PROCESO — WEEKLY NEWS BULLETIN — EL SALVADOR, C.A.
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Proceso 920
September 27, 2000
ISSN 0259-9864
 


Important Notice



INDEX


Editorial Ethical norms for local government
Politics The attorney general and the issue of impunity
Economy The legislative bill for the national budget
Society The World Summit Conference on Social Development: five years later
 
 
 

EDITORIAL


ETHICAL NORMS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

    Contemporary societies have seen numberless moral codes come and go, and many of these, with the specific norms which they contain, were designed to respond to particular challenges which originate in the diverse arenas of social, political and economic activity. One of these codes is that which is emerging for the area of local governments in diverse Latin American countries and from which criteria for norms and values might be extracted thereby permitting those who are responsible for government functions at that level to have at hand a guide for efficient and consistent moral action. El Salvador is not staying on the sidelines of that process and for several years now the need has been felt for a moral code which might serve as a guide for those who are involved in government work at the municipal level. That need has been made palpable in a document approved by the Mayors’ Council in 1999: “Ten Ethical Principles for the Administration of Municipal Councils”.

    The preamble to these “Ten Ethical Principles” takes the form of a general announcement or summary of the philosophy which inspired them: “The administration of local government ought to inspire confidence in the public, in the first place, by being faithful to the Constitution of the Republic, to the laws which proceed from the Constitution and from the following ethical principles over and above any personal gain”. This is to say, the common good—as it is expressed in the Constitution—ought to be placed above any individual interests. How is this to be achieved from a moral point of view? This can be done by putting the moral precepts of the ten commandments for Municipal Council administration into practice

    These precepts pose the following duties for a municipal functionary: (1) “[a municipal administration] is guided by the concepts of effective, efficient and democratic government”; (2) “[the municipal official] will recognize at all times that the basic function of local government is to serve the best interests of the citizenry”; (3) “[the municipal official] will dedicate him or herself to the highest ideals of honor and integrity and so maintain the respect and confidence of other officials, employees and the public”: [“he or she] will affirm the dignity and validity of the services offered by local government and will maintain a constructive, creative and practical attitude towards local development as well as a profound sense of social responsibility”: “[he or she will] make a continual effort to improve his or her professional capacity and administrative techniques for the administration of the municipality; (6) [he or she] will make decisions on personnel matters on the basis of merit in such a way that equity and impartiality govern his or her decisions as to assignments, salary increases, promotions and disciplinary actions”; (7) “[he or she will] keep the community informed on municipal matters, stimulate communication among citizens and local government, emphasize the need to offer friendly, courteous and committed public service”; “[he or she will] carry out his or her administration without interferences from the outside, always considering the common good at a local level and will handle each problem without discrimination using the highest principles as a basis”; (9) “[he or she will] will keep firmly in mind that it is dishonest to pursue personal ambition, profits obtained through the use of confidential information to which he or she has access or through the undue use of time for which he or she is paid a salary for public service”; (10) “[he or she will] not have or maintain financial interests which are in conflict with a conscientious carrying out of his or her functions”.

    It is clear that these are ten simple moral or ethical principles which are easily understood, but the application of and compliance with which require commitment and responsibility by each and every member of the municipal council. The first norm requires a commitment to effectiveness, efficiency and democracy. This norm is related to the fifth, which requires a permanent updating of administrative, professional and technical skills. The second, fourth, seventh and eighth norms focus on commitments to the common good, local development and relations between the local government and citizenry. The third and sixth norms speak to moral obligations inside local governments such as confidence, respect, impartiality, equity and the rejection of discrimination. Lastly, the ninth and tenth norms deal with the question of corruption in three specific forms: that of not using confidential information available in the mayors’ offices for personal gain, that of not using labor time for extraneous occupations and that of foreswearing financial interests which could obstruct the carrying out of assigned functions.

    So then, on the moral level, it is not sufficient simply to lay out determined precepts such as those listed above, given that their significance and importance can only be established in practice. So it is, then, that it is necessary for those precepts, in addition to their being made known to the people for whom they were meant, be accepted with conviction by those very people that these same precepts be permanently applied in the carrying out of their activities. Only in the light of these elements—knowledge of, acceptance with conviction and application in practice—can it be said that moral norms might be effective. As a result, if the “Ten Commandments on Ethical Matters” have been drawn up with an eye to guiding the administration of municipal councils, it must be determined to what extent they are known by the people for whom they were meant and if these people accept and apply those principles in the exercise of local government. It is precisely at this point that major problems arise because it is not an easy task to evaluate whether the members of the municipal councils throughout the country have made these principles their own and are making an effort to comply with them in their daily activities in the mayors’ office.

    All in all, an important step has been taken for the establishment of a normative code for the exercise of power in the municipal sphere. But this is only the first step. What follows is what really counts. And it is the question of whether the mayors and council members are seriously committed to the moral obligations which their responsibilities pose for them; because, should this not be the case, the “Ten Commandments on Ethical Matters” will be nothing more than a list of good intentions, the objective of which will be none other than to provide a saintly halo of moral practices and vices which are contrary to the public good and the interest of the citizenry. Good municipal government is necessary for all Salvadorans. As a result, all of us ought to be alert to those practices and behavior modes exhibited by municipal functionaries which impede the establishment of good local government.

G

 

POLITICS


THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE ISSUE OF IMPUNITY

    The functions of the Attorney General, according to Article 193, Section 1 of the Political Constitution, are “the defense of the interests of the state of society”—so stated, they do not permit bargaining, haggling and decisions arrived at on the basis of convenience or the interests or desires of the powerful groups in office at the moment. Does the current head of the Public Ministry understand things this way? This is the big question being asked by Salvadoran citizens now, nine months since the election of Belisario Artiga as the person responsible for the destiny of such an important public institution.

    In November of last year, after four months without an Attorney General, the institution charged with the investigation of crime feared the worst, given the unfortunate experience resulting from the election of Eduardo Peñate Polanco to the post of Ombudsman for Human Rights. After the newly elected Attorney General’s message to the nation, nevertheless, there was the impression that things would get better began to take shape— or, at least, the impression that the new Attorney General would attempt to offer the country a leadership for the Attorney General’s Office in accordance with growing citizen demands. At that point in time, the new Attorney General committed himself continually to fight crime without faltering in his efforts. He also announced his decision to work without having reference to party commitments of any kind. That commentary gave rise to the idea that the Attorney General was fully conscious of the principal problems in the Attorney General’s Office and that, given this, he was conscious of the fact that one of the reasons that impunity is rampant in El Salvador is that political criteria prevailed at the moment in time when investigations on particular crimes were carried out. This idea grew to be so strong that the Attorney General became, at any given moment, a bellwether championing discourse on the need to pursue the intellectual authors of serious crimes.

     Given this kind of discourse—which was very frank and, it must be said, atypical of public functionaries linked to the political right of the country—public sentiment grew towards the idea that the Attorney General would play a large role in issues of reform and the confidence which should be had in the judicial system. Special mention, then, should be given to the leading role which Artiga assumed, after his having been chosen for the office in the case of the murder of the child, Katya Miranda in April of last year. Suspicions of links between those implicated in the murder and the State Intelligence Office (OIE) and the National Civilian Police (PNC) made a determination very difficult—at least on the question of the effective participation of the Public Ministry—once the unequivocal commitment which this head of ministry had taken in this case had dissipated. On the other hand, one should remember that the differences which have come to light publicly between the Chief of Police of the PNC, Mauricio Sandoval, and the Attorney General, who, in effect, denounced, without mincing words, the too frequent linkages between kidnappers and criminals with high-ranking police agents. He also criticized a certain tendency towards covering up indices of PNC members’ accused of crime inside that police institution. So it was that structural problems were brought publicly to the fore and the Attorney General had to deal with them as well as he could within the inherent limits of his functions as Attorney General, in that he could not rely on prompt and efficient collaboration from other authorities also charged with oversight of the interests of society in the matter of justice.

    Along this same line of thinking, it is important to point out the persistence of certain deficiencies, all the good words and speeches and the aura of exemplary public functionary that came to surround the Attorney General in his attempts notwithstanding these deficiencies have not been overcome, at least for the period of time which the Attorney General has been at the head of this state office. During this period, he has not given any signs of complying with the commitment acquired on the day of his investiture: that of assuring that the interests of society are monitored without the taint of partisan politics.

    There is no doubt that the Attorney General cannot provide a solution to all the ills of the Salvadoran judicial system. Nor can he, by himself, efficiently confront the problem of organized crime or the impunity enjoyed by those who commit white-collar crime in El Salvador. This paragraph on justice, important as a persuasive message for criminals of all social categories, also requires political decisions which those in government must take, but more than anything else, it must be the result of a national consensus on the need to fight impunity, taking into account its possible connections with state structures. This, however, does not obviate the fact that the Attorney General must assume his role as the defender of society and bulwark against impunity. It is precisely in this context that Artiga’s failure of will is to be found.

    The promise to struggle against criminals does not reach into the most select circles of established power. This is what the Attorney General demonstrated in the way he handled the investigation of illicit telephone wiretapping. Everything points to the fact that his work will not help to dispel doubts concerning the participation of the OIE in illegal wiretapping. In this respect, the Attorney General has not been efficient in the work of identifying the threads of power in the labyrinth which deals in telephone wiretapping. On the contrary, up until now, the investigation has centered on topics which, by all lights, will not come to the point of actually determining the identity of those implicated in the wiretapping, even though they might be within the state apparatus. Neither has he been congruent with the criteria for impartiality in the persecution of crime in his posture with regard to the complaint presented by the UCA concerning the case of the Jesuit priests assassinated within the university campus. It should be noted that Artiga decided to pay little attention to the petition to re-open the case against the powerful people implicated in the assassination which took place at the UCA, including ex president Alfredo Cristiani. Here the refusal of the Attorney General to comply with his mandate of office gives rise to suspicions regarding the possible existence of political motives which could, once again, impede the course of justice in El Salvador.

    Regarding these topics, the poor level of work and interest in getting to the bottom of the complaints exhibited by the Attorney General could not be more palpable. Understood from this angle, the possibility for all out combat against the impunity rampant in El Salvador can hardly be seen as possible. On the other hand, the Attorney General had promised that in less than three months he would have a law ready against money-laundering. Nine months have passed and there is no indication that this problem will be taken up. Meanwhile, continued complaints make it clear that El Salvador is a country where money-laundering from narcotics-trafficking and high yield kidnappings are flagrant practices.

    In summary, there is still much to be done to de-politicize the work of this Public Ministry. A frontal attack against crime or impunity cannot yet be envisaged as long as the Attorney General engages in suspicious orientations in the conduct of key investigations or when he falters in the prosecution of some crimes because of the political or economic influence wielded by those alleged to have committed them.

G

 

ECONOMY


THE LEGISLATIVE BILL FOR THE NATIONAL BUDGET

    The National Budget could become the means by which the government achieves its economic, social, political and even environmental goals. Maintaining a clear definition of the objectives to be pursued and the way in which the budget ought to be distributed appears to be clear: in categories of social development, support for economic development of strategic sectors and/or resources for public security, for example. Nevertheless, in examining the limit of the budget presented in the legislative bill for the budget itself, it appears to be clear that spending for social categories has increased. Although beneficial in and of itself, such positive tendencies are blurred by the fact that the state has not adapted its budget to the demands of the current situation characterized, as it is, by slow growth which, in turn, demands an economic reorientation in which the state must play an important role.

    At the beginning of the month of September, the Treasury Ministry published an initial proposal for a legislative bill to present the general national budget for the year 2001. In it was highlighted the fact that an increase of 5.48% in the total amount; as well as increases in budgets destined towards general obligations which as education, health and environment. These increases, although moderate, point to the fact that the state will have to increase its income if it does not wish to increase the fiscal deficit even more during fiscal year 2001. This is aimed at obtaining a greater tax income which would result from an increase of 4% in the GNP which, at this point in the year, would be difficult to achieve. On the other hand, on the question of spending, changes are highlighted which the legislative bill will present in the following categories: social spending, defense and public security, support for economic development and compliance with fiscal commitments such as service to the foreign debt and other general obligations.

    This category of social spending consists in the areas of education, health, housing, work and social welfare. Of these, the only costs which have suffered budgetary increases are the areas of education and health (10.81% and 8.03%, respectively). The category dealing with labor will be in the same amount, while that of housing will experience a reduction in 12.55%. Nevertheless, increases in the budgets of education and health have been more significant. This will mean that the total for social spending will increase from 30.15% to 31.3% of the total budget for the years 2000 and 2001. Although, even while the totals of social spending for the decade of 1970 were higher than they are now (with more than 32% invested in this category) it is only fair to recognize the fact that during the decade of the 1990’s a significant increase in this category of spending is to be noted because even in 1994 it only represented 23.87% of the total budget while for 2000 it was 30.15%.

    On the question of defense and public security spending, it is noteworthy to point out that a reduction of 2.55% in the rubric for defense is to be noted as well as an increase in 1.54% in the rubrics of public security and justice. In practice, this measure implied a reduction in total participation of these rubrics for spending in the budget from 13.94% in 2000 to 13.19% in 2001. Costs in these categories have fallen during the decade of 1990, but they are still at relatively high levels if we compare them with the decade of the 1970’s when they hardly rose to 7% of the total budget.

    Basically, costs in support of economic development can be reviewed by means of the behavior of the budgets for the ministries of agriculture, economy, treasury and public works as well as for the “Fund for Stabilization and Economic Growth”. These branches of government represented 1.99%, 1.4%, 2.38%, 4.99% and 0.83% of the total for the year 2000 and it is expected that, for fiscal year 2001 they will represent 1.7%, 1.28%, 2.06%, 6% and 0.78%. The foregoing presupposes that practically all categories (except for public works which will increase by 0.01) will experience reductions. This is evident when we take note that between 2000 and 2001, total spending in support of economic development went from 12.59% to 11.82%.

    Of the foregoing, the most important is the new reduction in the budget for the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock which fell by 36 million colones because it was announced precisely and simultaneously with the “Plan for the Reactivation of Agriculture and Livestock” which, doubtless, needs support from this Ministry. In the same way, the diminution in the total assigned to the Ministries of the Economy and Treasury implies greater restrictions for the development of tasks related to the reorientation of the economy and obtaining more tax income with which to finance the general national budget.

    It should be pointed out that, in addition to the reduction in the resources assigned for the support of economic development in some cases, state funds are not being spent efficiently, even in this area. Proof of this is the creation of a special fund for financing the cultivation of coffee—international prices for which have been falling for ten years—when what is needed is to promote the diversification of agricultural and livestock production towards better prices and perspectives on the international market. Likewise, the creation of a fund to finance the construction of the industrial parks implies that funds are to be used by the contributors in order to favor businessmen in the textile and garment factories [maquilas] (see Proceso 918).

    There is another aspect of the national budget which is also noteworthy: the service on the public debt, which has been reduced, but, at the same time, the general obligations of the state have been simultaneously growing, generously compensating for the reduction of the first. For example, between 2000 and 2001 it is hoped that the payment of interests on the public debt will be reduced by 1.46 units, which is to say, it will almost double. So it is that, although one cannot deny that service to the foreign debt has become a lesser category in the total general budget (in 1994 it represented 22.03% while in 2000, it represented 16.97%), one cannot help but notice that the general obligations of the state have also been growing to the point that they have reached 5.86% in 2000. If we consider both categories, it turns out that spending continues in the same proportion of the budget in order to comply with the financial obligations of the state. It should be pointed out here that one should not wonder that the increase of general obligations might result from the tax burden generated by the privatization of the pension system, which would imply that this did not contribute to lessening the tax burden, but rather all to the contrary.

    It cannot be denied that, upon examination of the budget, positive indications are to be found in the fact that social spending has increased. Negative aspects are to be seen in the reduction of the support for economic growth, as well as heavy spending in defense and public security as well as increases in the general obligations of the state. The low rates of economic growth have already drawn the attention of state functionaries, who have announced the implementation of economic reactivation measures which have not produced greater results.

    For this reason, a review of the amount and effectiveness of tax resources which are being used to reactivate the economy is to be recommended, given that up until now the available data suggests that they might achieve better results if the policy for support of economic growth were to be reviewed, as much in the sense of reinforcing the budget of related institutions (which must necessarily pass review for a redefinition of their goals), as in reducing national defense spending and reviewing the final destiny of the funds oriented towards the reactivation of the economy.

G

SOCIETY


THE WORLD SUMMIT MEETING ON SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: FIVE YEARS LATER

    On the other side of the world, in Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic, the highest level representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) are meeting to share their particular visions and their “successes” on the question of the struggle against poverty, social development and international cooperation. Meanwhile, El Salvador feels the negative effects that a five year period of following the dictates of these and other financial institutions have left upon the most vulnerable parts of its population. In its last annual report on the state of commitments acquired by our country—and by the other 117 nations throughout the world—in the World Summit Meeting on Social Development in Copenhagen (1995), the institution for the international verification of Citizen Control gives El Salvador a mediocre rating because of the work carried out by the administrations headed by the ARENA party to date. Evidently, the country has not been able to rise above the shadow of the backlog on the question of social matters which has characterized it for decades now. And although this observation does not have much new in it, its value obtains, principally, from the context in which El Salvador signed the declaration in Copenhagen five years ago.

    A little while after having managed to end, through negotiation, the ten-year long armed conflict, and having, in its favor, numerous offerings of international aid for reconstruction, El Salvador was one of the nations which awakened most hope when reviewed according to the 16 commitments assumed for fomenting social development. Very few countries hesitated in considering the process of national reconstruction which might follow the signing of the peace accords as an example and guarantee of new and heretofore unhoped for progress opportunities. In this context, the attention which was offered by international organizations in terms of financing was very favorable to the governments which shared the challenge of pulling the country forward. Nevertheless, five years having passed since the summit meeting, the efforts of the administrations responsible for setting the country in march (under Armando Calderón Sol and Francisco Flores) have not fulfilled expectations. Review of the level of poverty, unemployment, investment in health and education or equal rights for both sexes, among other aspects, the notion prevails that none of these administrations has seriously occupied itself with drawing up coherent and systematic plans and policies for full social development.

    The panorama posed by Citizen Control is most revealing: of the 16 commitments acquired by El Salvador, 14 are still not complete. Of these 14, only three show a satisfactory advance, while six are moving at a slow pace, one is stuck and four have not been evaluated because current information is not available. And of the two which have been complied with (hope for a better life at 60 years of age and a reduction in the mortality rate of those less than 5 yeas of age), in one, no major efforts have been made to comply with or improve the goals projected at the Summit Meeting in Copenhagen. Definitively speaking, El Salvador continues to be the country with the conditions, on the one hand, to oblige a greater part of the population to live submerged in a precarious status and, on the other, contributes to a situation in which a minority are getting progressively richer, supported in no few cases by deficiencies which the public administrations tolerate or are unaware of.

    Logically speaking, in the make-up of this less than cheerful social profile of principles of a new century many factors have come into play, the most important among which have greater or lesser influence on human intentionally. And Citizen Control is not unaware of this situation. For this reason, one of its most important contributions consists in indicating the need for not losing sight of the fact that in the generation of a new social reality for a country elements intervene which, in some cases, surpass the capacities of the national governments. Our notice seeks, in this sense, the alignments which financial organisms of the stature of the IMF or the World Bank or the InterAmerican Development Bank (BID), have imposed according to their wishes upon the economies of the least developed countries. In the experiments encouraged by these organisms, there is an underlying logic which, perhaps inspired in the supposition of the “death of ideology”, places the dynamic of the market as the only factor capable of guiding the processes of development. From this, their behavior and procedures might be seen, on occasions, as hateful and cruel: the Structural Adjustment Programs (PAE) which they design and promote tend to pursue an accelerated insertion of poor countries into the rhythm which the process of globalization demands.

    In taking into consideration the effects provoked by those factors which depend upon the activity of government administrations which assumed and inherited the objectives posed by the Copenhagen meeting and of those which are given because of the influence of other countries or of international institutions, the resulting panorama is not very encouraging. The very vulnerability of a n0ation such as ours, which was so much in evidence was revealed with the passing of the tropical storm “Mitch” through Central American region, might find an explanation in the poor evaluation and consideration of these factors. So it is that while the international community does not react in the same way when confronted by disasters which occur in poor countries and is not concerned with how to monitor the handling of the aid, the favored governments administer these doubtful injections of funds and resources in the majority of cases inspired by purely political interests. And this is precisely the constant factor which the paths to development in our country have adopted.

    El Salvador just came out of a stage in which the collaboration of friendly countries would have presupposed a significant reduction in the levels of poverty, but recent data offers up an image of El Salvador as a country which has moved ahead with what is most essential for its survival. According to Citizen Control, for 1999, “20% [of the population] which is poorest hardly receives 5.7% of its income while 20% o the rich receive 48% and, although the government exerts itself to say the contrary, levels of education, health, housing, access to basic services of sanitation and equality of the sexes do not convince anyone of the good work ostensibly being done by the parties in government administration during the post-war period. Half a decade after the Copenhagen Summit meeting, the impact of the prosecution of the goals suggested have not been translated into structural changes which offer greater opportunities for the population: unemployment is at 7.45%, underemployment at 31.2% and informal employment has reached an alarming 51%, which leaves only a little more than 10% of the economically active population in a situation of stable employment.

    Certainly, as we analyze the context in which El Salvador has developed during the second half of the decade of the 1990’s, there is no great doubt about the negative influences which come from afar, and intervene in the generation, sharpening and continuance of many of these problems. But it is evident that the lack of capacity of government administrations headed by ARENA to guarantee, through their work, a minimum of stability faced with the hopes for national progress shared by all. Incapable as they have been in safeguarding even the interests of all sectors of big business which represent—note the fragile and decaying level of the agricultural sectors and the relegation of the industrial sector during the last decade—, the public functionaries placed on their thrones by ARENA have dedicated themselves to favoring their own closest colleagues to the detriment of broad national interests. This is the reality which has guided the governmental vision of development during the last decade. El Salvador, should it continue to be submerged as it is in that reality, will become a country which is a long way from freeing itself from the consequences of a scarce and localized degree of economic growth which unpredictable, not very advantageous and, therefore, not compatible with the commitment acquired at the 1995 summit meeting.

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