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Proceso 931
December 13, 2000
ISSN 0259-9864

Important Notice

INDEX


Editorial The government deals with the security of its citizens
Politics The judicial branch of government questioned
Economy The government economic package
Society A budding voluntary retirement plan
 
 

EDITORIAL


THE GOVERNMENT DEALS WITH THE SECURITY OF ITS CITIZENS

    The end of the civil war in El Salvador in 1992 generated serious demonstrations of social violence, and what catches the eye most of all are the activities of organized crime such as kidnappings, narcotics trafficking and contraband activities involving vehicles as well as common crime, the activities of the ex – Civil Patrol Agents, gang warfare and fighting among student gangs. The social impact of these activities has been such that the ARENA administrations have had to deal with these problems from the early efforts of the Armando Calderón Sol administration to form the Public Security Council and continuing on through the Alliance for Security of Francisco Flores.

    The problem of public and community security, seen from the government point of view, is that it is something which is the province of the central government. In this context, the Executive branch of government, through the Public Security Ministry, has become the protagonist of the job of guaranteeing public security. Meanwhile, the National Civilian Police (PNC) has been prepared to fulfill its mission of dealing with the fight against crime, in which it has been supported by the judicial system which is charged with applying penal sanctions. The preventive dimension, as well as the correctional aspects of dealing with the situation have been placed on the back burner, as demonstrated in the precarious nature of the Salvadoran prison system. It is overly obvious to say that the governmental reaction to criminal activity has suffered from serious institutional limitations, the most severe among which has been

    The tendency of some of them to be infiltrated by dangerous and powerful criminal networks—specifically, the PNC. The problem of public security is obviously not exhausted by mentioning these institutional vacuums. There are at least two additional central foci which make this a more complex situation than first meets the eye: there is the psychosocial dimension—which is to say, the way citizens experience the problem of security subjectively--; and the specifically criminal dimension as well—that is to say, the dimension related to the effective activities of organized crime, common crime and private violence.

    Among criminal activities can be listed kidnappings, which exhibit the most public incidence during the outgoing year in such a way that it has become the center of attention in the media. Kidnapping, although it is certainly a serious and worrisome crime, is not the only one. Until now, no indications that there is any change of course have appeared on the horizon. In fact, the contrary has been the case. As things go, the country is on the road to a greater and greater deterioration of its social fabric, from which it can emerge only by means of drastic changes in the customs and practices of those who, with the aid of some few not particularly solid institutions, have made the use of force, arrogance and abuse a daily way of life. A change of this nature must be forcefully articulated and sustained by institutional change which must be controlled by the norms and values of democracy. The fact is that the problem of security of citizens and communities is inseparable from the problem of the construction of a democratic order, to which it must respond as much in its particular requirements as in its global nature.

    But what is to be understood by the term democracy? It is, basically, a political system based on the competition between parties, periodical elections, the separation of powers, ideological pluralism and the respect for the civil and political rights of its citizens. It is on the question of this last set of citizen rights that democracy must face the question of the security of the citizens of a political system: under the schema of democratic order, it is a question of guaranteeing that the goods and persons of members of the society are safeguarded against external threats such as natural disasters or the acts of their fellow men, but also that they themselves should be capable of actively participating in this defense.

    The security of citizens in a democracy is, then, security obtained at any price and not meted out exclusively from above—from the heights of state power, but something which (at least in theory) ought to involve all of the various sectors of society. Guaranteeing the security of citizens without the participation in society easily degenerates into authoritarian modes of guaranteeing security which end by undermining what they purport to defend. The doctrine of national security assumed by the military administrations of El Salvador beginning at the end of the decade of the 1960’s should be the touchstone against which these visions of security as the exclusive province of the state apparatus as its sole guarantor should be measured. The principal limitation of thee visions is that they issue in a centralized conception of security, or, a conception according to which it is the central government from which the guidelines must issue on the question of security for citizens and communities.

    Up until now, these “centralist” notions have predominated in the conception of security of citizens and communities. The weaknesses of the governmental agencies responsible for this question of security—either because they have been infiltrated by criminal elements or because they are technically and administratively deficient—have, in themselves, become an additional factor in this question of security. If things continue as they are, the country is headed towards a species of social wastebin. A substantive transformation in the conception of security as it applies to citizens and communities as administered by the government is, therefore, crucial at this point in time. Doubtless, the first step is the initiation of a process of deep reflection on the breaches and weaknesses of the prevailing concept of security. Without this preliminary reflection, old mindsets of an authoritarian nature will continue to obstruct the formulation of a schema of public security which measures up to the values and norms of democracy.

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POLITICS


THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT QUESTIONED

    One can easily agree upon the importance of an efficient and transparent judicial system for any society claiming to be democratic. To the extent that citizens perceive a situation in which the institutions belonging to a specific system function according to the criteria of impartiality and independence from group or sector interests, the functioning of society can be harmonious to a greater or lesser degree. Beginning from this premise, then, the basic role of the Judicial Branch of government as the guarantor of the life of the society, doubtless this branch of government requires social and political support as well as support for auxiliary institutions for it to function in an efficient manner.

    Given this state of affairs, there is no room for doubt that El Salvador is experiencing a difficult period in the functioning of the justice system and its auxiliary institutions as well as on the question of the social and political support requisite for its functioning in an efficient manner. This is the first time since the signing of the peace accords that the relationship between the institutions of the judicial branch of government have been so questioned and that there is such a strong sense of insecurity on the question of government corruption. At the same time it is generally accepted that the corruption which plagues the PNC, the Attorney General’s Office and the Judicial Branch of government should be dealt with in a radical way—that is, going to the root of the ills which make it dysfunctional.

    In the beginning, it was the PNC which undertook a process of internal cleansing of its ranks. In this, complaints by the citizenry together with media coverage which convinced the authorities of the need to take up police reform. In spite of the possibly and legitimate criticisms of how deeply and how seriously such reforms were being implemented, at least they made some contribution towards raising the hopes and spirits of the authorities as to possible results. And then it was the Attorney General’s Offices turn and the Attorney General had to recognize to the press that the institution was experiencing difficult moments in which, in addition to incompetence and the notorious lack of ability and preparation of the prosecuting attorneys, organized crime had, in good measure, gained a foothold. To the list of institutions being questioned was added the Judicial Branch of Government, denounced, as it was, by the Attorney General’s Office as harboring corrupt judges, some of whom even held false documents and titles accrediting them as judges. The public denunciation of corruption in the judicial system is something unexpected and cuts deeply into the social construct which must now examine the implications of a profound cleansing and review of its functioning.

    In the first place one should take note of the effect had resulting from the consternation caused by the dispute between the institutions charged with overseeing judicial and personal security for citizens and society in general. In this sense, the mutual accusations bandied about between the Attorney General’s Office, the Judicial Branch of Government and the PNC contribute not at all to social peace and security, and even less to the building of confidence in the authorities on the part of the citizenry. Moreover, the situation could not be more chaotic if one perceives that the accusations contribute not at all to the creation of harmonious relations, but are, instead, the result of conjectural necessities for winning over public opinion.

    On the other hand, the situation of the PNC and the Attorney General’s Office being, in and of itself, disquieting, it becomes particularly necessary to focus on the gravity of the lack of credibility in the judicial system. While recognizing the incidence of the peace accords in the institutional life of the country, one must emphasize that the reform of the judicial system is one of the topics, which has not received sufficient attention. And this is the case to the extent that one may be sure that, after the peace accords, the same system continued functioning—this same system which had been noted for its dependency, dysfunctional operation and generalized corruption. In spite of its efforts at modernization and the role of the National Council for the Judicature designed as a provision of the peace accords, it is clear that a far-reaching reform which would deal with the functioning and structures of judicial power and the mentality, often submitted to dark and obscure interests, of a good number of judges, which reform was not undertaken.

    To this must be added that attempts by the Legislative and Executive branch of government in which there was a lack of respect for the autonomy of the Judicial Branch of government set down in the Constitution of the Republic have not been lacking. So it is that in the simple case of the budget assigned to this branch of government—for which the constitution apportions 6% without any intervention at all by other branches of government, even including obvious incursions against the independent criteria to be exercised by judges on the bench, the pressures exerted are obvious. Moreover, facts illustrate that the Judicial Branch of government has not had the benefit of a leadership body, which has, during recent months, has been willing to engage in the struggle surrounding the question of its independence from the other branches of the state government. Given this, judicial system reform has not proceeded on a par with the structural transformations of national power which were set down as provisions of the peace accords. So it is that at the present time when the people have had need of solid decisions, hesitations and the so-called criteria of opportunity have far too often prevailed far too often.

    Along the same lines, one cannot but help take note of the silence of the Supreme Court on topics of great importance to society. A case in point is the spontaneous reform of legislation proposed by certain sectors influential in national life. In spite of the fact that one must recognize that constant change is not the best solution to problems of public security, the Judicial Branch of government has said not a word of orientation to the society on this question. It is in this way that silence and the obstruction of justice have conspired against its own credibility.

    Against this background, one should not only make an effort to get this institution up to date with the demands of society for the prompt and impartial meting out of justice under the law, but one must also work hard to distance the use of political criteria in the decisions of the judges and in this way struggle for its independence. And it is precisely on this point that there does not appear to be unanimity or much political willingness to achieve the most basic agreements. Hesitation on the part of those responsible for the Judicial Branch of Government and the way in which the necessary reform to the judicial system was posed ought to concern the citizenry. Moreover, there are no clear signals from the Supreme Court judges that they are interested in strengthening judicial independence. The lack of leadership on the part of the judges together with their silence in the face of serious situations now obtaining on the question of the administration of justice ought to alert the population.

    Another worrisome question upon which the judicial system ought to enlighten and orient the society is the current prevailing notion of the suspension of certain constitutional guarantees under discussion among the circles of power. Not only ought its legality to be discussed but also its convenience at moments in time in which the credibility of institutions is seriously questioned. There is no assurance that the suspension of constitutional guarantees might resolve serious problems affecting the security of the citizenry which are confronting the country. This situation is cause for particular concern in the context in which complaints against judges and police are coming thick and fast, and in which corrupt prosecuting attorneys sell out to the highest bidder, while the incompetence of state authorities to control criminal activity within and without their institutions is revealed to the public eye.

G


ECONOMY


THE GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC PACKAGE

    The intense debate surrounding the topic of dolarization has created the conditions such that other legislative bills dealing with economic measures have passed practically without being noticed in spite of the fact that these will also have an economic impact arising from the importance of their content. For example, laws having to do with the Highway and Road Fund and the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico (in which Guatemala and Honduras are also to be included) have been approved recently by the Legislative Assembly, and all the while a new Tax Code is under preparation together with a Law for Registering Importers, about which little or nothing is yet known.

    What is especially noteworthy about these measures is that they arise in the context of what the government political party has succeeded in cozying up to allies for help in pushing forward their legislative bills in the Legislative Assembly without many problems, a scenario which has already facilitated the recent approval of other measures and, it would seem, favors the massive “creation” of law of an economic nature.

    In this context it is easy to lose perspective on some of the implications of the measures in question: for example, the use of funds obtained from privatization processes for the maintenance of highways (when in theory) they ought to be used for social programs), reduced state participation on basic items such as highway and street infrastructure as well as for the opening up of the Salvadoran economy to other more developed—in fact, to economies exhibiting much greater relative development—i.e., the Mexican economy. It might be useful, then, to sketch out some of the principal characteristics of these economic initiatives proposed and approved by the Executive branch of government and the Legislative Assembly during the recent series of conjunctural events, but distinguishing between those related to public finances (especially the Traffic Fund) and others, such as the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico.

    FOVIAL, the legislative bill dealing with the Highway and Road Fund, aims to create a new consumer tax on gasoline in order to finance the repair and maintenance of highways and rural roads. The law proposes a 2 colon tax per gallon of gasoline beginning in 2002 which would be added to the cost of gasoline to consumers who already pay for the subsidy on diesel used by public transport businessmen, or 5.50 colones on special gasoline and 3.50 on regular gasoline. In other words, this would imply raising the tax on special gasoline from 25% to approximately 50% of its value. In the end, the legislative bill for the Highway and Road Fund was approved with modifications which eliminate the charge to the gasoline consumer projected for 2002 and assign only a fund of 250 million colones obtained from the sale of the former ANTEL company (National Administration for Telecommunications).

    There are some important aspects of the Highway and Road Fund which ought to be pointed out. These involve the implications for public finance and their impact on the availability of funds for social programs. The first effect of the creation of the said fund is the reduction of the tax on highway maintenance. In fact, the Ministry of Public Works would now receive the equivalent of 6% of the national budget. Nevertheless, this effect is not certainly assured in the medium range because, as mentioned above, the charge on gasoline consumption was not approved. This means that the Highway and Road Fund has only 250 million colones for the year 2001. A second effect of the approval of this bill is the reduction in available resources for social programs resulting from the financing of the first using funds from the privatization, which were originally destined to finance social spending. This implies a reduction in the attributions of the state, even at the cost of basic functions which everyone is aware that need to be dealt with seriously: education, health and infrastructure support for production.

    The question of the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico also has to do with the role of the state inasmuch as it would eliminate customs barriers along with non-customs barriers which serve to protect national businessmen. The Free Trade Agreement eliminates customs on close to 4,300 Salvadoran products, which would freely enter the Mexican market but would, at the same time, eliminate customs on 7,200 Mexican products, which will freely enter El Salvador. Although the Salvadoran government has insisted upon the convenience of ratifying the Free Trade Agreement, the benefits accruing from its entering into effect will not be as automatic as they would wish us to believe. That El Salvador might benefit or not will depend on the adoption of complementary policies on questions such as industrial reconversion, agricultural and livestock diversification, technical vocational training, the improvement of access to credit and, in general, of a favorable macroeconomic context for productive activities. This proposal is more worthy of justification if one considers that the Mexican economy is much more diversified and competitive than the Salvadoran economy.

    Currently, however, the government does not seem to be very convinced of the necessity for these complementary policies. In fact, the most important among the government’s development policies are the dolarization of the economy by means of monetary integration and the negotiation of free trade agreements, even though these measures are not entirely compatible with one another.

    It is also important to reflect upon the implications of the simultaneous adoption of dolarization and the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and the other countries of the Northern Triangle, i.e., Guatemala and Honduras. Assuming the full entering into effect of the Free Trade Agreement, a situation could arise that El Salvador would find itself at a relative disadvantage vis-a-vis its neighbors of the Northern Triangle because if they also decide to devalue their currency, their exports would cost less in dollars and become cheaper and more competitive than Salvadoran exports. Against this scenario, Guatemala and Honduras would reap the greater benefits from the Free Trade Agreement.

    In addition to the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico, must be mentioned the legislative bills presented in the Legislative Assembly designed to introduce new taxes and fight tax evasion as reflected in the case of the Highway and Road Fund, the Tax Code reforms and other legislative bills. This reflects, in part, the government’s interest in the problem of public finances—one of the principle structural obstacles to dolarization—but, at the same time, the government seems not to want to design or adopt measures linked more directly to economic and social development.

    Effectively speaking, measures such as dolarization and the Highway and Road Fund ought not to occupy so much space on the agendas of politicians and technocrats when the real urgency lies in emphasizing policies which would improve the competitive possibilities of our economy. To pretend that dolarization or the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico will overcome the obstacles for growth and development is an illusion because none of the measures directly attack the big problems of the country: low economic growth, jobs and the lack of equilibrium between internal and external fiscal matters). For this reason, the development of a plan which really responds to these problems continues to be a task which must be articulated, promulgated and implemented, thus providing greater coherence to the diverse measures of economic policy so that they will complement each other.

G


SOCIETY


A BUDDING VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT PLAN

    It seems as if the Francisco Flores administration has taken the task of “redefining” the country much to heart, although this does not necessarily imply an improvement in the situation of the Salvadoran populace. Some few days ago Flores’ economic team chalked up a rousing victory as it won the accelerated approval of the Monetary Integration Law, its own particular version of the delayed process of dolarization of the economy. Almost on a par with this amazing act, the Ministry of Public Works surprised more than three thousand rank and file employees when it successfully introduced a Legislative Assembly decree which would require them to hurry up their retirement or resign. Jose Angel Quirós, the head of the Public Works Ministry, justified his decision by arguing, as ARENA administrations of the last eleven years have been wont to do, that it is necessary to modernize the state, make its institutions more efficient and, in the case of the Public Works Ministry, optimize the income of funds which the implementation of FOVIAL appears to presuppose.

    The Minister of Education, Evelyn Jacir de Lovo, together with Quirós, saw in the call to voluntary retirement the possibility for renewing the teaching resources currently available. With this measure, an open road would be provided for 4,300 teachers who could take advantage of the still unstable pension plan and leave their jobs and allow the educational system to absorb the contingent of unemployed professors currently available. The other members of President Flores’ government team saw in their colleagues’ strategy a tempting way of cleaning out the chests which provide for their precarious functioning. In this way, little by little temptation gave way to actions and now the voluntary retirement decree must be applied to all levels of the state apparatus. But there are more arguments on the government list: a willingness to implement a measure of this kind could make public institutions work more closely with the supposed austerity plan which the president imposed upon them from during his first day in office.

    The haste with which these deeds are being done raises numerous questions especially about the public worker sector. In fact, El Salvador has already had to deal with the uncertainty provoked by a similar decree, applicable to all state ministries and to several autonomous institutions because, on the one hand, 15,000 public employees were fired in excessive haste and, in some cases, without observing the procedures required by law. On the other, because, at a time when the government was still dealing with several trade unions of public enterprises (which then ended up at the mercy of the best offer on the market), voluntary retirement was presented as a perfect legal arm for reducing the influence of their power in state functioning. And finally, because, with the passing of time, the measure contributed to enlarging the rank and file of state workers at the pleasure of public functionaries who were most faithful to the ARENA party and, consequently the benefits of the proposed reduction of the state was cut off at the root.

    For now, neither the dynamism of social groups—be they state or private enterprise—nor their capacity for public demonstrations constitute a principle concern for Flores and his cabinet. Given this, the use of the voluntary retirement strategy with clearly political ends can be laid to one side. For this reason, what ought to be performed is a critical analysis of the notion of modernization which the Flores administration is using—and which it is proposed to set in motion in case the new retirement legislation should go into effect. A foretaste of that notion was Flores’ willingness (mentioned above) which consists in freezing new hires and reducing public spending to a minimum. In this sense, the premise that possible voluntary retirement might enter into effect might be valid: the modernization of the state should have been a priority for the ARENA administrations for some time now. By the same token, someone had to take on the responsibility for reducing costs in the salary category, one of the heaviest in the functioning of the state apparatus.

    Both aspects are part of the cause and concrete manifestation of a very much criticized inefficiency of the state apparatus, a presumed opponent of all government initiative generated by right-wing thinking. And both are part of the discourse by means of which big business (recently systematized in ENADE 2000) will attack the lethargy of the government as it faces the urgent challenge of resolving it. But the solution to these and other problems is not exhausted by the implementation of measures which affect only the workers of public agencies. The state is and has been inefficient not only because of the number of intermediaries which it places to deal with the needs of any individual and the competent authority for responding to the said needs, but also because the systems of information administration which the state has are almost by nature obsolete and because the established procedures for the mobilization of the said information cause involved labyrinthine and unnecessarily exaggerated procedures and follow up for citizen needs and requests.

    It is so, moreover, because a clear definition does not exist between the differentiation of functions among public agencies. Above all because the definition of functions is carried out in accordance with the interests and nature of the institutions themselves (Environment, Treasury, the Public and Economic Ministries can verify the traffic in substances dangerous for human consumption, such as Methanol, for example) and not human needs (consumption of products of better quality which ought to be regulated by a public agency).

    Finally, the Salvadoran state is inefficient because no one establishes serious and systematic control over its actions, beginning, logically, with the way money is spent and misspent, given the economic resources on hand. Finally, none of the ARENA administrations—the presumed bulwarks of the modern national state—have succeeded in establishing an agency or mechanism of control which is sufficiently strong to demand that its employees and functionaries stop being inefficient or corrupt. This is to say not to sacrifice the public service for which they have been contracted for mere ambition and political favoritism. Flores and his team planned to implement actions to tighten up public spending even more, not to respond to the majority of these problems.

    Again, the intentions do not sustain the actions and their consequences. This, of course, under the assumption that the reduction and modernization of the state is the final aim and not the stability and improvement of working conditions for public employees. Beginning from this premise, it seems that the administration has decided to set the rules, paying no attention to the interests which are not part and parcel of the economic and political sectors it represents. Flores administration discourse has changed, in intention and appearance, to such a point that it was earlier committed to the “individual worker” and the much desired equilibration of opportunities. Today, allied with the new viewpoint which the wealthy class has inculcated into him from the moment he assumed responsibility for the leadership of the country. Before, adhering to what the New Alliance dictated to him; today, he is closer and closer to the proposals of the right wing impresario sector—fundamentally to the financial sector. As a result, it would not be entirely erroneous to imagine the definitive realization of the new alliance that Flores espoused so much during his campaign: that alliance which would make compatible once again—either by means of dolarization or forced exclusion of sectors—the interests of some few powerful people with the actions of those who set the country in march from the vantage point of the government administration.

G




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