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     Proceso is published weekly in Spanish by the Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI) of the Central American University (UCA) of El Salvador. Portions are sent in English to the *reg.elsalvador* conference of PeaceNet in the USA and may be forwarded or copied to other networks and electronic mailing lists. Please make sure to mention Proceso when quoting from this publication.
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INDEX

Editorial:  The challenges of the new Procurator
Politics:  Mario Acosta: In his way to the COENA
Economy:  The dry season impact
 
 
 
 
 

EDITORIAL

    After endless "negotiations", the congress members finally came to a decision about the person who will occupy the important position of Procurator for the Defense of Human Rights. It seems odd, but it is not surprising who the new public official is; her candidacy was firmly profiled during the last weeks, therefore, her designation in this charge was highly predictable. What is interesting is the amount of time that the congress members took to decide the name of the person who would fill in the vacant that was left over a year ago, by the sadly famous Eduardo Peñate Polanco.

    Even more than this, it is inexplicable that once Beatrice de Carrillo —when she was recently elected as the Procurator— was profiled as a strong aspirant for the charge, the deputies would take so long to make a decision that, after all, they would adopt in the end anyway. Why did not they decide for once and for all to name Carrillo for the charge instead of ending with the patience of the Salvadorans, and undermining even more the weak legitimacy of the institutions? Why delay a decision that sooner or later would be taken?

    There can be three possible answers to those questions: the first one is that there were principle reasons that prevented the deputies from agreeing. The second one is that for the deputies —mostly the ones from ARENA— it did not matter much to elect or not a human rights procurator. And the last reason was that, in order too make a decision, the deputies had to make a series of adjustments that would turn into specific benefits for them and their political parties.

    The first answer -which is one that would give a sign of seriousness to the legislative work- does not seem to have a place in reality. You cannot see what are the principles that might have prevented the parties with more members in the legislative field —ARENA, FMLN and PCN— from making a decision about who would occupy the position of Procurator of Human Rights. If it was a matter of principles, it is not clear why the ARENA deputies suddenly changed their minds about the suitability of Beatrice Carrillo and decided -after constantly blocking her designation- to support her election.

    The second answer is more realistic. There are enough factors to assume that, after the unnecessary long time that was given to this subject, it was all the same to the deputies whether the Procurator of Human Rights was elected or not. The ARENA congressmen cannot hide this fact. Not just because of their authoritarian alliance —which makes them fear about any sort of control over the State power—, but also because of their inclination to see in the Human Rights Procurators’ Office a favorable instrument for the left-wing interests, specially the FMLN's.

    However, not only ARENA has neglected the election of the new procurator. The FMLN did not help much to make the institution come out of the abnormal situation that it was into ever since the departure of Peñate Polanco. The ARENA rhythm was followed. For different reasons, everyone got involved into a situation in which the least important issue was the designation of a procurator who, without being the ideal official, would start working for the procurator’s office institutional recovery.

    The former ideas lead to a third answer: the obstacles to elect the Human Rights Procurator were the negotiations and the deals between the deputies (and the parties they belong to). No principles or compromises with the country's democratization; just personal and party adjustments of the lowest kind. As long as the arguments —about how much was to be gained or risked— lasted, that was the amount of time that we had to wait for the name of the new procurator to appear. They took about a year and a half to decide, and they could have taken either a week or even two years. It all depended —in this one, as well as in other cases— on the discretion of the congress members, who are never questioned for their incapacity and irresponsibility.

    However it might be, the Human Rights Procurators Office is no longer "brainless", to use an expression employed by the Salvadoran reporters. Despite this fact, the damages suffered by the institution are such, that the new procurator has an urgent duty to perform. Mostly, there is the challenge to reconstruct the organizational relations, and the commitment spirit that must prevail in an instance responsible for promoting the respect of the Salvadorans human rights.

    The institution has to fight to recover the space that it lost during the dark period that began with Peñate Polanco. This requires to gain the respect of the politicians, high rank officials, businessmen, and the civil society. While that does not happen, the institution will be condemned to a total irrelevance. The last challenge is to clearly define the profile that the human rights defense will have in the present moment, in a way that politicking does not pervert such a transcendental work for the country’s democratization.

    As it seems, the situation is not going to be easy for the new Procurator. If she wants to firmly comply with the authority that has been conferred to her, she will have to have an immense courage, an enormous doses of audacity, creativity, and imagination. Hopefully she’ll know how to surround herself of capable collaborators, compromised with justice. We hope that no selfish interests interfere with her work, and allow her to make her best effort. We have to be watching closely, setting our sights in the strengthening of such a necessary institution, in these times of power abuse and corruption (that come from the State).

    In summary, nobody but the society should be more interested to count with a solid institution, one that defends its fundamental human rights. It is understandable if this is irrelevant for President Francisco Flores or for the congress members; however, it has to be important for those who are continuously exposed to the governmental power abuse

    When the results from last year’s March elections were made public, and ever since then, ARENA has gone into a state of commotion, which can be compared, at times, with the most dramatic experiences from a painful delivery. From Alfredo Cristiani to Walter Araujo, ARENA does not seem to find the ideal leader that helps the party to overcome its internal crisis and leads it with hope for success to the next elections. In the meantime, the party’s foundations seem unhappy, their movement is not convinced; in summary, ARENA sails with no direction into deep waters.

    In this context, Mario Acosta Oertel emerges, the ex strong man from the Internal Affairs Ministry. Together with the disagreements of the official party, Acosta intends to postulate his candidacy to direct the COENA, the maximum decision instance inside of that political institution. He introduces himself as a savior, capable to provide the foundations with dynamism, and re-conquer the trust of the Salvadoran population for his party’s cause. That is the bet of the ex Internal Affairs minister, and the one of his sympathizers, who he conquered during his long period at the migratory control and territorial supervision ministry.

    With this scenery, the tension environment, which started ever since the surprising strike of the last electoral dispute, is still here. To proselytize and to debate —activities that have been almost forgotten—, is now fashionable. Acosta’s sympathizers have promoted him in the different department structures of the party.

    During these occasions, as if it was a tour of a great leader, Acosta has spoken about his “project” for the official party. In the meantime, Walter Araujo, COENA’s president and direct rival of the ex minister, has done everything that has been possible not to lose any space. His presence in some celebration acts for him is a proof of what has been formerly said. He does not miss an opportunity to reiterate his friendship with the ex minister. According to Araujo’s judgment —tuned in with Acosta—, to proselytize cannot distract us from the enemies: the red ones, for whose disappearance (including a physical one if it is necessary) every good ARENA member must work at.

    With that silent dispute for power, there will be plenty of people crossing their fingers, hoping that the ex minister does not take the direction of the COENA. Mario Acosta is not a widely accepted man by all the sectors of the party. His ideological radicalism and his little respect for his opponents have drained his attachment to ARENA. In addition, long time militants, such as Gloria Salguero Gross, usually call him an opportunist. She recalled -with a certain displeasure- how a few years ago the ex minister had gained her trust in order obtain a place for him in the party, from where he would favor his personal ambitions.

    It is evident that in such situation it is necessary to ask who, among the ARENA members, is not defending personal interests. It is well known that this party is influenced by the elite businessmen of the country (many of them are anti-Communists) willing to do anything to defend the economic order that grants them with their privileges.

    From this perspective, Mario Acosta is the best representative that the official party could have. Because he usually dares to say, without going around the bushes, what the ARENA members do not make public, but that they share during their secret meetings. For these reasons, the fact of his possible access to the presidency of the COENA could be uncomfortable for the most diplomatic ARENA members, mostly inclined to maintain a certain conciliatory and tolerant image with those who do not have their political and ideological creed.

    Closely to the decision of who will direct the COENA’s destiny, it is possible that a major debate about Mario Acosta’s style and a profile starts. Such profile —about the new president of the COENA— will be defined by the party’s most important members. Until then we will know if his candidacy is accepted or not or if, instead, his intransigent image is interpreted as an obstacle to promote the party’s marketing. At the moment, the idea of a renovation has been imposed, promoted by the movement of ex founders. The president of the COENA, who is also the Legislative Assembly’s president, Walter Araujo, has kept a renovation image. He has surrounded himself with a multifaceted team, in a supposedly closer COENA. That such team has not made any new decisions is a fact; however, that is the slogan of the moment.

    However, due to the party movements, one could think that the profile of the ARENA leader for the next elections is already defined. Everything seems to indicate that the model that was used for the “coronation” of Francisco Flores will be adopted once again. The variant that seems to be imposed is the one of a successful businessman, good friend, a little distant from the actual militancy. It is the image that the ARENA direction is promoting in the present, and which they materialize in the person of Roberto Murray Meza.

    The different party structures seem to have received instructions about it. And, ever since the organization of the National Solidarity Commission (CONASOL, in Spanish), after the January 13 earthquake, even the impossible has been done to keep in the public eye the image of the beer businessman. The different opinion polls, ordered by the right-wing groups, confirm it: he is one of the country’s most popular characters. One curious aspect is that, not too long ago, they compared him with the San Salvador Mayor, Hector Silva; however, in the last opinion poll that was made public, he shared honors with Shafick Handal, as one of the two first characters identified with the solution of the country’s problems.

    According with this situation, it might be that Mario Acosta has the wrong perspective about his possibilities to become COENA’s president. His radical militant image with an irascible mood, contrasts with the elected character, it seems, to represent ARENA. If it is the moment to present himself as a conciliator, willing to listen, beyond the party’s interests, it is evident that the ex internal affairs minister is out of tune with the popular hymn. That is why it is not insane to think that the strongest groups inside the party are getting ready, according to the prevalent image, to abort his project to direct the COENA.

    However it might be, Mario Acosta’s aspirations to become president of the COENA cannot be materialized turning the back on this image project that, so it seems, the official party is imposing. Before any other discussion about the possible renovation that ARENA might contribute with, it is interesting to analyze the possibilities to arrive at such a coveted position. Only if that obstacle disappears, Mario Acosta can make his dream come true some day, about becoming the president of the COENA.

    After only a few months away from the disasters caused by the January and February earthquakes, a new disaster has once again affected the most vulnerable social sectors. During June, a new dry season was reported and it has caused considerable loses in the basic grains production (especially corn). This means that the peasant families have been affected once again by damages and loss in the food harvest that is dedicated, fundamentally, to their own consumption.

    The dry seasons are not new for the Salvadoran history; they were especially severe during the 1950’s and along the next decades. However, after the nineties, they have been particularly frequent, to the point that three years with a severe dry season were reported: 1991, 1994 and 1997. Over the last two years, there was a dry season during July of 2000, and on last June (2001), we can feel the impact of a new dry season.

    The implications that this threat has are diverse, and they not only include the basic grain harvest, but also coffee growing, cattle raising, hydroelectricity generation, and the general price level and, in extreme cases, even the water supplying. The impact of these events has not only reached El Salvador, but also its neighbors Nicaragua and Honduras, which can also have severe implications in the alimentary guarantee of the Central American region. It is necessary to ask ourselves for the impact of the dry season and its causes. The need to formulate and implement prevention and mitigation policies is very clear, because of the damages and the loss caused by such seasons.

    According to the first estimate of the General Direction of Farming Economy, during the agricultural year 2001-2002 a loss of 2.4 million quintal in the corn harvest is expected. This amount represents close to a 16.1% of the total from the harvest expected for the agricultural year. However, according to the farming cooperatives’ representatives, the loss could be getting close to 50% of the total harvest. Using the official production figures of the agricultural year, and this last estimated loss percentage, it turns out that the loss in the corn harvest could reach 7.5 million-quintal.

    The implications that the dry season will have are already considerable. At a price of 125 colones per quintal, the economic cost of the corn harvest loss could be between 300 and 937.5 millions of colones, according to the estimated loss percentage that will be assumed.

    Another easily anticipated impact of the dry season is a price increase of the basic grains. In the case of corn alone, the first impacts in the offer and in the price level can be perceived already, although it must be said that this is a result of the impact that the 2000 dry season had. By early July, the imported corn existence —commercialized through the Farming Product Stock and the local markets— was finished and had suffered a price increase. During the last two weeks, we have gone from a 120 colones price for the quintal, to a 140 colones price, approximately, meaning a 16.7% increase. If we add to this the impact that the present agricultural year dry season will have —which effects over the basic grain offer are yet to come—, the offer and price perspectives for the next months are turning even more somber.

    However, not just the basic grains’ prices will be affected; another impact is also affecting the electric energy prices, and therefore, the general level of prices. With the dry season, the levels of the four hydroelectric dams have not been increased enough to guarantee that the country’s energy centers will be fully operational. The situation is especially serious at the Guajoyo and the Cerron Grande water supplies, since they are close to the minimum level allowed. This situation has obliged the Lempa River Hydroelectric Executive Commission (CEL, in Spanish) to start a contingency plan: to reduce in a 27% the electricity generation through hydraulic means.

    In the past, an energy crisis such as this one would have conducted us to a rationing, as it happened during 1988 and 1991, when electric energy was rationed for up to eight hours. However, in the present, the rationing does not seem possible because the capacity to generate through thermal resources has been significantly increased. In fact, the reduction of the generation in the dams will be covered by a more active participation of the private thermal generators in the electric offer.

    Even if the rationing ghost is dissipated, the truth is that the situation can lead to a substantial increase in the electricity prices, since the generation by thermal devices is more expensive than the hydraulic generation. Even if for this July a reduction of 1.8% in the prices of the electric energy has been announced, it would not be odd that —if the precipitation deficit continues—  the prices will increase again by August.

    At the same time, that increase would have a very significant impact in the general level of the prices, since electricity is a material for practically every formal business of the farming industry, industry, commerce, and services. In fact, representatives from the Salvadoran Association of Industrials (ASI, in Spanish) have expressed that if an increase is reported in the electric energy prices, higher costs could be generated. Therefore, the industrials will not be able to absorb them, and the consumers would pay for it through a price increase in the consumption products. A similar situation would occur in the case of the service and the commerce sectors.

    These circumstances require a reflection about the elements that explain why natural events —such as the dry season- turn into disasters, since it opens the space for the identification of possible impact mitigation strategies. The damage over the basic grains’ harvest is magnified by its little resistance to the dry season conditions. In this case, even if a variety of corn grains that offer more resistance exist, they are not used by most of the producers.

    In the second place, the absence of watering systems to satisfy the demand for the cultivation fields is another element that prevents from mitigating the impact of the dry season. However, in the case of the basic grains, the low profitability of these cultivated fields practically obstructs any watering system strategy introduction. Finally, another factor that contributes to increase the impact of the dry season over the general price level is the unnecessarily high prices that the CEL pays for the electricity to the private thermal generators. Those prices are higher than the ones that could be paid if the electricity was purchased from Guatemala, since there is an electric interconnection with this country.

    Consequently, there are at least three measures that could be implemented to mitigate the dry season impact. First, to promote the adoption of better seeds in the basic grain cultivation or, even better yet, to implement farming diversification programs to introduce a more profitable cultivation, more resistant to the dry season. In the second place, to promote the watering system construction wherever it can be possible. And finally, to reduce the purchase of overpriced energy to the local thermal stations, and increase the purchase of electric energy to Guatemala.