ought to accompany any commercial policy aimed at establishing free trade agreements with countries enjoying a higher degree of industrial development.

    Public finances continue to be one of the weakest points in macroeconomic policy because, as 1999 drew to a close, an increase in the fiscal deficit which came to represent up to 3% of the GNP was registered. According to the monetary and financial program of the Central Reserve Bank (BCR) for 2000 the deficit is expected to represent 2.6% of the GNP, which does not inspire much hope. This deterioration in public finances will be the case when the government proposes to use measures for increasing tax collection such as are mentioned above (i.e., raising tariffs, fighting tax evasion, eliminating the exemptions on IVA and including the small and very small businesses in the register of those who must pay IVA).

    Neither are there any important changes in the foreign sector as compared with preceding years: the trade balance deficit, an increase in unilateral transfers (89% of which are family remittances), a slight rise in capital and an increase in net international reserves which is possible only thanks to unilateral transferences. On the other hand, the exchange rate has remained stable for almost seven years now owing to the dynamism and increased level of family remittances which, were it not for the intervention of the BCR, would even provoke a reduction in the exchange rate.

    For the moment, owing to the fact that policies for encouraging productive activities are not being encouraged, it is not possible to expect an increase in growth rates for exports which would allow for a compensation in family remittances and it would, therefore, seem to be the case that we will continue to depend on Salvadorans in other countries and upon U.S. businesses to equalize the balance of payments, to maintain the kind of change and control inflation.

    In the monetary and financial sector a relative relaxation of monetary policy has been noted because of the progressive reduction in the legal cash reserves which have gradually been reduced to levels observed in 1998 when a progressive process of increases was begun which thereby raised the rates by three percentage points. Nevertheless, credit has sustained growth rates which are notably inferior to those observed during the epoch of high economic growth registered for the period between 1991 and 1994, to the point that it has risen to levels of 30% from levels of 15% in 1997 and even a mere 5% in 1999.

    In general, one might take note of the fact that the Francisco Flores administration has distinguished itself by actually breaking with policies which were traditionally adopted by the preceding administrations, such as the lowering of tariff and customs rates and the lack of adoption of sectorial economic policies. Continuity has been more evident in its focus on taking up the topic of productive activities and the balance of trade deficit: there is an almost total indifference shown as a result of the tranquillity which is generated when there is a flow of family remittances which still represent than 11% of the GNP.

    The government has yet to deal with any great firmness with aspects that have been overlooked in spite of their strategic character. These are: diversification of agricultural and livestock production, industrial reconversion, encouragement of exports, review of tax reform and coordination of the monetary and financial policies with all of the foregoing aspects just mentioned. Just as this administration has inherited several problems on the order of slow growth and a fiscal deficit, it has also inherited a favorable environment for maintaining a relative macroeconomic stability (i.e., as a result of the continued flow of family remittances). The real challenge is to capitalize upon this opportunity for setting in motion strategies that might generate the production, jobs, income and exports necessary for guaranteeing sustainability in developmental processes and not mere macroeconomic stability.

SOCIETY

    President Francisco Flores has just completed one year as head of state. During this period of time he has had to confront the ever-sharpening needs of the population in all of its diverse sectors. Two ARENA administrations, an unfinished transition and an economic model incapable of improving the quality of life for the vast majority of the population were received as the challenges facing his administration. But these can be said to arise from even greater structural ills. For the present time, the national news media has offered unconditional support in presenting Flores as a president the likes of which have not been previously seen and who, therefore, merit praise more than criticism. He has additionally been presented, above all, as worthy of the confidence of the population. In addition, a Fair in which Progress is celebrated is added to the sleights of hand used to raise the image of an efficient, modern state encompassing a great willingness to work.

    The president apparently feels calm and tranquil about his first year in office; he has said as much when asked. Confident in the hope that he still awakens hope among those who have less, he seems sure that his manner of providing leadership to the country is the best and that those who criticize him “are mistaken” because they simply do not understand his plans for the future of El Salvador. Among the critics can be included, without distinction, those who protest against including basic grains and vegetables on the list of products to which IVA must be applied, transportation moguls and the leadership body of ANEP together with all of those who demand a more equitable treatment from the state. And, of course, those municipalities which demand an increase in their piece of the budgetary pie in order to more effectively promote their work on social issues. Some few days ago, an element that raised the dander of the FMLN and ARENA was added to the debate surrounding the millionaire disbursement in education. This was the proposal to condition the approval of the educational credits upon the concession of 12% of the national budget to be divided up among the municipalities together with the concession of a loan for the municipality of San Salvador.

    Coincident factors in both debates —that of the first year of the presidency and the negotiation of funds for education and municipal governments— throw important light on one of the weakest points in the Flores administration: his relationship with the municipalities. During his first months in the presidential office, the president stayed markedly out of the spotlight of municipal administrative activities. The only points he managed to announce was the creation of a commission which would serve a liaison function between the presidency and the municipalities and about which no one knows anything more. At this writing, the Flores administration has had to engage in relationships with the municipal governments only on very particular projects as well as for ministries and autonomous units, respectively.

    The electoral period having passed, Flores had to show his face to the 262 mayors who work the closest with the population —at least closer than he was working with them. At that point in time he did not exhibit any great degree of discomfort in inviting them to join in a consensus-making process and work together for the benefit of the country. His government administration, he stated, was open to engaging in dialogue with anyone who asked to do so. The commission, conspicuous by its absence, did not appear in a single word of his speeches. In the future, the support promised to the mayors in their work has not been seen to materialize. And, although the president has no obligation to get involved in anything the municipal offices propose to do, the discussion to which reference is made here —that of a possible increase in economic capability of the local governments— cannot be reduced to this ever-present and most important national functionary in local affairs. The debate over municipal funds aims, in the long run, to awaken the consciousness of the importance of local work as a way of responding more effectively to the needs of the population, and not simply to the institutionalization of some bureaucratic functions among public institutions.

    So it is that Flores not only shortens the distance he had aimed to set up with some of the municipalities who do not partake of his party-line ideologies, but who clamor, a year after promising to give El Salvador a “better future”, that indifference is more in evidence as a characteristic of the modality by means of which the possibility for development for the country is characterized. A clear possibility is that if this is not well monitored, corrupt practices in the municipalities might be strengthened. And it is for this very reason, what ought least to be expected from him is silence. Acting as a cut-out twin of his predecessors, Flores has set himself to criticize the capability and technical preparation of the mayors for administering those resources. His more immediate intention has been to demonstrate that his government is willing to examine, department by department, the projects which are still pending. But he has never even though about the municipalities as a minimally qualified way to encourage a real model of decentralization of services, at least on the question of the implementation of the projects referred to here.

    In this sense, the success of the Hector Silva administration in the municipality of San Salvador has turned into a pressure point which the president cannot easily ignore. Recognized by the World Bank and by the Inter-American Development Bank as a model administrator, Silva has been capable of locating himself at the same level as government functionaries of greater rank when it comes to soliciting financial aid. He has even surpassed many of them in credibility on international community questions. One single mayor, with a specific plan of action and a work team which has demonstrated its efficiency in carrying out tasks has been capable of negotiating by himself, and with a great deal of success, with international financial institutions. This is a precedent which does not sit well with Flores, at least in areas which correspond to him, a mayor has demonstrated that he possesses the capacity and technical preparation to administer a great many resources.

    It is now time for the president to open his eyes to the possibility of supporting local government work, at least in procuring for them that technical preparation —of which his government team is so vauntedly proud— in order to learn how better to administer the resources available to them. Salvadoran society deserves to benefit from the experiences in institutional modernization implemented by the San Salvador municipality and in this sense they should and can be extended to other municipalities. Better yet, Salvadoran society needs someone who can take up the mission of providing social welfare for the population, an area in which the Flores administration, as well as his predecessors do only what is absolutely and unavoidable placed in front of it. But this is a wish which will not be fulfilled by denying absolutely necessary funds or justifying the existence of obsolete structures for collecting taxes.

    Flores’ relationship with the municipalities during his first year in office has been poor. And because of this the relationship comes to the fore as one of the lacunae in his administration. The president has not been able to get the municipalities —above all those of the opposition— to stop being an isolated public structures incapable of proceeding beyond what his purely administrative tasks allow. In this sense, given the unavoidable linkage which joins them, the president can neither hope to work as a true bellwether for national well-being, nor can the municipalities succeed in demonstrating all that they are capable of. From this, we have had a year of excessive publicity, of useless tours of the countryside and tolerance towards a president who can act only until he bangs his head up against what his political membership will allow him to do.