Proceso is published weekly in Spanish by the Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI) of the Central American University (UCA) of El Salvador. Portions are sent in English to the *reg.elsalvador* conference of PeaceNet in the USA and may be forwarded or copied to other networks and electronic mailing lists. Please make sure to mention Proceso when quoting from this publication.
     Subscriptions to Proceso in Spanish can be obtained by sending a check for US$50.00 (Americas) or $75.00 (Europe) made out to 'Universidad Centroamericana' and sent to the above address. Or read it partially on the UCA’s Web Page: http://www.uca.edu.sv
     For the ones who are interested in sending donations, these would be welcome at Proceso. Apdo. Postal (01) 575, San Salvador, El Salvador.

Proceso 929
November 29, 2000
ISNN 0259-9864

INDEX

Editorial The phenomenon of violence in El Salvador
Politics National policy: impression and reality
Economy On the road to “dolarization”
Society Considerations on the social impact of the kidnappings
 
 
 

EDITORIAL

    Since October of 1997 when the results of systematic research on violence in El Salvador were published at the UCA, other studies on the same question have been under way at the UCA as well as in other research centers and think-tanks in the country. At this point in time, there exists an accumulated body of information on the problem of violence which constitutes the obvious jumping off point towards the advance of a better understanding of the problem so as to design mechanisms leading to a solution.

    Below we will summarize what has been learned on the question of violence in El Salvador:

1. The violence that erupted during the decade of the 1990’s in El Salvador is social violence, or, violence which, on the one hand crosses the totality of the social fabric in all levels and sectors, and, on the other, affects the inhabitants of the country on a daily basis although in diverse manners. The most noteworthy expressions of this social violence are the violence manifested by the drivers of vehicles (public and private transportation), conflicts among youth gangs, common crime, kidnappings and rapes. But there are more hidden (or, relatively hidden) manifestations: violence in the families, in the schools and in the workplace, for example, that which occurs in the maquilas (runaway shops).

2. The levels of violence in El Salvador are such that they qualify the country as one of the most violent countries in Latin America, very close to the situation of Colombia. An approximation figure for the number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants reflects this, as does the recognition in government circles recently at least publicly. Private enterprise has also recognized this situation, at least up until a year and a half ago. Nevertheless, their realizations have been a little tardy, which has impeded the anticipated design of an integral strategy for citizen security.

3. The quality of life in El Salvador is being heavily suffocated by crime, violence and impunity. Up until now, no sign has appeared on the horizon which might indicate a change of course; rather, the contrary has been the case. As things go, the country is moving towards a major deterioration of its social fabric, from which it can emerge only by means of a drastic change in the manners and customs of those who, as they support institutions which are not entirely solid, have made force, arrogance and abuse a way of life.

4. The obtaining and carrying of firearms is one of the factors which has had the most incidence in the high number of homicides committed: for example, of the total number of homicides in the Greater Metropolitan Area of San Salvador (GMASS) for 1998, 60% were caused by firearms. That percentage has been growing since 1995 and there are no reasons to think that it will diminish in the future—unless an arms control strategy which could lead to the disarming of the society as a whole is put into practice.

5. Violence brings with it some significant economic costs which limit the possibilities for development in the country. On the one hand, there are the costs per family for security—guards, heavy doors, walls, alarms—; and, secondly, costs directly related to payments of ransom for kidnapped persons or medical recuperation of the victims of violence. A third set of costs is the state expenses for police, courts and health systems. In the measure that violence increases, these costs also increase, which means that, as the violence increases, these costs also increase and so the national economy is seriously affected. To present some idea of the situation we have only to note that in 1997 the personal costs resulting from bodily harm and wounds were a little more than U.S $ 27, 000.00. Meanwhile, for the same year, legal and institutional costs were somewhat more than U.S. $284,000.00.

6. Violence in El Salvador is multi-faceted, organized crime being one of the most worrisome and perhaps the most difficult to fight because of the political economic and police linkages which have developed, as well as because of its ramifications in Central America (networks of narcotics traffickers, car thieves, kidnappers). It can confidently be said that Central American “integration” exists through crime networks which have advanced more rapidly than the efforts of the governments in the region to establish firm bonds of economic, social and political cooperation.

7. The governmental response to the problem of violence has given precedence, up until recently, to the coercive dimension in attempts at resolution (i.e., a violent reaction to violence), forgetting the preventive and corrective dimensions. The reactive level, as the expression itself says, consists in the response given to a situation of violence which could be an individual impact or the impact of a group. The preventive level deals with the creation of conditions—social, economic, political, cultural—which favor a climate of respect and tolerance among the members of a society. The action of prevention favors the creation of recreational, cultural areas and areas for sports activities which not only serve as a channel for expressing group energies—above all for adolescents—, but so that people can learn to share dreams and projects. But not only this: it is also a question, at a second level, of creating social and economic orders with a minimum of equality and justice, given that one of the sources of violence in societies such as the Salvadoran society is the prevailing socio-economic inequality. And all of this, on a third point, ought to be sustained by a legal-institutional framework capable of responding to the complex challenges which the current state of citizen security pose.

8. Efforts by the central government to guarantee citizen security—seen as a problem for public security—have not been so successful as those who defended the merely reactive focus might have believed. Emphasis on this dimension to the detriment of the preventive dimension has suffered from serious deficiencies. Apart from this, the institutions charged with public security—the PNC, the Ministry of Public Security and the Judicial System—have not only been invaded by crime—the PNC being a case in point—but, moreover, have not been able to articulate their work, which causes incompetence and efforts at cover-ups.

9. In El Salvador, there persist cultural schemes which positively value behaviors characterized by the use of force, aggression and arrogance as ideal behavior styles. This is to say that there exists authoritarian cultural schema inherited from the past which favor abuse and violence of the weakest. And this modality can be generalized to cover the whole of society.

10. The problem of violence demands a commitment by civil society to eradicate it or lessen is prevalence, which presupposes a greater sense of initiative in action by local governments in the empowerment of citizen participation, considering the fact that the central government has not been capable of dealing with and confronting the problem in an integral way.

POLITICS

    We are living times of transition and things will be better tomorrow. This is the minimal conclusion to be reached if we take seriously the declarations of some of the state functionaries in relation to their plans for the solution to problems of public security, economic crisis and removal of corrupt and incompetent functionaries which plague the Attorney General’s Office and the Judicial Branch of Government.

    With the integration of the National Plan and the New Alliance—the supposed government program for President Francisco Flores—the imminent ratification of the Monetary Integration Law and the promise made by the Director of the National Civilian Police to eradicate in its entirety the big business in kidnappings by 2001, the Flores administration finally places itself on the road to development and the answer to the problems which are wracking the nation. The governmental publicity campaign makes one believe that these are the most tried and true, audacious and, in fact, only measures to set the country on the road to progress and put an end to the stagnation which corrodes the bases of the national economy.

    Along the same lines, the Attorney General, Belisario Artiga, after what he described as a conscientious evaluation of the functioning of the Public Ministry, announced a plan for cleaning up this very ministry, encouraging, by the bye, the need for beginning a process of cleaning up the judicial system, as corrupt as the institution which Artiga heads. The Attorney General, in agreement with the demands of the population, is aiming to restore the image of the institutions he leads, which is currently being questioned because of its multiple judicial failures. In this way, he reaps favors from influential sectors of the population for whom the courage and sincerity of this Attorney General is unprecedented in national life.

    Meanwhile, the Legislative Assembly, by means of a transitory decree, awarded full power to the Attorney General to begin the process of cleaning up. In this same sense, he began a media offensive, exuding optimism in order to present the impression that finally his institution will be able to respond to the necessities of the population for justice. Nevertheless, in the middle of this maelstrom, no one took the time to ask himself why it took Artiga a year to become aware of the serious corruption which is eating away at the Attorney General’s Office. Neither is it known why he has not been able to investigate and present clear proofs against the corrupt judicial functionaries which have been pointed out.

    What is happening, definitively speaking, is that state functionaries are more worried about their image as perceived by public opinion than in carrying out a serious and transparent process in order to pose serious problems in the national institutions. The public denunciations by ANEP are worth more than the real work of the institution. On the other hand, from the point in time in which he was named as Attorney General, a year ago, he has not gone beyond words of promise to clean up the institution and attack organized crime. The courage and sincerity with which he makes his declarations do not appear to be accompanied by concrete actions for complying with his promises.

    The President’s most recent offers to solve national problems may be placed in the same category. Over and above discussing the possible results which these announced decisions might yield, one should remember that President Flores has been announcing measures to set the national economy straight. Each new proposal has been followed by a publicity offensive aimed at public opinion announcing the expected short range effects on the national economy of the country. Finally, in the year and a half of his mandate, the national situation has been worsening, to which must be added a good dose of deception and pessimism on the part of the population.

    Pessimism and increasing discontent by the population is owing, in good measure, to the false expectations created by the press team at the presidential palace. The objective of these publicity announcements have been centered on an effort to make an impression on the population that the government team is sure and steady, seeks to conciliate and is highly qualified. But this impression runs contrary to the obvious reality of a depressed economy, incompetent functionaries and muddled politicians, which is more than evident to all. It is the case of a government that says it is fighting impunity and which, nevertheless, is willing to turn a deaf ear to the criminal cases involving heavy-weight personalities in the political and economic hierarchies.

    The same occurs on the question of the carefully honed image of a conciliatory president, which image, however, exists side by side with the existence of constant and unnecessary confrontations between the government and the opposition. The most recent measures announced by the Executive Office might serve to make this very clear and illustrative of the point under discussion. In the midst of negotiations and the supposed consensus-building by the political parties represented in the Legislative Assembly, comes the announcement by the president concerning the dolarization of the economy. This not only calls attention to the fact that he has not in the least consulted with the most areas of national life, but one also notices the defiant and intolerant attitude by the functionaries vis-a-vis those who question the supposed good effects of the measures announced.

    The government has given privileged place to the publicity for this process of insinuating itself more closely into the life of national sectors which are simultaneously pointing out the limits of the decisions he has taken. Appearance seems to be worth more than reality. A country cannot be governed by the manipulation of public opinion. For as costly and persuasive, as a publicity offensive can be, it must necessarily reconcile itself with the true reality of the population. For as much optimism which the functionaries wish to irradiate, if concrete actions and irreproachable willingness to seek the common good do not accompany such a campaign, publicity evolves into a fraud and commits fraud against the most patient of people.

    The population has expressed something of this kind in the polls to evaluate the first year of the administration of President Flores last June. The president has not succeeded in fulfilling the false expectations created, and the general feeling that the national problems are getting worse contrasted with the perception of the government itself. And so it has been proven that the optimism of the publicity campaigns is insufficient to resolve the problems which Salvadoran society is confronting. Definitively speaking, the president ought to initiate an honest effort to get at reality and protect itself against the magician-style modality, which has come to characterize the functionaries at the presidential palace.

    In this way it would be more honest to recognize the fact that dolarization is not, as it would wish us to think: that it is the panacea for national economic problems; that the reigning model of impunity is also owing to the use, in some cases, of political criteria incompatible with justice; that cleaning up corrupt and incompetent functionaries ought to be a constant and ongoing task for all national institutions; and that, finally, publicity images are at odds with the objective reality which the majority of Salvadorans have to live with.

ECONOMY

    After almost four years of debate, dolarization of the Salvadoran economy seems to be imposing its visions and strategies, as much from the government as from the business sector. At least, so it is reflected in the legislative bill for Monetary Integration presented by President Flores last November 22, which, in practice, means a conversion to dolarization owing to the fact that the use of the dollar in the financial system becomes obligatory.

    The real reasons for this measure are not clear, but what is clear is that the government declares that this measure will be adopted with the final objective of reducing interest rates at the commercial banks—or at least this much can be gleaned from President Flores’ speech. Paradoxically, this deed does not depend, fundamentally, upon fixing the exchange rate at 8.75 colones to a dollar; in fact, El Salvador has had this kind of fixed rate practically since 1992, with interests rates tending to be lower for this reason. And if this were not all, there is no reason for fixing the exchange rate because the risk of devaluation is minimal, thanks to the support and backup of all of those dollars coming in the form of family remittances, which permit the accumulation of net international reserves and maintain the exchange rate at a fixed point (or even lower).

    In this context, the “monetary integration” raises important questions not only about the reasons for implementing it, but also about the possible effects on the economy and society; even more, the major part of private enterprise has shown itself to be in accordance with the measure, with the exception of some press media and the guilds and associations related to the export and industrial sectors, which have indicated—from their peculiar sectorial point of view—that some are against the measure (especially as it is related to a supposed loss of competitivity in exports).

    In his speech of last November 22, President Flores established the fact that the reason for implementing a process of monetary integration lies in the fact that “we have not been able to harvest all of its fruits (that is, from the economic stabilization). The majority…pay high interest rates and we only have access to the money in the short run”. Nevertheless, he added, “there are many businesses which enjoy low interest rates…those which operate with foreign currency”.

    “In order to eliminate this injustice”, Flores sent to the Legislative Assembly, on November 22, the legislative bill for the Monetary Integration Law which pursues three objectives: to fix the rate of exchange at 8.75 colones to the dollar, make the dollar the legal tender of the country and allow for freedom for making contracts in Euros, Pounds Sterling and Yen and, most important of all, “establish the Dollar as the legal currency in the financial system”. It is this last disposition which has the most evident effects upon the financial-monetary system because it implies practically the dolarization of the economy.

    The foregoing turns out to be clearer if one reviews the content of Art.5 of the aforementioned legislative bill where it is established that: “the Colon currency bill and its fractionary coins emitted before the entering into effect of this law, will continue to be legal currency without restriction in a permanent way, but the institutions of the banking system will have to change them for Dollars if they are presented in any transaction. The Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador will provide Dollars to the banks of the system by means of the respective exchange”.

    It is in this context that the statements of the president of the Central Reserve Bank, Rafael Barraza’s statements are best understood when he declared that in order to satisfy the enormous demand for dollars the dollar reserves of the institution (2,000 million dollars total) will be used. This is to say that the BCR will be willing to get rid of the net international reserves of the country in order to encourage this process of disguised dolarization. Moreover, the most important thing is that the BCR will also resign itself to the possibility for developing its own monetary policy, which, although it might seem nefarious to some sectors, continues being the key to the economy.

    As a result of the change in the monetary policy, Barraza hopes, in addition to a large diminution of interest rates (from 17% to 11%), to achieve a substantial increase in the growth rate, which could reach 5.5% for the year 2001, and a reduction in inflation to the level of 2.5% for the same year.

    In examining these postures, it turns out to be clear that the government, in reality, is promising more than it can deliver with the dolarization of the economy and is adopting, therefore, demagogic postures. The reduction in the interest rates is not derived from the approval of the legislative bill in question, but rather from the managerial decisions of the bankers. It would seem, if we stop to take notice of the premises and suppositions offered up by President Flores, they would be in accordance with reducing interest rates (but one does not know to what point) in exchange for the dolarization of the economy and the elimination of the risk of devaluations.

    Unfortunately, the big economic problems, such as the growing deficits in the balance of payments and public finances and, above all, the stagnation of productive sectors are not going to be solved simply through dolarization. In the first place, owing to the fact that neither exports nor imports are going to react to the introduction of the dollar; in fact, they have always been paid in dollars and the rates of exchange are practically fixed. In second place, the fiscal deficit will continue to be the same, given that the government must always be in tight circumstances for the financing of budgets which are always greater than their income with the consequent indebtedness. Even the fiscal deficit could increase owing to the fact that the government will no longer issue currency and will, therefore, not receive a commission equivalent to close of 900 million colones annually (which is to say, close to 5% of the General Budget of the Nation for 2001 and 40% of the fiscal deficit for 1999). Finally, we ought to take into account that the productive sectors do not need dolarization to recover because they will continue confronting the same restrictions (low prices on agricultural products, low soil productivity, deficient application of science and technology, low level training for the workforce, etc.

    And if this were not enough, the Central Reserve Bank would lose the net international reserve which it has accumulated during all of these years thanks to the growing flux in family remittances. This implies that the capacity to cushion the shock of acute crises provoked as a result of the deterioration of the exchange rate terms would be lost. In other words, El Salvador would be more vulnerable to changes in international prices for exports and imports.

    Dolarization would be the result of the implementation of the legislative bill for the creation of the Law of Monetary Integration and this, in the current context does not constitute a realistic response to the big economic problems of the country. Not even the interest rates are directly affected, as they would wish one to believe. On the other hand, we would be locating ourselves in a more vulnerable posture because of the loss of the international reserves and the possible increase in the fiscal deficit. In this sense, a much more detailed analysis is imposed upon the legislative bill presented by the government, not only by the deputies of the Legislative Assembly, but also by the social actors which turn out to be affected by this measure.

    In fact, it is to be recommended that, if the only thing that is being pursued is to reduce interest rates, one could proceed to other kinds of legal reforms which give this power to the Central Reserve Bank, given that—contrary to what bureaucrats and businessmen might believe—the economic situation of the country does not require less state intervention but greater strength and firmness as much in the handling of the monetary-financial policies as with support for productive sectors.

SOCIETY

    Once again, national public opinion is worried and agitated about the menacing (omni)presence of the kidnapping industry. Although the attention of the media is concentrated, for now, on the most recent economic proposal of the government, some few days ago everything indicted that the country’s populace would return to the dynamics of the condemnations and public demonstrations which certain sectors are holding against kidnappers. First of all, thanks to the publicity given to some of the low-level arrests by the PNC which they tried to present as real and true accomplishments in the efforts to turn back the tide against those who practice this criminal activity. To this was added the singular case of the kidnapping of a member of the Zablah family in which a businessman of some repute involved with spectacles and shows appears to have been involved. Finally, with the generalized commotion provoked by the finding of the body of Mrs. Irma de Torres, who disappeared several months ago and for whom payment of a large ransom had been paid to gain her liberty—but all in vain.

    It would not be out of the question to hope that soon the news media could lend its weight to this game by means of which some groups in power aim to offer the country a very unrealistic vision of the implications of this criminal phenomenon in our society. It would seem that these groups—which are, in the last analysis, those who feel most threatened by this kind of crime—have made the topic of kidnappings one of their principal weapons in the debate referred to in the penal laws and the administration of legal punishment against those who commit crimes. One thing necessarily leads to another: if the indices of criminality increase to the extent that they are unstoppable, way the coercive response of the authorities must be moved up a notch as a result. At the basis of this conception is to be found the idea that those who kidnap do so for perverse motives in which the desire to get rich quick in an illicit way abounds. Finally, those who do not support the taking of the necessary measures in order to stop once and for all the uncontrolled march of the kidnapping industry are, simply, not sensitive to the suffering of the Salvadoran families who suffer from this terrible and fearful threat.

    Nevertheless, the social juncture today offers many other details concerning the phenomenon, which, strangely enough, is not part of the excessively exaggerated discourse which these sectors use. Nevertheless, today the dimensions of the problem become more and more worrisome, but we should not, for this reason, have recourse to simplistic interpretations which put the average kidnapper in the range of the antisocial, psychologically unstable and blindly ambitious as some of the powerful sectors of the country maintain. Unfortunately, there are no studies which throw sufficient light upon the social and psychological origins of this very complex criminal practice. But one can deduce that those who thought of this as a profitable “profession”, did so because they had the acquisitive capacity and organizational experience necessary to get a project of this kind going. And even knowing that this organizational experience implied the ability to escape and avoid authorities or, even more certainly, to take advantage of our weak systems of security institutions and public monitoring.

    In fact, some years ago certain factions of the guerrilla opted to use kidnapping as a method to obtain funds for their cause and to take vengeance against determinate political decisions which affected them directly or indirectly. But along with the activities of these factions, the well-elaborated work of the Death Squads made forced kidnapping the perfect weapon not only to obtain economic resources but also to eliminate those who were then seen as enemies of “democracy”. Today it is precisely that dimension of the practice of kidnapping which is least taken into account in the public demonstrations to reject this phenomenon which are carried out by sectors of the groups in power. This in spite of the fact that indications abound which suggest that kidnappings are used, at certain levels, as a way of collecting old debts which would be impossible to resolve with money. In these cases, those who have obtained a position within certain circles of power by not very honest means would be implicated. In this way, kidnapping would no longer attempt to deal with the enemies of democracy but with clear and plain enemies, for whom the legal mechanisms of well deserved punishment do not go far enough.

    But the kind of kidnapping which involves revenge and personal feuds as well as that kind which is most noticeable in which abundant economic and organizational resources are used is followed by a series of minor demonstrations which are, in the last analysis, those which can dangerously accentuate the dimensions of this criminal practice. For some years now a more common kind of kidnapping has come to the fore—that involving middle-class families, the resolution of which does not depend upon the payment of exorbitant amounts of money, but rather much smaller amounts of money. This kind of kidnapping places in evidence that in a country in which only with difficulty have those responsible for these acts been dealt with—as scandalous as they may be—it is sufficiently possible to have recourse to illicit methods in order to assure material gain which is not something to be taken lightly. Probably other motives are at play which give rise to the practice of this kind of kidnapping: the payment of debts impossible to pay or the mere desire for power to acquire more material goods. In any case, this kind of practice says much more about the situation which society confronts as a whole as it faces the kidnappings, something more than the empty discourse of the powerful classes of this country.

    At bottom what is worrisome about the practice of kidnappings in El Salvador is the capacity for symbolic reinforcement vis-a-vis certain determinate social practices. The kidnapper presents a very pessimistic reality in each and every one of the blows it deals to the security of the Salvadoran family: after all, it is relatively simple to obtain sufficient weapons and resources so as to dedicate oneself to extortion by means of threats and, definitively speaking, to a style of life which is produced and which is reproduced outside the law. In essence, this becomes a pattern of very generalized behavior in our country which grows up on the basis of illegality as an effective means to obtain specific objectives. In the case of those sectors which have privileged places within the power structures—state power or not—it is not at all out of line to begin to think that these illicit methods might also serve to legitimate the supremacy of determinate interests, perhaps excessively sectorial and, therefore, with little or no national calling.

    Confronting the necessary and almost obligatory punishment which support these sectors in each and every one of their public declarations, one must ask oneself frankly how much can be done concerning a problem which, in the last analysis, is an expression of other ills which strike the same structure of the persecution by criminal elements and the resolution of social conflicts. Logically speaking, what might be expected is a less vengeful posture, less thirsty for the institutionalization of punishments which make an example of the criminal—or perhaps terrorizing punishments—and much more open to the identification of the recent roots which nourish the kidnapping industry.

    Unfortunately, none of those who present themselves as defenders of citizen tranquility are accustomed to take up this necessity at the moment of condemning what for them is the most abominable criminal which inhabits Salvadoran society: the kidnapper. At bottom, it is this kind of attitude which nourish suspicions which surround this criminal phenomenon and which, occasionally, make even the most serious persons who denounce them as a judge and part of the problem which demands an urgent, integral and definitive solution.