Proceso 918
September 13, 2000
ISSN 0259-9864
 
 
 

INDEX

Editorial Cristiani enthroned?
Political Francisco Flores: a speech for the millenium
Economic Concerning runaway shops (maquilas)
Legal Affairs The constitutionality of diplomatic immunity
 
 
 

EDITORIAL

    Even the most astute observer might find himself confounded by the things that happen in the ARENA party. Since last March’s elections—which, by the bye, were read by many ARENA party members as a resounding political defeat—a series of readjustments in the internal party structures of this right-wing party were taken in hand, which, it would appear, are aimed at rising above those weak points which led to the electoral debacle. Given the changes accomplished at the level of the national executive committee (COENA) of the party, it was clear that the post-electoral diagnostic issuing from the rank and file of ARENA was, undeniably, that a good number of the deficiencies in the party on electoral questions could be chalked up to the category of deficient political leadership. In other words, the responsibility for the March 12, 2000 electoral failure was laid at the door of the COENA. There were those who openly pointed their finger at Alfredo Cristiani, seasoned president of the ARENA party, as the person principally responsible for the defeat, and there were also those who whispered sotto voce as they pointed their accusing finger at him. The first group not only got themselves a lot of press coverage but quickly began, as well, to get together an anti-Cristiani opposition group which presaged a split in the party itself, which, in turn, implied serious consequences for the party. The second group were more cautious and made an effort to avoid the rupture and easily strung up a moderate, alternative banner for a group and placed themselves at the head of it: this with an eye to allow for change within the ARENA while avoiding an open break.

    As things went, the moderates opened up a path for themselves in this party of the right. Cristiani was relieved of the COENA presidency and replaced by Walter Araujo who, together with Gerardo Suvillaga and René Figueroa, has emerged as one of the most outstanding personalities among the new generation of ARENA party leaders. Obviously the moderate alternative presupposed, on the one hand, the persistence and survival of timeworn privileges in the hands of Cristiani. Cristiani, effectively, left the presidency of COENA, but did not renounce his influence within the party, given that he was named advisor to Araujo. The other side of the dialectic, on the other hand, was that those who called for a drastic change in ARENA did not see their hopes fulfilled in this arrangement. If what they wanted was to see Cristiani cast in the role of the accused and put on trial, they were surely disappointed to note that nothing of the sort took place—nor will it, apparently, in the future. If what they wanted was to take hold of some quota of power within the party in order to begin “founding the party anew”, here too they had to come to terms with the fact that there was nothing farther from reality once the moderate solution was imposed in the most weighty circles of power within the ARENA party.

    Ostensibly, at least, on the basis of the currents of opinion which questioned internal organization and leadership within the party after last March’s elections, were as water returning to its channel because, after a last minute push and pull, they accepted the rules of the game prevailing inside the party. From here on out, the challenge for ARENA will be something altogether different: it will concern the matter of the election of the new president and new members of COENA when the terms of office of the incumbent leaders end. It will be within this context—regulated by the length of terms in office and the internal party statutes—that possible alternative space for institutional change will open up. Meanwhile, those who dream of changing the face of ARENA, as well as those who resist all change, will have to resign themselves to strategic movements which permit them to take up positions along the road towards control of the party without creating any major friction.

    It might be mentioned here that there are suspicions that these movements have already begun to take shape within the ARENA rank and file. It is in the light of these movements that the homage that the ARENA party offered up to Alfredo Cristiani takes on some meaning. Last Saturday, September 9, saw a return to an old, worn out topic which threatened to cast even greater doses of ideology upon the country’s past history: this was the topic of naming Cristiani “the Peace President”. At this stage of the game almost no one unequivocally accepts this characterization of Cristiani. True it is that he signed the peace accords with the FMLN—although it is also true that no one decided to name the FMLN the “Peace Left”—but Cristiani also tolerated and covered up the terrorism of the Armed Forces and made himself wealthy to an unimaginable degree. More than the President of Peace, many in El Salvador see Cristiani (and not without some measure of justified sarcasm) as the president who, at the same time as he was signing the peace agreements with one hand, was filling his pockets with money with the other hand. Bordering on manipulation of history, the president to whom homage was being paid, received a visit from an indigenous woman from Panchimalco.

    It all happened quickly, as if an effort were being made to identify Cristiani with a world totally alien to his person and his family and friends. On the question of the significance of indigenous culture in a country such as El Salvador—which is predominantly mestizo—it is clear as day that neither the indigenous cause is the cause of people like Cristiani, nor is the indigenous problem one of the most serious problems in the country. Of course, at the moment when history is to be manipulated—above all in this period of independence day celebrations—anything goes—even taking a poor indigenous woman to a circle of people to whom their own power and wealth is more important to them than anything else. It is a good thing that the sponsors and hosts of the ex president did not think up a scenario in which they brought before him a woman who works in a runaway shop (maquila) or a poor farmer from northern Morazán or northern Chalatenango. That would have been the irony of ironies.

    However the case may be, Cristiani was paid great and celebrated homage on this occasion, and within the ranks of the ARENA party, such homage served to make itself felt as one of the centerpieces of party power. So now, however, such festivities as were paid to the ex - president might be said to have a double meaning: it could mean a confirmation of Cristiani’s power within the rank and file of the ARENA party—of which members and outsiders alike might take note—or it could mean the beginning of the end of his fall from grace, softened by a celebration, the objective of which would be to break the fall. This last reading of the events in question, although perhaps less probable than the first suggested reading, ought not simply to be laid aside, above all if one takes into account the deterioration which the image of the ex president has suffered. The first reading—should it turn out to be the correct one—would point towards Cristiani’s assuming the throne with all of the subsequent difficulties which such an institutional change would imply, demanded in a thousand ways by important sectors of the party. One thing is predictable: if Cristiani once again concentrates the power of ARENA in his hands, the possibilities for an institutional change in the party, as well as the relationships existing between this party, businessmen and the state will, become more remote.

POLITICS

    On the occasion of the celebration of the Summit Meeting of the Millenium last September 6-8, the heads of state of the whole world were in New York. This meeting was called at the initiative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, who invited the presidents to reflect upon the challenges presented by globalization for all humanity. In his report on the state of the world, the representative of the United Nations called for political intervention that would assure a situation in which the benefits of globalization would be enjoyed by all humanity. He also, in some manner, attributed a quota of responsibility to the most developed countries in situations of famine, war, genocide, inequality and poverty, ills from which a large portion of the world’s population suffers.

    Nevertheless, on this date at the change of the century, the President of the Republic of El Salvador, Francisco Flores was not in step with the rest of the world leaders. For the Salvadoran president—as opposed to the opinion expressed by Kofi Annan and other political leaders—to accuse developed nations of being responsible for the poverty is other countries is to produce a transference of responsibility which, in turn, would close off possibilities that these nations would emerge from their condition of misery. For him, “the only possibility which a poor nation has to move ahead lies in its assuming the complete responsibility for dealing with that poverty”. According to the president’s logic, poverty is a question of attitude among nations and poor people.

    Given this, a nerve point in his speech before the UN consisted in calling for a change of attitude vis-a-vis the rich people of the world. He highlighted the fact that “we should not ask the world to resolve our problems for us”. What ought to be called for, on the other hand, “is the opportunity to participate in the development processes in a condition of equality”. Along this same line, he advocated an opening of markets in industrialized countries to the products of the less developed countries. “Salvadoran peasants,” says the president, “consume the products which industrialized countries produce. It is absolutely intolerable that the industrialized world should tell them that they cannot sell the fruits, vegetables and grains they produce through their work in these countries”.

    But beyond the rhetoric of these phrases that, according to some local analysts, uphold the dignity of the Salvadoran people in the midst of the UN, the vacuity and falsity of such statements should be underlined in the current situation of the globalization of social linkages. In the first place, it draws attention to the fact that the products which the president wishes to export—in the name of Salvadoran peasants—for which he calls for an opening in the markets of the industrialized countries—are precisely those which are most scarce in local production. It is no secret, for example, that they are the very fruits and vegetables which are most lacking in local production. It is no secret, for example, that the majority of fruits and vegetables consumed in El Salvador are brought in from neighboring countries.

    In second place, and more serious yet, is the reading which Francisco Flores makes of the cause of poverty and the solution which he proposes to get out of it. The president cannot accept the premise according to which the wealthy nations have responsibilities for the poverty in the poorer nations. He cannot imagine—thinks the observer—any entity from among the wealthy countries that actually dedicates itself to making the rest of the nations poorer. Colonization, the exploitation of raw materials in the countries to the south have created institutions charged with planning poverty for other countries because of the injustices and inequalities in economic, political and social relations which they have established with the rest of the countries. Colonization, the exploitation of raw materials from the countries to the south, the foreign debt and forced privatizations of the profits of the poor countries for the benefit of the multinational corporations of industrialized countries are some of the most resounding examples of the evolution of this relation.

    On the other hand, a quick look at the ecological reality highlights the interconnection between poor and rich. There is an undeniable linkage between the lifestyle of the rich and the effects suffered by the poor. The poor are those who are least destructive of the environment and who cause the least contamination in spite of being those most negatively affected by the ecological administration worldwide. Unfortunately, the president of the whole Salvadoran people was not up to par. A false patriotic pride did now allow him to take account of the facts that constitute reality in the world today. It would be false to suppose that in today’s world any country could be the only architect of its own destiny as the president alleges. To think in this way is to ignore the world ties to human societies. Unfortunately, world leaders are not much given to thinking this way and, if this were the case, it would be still more utopic to request a worldwide administration of economic development as well as threats to peace and to international security which are mentioned in the Declaration of the Millenium of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

ECONOMY

    Almost no one is unaware of the expectations concerning the behavior of productive forces in El Salvador: faced with the possibility of an increase in prices and the elimination of state regulations on some product, businessmen generally react by increasing their offer. This is precisely the phenomenon which is beginning to occur in the countries which will receive the benefits of the extension of the period of time in which the benefits of the Caribbean Basin Initiative will be in effect, especially in the industrial sector involving in runaway garment shops. In El Salvador an aggressive campaign for broadening the availability of industrial parks has been initiated. This campaign is decidedly supported by the government which, has not minced words in attempting to create incentives for runaway shop production to the degree that funds obtained from the sale (privatization) of the former National Telecommunications Administration (ANTEL) are to be used.

    The proliferation of runaway garment shops is circumscribed by the conditions which the U.S. itself has created for the Central American and Caribbean region: easy access to markets and deliberate promotion of free trade zones by means of programs of the Agency for International Development (AID). Since 1992 the topic of U.S. government support for the creation of free trade zones and the elimination of barriers for the importation of textiles caused significant concern to the organized labor movement of the United States itself because of the jobs to be lost in garment with the opening of runaway shops, or, maquilas in other countries. Moreover, the salaries paid by the business enterprises in the host countries were significantly lower than those paid in garment shops in the U.S.

    Recent data disclose the fact that U.S. trade unions—especially the AFL-CIO—are encouraging the exclusion of El Salvador from the benefits of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, given that, according to the Ministry of Labor, labor rights are not respected in the runaway shops (maquila).

    So it is that expectations concerning the runaway shop sector are not very clear. On the other hand, a greater demand is to be expected as the effect of prolonging the period during which the Caribbean Basic Initiative is to be in effect. But, on the other hand, a situation contrary to these expectations could be expected if the proposal of the Salvadoran trade union organization is met with success. As things go, the government seems to have taken a decision to support development of this sector, suggesting that it is one of its clearest options for encouraging economic growth. Given the foregoing, it would perhaps be useful quickly to outline the principal characteristics of the runaway shop (maquila) sector in order to highlight the fact that this activity does not in and of itself constitute an option for sustainable development in the country. For this very reason its contribution to the growth of production, the creation of jobs and income and generation of exports will be examined below.

    The “boom” of the runaway shop (maquila) phenomena began in the year 1992 when surprising growth of this sector took place, registered in the industrial GNP as it rose from 2% in 1990 to more than 10% in 1999. In the same way, it is estimated that that sector would create approximately 60,000 jobs, a percentage representing 5% of the total number of jobs and close to 20% of the jobs generated in the industrial sector. Additionally, exports coming from the runaway shop sector (maquila) doubtless provided a new dynamic of production and jobs, but it did not provide multiplying effects: it does not require or produce raw material or capital goods for other economic sectors. The raw material required by the runaway shops is imported, while the final products are exported. As a result of this tax exemption the GNP of the runaway shops (maquilas) does not generate value added tax, income tax, municipal taxes or customs duties. Likewise, given the fact that its owners are foreigners, the profits generated by the runaway shops (maquilas) are expatriated to other countries, without there being any major contribution towards increasing national savings and without providing financing for other investments.

    Jobs generated by the runaway shop sector are low-paying jobs, to the extent that practically all employees in this sector are paid minimum wage (1,260 colones), which is below the minimum required to purchase the basic food basket, which is to say, below the income considered to be indicative of extreme poverty. And if this is not enough, on repeated occasions grievances and labor conflicts as a result of alleged bad treatment and unhealthy conditions prevailing in these shops.

    On the other hand, although in the national accounting, runaway shops (maquilas) might appear to offer a strong dynamic contribution to production, it is also true of importations, owing to the fact that all of their raw materials are imported. If we calculate net exports forthcoming from the maquila (this is to say, exports less imports) it turns out that the maquila sector is not the formidable exporter it might be thought to be: for 1999 total exports for the runaway shop sector (maquilas) were 1,333 million dollars. Net exports, however, were hardly 378 million dollars, which are only 15% of total exports.

    Even so, the government has always offered its full support for the proliferation of the maquila in El Salvador in that it created tax exempt shelters (something much too benevolent), the creation of a legal context for the free trade zones and, more recently, it has created trusteeships, the objectives of which are to subsidize interest rates on loans aimed at creating a great expanse of industrial parks which would be available to the runaway shops (maquila). According to statements attributed to the government, there exist projections for the construction of 200,000 square meters of industrial park. The use of these funds has been approved by the “Consultative Committee for the promotion of Investment of the Funds accruing from the sale of ANTEL” and will be administered by the Multi-Sector Investment Bank.

    From the foregoing one might conclude at least two things: first, that the maquila does not figure as an option in overcoming the problem of poverty (or, rather, of the lack of equilibrium of the foreign sector); and, secondly, even so, the government aims to provide incentives for investment in the maquila using funds from he privatization of ANTEL. These funds were originally to be channeled towards social investment. In this context, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that, although it ought to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the broadening of the benefits forthcoming from the Caribbean Basin Initiative, it ought also to begin to consider more worthy and better paid options for employment of the Salvadoran labor force, which, moreover, has a multiplying effect on the production of other economic sectors and which generates income. This occurs, evidently, because of a greater formation and training of the labor force as well as for the application of an economic plan.

    Funds for the privatization of ANTEL were to be used precisely for investment in education. It seems, however, that the government prefers to use those funds for subsidizing investment in the maquila, which implies continuing to put off the formation of our labor force for the benefit of foreign investors.

    Investment in the maquila is characterized by its moving into locales where there are tax breaks and where they are permitting to pay low salaries. For this reason, we cannot fix our vision of the country entirely on this sector, but, rather, on sectors with greater capacity for making the whole of the economy more dynamic and, above all, for creating jobs with salaries which permit to overcoming of chronic poverty in which the majority of Salvadoran families reproduce the labor force.

LEGAL AFFAIRS

    “To be faithful to the republic, comply with and assure compliance with the Constitution in such a way that laws, decrees, orders or resolutions are in accordance with its textual content, promising, moreover, to comply exactly with the duties which the position imposes on you, and for any infraction whatever to be responsible in accordance with the laws” is the minimal conduct required of public functionaries by Article 235 of the Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador. Article 236, however, provides these very functionaries with a protective guarantee known as Constitutional Immunity.

    This provision of the constitution implies that all public functionaries must respond to the Legislative Assembly for official and common crimes which he or she commits and which will not be judged in the same way as the rest of the citizenry. The process is the following: the Legislative Assembly, in an audience in which a prosecutor from among its own body, either before the person indicated for whom the hearing might be invoked, or before a special defender, declares there is no reason to proceed against the functionary and that the file will be made inactive. In case the Assembly decrees that there is reason to proceed, the functionary for whom a hearing will be convoked will be suspended from the exercise of his functions. In this manner the stage of pre-trial hearing is comprehended. The procedures of the Second Chamber of the Court are then invoked according to law so that the case may be heard and a determination reached. If the determination should involve a condemnatory finding, the public functionary in question will be removed from his or her position and must respond personally for the moral harm and material damages occasioned as well as for the violation of the provisions of the constitution. The state, for its part, will only respond subsidiarily for these harms and damages. If the finding should acquit the person in question, he or she will be returned to the exercise of his or her functions as long as the period for which he or she was named to the post has not expired.

    The public functionary invested with this protective guarantee can also opt to renounce such protection. However, as has been seen in the well-known case of the National Conciliation Party deputy, Francisco Merino—accused by the Attorney General’s Office of three crimes—, the possibilities that the public functionary might be judged, voluntarily for his part, as a common citizen are very small. In this particular case, the problem is rooted in the creation of a Special Commission which will decide if Merino will or will not be relieved of Constitutional Immunity, given that this will have repercussions on the convocation of the pre-hearing stage.

    Several matters draw our attention on the question of “the Merino Case”. In the first place, it seems that the Legislative Assembly has been obliged to make up the said commission as much the publicity surrounding the case in consequence of the reputation which Merino has forged for himself from the time when he belonged to the ARENA party. All in all, it is high time that the “Fathers of the Country” should proceed in accordance with the law and that no margin for impunity be allowed—as has been the case throughout the history of El Salvador. It is time to put a halt to the phenomenon of negotiation among the parties that seek their own political ends and not the common good. If the deputies were elected by the people—which are the only sovereign force—, it is facing the people themselves that they ought to respond and not only responding to party interests.

    Secondly, not only are the deputies committing acts of corruption, but also the Attorney General of the Republic itself, from the point in time when it made it possible to soften the inevitable: removing Francisco Merino’s constitutional immunity. Given that the criteria for the resolution emitted by the deputies making up the Special Commission will be based on the allegations presented by the prosecuting attorney in the case and by the person in question or his or his defense attorney, of the activity of the prosecuting attorney will depend not only the future of the public functionary, but also the forward or backward movement in the struggle against impunity. The Attorney General accuses Deputy Merino of three crimes: grave harm, threats with special aggravation and aggravated harm. However, the typification of the first crime, seen from the point of view of the declaration made by the National Civilian Police—using the Penal Code as a basis for said declaration—has been covered up, with the objective of minimizing the gravity of the actions committed by the functionary, Merino. A charge more in accordance with the actual acts is that of “attempted aggravated homicide”, in view of the fact that the agent wounded by Deputy Merino was acting in the line of duty when the attack was perpetrated against her. The Attorney General, using the charge of “serious harm” is opening up the opportunity for the person under question to be charged—with or without immunity—for a less serious crime, the sanction for which is not proportional to the crime really committed. In effect, the crime of serious harm carries with it a penalty of three to six years, while that of attempted aggravated homicide is punishable with a sentence of between ten and twelve and a half years in prison with no option for time off or release of any kind.

    Definitively speaking, Constitutional Immunity, as a protective guarantee, presupposes holding responsible those who are protected by it. And it is not a shield for hiding or covering up crimes committed by functionaries whose responsibility it is to serve the people.