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Proceso 946
April 4, 2001
ISSN 0259-9864
Editorial: The temptation
of power
Politics: A necessary
stop
Economy: Remittances,
loans and donations
THE TEMPTATION OF POWER
The FMLN has been strongly tempted with the share of power that it could acquire if it decides to be part of the Legislative Assembly's directive board —including its presidency, even if it is for only a year. The right wing blocked the FMLN's chances to assume the presidency of the aforementioned Organ of State, when the latter were definitively eligible for such position, according to the current regulations. ARENA stated that it had obtained more votes, although less deputies. This political party modified the legislature's internal regulations at the last minute, to rotate the presidency among the parties, which had a higher amount of votes.
Those who presently are in favor of reverting such irregularity, assert that their presence in the directive board will prevent the right wing from directing the Legislative Assembly in an arbitrary and secret way, the FMLN's positive influence in the development of the legislative duties, the obligation of being part of the legislature as an institution, the respect to the popular will expressed in the votes, etc. The central thesis of these and other similar assertions is that, from a position of power, the FMLN will influence the legislative affairs in a way that the country will obtain certain benefits, from which this party is presently deprived of. It is a thesis of power from a higher level in order to make transformations. Those who have such opinion think that social changes come from the heights of power, and not from the popular majority's strength.
These ideas do not resist the least analysis. The presence of the FMLN in the Legislative Assembly's directive board will make no difference, because it is a minority compared to the right wing's block (controlled by ARENA) and it has not been wise enough to gain a space in the informative media, from which it could show its opposition stance, and because, unfortunately, it does not seem to be at the height of the country's challenges. In order to prove this, it is enough to observe the little influence that the FMLN has on the legislation and on other important legislative decisions, even though it has the highest number of deputies. The right wing not only prevents it from any action that ARENA might dislike, but also —through a bond between the party and the telecommunication enterprises— prevents it from expressing its points of view to the public opinion. ARENA, as well as its government, has the power of censorship in the Salvadoran communication enterprises. On the other hand, if the problems are participation and representation, the FMLN is already part of one of the most important State organs, which is not understood as an accomplishment in the life of the popular majority. As far as the respect for the majority's will is concerned, expressed in their vote, it is unquestionable that the internal regulations must have been observed without any modification.
Actually, what some FMLN's members do not tolerate —those whom the government and the media call "renovators"— is being out of the heights of power, and they justify this attraction by saying how much they can do if only they were at the top. The media at the service of ARENA constantly reinforces these assertions. Those media do not only constantly flatter ARENA, but also take advantage of the ideological differences and of those political flaws of the party. In addition, this situation is useful to hide the personal ambitions and the economic advantages inherent in the Legislative Assembly's directive board. Therefore, to assume its presidency and to be a part of its directive board is to be an accomplice of the corruption and the incapacity of the right wing, responsible for its administration up until now. In the present circumstances, it is already too much of a discredit to be a deputy, as it is even more to be a part of the legislature's board.
This temptation is not new for the FMLN. Ever since the beginning of its integration to the country's institutional life, has always been tempted with power and money. Quite a few of its members still think that State power is necessary to promote changes. With this excuse, some of those who were formerly part of the radical guerrilla have found the way to penetrate into the ARENA governments. They were convinced that remaining on the FMLN's side meant to be on the loser's side. They chose to be on the power side, from which they would be accomplishing their ideals, "revolutionary" in another time. It might seem that there is no other way to fight for social changes. However, the power that public duties can bring is an empty sort of power. Those who occupy this high positions are not the ones who actually make the important decisions, but the national and transnational capital. Those who have climbed into such positions do so because they have previously adjusted to that capital's demands. They have accepted to represent and serve their interests. One can only arrive and remain in such positions when one is willing to serve that capital unconditionally. But that is what the right wing is for, accomplishing its duty very well. Therefore, it is not necessary that a political party that intends to seek social change -saying that its main interest is the people- is also willing to serve that kind of power as long as it gets the party to the top.
The FMLN should not feel tempted with the power of public duties. Instead, it should fight restlessly to seek the power that is given by the popular majority, in order to represent their interests. Its major affliction should not be whether it is accepted or not in the economically powerful circles, but whether it is acceptable or not for the people, because it defends their interests, fights for their aspirations and generates hope in social change. Their decisions and their attitude should obey the popular majority's expectations, not the aspirations of the business elite. Such elite will do anything they can so that the FMLN does not arrive to power, since they do not trust it. Momentarily, they have found an acceptable mechanism in the electoral democracy, in which a businessman is elected to represent that sector.
The FMLN has not yet been able to become a true opposition, because it does not represent the Salvadoran people, but the reduced sector those votes for them and their candidates, by tradition or party obedience. Until now, the electoral possibilities of the FMLN have relied more on the decrease of the preference for ARENA, than on the growth of its own chances. The problem of the FMLN is to think that in order to be in power its party has to be recognized by the established order. Following such goal, it moves away from the people and gets near the capital's power. For that matter, it is not necessary another political party, ARENA is more than enough. The FMLN will not find the power that it needs in the heights of the State, but on the pathway of the popular majority.
A NECESSARY STOP
The expression "a stop on the way" is usually used in a context of human dissatisfaction, when an internal reflection is necessary to ask yourself for the roads you have walked on. Human beings experiment the need to stop when they have the sensation that something is not right in their journey and, therefore, they have to correct their pace. To make a stop on the way is to look back into the past, from the uncomfortable present, in order to prepare a better future. Such feelings can be experimented in both individual and collective ways. It is a peculiar feature that differences man from animal, who walks blind and with no direction. Judgments of the past are made from a particular perspective, from which human beings criticize and evaluate their own performance. In other words, there is not an impartial nor neutral self questioning, without claims to identify the guilty ones and to establish responsibilities, both individual and collective.
Salvadoran society has recently gone through this experience, when the main characters of the civil war decided to abandon the weapons to work out their way into a dialogue. The negotiations for the Peace Agreements were a stop on a way of self-destruction. Both sides had to recognize their responsibility for the crisis and mend their mistakes with the creation of a proper environment for social harmony. Despite of all this, after only nine years away of having changed our route, there is the need to make a new stop on the way, in order to redefine a political, social and economic direction after the January and February earthquakes.
The different social actors seem to be conscious of such need. President Francisco Flores, during the "A roof for a brother" project presentation, emphasized the state of misery and abandonment that most of the population lives on. With such project it is intended to erase the image of the marginal "houses" that speak out loud about the extreme poverty. In the same line of work, there is the elaboration of diverse diagnosis, made by both the civil society's organized groups and the political opposition.
In the political environment, the evidence is the same, There is a sort of generalized agreement about the boundaries of the political system —State institutions, political parties and the politicians in general— to answer the demands of society. There is also certain unanimity among the different sectors about how dangerous can be that “disconnection” between the social demands and the State answers.
Despite these evident coincidences in the claim of the national problems, the different sectors have not reached an agreement to propose solutions to the problems. The constant negotiations have not permeated the conscience of politicians. What is the reason for such disorder?
In the first place, despite contrary statements, the main characters —both the economic and political sector— do not seem to have understood the poverty and homelessness' magnitude, situations in which most of the population lives. In that sense, it is hard to speak about a true stop on the way. That who is not willing to accept individual and collective responsibilities —regarding the configuration of an excluding social and economic system— obstructs the attempts to resolve such complex problem. That is the reason that quarrels among the government and the opposition persist: the former stimulating charity, and the latter pressuring to design a formula that attacks the foundations of the social exclusion.
The same things happen when we comment on the political system's crisis. The mutual disqualification is nothing but a lack of understanding about the problem's real dimensions. If it was not so, the politicians would show certain disposition to remake the political game rules, in a way that these rules respond to the most urgent social aspirations.
In the end, there is a lack of compromise with the change offered. It could not be in any other way. What happens is that in the back of all that potential incoherence there is a lack of will to examine the horizon from were we judge the present problems. If somebody thinks that politics is a channel to defend individual or group problems, there are no foundations for a basic understanding. If things keep going like this, there will always be an abyss between the left and the right wing.
The same thing happens with social solidarity. When solidarity is understood as a true social responsibility, its meaning is widely different from "charity". One thing is to be charitable in order to help our "brothers in need", and a different thing is the ricer’s responsibility for a society to which they owe their richness and economic well being. As long as this subject is avoided, the society will hardly accomplish a compromise to resolve the poverty issue.
A good judgement to value the effort will be the disposition to submit to critics any presupposition. If these remain untouched, it will be evident that there is still a long way to go. Apparently, "good intentions" —excuses to avoid crisis and personal problems— end up delaying the moment to face the problems.
The proposed solutions should not only intend to attack problems, but also to be submitted to social critic, in order to measure its capacity to achieve its goals. There is enough evidence to think that not all sectors are going to accept a critical review of their national reality perspective. They would not accept a disqualification, either, because of the poor answers that they offer for social problems.
The same kind of observation can be made about some of the proposals to face the current political crisis. These could be questioned not only for its shortsighted vision of national reality, but for its weak assumptions. This is the case of certain proposition that seems to seek a solution for the politicians´ legitimacy crisis through the privatization of politics. According to this view, an appropriate answer to the national political crisis is to start practicing constitutional and electoral reforms that could open the door to independent candidates. Given the failure of political parties, that would be —for some people— the best way to bring closer politics to the people. However, it would be naive to believe that the independent candidate, with its good disposition, would be able to overcome the economic and political selfish interests in which the political parties' elite is trapped.
It is enough to analize the temptations and interest conflicts of any political position to understand that the solutions to those problems do not depend on the type of candidacy, but on the effective institutional and legal control that can be exerted on public officers.
ECONOMYREMITTANCES, LOANS AND DONATIONS
Throughout the nineties, it became evident that the national economy depends, fundamentally, on external factors, such as the family remittances, donations, and loans. With the signing of the Peace Agreements in 1992 —and the programs and projects included in those Agreements— a first economic "boom" was experimented, impelled by these external factors. All of those external factors, along with the credit expansion for the consumption and third activities, explains the high growing rates obtained from 1992 to 1995 (between 6% and 7%).
It can be said that there was a period of a relative economic ease that was not capitalized to build the foundations of a growing and sustainable economy, based on internal factors. Apparently, in the near future, this dependency will be reinforced by the imminent increase of the capital and external transference flow, started in the 2001 post-disaster period.
After the January and February disasters, the government is getting ready to receive $700 million, from different bilateral and multilateral organizations. In addition, $300 million were offered in donations. The new loans will add up to the external debt, which by the end of 2000 was close to $2,794 million (an amount equivalent to a 125% of the 2001 nation's general budget). For the amortization of this debt, almost 12% of the 2001 nation's general budget will be used.
At the moment, the activity of family remittances does not seem to show signs of reduction in its growing rates. For the year 2000, the amount of family remittances would have reached $1,750 million ($1,373 million had been obtained in 1999). With the new disasters, the tendency of the first months of 2001 announces, once again, a probable increase of the family remittances for this year.
Without a doubt, this is a very favorable context to keep the macro-economic stability. But it is also a dangerous one because it can delay the efforts to raise the production and exportation growing rates, and the correction of the profound unbalance of the commercial scale. In fact, during the nineties, the nourished external monetary flow has allowed the government a wide range of economic maneuvers, which have made possible to delay the adoption of drastic measures, such as devaluation. Some positive effects of the external monetary flow have been, among others, a neutralization of the commercial scale deficit, stabilization of the type of change, inflation control, and increase of the added demand of goods.
It is worthwhile to remember what has been the role of the external monetary flow related to the country's economic situation support, during the nineties. For that reason, this article briefly examines the recent behavior of the family remittances, donations and external debt.
Between 1992 and 2000, the remittances increased from $858.3 to $1,750.7 million, which means an increase close to 104% in that period. Between 1999 and 2000 the remittances alone increased from $1,373 to $1,750 million, up until now one of the highest increases recorded. After the 2001 disasters, it would be expected a new peak in the amount of remittances, proportional to the one reached in 2000.
On the other hand, official transfers or donations have experimented a different behavior, since they have diminished along the last decade. In 1993, official transfers reached $220.3 million. For 1999, this amount had fallen to $27.8 million. This situation would be altered during the years that followed, since $300 million in donations were expected. Even though this amount does not come close to that of the remittances, it would add up to the latter in order to counteract the commercial balance deficit.
Transfers alone (which include remittances and donations), reached over $1,800 million in the year 2000, while the account of goods and services had a deficit close to $1,600 million. This means that the transfers (and specially the family remittances) are decisive to cover the downfall of the goods and services account.
The funds received as loans add up to the transfers. These funds will substantially increase in the years to come. By the end of 2000, it was estimated that the external public debt ascended to $2,794 million, equivalent to 21.1% of the Domestic Gross Income (PIB, in Spanish). This amount is not among the ranges that could be considered alarming, but the situation could change when the $700 million obtained after the disasters and the other $300 are added. If both amounts were added by the end of the year 2002, El Salvador would have a public debt of approximately $3,800 million, which would be equivalent to 27% of the Domestic Gross Income for that year (considering annual growing rates of 3%). Even with the substantial increase, this amount would not be enough to consider the country in a high debt situation, but it would serve to focus our attention towards the need that the government generates higher own resources to counteract the increase of the external debt.
In the remittances, donations, loans, external debt increase context, there is no room for bragging. Even if low inflation rates were obtained, the economy was dollarized and the external sector deficit problems were surpassed, it cannot be denied that we still require decisive measures. On one hand, the creation of internal poles of economic growth, generation of exports, and balance of the external sector deficit. On the other hand, the generation of local governmental funds that can reduce both the external debt and the fiscal deficit.
Without a doubt, the transfers —specially family remittances— create an adequate context to take advantage of the relative stability conditions that will allow us to make a reorientation of the economic growth, give privilege to those sectors which generate a high added value and a substantial exports increase. This requires that the government abandon its traditional stance as a mere administrator of the remittances, in order to assume the role of a development planner. The external debt issue is related to public finances in a double sense: it increases when public finances have a deficit and, at the same time, puts pressures on the deficit to increase. The growing external debt leads us to consider the need to correct the fiscal deficit, and to identify and establish new sources of fiscal income that would finance the urgent investment projects that the country needs.