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     Proceso is published weekly in Spanish by the Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI) of the Central American University (UCA) of El Salvador. Portions are sent in English to the *reg.elsalvador* conference of PeaceNet in the USA and may be forwarded or copied to other networks and electronic mailing lists. Please make sure to mention Proceso when quoting from this publication.
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Año 21
Número 935
January 17, 2001
ISSN 0259-9864
 
 

INDEX

Editorial  Tragedy in El Salvador
Politics  Politics in times of emergences
Economy  The social components of a "natural" disaster
Society  Disaster and opportunism
 

EDITORIAL

    On Saturday, January 13, a little before noon, El Salvador was wracked by a violent earthquake which caused immediate and serious loss of human life as well as tremendous material damage. Up until almost five days after the disaster no one had any idea of the number of dead or disappeared, given than many people were trapped under the walls, bricks and fallen buildings or had been cut into many pieces by the mechanical landmovers and tractors involved in the search, rescue and cleanup work.  The economic costs in terms of loss of family housing and goods, highway infrastructure, electrical and water pipe networks are still unknown —and these are only a few of the categories of losses directly resulting from the earthquake.

    To the costs of material losses must be added reconstruction costs which, examined from any angle, will be in the millions, given that there is no governmental plan for medium or long-range assistance to the families hit by the disaster, all of which will translate into a worsening of living conditions for the poorest sectors in the country.  It would be absolutely inhuman and irresponsible to leave these families, who have lost absolutely everything, the task of remaking their lives.  To think that it would be enough, or more than enough, to provide temporary shelter and food for those left homeless after the earthquake —after which time they would have to figure out by themselves what to do— would run counter to the untiring governmental messages of solidarity with the disaster victims.  The government has an obligation to those who have suffered such losses as a result of the earthquake which goes much beyond temporary help: the state must design a plan to aid those Salvadorans hardest hit by the earthquake —above all those who, because they are poor, will have greater difficulties in picking up the pieces to start their lives again, in addition to rebuilding their homes.

     Such a plan would have to include the whole country, in such a way that the needs of all of the municipalities, towns and outlying areas affected might be dealt with in order of the priorities established in accordance with the losses suffered, as well as the resources which their inhabitants have at their disposal.  The earthquake surely affected the entire country, but its impact was not the same throughout the whole of the national territory.

     Thousands of homes fell to the ground, burying everything inside of them, but, among those affected were the poorest of the people living in rural areas and they cannot even hope to request help from insurance companies and they obviously have no savings to rebuild their properties.  It would be unjust to allow the reconstruction aid simply to reproduce existing inequalities among the Salvadoran population.  In other words, it is only just that those who have less than everything in terms of economic resources and access to basic services, for example be those who receive priority attention from the authorities.  Perhaps in this way the slogan, which indicates that there is an overriding interest in the wellbeing “of the poorest of the poor”, will cease to be simply empty words.

     Leaving aside the problem of the economic impact of the disaster, we must turn seriously to the problem of the human costs.  Several hundreds of lives have been irreparably lost.  Whole families have disappeared; many more have been separated by death from the heads of household, sons, daughters, aunts, uncles and grandfathers.  The number of wounded continue to increase unceasingly and in varying degrees of seriousness from contusions to amputations.  Illnesses provoked by unsanitary conditions and unclean foods begin to appear in the areas hardest hit by the earthquake.  Fear and collective tension, although most serious in places where the tragedy has been greater, affect practically all inhabitants of the country.  The gravity of all of this is difficult to measure and it is difficult, as well, to measure the consequences of it all on the issue of the emotional recuperation of the Salvadoran people.  And what is worse, no one is prepared to confront a psycho/social challenge of this nature and magnitude, just as no one was prepared to deal with the victims of floods, hurricanes and fires.

     The January 13 earthquake brought to light once again one of the serious weaknesses of the administrative, political, economic and social model prevailing in the country: the absence, in this model, of any plan to prevent disaster on a national level and, specifically, a plan for the most vulnerable sectors of the population.  As a result of this, there is no preparation to deal with emergencies such as the January earthquake nor to minimize its potential effects on the population.  There are tremors in El Salvador on a regular basis and this, obviously, cannot be controlled by anyone in the world.  But the construction of homes in specific areas with specific materials and with a specific structure is administered by human beings.  At this point there is an accumulation of technical and scientific knowledge about the topographical and geologic structure of the country which must become the obligatory reference point for establishing where, how and with what houses, highways, airports, racetracks and stadiums should be built.

     In the specific case of the landslide which buried several hundred families in the La Colina district of Santa Tecla, the question to be asked is not what caused the earthquake but whether the landslide which fell upon the families in that zone could have been prevented.  The answer is yes, it could have been prevented by not building the houses there.  So now the question is, why were houses built in that zone.  Aren’t there studies and recommendations, which would prevent such construction?  Who, because of a lack of knowledge of these studies or ignoring them decided to construct there?  Who supported them?  These and other questions arise from a more fundamental question: Who are those responsible not for the earthquake or landslides, but for the loss of human life which could have been minimized if those who built the homes or supported their belong build on the hillsides of the Cordillera del Balsamo had respected the security norms dictated by the geologic and topographic studies currently available?
 

     The vulnerability to earthquakes in El Salvador has become evident as a result of the January 13 earthquake, which shook the whole country.  Images of buried homes, cadavers of victims all reflect the state of calamity.  Once again the topic of insecurity —this time as a result of natural forces— become part of national reality.

     It is still too early to establish definitive figures as to the loss of human life and the economic impact of the earthquake.  The scale of the destruction of infrastructures, disappeared persons and homes buried or fallen across the length and breadth of the country present an idea of the magnitude of the catastrophe.  At this moment, grief for the loss of loved ones and tension as a result of each of the tremors which continue to wrack the country weigh upon the population.  The urgent need for help to the many homeless who need a roof to protect them is a central priority.

     As for the calls for help from the earthquake victims, the international community has responded quickly to alleviate the national distress and pain.  The many rescue brigades and foreign doctors who have come to the country in response allow for the measurement of the level of sensitivity and international solidarity with our country.  Worldwide solidarity with the victims helps to mitigate the needs of a society, which is still trying to deal with the calamity caused by the last hurricane, which struck the Central American region.

     As happened on October 10, 1999 in response to the destruction caused by the tropical storm Mitch, the country is once again in a state of public calamity because of the serious damage caused by the earthquake.  Given this, there is no lack for the fatalistic declarations of government sectors attributing the serious damage to the unpredictability of natural disasters.  Everything is being done to minimize the fact that the social vulnerability and lack of adequate administration of natural resources have contributed to making the situation worse.

     As long as an evaluation of public policies on the prevention of natural disasters is still pending, along with a reflection on the existence, of lack thereof of, of national policies to alleviate the effects of such phenomena, there is a prevailing climate at the local level with regard to the topic of the seriousness with which this emergencies is being confronted.  The National Emergency Committee (COEN), the permanent state entity charged with dealing with the crisis, exhibits a slow and disquieting lack of coordination on this issue.  Almost a week after the natural disaster took place, dozens of communities continue to receive governmental aid.  The principal body in charge of planning the handling of the crisis continues to lack clarity as to the magnitude of the disaster.

     COEN’s lack of ability becomes more evident when it appears to get involved in a struggle with the municipal bodies also called in to intervene in the crisis.  The resistance to the incorporation of the municipalities is a strange phenomenon in the work to deal with the homeless.  The centralization and unnecessary bureaucratization of the service to the victims makes the task to the rescue workers more difficult and uselessly prolongs the suffering of thousands of families.  And once again the shadows of political criteria in the assignment of aid and assistance appear —as it after Hurricane Mitch.

     In the political arena, government actions do not depart in any significant way from the centralism and unilateral activity of the COEN.  The make-up of the national solidarity commission named by President Flores to handle the foreign aid coming into the country does not leave any doubt that the opinion of the President Flores with regard to presidential opinion that political affinities with his party are the only criterion for participating in the said commission.  Otherwise, it would be impossible to understand how a National Solidarity Commission could be made up only of prominent members of ANEP known for their sympathy and servility with the government.  Could it be that only right-wing businessmen understand the language of solidarity?  Moreover, in monopolizing the structures dealing with aid to the homeless, still unclarified accusations of misuse and re-routing of funds towards electoral campaigns by the government party are not being taken seriously.

     On the other hand, reticence by ARENA legislators to assign resources to the municipalities which would permit them to deal with the needs of their populations is part of the same logic:  it is a question of centralizing actions in the leadership circles of the government party.  Definitively speaking, the topic of the national emergencies is being used as political propaganda to win terrain lost among the populace.  And definitively speaking, as well, in spite of the speeches on solidarity with the homeless, the government administration’s priority does not appear to be an effective response to the needs of the victims.

     It is for this reason that, in spite of the suffering of the people, the Legislative Assembly seems to be paralyzed by the sterile discussions and mutual accusations among right and left wing deputies.  Instead of joining forces to deal with the terror of the victims, it appears that both parties give more importance to political leading role. Electoral ambitions do not seem to include the emergency; on the contrary, they feed the despair of the victims.

    Meanwhile, there is no clarity about the breadth of the national emergency plan.  If, at the moment, what is most important is to aid the victims, the seriousness of the situation makes one think of the need for an integral plan for national reconstruction.  There is a need to think not only of highways destroyed, but also to design a plan to recuperate housing which was destroyed along with fields under cultivation, etc. Given the already precarious economic situation of the country, there should be more opportune reactions.

     On this topic what is necessary is not only a new design for economic policy but also for a change in concepts of national policy. In this set of circumstances what is particularly necessary is consensus building among government and opposition sectors.  The designing of a national strategy for dealing with the crisis requires collaboration and understanding from both sides.  If the contrary prevails.  If the contrary winds prevail, there will continue to be time lost in propaganda and baseless discussions.

     On the other hand, a discussion of the topic of the environmental vulnerability of the country cannot be postponed any longer.  More death and destruction from natural causes ought to require the design of mechanisms for construction and national education on these topics.  The excuses that natural phenomena cannot be foreseen are insufficient for preventing  this topic from being taken up.  Preparations must be undertaken so as to prevent possible catastrophes in the future.

     Another point that should be cause for concern is that, as a prelude to taking up these topics dealing with national survival, political leaders show no sign of being up to dealing with the circumstances.  Denunciations arising from the populace as to the crude and bald politicization of this topic should contribute towards correcting these errors. For the moment, solidarity from all national sectors with the victims should be increased.

    The January 13 earthquake was undoubtedly one of the strongest of this century, not only because of the explosive energy released and its effects upon human beings (7.6 degrees on the Richter scale and VIII or IX on the Mercalli scale), but also because it is the earthquake which struck the greatest area of national territory of all time.  The damage is registered from the far western zone (Ahuachapan) to the eastern sector (La Union).

     But one thing is a phenomenon in itself (in this case, the earthquake) and another thing altogether is the disaster, that is to say, the impact of the earthquake on groups of human beings.  The earthquake in and of itself is not a disaster, as some public functionaries seem to believe and wish to make us to believe; it only becomes a disaster when it affects groups of people who cannot resist or recuperate from its effects.  It is for this reason that an earthquake in a deserted area is not a disaster, but an earthquake in El Salvador (or in any Latin American country) rapidly becomes a disaster.

    It must be said that the immense damage and harm suffered by the Salvadoran population is not a “natural” disaster because it is not a result of the accumulation of distinct vulnerability factors (physical, economic, environmental and social) more than a mere phenomenon or natural threat as is the case with earthquakes.

     The physical vulnerability factors have accumulated practically since the conquest and colonization when the principal areas inhabited by human beings grew up in areas of highly active seismic activity, the first, with the founding of San Salvador in 1526 in a seismic zone and then with the foundation of other important cities along the central volcanic fault, as, for example, Ahuachapan, Atiquizaya, Juayua, San Vicente, Berlin, Jucuapa, Chinameca and Santiago de Maria.  Greater vulnerability is generated, as well, with the use of construction materials such as adobe and bahareque, which, although during its early years, is relatively resistant, its consistency is lost afterwards and becomes a material highly sensitive to earthquakes.  In fact, the greatest portion of the housing collapsed throughout the country was made of bahareque, which had aged at this point in time and had also
been previously affected by recurrent local seismic activity, as is the case in Ahuachapan, San Vicente, Berlin, Santiago de Maria, Jucuapa and other towns in Usulutan.

     Economic vulnerability refers as much to the scarcity of income for satisfying fundamental needs and for recuperating from a disaster, as well as the use of income in activities which generate risks as, for example, the orientation of credit from the financial system towards construction project do not count on an adequate study in terms of environmental impact and prevention of risks and disasters.  Remember that, during a good part of the decade of the 1990’s, credit has been oriented strongly towards urban activities such as construction, and this has modified the kind of use of the highly fragile environmental and high risk zones.  Consider,; for example, the urbanization of the foothills of the San Salvador volcano area where, in additional to the threat of volcanic action, streams and rivers issue into the city of San Salvador, or even the housing construction of areas with a propensity for landslides such as the Cordillera del Balsamo, the Cerro de San Jacinto and many other topographical accident zones.

     Environmental vulnerability, on the other hand, is related to ways in which natural resources are used in an unsustainable way which provokes a lack of regulation of vital ecological processes such as, for example, the propensity of hydrographic formations in order to prevent floods and droughts or, in some cases, the stability of the soil in mountainous or volcanic zones.  These vulnerability factors explain why phenomena such as floods, droughts, landslides and mudslides may be, in reality, provoked by human activity which causes erosion, deforestation, construction of infrastructure and the extraction of rock material.

     The final group of factors are the most numerous, given that they are related to social vulnerability and, therefore, related to organizational aspects which are educational, political, institutional and cultural and ideological.  In the end, these factors must be observed with vision, perception and organizational forms which take place  between the state and civil society, which do not favor prevention and mitigation of disasters and which, moreover, undermine the effectiveness of the actions for attention before they unfold.  For example, if we accept that the premise that disasters are “natural” we are practically accepting, beforehand, that it is not possible to prevent them or mitigate them and that, therefore, the only reasonable actions ought to be oriented towards preparation for the attention to the emergency, attention to the emergency itself and, with luck, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

     From this ideological vulnerability (naturalist visions of the causes of disasters) come many attitudes and political alignments, which do not make prevention and mitigation viable.  This becomes clear if we consider that many activities that cause physical and environmental vulnerability are seen as external activities or even different from protection against disasters when, in reality, they are intimately related.
 

     Regulations governing the location of human settlements (territorial ordering), the characteristics of the buildings and the kind of use made of the natural resources are indissolubly linked to protection against disasters, but surprisingly institutions related to this, such as the Ministry of Environment, the Planning Office of the Municipality of San Salvador)are not integrated into the inter-institutional structure defined by the Civil Defense Law of 1976.  On the other hand, institutions making up civil defense do so with the vision of dealing with the emergency and not from a broader perspective having to do with the prevention and mitigation of disasters.

     The Public Works Ministry participates in the removal of debris and the rehabilitation of roads and highways without playing a more decisive role in monitoring the application of the Construction Code (with all of its defects) or even in the verification of the satiates of structures and the application of recommended measures.  In fact, structures seriously damaged by the 1986 earthquake continue to be used and they continue to suffer new damage.

    The Health Ministry participates very actively in the tasks of aiding the wounded and monitoring health conditions, but many of the public hospitals present structural weaknesses because they are old buildings constructed without any attention to the criteria of resistance to earthquakes.  This makes emergency attention very difficult.

     The Ministry of Education is linked, by means of its responsibility for providing educational centers to the aid being given to the homeless and the evaluation of damage to the infrastructure, but does not incorporate into its education programs topics such as the threat of earthquakes and floods or the different vulnerability factors which could cause disasters in El Salvador.  As a result, strategies for reducing the impact and frequency of disasters are not transmitted either.

     Finally, in summary, the principal challenges foreseen in the process of reconstruction have to do with the adoption of criteria for prevention of risks and disasters in the plans, programs and development projects which are linked to the construction of an inter-institutional structure of protection against disasters which take up the challenge of confronting the reduction of vulnerability in all of its diverse expressions.

     All of El Salvador suffers the consequences of the lack of forethought and prevention.  Each one of the disasters suffered by Salvadorans as a result f the January 13 earthquake is a reminder of this fact: the bodies of the victims which are slowly being identified and those which may never be found by their family members, the millions of colones destroyed in public, private and family infrastructure, the dramatic evidence of poor planning in urban growth and a total absence of even minimal planning in rural development.

     We are and have been, always a country threatened from all sides and no one other than our government leaders should take up that reality from the moment in which the administration of the lives and living conditions of the whole nation is delegated to them.  Certainly there is not a single country in the world which has the capacity for predicting and resolving, on an immediate basis, all of the problems which an earthquake or hurricane leaves in its wake.  But this does not make nations less responsible, even as vulnerable as they are, for preparing plans for minimal responses and reduction in damage caused by such phenomena.

    It is precisely the response which, up until now state institutions at a national level have given (including state ministries and autonomous entities) to the devastation caused by the earthquake, which has not been effective.  They have not even begun to sketch out the framework which might guide urgent reconstruction, or at least that which national resources and the “people” themselves (the little crutch used by those who aim to discharge their responsibility onto the rest) might make possible.  In this way, at moments in which public calamity overtakes the country —in the form of 681 dead, some 2,600 wounded, the almost 46,000 evacuees and the 20,000 homes destroyed as a result of the January earthquake— the re-establishment of minimal guarantees for the stable survival of the population ought to become everyone’s responsibility.  This ought to be the basic and unavoidable principle of the whole contingency plan for responding to the magnitude of disasters to which a country like El Salvador is invariably exposed.

    The government’s organizational response does not respond to this principle even in the most minimal way, but, has rather, bordered on bureaucracy: the declaration of a state of emergency and public calamity was the most logical step to follow, as well as the calls for international cooperation and for the collaboration of the citizenry in a position to help.  In this, the president and his ministers used up the first 24 hours of the crisis.  Then, the setting up of the National Emergency Committee (COEN) —as if the sovereign omnipresence of the disaster and its quick reparation— on the grounds of the International Fairgrounds, has done nothing more than violate one of the most important schema to follow during periods of crisis: centers for the diversification, reception and transmission of information centers.  In the long run, none of these measures imply the setting up of rational and transparent administration of the resources which are set in play by the delicate task of responding to the exigencies of the emergency.

     And if this were not enough, in order to increase the discontent with the governmental response even more Flores himself committed an enormous error when he visited, much before any rescue commission could, the La Colinas suburb, where close to thee hundred homes were buried by a landslide from the Cordillera del Balsamo.  It was precisely in this context in which the government decided to set up the so-called National Solidarity Commission (CONASOL), to whose leadership  the businessman Roberto Murray Meza was called.  In some way, this commission aimed to rescue the fallen image which the government had created during only the first two days; and in this he was charged with documenting in a detailed manner the aid which was  coming in from friendly countries as well as coordinating the efforts of private enterprise in the most urgent tasks of rebuilding damaged infrastructure.  A curious fact is that practically all of the members of the commission enjoy a comfortable position within the highly questioned leadership body of the government party, the COENA (National Executive Council of the ARENA Party).

     And so it goes.  Once again Flores has had to turn to his political godfathers so that they could show him how to do his work well without stepping outside the guidelines of the party to which he belongs.  Once again the young president demonstrated that his principal enemies are his own ideological roots which will not permit him to act as a good government leader.  First of all, because they have not permitted him to assimilate the need for concerted effort in order to draw up that integral plan  to respond to the disaster situations such as the country is currently facing.

     The hurried support which the formation of CONASOL gave him represents an abuse of his faculties as the executor of national policies.  Above all, because, before running for help to a small group of business impresarios —visibly committed to the cause of the political sector in particular— , Flores had to erase, in practice, the shadow of inefficiency and contamination which still weighs upon the way in which the government administration handles foreign aid.  Moreover, because a coordinating and audit body for this flow of aid does not require the attention, which the government has, aimed to give it.

     In some ways, the idea that the setting up of CONASOL is viable: it presupposes that the government recognize that it does not have qualified human resources to administer a crisis situation.  >From this perspective, then, along with the civil control of foreign aid, a coordination mechanism should be designed for other areas which, in disaster situations, sooner or later represents concerns impossible to ignore.  So it is that if he really wanted to take maximum advantage of a commission of this kind, why did he not delegate the design of a proposal for the prevention of the outbreak of epidemics or training in high-risk areas in order to respond to future calamities, for example?  It could be that there is more than one state ministry, which ought, at some moment in time, to stop and think about these possible problems.  The problem is that, for now, this urgent requirement of being able to count on the support of all sectors for preventing and responding to disasters, has not been complied with, as was mentioned above.

     Definitively speaking, all seems to indicate that the measures taken by the president and his advisors respond more to a tendency towards political opportunism —probably inspired by the high public profile which important political opposition figures have won— than to an organized and conscious response to the crisis which the whole country is suffering.  And this opportunism leaves no doubt that the shipwrecked boat of Salvadoran politics and politicians there is room for only a few.

     The absolute absence of contingency plans, therefore, as well as the absence of willingness to share the credit for the reconstruction —if there is any to be claimed— has made our country backtrack into the same situation as when less than a third of its national territory suffered the damage caused by “Mitch”.  This time, as is evident, Salvadorans live, from beginning to end, in a disaster zone.  And if the dimensions of this tragedy surpass in some measure those which it has experienced during earlier periods, with how much more reason should the country be more alert to the fact that the responses of the principal social actors —those from whom an immediate response should be expected— must be all the more adequate.

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