Proceso 908
June 28, 2000
ISSN 0259–9864
 
 
 

INDEX

EDITORIAL

    The ad hoc commission set up by President Francisco Flores to clean up the National Civilian Police drew up a preliminary list of more than 200 police officers who have open files for having committed serious and very serious misdemeanors and breaches of the law. The commission’s recommendation is that these police officers ought to be expelled from the force immediately. A second list followed on the heels of the preliminary list and, according to information leaks, includes hundreds more police officers to whom the same kind of breaches of the law are attributed. The commission also stated that in some units of the National Civilian Police —including 121 emergency— there exist organizations involved in criminal activities. To all of this must be added the practice of torture in some police units. As a result, the commission recommends the expulsion of criminals in the police force and the reformation of current practices and normative regulations, all of which implies a re-structuring. In demonstrating a strain of sensibility uncommon among current government functionaries, the commission holds that the principal problem in public security is not the result of the legislation in force but lies, rather, in the National Civilian Police. As a result, changes ought to begin at this level, leaving a review of the law and other complementary measures for later.

    The efficiency and firmness demonstrated by the ad hoc commission leads to a questioning of internal controls within the National Civilian Police and its leadership. The obvious question is why neither could perform the task of cleaning up the police and neither could they identify the principal weaknesses in the police force. As a result, a presidential commission had to be formed to deal with the problems. It is noteworthy that this commission has accomplished in less than a month what the leadership of the police force and President Flores himself could not accomplish during the course of an entire year. During the course of this period, both officials have tested the good functioning of the police and security, without learning of the serious internal problems in the leadership and organization of the police. This is an unequivocal sign that the current National Civilian Police authorities are not the ideal leadership for the police. To the objection that they could not act because current legislation tied their hands and did not allow them to do so, one might respond that just as they request modification on other points so insistently (as in the case of allegations of telephone wiretapping), they could have done the same in the case of the police and would probably, thereby, have achieved more and been more successful. And now, if they, as the leadership of the police, allege ignorance of what is happening within the police force as an institution, they should be removed from office for incompetence.

    It is still not clear under what circumstances the police who have been removed will leave the force. Most likely these situations have now been negotiated. Cleaning up the police force is a worthy matter and, undoubtedly, a necessary one so those undesirable elements can be removed. But another, more serious, problem is posed when these criminal elements are released into society. At the very least, the most dangerous among these who have been removed from the police ought to be continually monitored. The only difference is that, in their new circumstances, such criminals will not be able to count on the advantages which operating from within the police force previously offered them. Customary procedure would be to open judicial files on each one. But it is common knowledge that neither the police nor the prosecuting attorneys’ offices have proof sufficient to bring them to trial —and this, either because of carelessness or lack of interest, or both. The conditions under which this sifting out of undesirable elements takes place are more important than would appear to be the case at first glance. Regular and “irregular or extraordinary” income is eliminated in the case of the police officer removed from the force, or when income tends to diminish and, with it, lifestyles to which such people have become accustomed. Unemployed and without a profession, the probability exists that they will continue along the path that others have chosen when they are removed or demobilized after the war and who, in similar conditions and circumstances, find in crime a comfortable and secure way of life. Some police removed from office who no longer have a salary will not hesitate to continue with their delinquent activities.

    But all the while that the presidential commission is occupied in cleaning up and reforming the National Civilian Police, the chief of police of that organization is engaged in efforts to demonstrate his efficiency in fighting crime by engaging in “showcase” operations: a series of police actions serve to corroborate this duplicity of intent. The chief of police received a small airplane transporting drugs in the airport at Compalapa when, according to early police reports, the aircraft had requested permission to land and fuel up. Another version, however, states that the aircraft was already being waited for, which would explain its presence in the airport. The prosecuting attorney’s office declares that the final destination of the aircraft was El Salvador. And so the documentation found on the two polls confirms: on the documentation appears the name of a government official whose name has not been released but this fact is, beforehand, not assigned any relevance either by the police or the prosecuting attorney’s office as being related to the incident.

    Along the same line, the press has published a photograph —the provenance of which has not been fully explained— in which there appears a boat moving at high velocity, presumably along the Lempa River transporting drugs. The prosecuting attorney’s office deduced the nature of the cargo from the color of the skin of the occupants of the boat. The message from the authorities is that, as they do not have the equipment necessary for intercepting this kind of boats, it becomes necessary to turn this kind of monitoring from the air and sea over to the U.S. Army. In reality, the ship could have been intercepted by the helicopter itself from which the photograph was taken. The rapidity with which the police, with their police chief to the fore, is astonishing in that they captured the presumed kidnappers of a wealthy businessman just a few hours before his being freed.

    In the vast majority of cases, the police do not act with such speed. Perhaps in this case they did so because the kidnapping had been undertaken with the participation of police, including a police vehicle and one could, therefore, presume that the investigators knew beforehand about the group committing the kidnapping. If this is the case, why not proceed against them before the kidnapping took place. Although the director does not rule out police participation, he maintains that the radio patrol is not authentic, even while investigations did not locate the said vehicle nor the police uniforms, perhaps because those who wore them had them in their possession. Other possibilities exist, however. It could be the case that those arrested were not involved in the kidnapping under investigation, although they were involved in other crimes. The proof that the prosecuting attorney’s office needs to charge the accused could have been fabricated, falsified —this would not be the first time that this species of illegality has taken place, which, for the police would be justified. At any rate, the persons captured do not seem to be the intellectual authors of the kidnapping. And then it turns out that the chief of police supposes that the gang of kidnappers captured is related to another such gang in Guatemala. But the proof in hand is very circumstantial.

    Lamentably, precision is not the police chief’s strong point. But this worries him not a bit, because his objective is to project a positive image. And so it is that while he is engaged in propaganda, the ad hoc commission is engaged in cleaning up the police force and attempting to reform it.

POLITICS

    The most recent national convention of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) poses various concerns for the observer of how political parties work. The first concern is the climate of internal division which pits the “orthodox” wing against the “revisionist” wing within that party. Neither group allows itself a moment of respite in its full throttle struggle to take control of the principal party structures. Mutual accusations of anti-democratic radicals and traitors selling out to the neo-liberal project are the order of the day. For such reasons, the observer of political parties must ask if the situation will not issue in a split at the heart of that left party. On the other hand, it is possible to contemplate the necessity for taking advantage of this particular climate in order to generate internal discussion which ought to respond to the identity of the FMLN in the current national state of affairs.

    Essentially, the basic problem, after the signing of the Peace Accords, was that the incorporation into civilian life of the FMLN members did not bring with it an internal discussion concerning the change, which such a new reality presupposed. On the contrary, it appears as if the challenge for the creation of a new political party was taken up as a mere strategy, which simply replaced the armed struggle as a means of taking state power. In this sense, the diverse armed movements which made up the FMLN dedicated themselves as more or less similar tendencies which corresponded to the organizations from which they came. So it is, then, that instead of producing a discussion concerning the new role of the left as a political party in the national and international state of affairs currently in place, the struggle for power and towards producing a socialist society continues to be the center of the schema without even dealing with the question of the violability of the project under discussion.

    The time for internal debate on the question of the identity of the FMLN as a left political party cannot be put off much longer. The most recent events in that party indicate as much and the party leaders ought to move on down along this path without delay. A broad internal debate would help not only to exorcise the ghost of a possible rupture —the product of a struggle for control of party structures between the revisionist and revolutionary socialist tendencies, but would also help to respond to the desires of a good portion of the Salvadoran population which sees in the FMLN an alternative to right-wing mercantilist neoliberalism.

Some suppositions for the debate

    The debate which should to take place inside the FMLN cannot be reduced simply to a negotiation between the tendencies in dispute for the control of the party. The existence of these tendencies cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, one must ask oneself what the divergent tendencies existing between the tendencies respond to. What can be perceived up until now responds less to basic visions concerning the role of the left in current national reality —in conformity with the world situation involving the imposition of the neoliberal model— than to momentary disagreements which are merely points of conjuncture around internal democratization and strategies for negotiation with other political parties.

    On the other hand, there is not the slightest doubt that the current national and world situations impose certain conditions on the functioning of any political party. As such, the FMLN —in addition to democratizing itself— ought to move along with a certain dosage of political pragmatism, which recognizes and takes into account the limits imposed by the current socio-economic and political system currently in place. But while this is a first step in strengthening the internal democratic process in the FMLN as a left party and in recognizing the limits imposed by reality, it ought not to lead to a loss of ideological-political identity. One must also evaluate and insist upon the differences between the left and the right. One must underscore the fact that such differences are important: the populace sees it and needs it to be this way.

    The foregoing leads to another possible reading on the necessary debate which current reality urges upon the FMLN. It could make an effort to take the international context into account and ask itself about the role of left parties in general as they face the reigning capitalism’s. One reading of this sort not only de-authorizes he or she who seeks to deny the past history of the FMLN —inasmuch as the alternative project for liberation of the majorities excluded by capitalism— rather than also ask oneself about the viability of the left project in the world today.

Antecedents

    Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent dismantling of important communist countries, the right wing exudes an air of triumphalism under the banner of the right wing. Communism is accused of all ills in that it not only showed itself incapable of solving the economic problems of the countries where it was implanted, but also characterized itself as having installed a despotic regime repudiated by diverse peoples. On the other hand, among the ancient regime who unfurl the banner of the left project there exists a certain feeling of failure. Because of this, some become converts to reigning capitalism and others long for the world that was lost. There is no doubt that the capitalist system dominates the world. It seems impossible to imagine alternatives to the prevailing system.

    In spite of the de facto imposition of the capitalist project, however, the needs of the vast majority of the world’s population have not been satisfied. On the contrary, each day the gulf between rich and poor grows into greater inequality. In spite of the fact that humanity has the possibility for resolving many problems such as health, illiteracy, extreme poverty, etc, there seems to be no concrete willingness to advance along this road. Given this panorama, if it is true that the Communist world has disappeared and is considered to be the project for an alternative society which might respond to social ills, it is impossible to imagine that the cause for a left struggle does not continue to exist. As Jorge Castañeda states, “beyond the headlines of today and the disenchantments of yesterday, there continues to exist the essence of the debates and disagreements which for years polarized segregated societies on social issues and irremediably lagging behind on economic issues. The only thing that has changed —and this cannot be any other way— are the parameters for those debates” (The Left Unarmed. Barcelona: Ariel, 1995). So then, how shall we pose the question of the problem of the identity of the left?

    It has already been demonstrated that on a practical level, the left must move within the parameters imposed by the prevailing system. Nevertheless, one can think with courage and creativity about how to respond to the great ethical challenges of humanity today. This is to say that the left, if it is true that it ought not to continue to long for the Communist world and yearn for its restoration, it can perfectly well make concrete proposals which might come to change the order of things.

    And on this point we reach the topic of discussion which ought to take place inside the FMLN concerning its capability for making these two realities its own as a left party and enter into the world context where the left continues debating about what role it should play and what contribution towards change it can make for the situation of the majority of the populations. Faced with this panorama, the solution to internal problems is not to be found in choosing sides with the revisionists against the orthodox tendency or viceversa. This would not be the correct way of posing the problem. One sets out on the correct road to the solution to the problem of its identity is desired in general in a left party is to be defined along with the mechanisms for achieving these goals at the present point in time on the national and international levels.

ECONOMY

    The privatization of public services, from the beginning, caused serious doubts about its supposed benefits for the family economy. According to those who support it, with privatization would come greater efficiency in the functioning of businesses, would cause a reduction in the costs of production and would lower rates.

    Once telephone service and the distribution of electrical energy was privatized, objective reality would demonstrate that privatization has not contributed towards reducing rates and, moreover, has provoked, in the case of electrical energy, an increase in subsidies. At the present time it is important to review, rapidly, the behavior of rates and subsidies with regard to two recent events: first, increases in electricity rates and, second, the government proposal to eliminate subsidies to service rates for potable drinking water.

    Last April, electrical energy rates were increased by approximately 52% as a result of increases in costs of production, which were attributed to the necessity to generate a greater amount of electrical energy by thermal means, which presupposed higher production costs corresponding to the hydroelectric method of doing the same thing. Fortunately for consumers, the government absorbed all of this increase in the case of the residential sector and the majority in the case of the commercial and industrial sectors. These last two suffered increases of only 15% of their receipts for the consumption of electrical energy. Even so, it is evident that these sectors proceeded to pass the costs on to the consumer, something perfectly predictable when it is a question of private enterprises.

    According to calculations by functionaries of the national Investment Fund for Electricity and Telecommunications, the subsidy for energy rates implies monthly outlays by the state of close to 43 million colones, which implies that, during the second trimester of 2000, the state would have paid close to 129 million colones in subsidies, which is equivalent to 5.5% of the fiscal deficit.

    This situation raises doubts as to the supposed efficiency of the new businesses, but, above all, on the question of the convenience of contracts and formulas for calculating rates, and more so when one considers that in countries such as Guatemala, the cost per kilowatt is 13 cents on the dollar, while in El Salvador, it is 26 cents on the dollar, or, double. This disparity is explained fundamentally by the way in which the businesses calculate rates: using formulas which —although they could be perfectly legal— offer a substantially higher profit margin, especially considering the strategic character of electrical energy (which represents close to 10% of production costs of 48% of businesses, close to 3% of the cost of the basic food basket and indirectly influences inflation when businesspeople transfer costs to the consumer).

    The problem seems to be that the agreements with the distributors which provide electrical energy were undersigned providing excessively favorable conditions, such as are evidenced at the present time by the difference between rates charged in El Salvador and Guatemala and as evidenced, as well, in August of 1999 in the dispute between the Nejapa Power generating plant and the Executive Hydroelectric Commission for the Lempa River (CEL), which came to the fore when the CEL authorities realized that they were paying overly high prices for electrical energy (Proceso 865).

    To the problem of excessive electrical energy rates is added the government’s intention to eliminate subsidies on the consumption of potable drinking water, using the argument that this limits investment in work to amplify the distribution network. Currently, consumers with a monthly meter reading of 41 cubic meters or less will receive a 50% subsidy when their consumption is less than 20 cubic meters and 35% subsidy when their consumption is between 21 and 40 cubic meters. All in all, it is estimated that the subsidy signifies for the National Administration of Aqueducts and Water Carriers (ANDA), income not received in close to 220 million colones annually, but for the small consumers, would mean an increase of between 35% and 50%.

    This dynamic is, in reality, nothing new because, practically between the time that the private sector entered into the picture offering public services there has been a clear tendency towards increases in rates and towards an increase in the subsidies for consumption (Proceso 863 and 870). This situation poses two problems which require the adoption of urgent measures such as review of the formulas used to calculate rates and an evaluation of how pertinent it is to continue privatization of basic services (generation of electrical energy and the distribution of potable drinking water).

    It is difficult to hide the fact that the distributors of electrical energy are using formulas which issue in rates which permit them to obtain excessive profit margins implying costs being passed on to consumers and the state. This situation is unacceptable from the perspective of collective benefits, because it punishes a great majority of the population because it benefits a great number of businessmen. And if this were not enough, it also affects costs to businesses, prices of products and the cost of the basic food basket. Although it is difficult to think of rolling back the privatization of electrical energy distributors, it is completely necessary to review the process for avoiding unnecessary costs to consumers and the state.

    In the case of the potable drinking water sector, the problem, in the opinion of the president of ANDA, seems to be the scarce availability of resources for investment programs, which leads one to think that the elimination of subsidies is not the only possible solution. One might also consider the possibility of increasing public investment in the water sector, issuing exemptions for the payment of the Value Added Tax on new construction or transferring to the central government some 220 million colones which ANDA will not receive as part of subsidies. In fact, private enterprise engaged in the distribution of electrical energy reimburses the subsidy while ANDA, which is a public entity, does not receive this aid.

    This last situation reveals clearly government policy with regard to public enterprises: making them seem to be inefficient bodies beyond hope of rescue and incapable of achieving self-sustaining status. Few stop to think that the situation would be totally different if the state offered them the same generous treatment which it dispenses to private enterprise, even in the worst of cases —which is to say, with the elimination of the subsidies—, would be more advantageous for the state to own the public service entities because it would receive substantial tax income as a result.

    The policy of reforming the system of basic services —in reality reduced to privatization— it ought to change because these sectors are strategic sectors on two counts: their rates directly and indirectly influence the formation of prices and, moreover, are an important component in the costs of businesses which directly influences the competitivity of national enterprises. Up until now, the government has put off attempting to solve the problem, extending the assignment of subsidies and down-playing more permanent solutions such as review of the formulas for calculating rates, as has already been mentioned, and modernizing public enterprises which offer basic services (such as electrical energy and potable drinking water).

SOCIETY

    From the moment it was made public that Walter Araujo, deputy for the ARENA party, had been designated by the authorities of the National Executive Council (COENA) as the president of the highest authority of that party, the passions of many ARENA party members cooled. His profile, already familiar for his defense of party interests, seemed to be sufficient to calm the dander and quiet the most critical voices. With Araujo, the promise of a better party —stronger on the electoral playing field, closer to the rank and file and more solid in ITS declarations of “principles”— shown with all of its intensity among the brotherhood of the ARENA rank and file. On the question of his political abilities enough has been seen and among them does not appear to wave a single militant flag which does not recognizes the enemy with the same eyes as Major Roberto D’Aubuisson. On the question of his intentions, Araujo has made much of the traditional back of tricks and words which decorated his speeches in the Legislative Assembly by announcing them to all who wished to hear. On the question of his real power and what it could become once catapulted up to the throne of the party... on this there is much yet to be said.

    Certainly, in order to state definitive opinions on Araujo’s opinion we will have to observe the route upon which he will embark the party which now heads the government. But if the winning streak of the new president of COENA has still not come out to shine, his rapid ascent to the leadership of the party does show the route which he has followed in the struggle for the control of the leadership structures. Araujo is the last piece in the game that ARENA has been developing for a good while now. The pot is heated not only by the electoral stagnation which the party has felt during the last elections. The silent internal struggle has also contributed to a situation which was unleashed from the moment when D’Aubuisson was seen not to be in a position to take the reins of the party. In this struggle, the goal was to accumulate the greatest possible amount of support for the bases in order to fill the vacancy left by the Major. Although stability and unity occupied an overwhelming slot, the space left for power struggles was wide open for whoever might have the capacity to put the pieces of the puzzle in their correct place and under the aegis of the best strategy.

    The return of Alfredo Cristiani to the leadership of the party, after the poor quality work attributed to Gloria Salguero Gross in 1997, was profoundly marked by the logic of this game. The ex president appeared as the one to comfort all of the fallen. His private game wished to draw upon the perceived need to recover values lost from party life: i.e., those who won the respect of the military and economic sectors anxious to have power in any way possible. Moreover, conveniently retired from political pressures which obliged him to say the correct thing in correct situations, Cristiani could separate himself completely from his image as the committed president with a common objective (peace) in order to dedicate himself to placing his own bets in the power game which was revealed to him. When those who were guilty of poor support for the party at the polls were identified, when their profiles were lowered to the darkest corners of the public scene, Cristiani presented himself as a polished politician, committed to the ideological principles of the party and practiced as no other to lead the party to victory in the upcoming elections.

    No one can doubt the capacity and force of the ex president’s strength and experience in command —that is: he and his political and economic allies— with the leadership of the party at the service of his permanently staying in power and not for the benefit of all sectors of the political right. The presidency of the republic served him in supporting the financial and commercial sectors of the country that needed it. His handling of the party served to make his battlefields and trenches secure along with political loyalties. At this precise moment, the political game of ARENA consolidated itself and those who were relegated could not but hold their tongue until something might occur which would pin the leadership of the ex president and his group against the wall. This long awaited event or scenario occurred during the commotion which followed the electoral results of last March.

    In is in the wake of this strong questioning of Cristiani’s domination that Araujo appears as the option to take over COENA. In fact, in the presence of public opinion, the party could not have done better than to qualify Araujo’s arrival on the political scene as simply a relay, or replacement, above all because his arrival did not imply in and of itself a leaving behind of the race for control of the party. The impetus with which Araujo climbed the steps necessary to achieve the victory of claiming the leadership of COENA is owing to his savoir faire in taking over the mechanisms of his predecessor. Door to door work garnered support: promises were the guarantee of a longed for electoral takeoff for ARENA party political life. But this same astuteness was also accompanied by a dream of longing for the legacy of D’Aubuisson’s work in the golden age of the party’s splendor. Araujo, one of the Major’s spoiled pets aims to give life to those forgotten values and beam out a dose of obligatory populism aimed at the party rank and file.

    In this sense, Araujo knew how to position himself at the center of the playing field of the powers which persist within ARENA. Advantage was to be gotten from the nostalgia which still swells up as it did when unleashed by the charismatic leadership of D’Aubuisson among the rank and file and he sold himself as the son of a generation of nationalists who could see in him a means to locate themselves at the vanguard of the times. In no absolute sense of the word do this mean that he withdrew from power struggles and the play of power structures. It is only the confirmation that in this party, Araujo —and he who supports him from the vantage point of the outgoing leadership, if there is any— knew how to win over the hopes of party members dealing with the needs of the times. Cristiani, for his part, promised ARENA members the presidency of the republic and a fatted calf in the form of a larger bank of deputies in the Legislative Assembly. Araujo now promises to reconstruct the party from the point of view of his most fundamental principles and to safeguard the unity which has so characterized this right-wing party.

    If Araujo really intends to return ARENA to the leadership which its rank and file so longs for, the first thing he will have to do is win a larger opening for the leadership focussed more on the rank and file and of the party and focussed more on society in general. And this implies combating internal divisionism which has become more and more evident. But this will not be accomplished while escaping from the criticisms which well up along the political path along which that left party is so painfully moving. And it will be accomplished even less by holding strong to the words of the Major when the opportunity presents itself to do so. In fact, although the allusion to party unity and the committed work over and above the internal differences are present in the speeches of the recently inaugurated president of COENA, he still, however uses kid gloves on occasions when he must deal with the complaints of the founding members and those who are called “paquistas” [followers of Francisco “Paquito” Flores, current president of El Salvador. Translator’s note], relegated to the sidelines for daring to challenge ARENA party vertical lines of command. Should they persist in this practice —supported, and guaranteed but at the same time tolerated during the rule of Cristiani— he will not rescue the party from crisis into which it was sunk in the days previous to his election.

    Up until now, the figure of Araujo is —from the longing expressed by the ARENA party members themselves— the ideal means for evoking and invoking the past which brought glory to the party and which has now been clouded over by the electoral fumbling and mistakes from which it has suffered so. Definitively speaking, in accepting the challenge to represent that role he has been very effective and will continue to be so if the only thing he seeks is to secure his permanence in the post after the General Assembly in September. But in order to take up the reins of the administration with a minimum of intelligence and aplomb, to deal with the forces that wrack the party will require more than just an image. Could it be that these longings are linked to an epoch in which differences with the party line languished in the face of the threats and intolerance characteristic of the first and founding nationalists? The new president of COENA surely has a long path to walk and many bouts to deal with along the complicated steeplechase of power which will come to the fore in the course of his command.