Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI)
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     Proceso is published weekly in Spanish by the Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI) of the Central American University (UCA) of El Salvador. Portions are sent in English to the *reg.elsalvador* conference of PeaceNet in the USA and may be forwarded or copied to other networks and electronic mailing lists. Please make sure to mention Proceso when quoting from this publication.
     Subscriptions to Proceso in Spanish can be obtained by sending a check for US$50.00 (Americas) or $75.00 (Europe) made out to 'Universidad Centroamericana' and sent to the above address. Or read it partially on the UCA’s Web Page: http://www.uca.edu.sv
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Proceso 939
February 14, 2001
ISSN 0259-9864
 
 

INDEX

Editorial:  Legislation and criminality
Politics:  State of law or state under siege?
Economy:  Disasters and the challenge of local development
Society:  Disaster situation and education
 
 

EDITORIAL

     The organized crime has held the government under a serious threat. The government has practically declared itself incompetent for defeating the crime net operating in El Salvador, with extended ‘tentacles’ in some other countries of the region.  Kidnapping is the crime causing more problems for the authorities. Despite the frequent news about the capture of alleged kidnappers, the victims’ number keeps going up. The most important businessmen associations have been putting pressure on the state to adopt stronger actions against the criminals, who have been hitting influential groups and their families.

     Not only from the businessmen lines but also from the governmental ones has some criticism been proclaimed. There is a belief that the deficiencies of the struggle against the crime have their origin in the current legal framework, excessively protective of the defendants’ rights. With this diagnosis, it is impelling a radical revision of both the Penal and Penal Procedural Codes, which might establish a legal framework that facilitates the authorities’ labor, instead of making it harder. From the afore-mentioned standpoint, there has been a strong debate on the modification of the penal and procedural laws. In this battle, the executive branch and the businessmen associations have joined their efforts. Such efforts have been successful, since the Congress has approved important legal reforms and some other amendments are being analyzed. If we are to credit the need of these reforms, we could say that the struggle against the crime will go on, since the main problem has been overcome.

    Nevertheless, the situation is not as simple as the supporters of the penal and procedural legal reforms pretend them to be. If this were true, if the failure of the struggle against the delinquency were the result of the weakness of the law, it would be reasonable for us to put a lot of effort in the enforcing of stronger laws as a solution for the problem. The issue here is that nobody can assure us that the failure of the policies against the crime is exclusively caused by the fragility of the law. If this is true, hardening the legal procedures and norms may not become the solution we are requiring. Obviously, some people prefer to see the problem in a different way following either ignorance or individual interests, being both mistaken answers for the problem.

    In El Salvador, the failure of the policy against the crime goes far beyond the law’s weaknesses. Thus, the problems will not disappear just because such weaknesses disappear as well. A main source of failure is, undoubtedly, the corruption that permeates the institutions responsible for the crime fight. Neither the courts nor the police are free from the problems of bribery, blackmail and ‘influence trafficking’. As for the police, the situation is much more serious, since criminal groups (connected to a widespread net of drug dealers, kidnappers and car robbers) have permeated it. The cure against corruption should have more institutional, cultural and economic ingredients, than legal ones. It is not surprising to observe corrupted habits given that public officers control the institutions with arbitrariness; a tradition of power abuse and despotism prevail; and privileges are dishonestly concentrated on a few hands. Thus, bad conditions in most of the police stations, low salaries and institutional abuse are not proper policies to encourage honest habits among the officers.

    Another aspect that contributed to the failure of the fight against the organized crime is the complicity between powerful delinquents and important political and economic groups of the elite. The specific links between businessmen and politicians, and the organized crime are difficult to prove. It is also difficult to demonstrate who are those businessmen and politicians. Even without that evidence, it is reasonable to suspect that some groups of politicians and businessmen with high rank are backing criminal actions. If this suspicion becomes a fact, it could explain why the authorities are always failing to arrest and identify the main leaders of the organized crime. Wherever the mafia has extended its domain among the political and economic elites, the policies against crime have been unsuccessful. El Salvador is not the exemption to the rule: if powerful groups protect some gangsters, it is going to be difficult to eradicate their activities and penalize them.

     The last source of failure that the fight against crime had is the incompetence of the authorities. This lack of skill is neither deliberate nor motivated by specific interests or pressures; it has its origins in ignorance and lack of technical preparation. Everyday, policemen, public prosecutors and judges leave traces of their ineffectiveness in the concepts and procedures they use. Judges and public prosecutors fail to interpret and apply the law. Policemen, on the other hand, fail to deal with criminal activities.

    As has been seen, the failure of the authorities is not merely legal. Those who are arguing in favor of hardening the law as a solution should know that there are situations that the law, by itself, cannot create nor eradicate. After the independence from Spain, constitutions were seen as the creators of new social order in Latin America. There was a belief that after adopting a republican constitution, the political democracy would appear. Military leadership and political bossism put an end to those dreams. Despite these facts, the idea of a constitution remained for a long time; its supporters kept thinking that the law would create better conditions. Those who believe that crime in El Salvador is a problem only requiring for legal solutions are following the delusions of the past.

     The state of law, in a humorous definition, is considered as the place where the law rules. Such state is neither arbitrary nor occasional nor discriminatory. It is supposed to include all the individuals and groups within a nation, under a legislation embracing all the stages of the society in a harmonious way. According to this idea, there is no place for improvisation within a state of law. There is no place for the imposition of laws that answer to the needs and demands of particular interests, either. What is particularly important is the active participation of varied social groups in the discussion about those laws.

     On the other hand, a state under siege is propitious for the adoption of “special procedures” that the authorities (including the military) consider urgent to cope with extraordinary situations. In these cases, the ordinary legislation is considered to be insufficient. However, within those conditions, violations to human rights occur frequently because of the authorities’ excessive fanaticism. In addition, such violations are sometimes employed as a mechanism to deal with both real and supposed criminals. Either way, the state under siege leads to a negation of the elemental rights of the ‘insurgents’. Meanwhile, matters related to the presumption of innocence (established by law to any defendant) and the universal guaranties of the defendants’ rights are often considered secondary under the so-called “special laws”. El Salvador knows a lot about the latter situation. Its recent history was a witness to the most horrible aberrations applied by the local authorities.

    The new proposed reforms to both the Penal and Procedural Penal Codes (some of them already approved and the rest are still awaiting) make us promote a debate on the nature of the state that we want to build. It is commonplace to think of the reforms, enacted on January 8, as the result of a strong pressure exerted by influent economic groups on the state. The National Association of Private Enterprises (ANEP, in Spanish) has made the most insistent defense of the reforms. In a press conference on February 6, president Francisco Flores announced his support to the businessmen’s request for a number of legal reforms, which were studied immediately by the Congress.

    As some groups from the opposition say, the uncontrollable growth of crimes such as kidnappings reveals the failure of the governmental policies on public security. However, we judge convenient to analyze what kind of answers are being given, as well as what role the different groups of the society are playing to solve the crime problem.

    The executive branch and some private groups proposed the legal reforms under the premise that what was making the crime grow was the unsuitability of the laws to the concrete reality of the country. Accordingly, a systematic reform of the laws has been started to give the authorities more room for its coercive action. The reforms here referred to include telephone surveillance, increments of the sentences’ periods, and extensions of the periods within which the authorities can consider that a crime has been done under flagrant conditions. In addition, they compel the judges to authorize the inspection of any residence under suspicion within no more than two hours. However, it would not be surprising that, as Proceso states in the editorial of this edition, the organized crime had deep ramifications permeating the local institutions. The fight against the crime wave, therefore, must include a profound, responsible and serious purification of the state apparatus. If our presumptions are true, they would prove how limited the enacted legal reforms are. Under these conditions, it would be important to pose the question why there has not been a public discussion about the need for a national policy on public security.

    In this vein, we feel compelled to make two remarks. First of all, it is amazing how much pressure some private groups are able to put on the political elite. Declaring themselves the standard-bearers of the kidnapping fight, the ANEP forced the government to join their efforts. We are not criticizing such initiatives, but the enormous influence exerted by the business elite on the government. Recently, the ANEP dared to accuse the Congress of being responsible for the death of many people, given that the reforms of the Penal and the Procedural Penal Codes were enacted with too much delay.

    This leads us to our second remark: the ANEP seems to associate delinquency with kidnapping exclusively, as if the latter was the only problem our country had to face in terms of public security. Such opinion, in addition to being narrow, reveals a lack of solidarity for the society as a whole. There is no doubt that businessmen are more at risk of kidnapping than the rest of Salvadorans. Nevertheless, the fight against crime should not be reduced to a crusade against kidnapping. On the other hand, this particular way of dealing with the crime phenomenon is stopping us from finding a solution. Additionally, it prevents some civilian groups from participating in a serious study of the proposed measures and the legal reforms.

    It also called our attention the fact that, even when the enactment of the legal reforms was imminent, important groups of the population were not asked to participate in the debate. As was expected, there was a small group of protagonists during the discussion of the legislation change. As a result, there was no contribution from the rest of the population and their opinions were set aside, even though the problem affects all the country. Once again, this way of doing things does not favor the participation of everybody in such an important issue. It neglects the varied faces of the civilian insecurity and privileges the demands of certain groups over the needs of the whole society.

    In this context, it is difficult to foresee satisfactory outcomes for the eradication of the public insecurity. With the type of answers the government is giving, El Salvador is being lead to a patronizing and violent state. Those attitudes create the conditions for the state to treat the supposed criminals with cruelty. They are also the excuses that the government uses to elude its responsibility for the human rights’ protection. In addition, the society is exposed to possible abuses by corrupted public authorities. Protected by laws under the shadow of a doubt, public officers then will keep untouched and have the power to put any person with the appearance of a delinquent in jail.
 

     After almost a month and a half  the monetary integration (or dollarization) took effect, very little can be said of its positive consequences, since the interest rates charged to the loans (or active rates) have not experimented significant movements. Instead, negative effects are already appearing. Almost immediately, the banks reduced the savers´ interest rates, which were already low. It is very probable that the rates of active interest diminish in the next months, but that does not mean that we can trust in the future of our economy.

     The earthquake of January 13 caught everybody´s attention and made us set  the dollarization issue aside and, generally the deficiencies of the neoliberal economic model of the last three governments. These issues are  secondary, compared to the needs generated by the disaster; as well as to the effects of a second earthquake of less magnitude which has increased the harms and the needs (preliminary information detailed  273 deaths; 1,700 wounded and 2,220 houses destroyed in the central area of the country). However, even if the attention is not focused on the economic issue, the truth is that disasters are placed in a certain economic and social scenery that contributes to generate them. The slow growth of the economy, the lack of macroeconomic balance, and the existence of almost three million of Salvadorans living in poverty and vulnerability, are current issues related to the protection against disasters as well as to the national development.

     A new development plan is necessary to face the challenges originated from the new disaster. Those challenges are not new: the permanent presence of a high rate of population who lives in poverty and in vulnerability. Vulnerability includes poverty, but it is not reduced to it. The Mitch storm and the January 13 earthquake show that they can also affect non-poor sectors, such as the great farmers and the urban middle class employees.

     A fundamental problem is how to capitalize the recent tragedies, in order to put the economy and the Salvadoran society in the road to a sustainable development, which obviously goes through a reduction of poverty and vulnerability. The integration of poor communities to the formal economy is a basic condition for the reduction of poverty, as far as it allows to elevate the income and  improve the living conditions of the majority.

     The government is preparing its project of reconstruction, which will be presented in the next meetings with people willing to help financially. President Francisco Flores has announced that the program does not need to reach an agreement among  the political sectors because, according to him, "the only agreement that the plan (of national reconstruction) needs is the voice of the victims". If this is so, the reconstruction plan will have to be really comprehensive to become a sustainable development plan. Based on the post earthquake efforts, this project has to attack one of the main vulnerability´s causes: economic and social marginality. This means that the post-earthquake economic policies of development must realize that it is not convenient to follow the traditional steps of reconstruction, because they do not have multiplying effects on the communities. A specially important aspect is  how the housing reconstruction program will be implemented.

     Housing reconstruction with industrial material, such as cement, concrete, steel and metal, will provide the industrial business with more dynamism. It is not necessary to argue that much to know that the benefits and the workers´ profits generated in those companies will not end up in the pockets of the victims left by the disasters.

     On the other hand, research on the results of reconstruction show that these do not always fulfill the expectations of the beneficiaries. There are generalized complains about the housing projects done with urban construction techniques that are automatically applied, just like that, to the rural areas affected by the disaster. This has been specially true after the Mitch storm, and in different communities favored with a reconstruction process. In general, the residents point out the inadequacy of the houses because of its spaces and  materials which keep them in overheated conditions.

     A cultural aspect of great importance is how the post-disaster development efforts redefine the relation between the vulnerable population, the government and the group of sponsors. Most of the times, humanitarian aid programs reinforce the feeling of impotency among the victims, leaving them with the sensation that they cannot be active agents during the post-disaster process. The construction of houses has become a typical case: houses are built from the point of view of the sponsor, even if it does not satisfy the expectations of the people in need, related to its location, extension and characteristics. This situation can generate a "victim's  syndrome" and paralyze the community´s organization and the process of local action,  necessary to reach development.

     From the economic perspective, another problem is related to the urban housing solutions. The cost is too high to think of it as a benefit for a significant proportion of the victims (more than one million of them). There are budget limits that oblige to distribute the resources efficiently. But that will not necessarily be the result of the free game of the market forces.

     It is undeniable that after the emergency, housing reconstruction is the main element to be considered in the aid programs. However, this must go beyond the disaster effects, in order to attend the causes. Most of the collapsed houses were built with  adobe or bahareque, which do not incorporate seismic resistance techniques. They are built as a housing alternative, adjusted to the economic possibilities of peasant families.

     One of the causes of vulnerability is the low family income (or an inadequate use of it). but the traditional reconstruction programs do not take care this problem, being the main objective the housing solution. Throughout the way the construction materials´ production are more dynamic and its importation activities are favored. Consequentially the  beneficiaries are not the final destination of  the cooperation programs.

     This situation creates the need to redesign the aid programs as a way that to improve the housing conditions, and to integrate those  vulnerable families into the plan. The creation of housing construction micro-enterprises, using reinforced adobe (or any other kind of appropriate construction technology), is an example of how aid programs can turn into development programs. The challenge is to create plans, programs and projects of post-earthquake development, which can mitigate not only the effects of the constant disasters but also its causes.

     The educational field was hit with a low blow by the January 13 earthquake. Once again, children and teenagers were affected by the government´s negligence, despite the fact that  since a long time the schools were asking out loud for  better structures. This analysis will focus on the educational issue and its place within the disaster situation that El Salvador lives. How are the authorities of the Education Ministry (MINED, in Spanish) facing the emergency? Has the teachers´ union presented any alternatives to help their pupils? There is no doubt that rushed decisions never work out and that most of them are inadequate. In this context a reflection is made on the consequences that parents and their children will have to face. They are threatened to lose a school year.

The school year gets started

     "There are many parents that do not want their children to be exposed to dangerous conditions. It also happens that, even if we do not want to, there is no space available to establish the school". That is what the Ministry of Education, Evelyn Jacir de Lovo, said about the impact of the disaster on the educational field, when she referred to the physical structures as well as to the covering.

     Over 1,700 schools were damaged by the January 13 earthquake. About 400 were either destroyed or severely damaged, and 1,300 were slightly damaged. The earthquake has left a total of  200,000 children without a safe place to study. Despite the emergency state of some schools, education authorities gave their approval for the school year to start. They were not even sure if all the schools structures had been evaluated. It had also been decided to make classes last one more month (until November), when the first step should have been to repair the schools, so that they could offer basic security measures to the students. In addition there are families who have not found a place to live. In that situation, a high percentage of children and teenagers have not been able to enroll in the schools.

It came from somewhere else

     Last February 2, Jacir de Lovo gave to the School Board of the Jose Mejia School  the Educational Quality Bond, which is worth 86 million of colones, and is to be used to repair minor damages. According to the information provided by the MINED, "since June  1999 until February 2001,  there have been distributed 236,305, 298 colones as Quality Bonds, Mitch Storm, Maintenance or rehabilitation of school buildings, Youth Trust,  Educative Quality Bonds for an Accelerated Education, Workshop Bonds for Special Education Schools, Pro Cra Bonds and the  Repair of School Furniture Bonds". That leaves clear that the 86 millions of colones came from somewhere else. The Minister of Education stated that the quality bonds were destined to provide the school with educational materials, and that now, after the January 13 earthquake, the money was going to be used to repair the damage. It can be asked here who are the real beneficiaries of these bonds? Are they going to be enough for all the schools in the country? Notice that the rural zone schools were the most affected, and many of them will have to be rebuilt.

     In the meantime, the teachers are the ones who have to start running the motor  to make the educational field step up. However, some of them do not support  the MINED´s decision to make classes last until November, or to work on Saturdays. On February 7, the newspaper Diario El Mundo published the following news: "Unusual, teachers refuse to work on Saturdays", "We (the teachers) are not responsible that the Ministry of Education has not resolved immediately the lack of schools (that were damaged during the earthquake)". This is the image presented by the educational system, which is not positive for their interests. Obviously, if the teachers have received their salaries on time, even when they are not working regularly, they have the obligation to adjust their working hours. This would help thousands of children and teenagers grow academically. On the other hand, if the MINED authorities have not paid the salaries in the established period, it is not fair that they demand the teachers work over time.

Final considerations

     The truth is that, in the disaster context, those who have suffered the most are the students. Many of them have not been enrolled in schools and are at risk of losing a year of education. Parents do not want to risk the lives of their children sending them to school. This is logical, since the damages to the buildings are enough reason to fear the worst.

     This call is for the authorities of the Ministry of Education, so that, in the first place, they do not take advantage of the teachers who are willing to work in simultaneous shifts. We cannot set aside the fact that they also have families to take care of. Many of them have also suffered the loss of either relatives or belongings. It is important to be open enough to create participation spaces to evaluate their schools after each year. This could be one way to avoid the same problems: the improvisation when the consequences are helpless.

     It is also necessary to invite the teachers´ organizations to show good will and flexibility to the calls of the Ministry of Education, in order to respond to the educational needs of the country in these moments of crisis. Even though there is not a final balance of the information, it is clear that the new earthquake of  February 13 has caused more damage in the educational field, widening even more its problems. This sets unspoken challenges to the teachers, to education authorities and to parents. Gathering efforts, good will and flexibility will allow us to face the educative challenges of the moment.

Please, send us your comments and suggestions

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Tel: +503-210-6600 ext. 407, Fax: +503-210-6655

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