Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI)
E-mail: cidai@cidai.uca.edu.sv

Central American University (UCA)
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     Proceso is published weekly in Spanish by the Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI) of the Central American University (UCA) of El Salvador. Portions are sent in English to the *reg.elsalvador* conference of PeaceNet in the USA and may be forwarded or copied to other networks and electronic mailing lists. Please make sure to mention Proceso when quoting from this publication.

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INDEX

Editorial:  Guns and violence
Politics:  The Judicial Organ: between the crossed fire
Economy:  The nation's general budget for 2002
 
 
 
 

EDITORIAL

    After the pioneer investigation about the violence problem in El Salvador, made by the Central American University "José Simeón Cañas" in 1997, a long way has been walked to understand the factors that are associated with violence, those who feed it, materialize it, and make it even more difficult to resolve. The influence that the possession and the use of guns (in the hands of many civilians) has on the country's levels of violence has been constantly mentioned throughout the pages of this weekly publication, in the articles written by the University's Public Opinion Institute (IUDOP), and in the statements made by the authorities of this university.

    To repeat that guns —just like any other kind of weapons— are made to cause  mortal damages, would seem as a common statement about a place nobody would like to return at. However, the blindness that prevails about this issue in certain governmental circles is a reason not to take it slightly. In fact, among the weapons a person can count with to hurt others —in self defense, as an offense, voluntarily or involuntarily— guns are particularly lethal, not only because of the caliber, but because of the advantages of its easy use. To fire a gun is relatively easy and safe, mostly if it is about small guns such as revolvers or pistols. Other weapons —knives, for instance— can be equally lethal, but the conditions of its use —distance, comfort, protection— make them less efficient than a gun to achieve certain purposes.

    Whoever has a gun has an instrument specifically created to cause damage to others. Certainly, there are people who buy guns to decorate their living-rooms, those who wear them around their waists, and those who place them in their night table drawer to have a good night sleep. In other words, not all the people who acquire a gun do it with the purpose of using it against someone in particular. It is probable that many of those who carry a gun are not even thinking about shooting another human being at some point. Some people do not usually consider, beyond their motivations or personal morality, that they have in their hands a deadly weapon, and that the most reasonable thing is to get rid of it immediately, because it is enough to pull the trigger —by accident, by confusion, or by imprudence— to cause irreparable damages.

    The logic is simple: while more people have guns in their hands, the risks associated with its use will be higher not only among those who are armed, but between the rest of the people around them. The situation of violence this country is going through speaks by itself: multiple crimes are committed with guns, and the responsible ones are not necessarily delinquents or people that carry weapons illegally.

    At some point, high rank officials have said that given the growing levels of violence that presently prevail, it is not wise to suppress or forbid the possession and the use of guns, since this would be a disadvantage for the honest citizen if confronted with a criminal. This kind of reasoning is unconscious and inept. And the high levels of violence  —in which injuries and murder appear as important variables in the violence statistics— demand a drastic action to reduce la possession and the use of guns. To keep justifying the possession of guns means to keep encouraging social violence. The falseness of an argument such as "and armed citizen is safer" has to be added to this issue. Those who think that, should take the time to go through the police reports, in which is evident the little use a gun has in the hands of a civilian when it comes to face a delinquent prepared to dominate his victims.

    Another weak argument is to legitimate the possession of guns dividing the Salvadorans in "the good ones" and "the bad ones": the "good ones" would have the right to carry a gun, while the "bad ones" would have to be hindered from that right. The key question here is how to determine  —what is the criteria— who is good and who is bad. A choice would be the legal criteria: those who have a registered gun, according to the law would be among the first ones, while the rest of them would belong to the second group.

    What happens is that the violence statistics reveal that a great number of injuries and homicides are committed with legally registered guns.  The economy and the social status could be a different criteria, those people with a respectable social status would be considered the "good ones", while the "bad ones" would be those who do not enjoy any social or economic advantages. Then again, the violence research studies reveal that there are many respectable people involved in the world of crime.

    Therefore, the idea to arm the good ones and disarm the bad ones is, besides practically impossible, dangerous, not only because different crimes are committed by presumable good people —who count with appropriately registered arsenals—,  but because with a gun in the hand, the most honest and responsible  person can turn into a murderer in no time.

    The fight against the permission to have and carry of guns should be one of the main flags of those who say that they are worried about the country's prevailing social violence. It has been demonstrated that the legal registration of a gun, or that the presumed honorability of the person who carries it do not guarantee anything, neither for the owner nor for the society in general. On the contrary, each person who has access to a fire gun turns into a threat against himself (or herself), other people, and anybody who might be around.

    Quite a lot has been said about the ideological differences and antagonisms between the two main political parties in this country. ARENA is usually introduced by its followers as "the party compromised with the civilian and the economic freedom of all Salvadorans; that is the nationalist political organization, and their main concern would be to elaborate viable economic solutions in order to resolve the problems of the Salvadoran society". About the FMLN, instead, its followers usually emphasize on their leaders' commitment with justice, equality, and solidarity; they would be the ones called to elaborate a response that would truly resolve all the problems that trouble the country, in a clear opposition against the Neoliberal and excluding social structures, encouraged and supported by the government's right-wing. In the end, both parties usually think about the contender as the main obstacle to accomplish its dreams.

    However, the least important aspect of this rhetoric to distinguish the vocation of each one of these actors is how the population perceive them. It does not matter that the great majority does not attend to the elections which, in theory, work as legitimization mechanisms of the citizens' decisions; or as mechanisms to determine that a good number of Salvadorans do not identify themselves with the implemented policies, supposedly aimed to resolve their problems. That is why each party's declarations can be so different (and in fact this is what actually happens) from reality. Therefore, we find ourselves in an environment that magnifies the alleged differences between the main political forces, highlighting the polarization between them.

    Therefore, there are several proposals to deal with the bottom line issues. All of the plans, some evidently more delicate than others, and emerging from those irreconcilable differences, and offer solutions to end with the national politics’ polarization. This situation threatens to throw away the difficult national effort to finally build a democratic society.  This could be the moment to consider the similarities between these supposedly different actors. This task is not is not regularly done. However, probably doing such exercise some answers might be obtained about the national institutions' stagnation. And, in this context, a summary of their behavior about the judicial system's performance could be very helpful.

    A few months ago, President Francisco Flores stated, after a judicial decision in which the judge let a kidnap suspect go out free (who had been a member of the former left-wing guerrilla), that it is an insult to the population that the Judicial Organ would set free this kind of people, the responsible ones of having caused so much pain to the Salvadoran families. That strong discontent about a judicial decision that President Flores made showed what the right-wing politicians usually do when they do not agree with a judicial decision. All of the propaganda organs are ready to criticize and question the judges, accusing them of corruption and incompetence.

    The same behavior can be detected in the left-wing when it comes to a judicial decision that might go against its interests. The left-wing usually accuses the Judicial Organ, specially the highest instances, of acting under pressure or in connivance with whoever has "the power". For instance, the declarations of some of the FMLN's leaders about the little importance that the judicial decision gave to their demands against dollarization. A deputy of this party referred to such decision in terms of a "state of right-wing" to emphasize on the Supreme Court of Justice's inclination in favor of ARENA, as a clear rejection to the state of right that is yet to be accomplished.

    With such declarations, there is no doubt that it is all about a clear attempt against the country's institutional life, and specially against justice, called to play an important role in the present circumstances. By making public their unfortunate comments against the judicial decisions, the left-wing as well as the right-wing invite the citizenry and their sympathizers to doubt about the judicial decisions. In one or another case, the message is that the system is still permeable vulnerable to the interests of the dominant political and economic sectors. And, however, the task of serving justice should be more important than fighting for the political control.

    There will be people who will see in these constant demands, made by one or another side about the Judicial Organ's performance, a sign of impartiality. This could be true, in another society. In the Salvadoran case, there is a certain social consensus when it comes to assert that it is silly to talk about the independence of the judicial system. The citizens complain about it very often. However, in favor of what group is the scale usually inclined?

    The right answer to this question would have to be investigated at the sectors of the society that do not feel happy with the systems performance. And, about this issue, the poorest ones or those who are confronted with political and economic interests know that they are bound to lose. In addition, it seems as if the judicial decisions the right-wing responds for are usually the ones that are resolved in regular courts of law, and that situation can encourage suspicion. Instead, the left-wing seems to be prone to feel injured by the decisions taken at the highest levels of the Salvadoran justice.

    That evidently means a certain inequality among the actors. When the right-wing disagrees with the decision of an inferior tribunal, counts with a higher court of law that, generally, ends agreeing with the right-wing and revoking the former decision. Instead, the same does not happen with the left-wing, because the causes that usually affect the rights of their sympathizers are frequently ventilated at superior courts, which, generally, end up deciding against them or revoking the decisions of the inferior courts that would have favored them.

    Would this be a sample of the Salvadoran Judicial System's lack of neutrality? The judges and other competent authorities in this field should give an explanation of the facts. In any case, no one can count too much with the highest instance in charge of the judicial apparatus suitable performance. When the social sectors express their disagreement with any judicial decision, specially when the right-wing does, the response is usually lukewarm and it has no forcefulness to answer any doubts. The Supreme Court of Justice does not defend well enough the judges' independence from the influential groups of the society, such as the ANEP, for instance.

    In the mean time, the administration of justice is still questioned between the crossed fire of both the right and the left-wing. On the one hand, incompetence, corruption or partiality consume it in favor of some powerful interests; and, on the other hand, they keep waiting that the most important politicians, in response to the civilian demands, come to an agreement to begin with the pertinent reforms. If things continue to be the way they are now, it is very probable that their discredit increases, and that the dream of a solid judicial system, according to the Salvadoran democratic expectations, might be moving away even further.

    Once again, the budget's approval has caused different reactions, specially from the opposition's deputies, who question the debt's growing level and the legality of the Treasure Bonds (LETES, in Spanish). The government has been financing its deficit with these bonds. Additionally, it is also important to think about the details of the budget's distribution per institution, since in the initial 2002 budget proposal the education and the health branches —the main executors of the social policy— have experimented a reduction in its total participation. Simultaneously, the public debt service has experimented a very generous growth that reflects —once again— that, although El Salvador is not in an open fiscal crisis situation, it is in a growing debt and fiscal deficit situation, which partially obeys to the pressure that the debt service makes on the public finances.

    The context is not flattering at all, not only because of the already mentioned tendency to the public debt, but also because the budget's distribution keeps showing the obstacles that severely limit its potential effect of support for the sustainable development. This is not only because the social expense issue is not faced as it should be (specially after the disasters caused by earthquakes), but also because there is not enough support for the instances related to the economic development and the environmental activities.

    Between 2001 y 2002, the budget would grow in a 13% (from $2,206 to $2,502 million), but although during the last few years the government has been pointing out that the new amounts for the social development have been increasing, the truth is that the traditional branches of the social expense will receive a smaller proportion of the 2002 budget. For 2002, the government calculates that the social development expense will reach a 41.3% from the total budget. This includes part of the assignments of the different branches: the presidency of the republic, exterior relations,  "various" transference activities, education, health, employment and social prevision, and housing. However, in a more serious sense, only the last four elements mentioned can be considered as a part of the social expense, which implicates that this one will not actually go beyond a 28.3% of the total budget.

    Additionally, it can be detected that the amounts destined to the education and the health branches, although they increased in absolute terms, they dropped in percentage terms because they did not grow as much as the general budget did. While this last one grew almost 13%, the education and health budgets grew 8.76% and 4.28%, respectively. Although these growth levels are not unimportant, they could not hinder that the participation of these branches inside the 2002 total budget would drop if compared to the year 2001: the education branch will go from a 19.35% from the 2001 budget to a 18.63% in 2002; the health sector will go from a 10.04% to a 9.26%.

    The situation would have also affected the other two "classic" branches of the social expense: The employment and the social prevision sector will only receive a 0.24% from the 2002 general budget, when in 2001 it received a 0.31% from the same total  —an amount that was already pyrrhic back then. The housing sector will go from receiving a 0.23% in 2001, to receive only a 0.16% in 2002 (this is supposing that the amount designated for the social development inside of the public works branch belongs to the housing branch).

    About the other elements that the government includes in the social development expense, it must be said that some of them could be considered as a promotion of the social development (as in the public works, which includes the housing expense), however in other cases (the various transference activities, for instance) it is not too clear that the total budget that is declared is destined to the social promotion.

    However, even if it was so, the fact that a good part of the social expense depends on both donations and loans, shows how vulnerable the public finances situation is. By the time the transference activities and the loans are examined, economic, social development and modernization development programs are found. Post disaster recuperation programs (rehabilitation or road infrastructure reconstruction programs) are detected as well, but they are not as numerous as the development programs. If the government did not count with the possibility of the loans, its general budget would have a deficit close to 8.4%. Additionally, if the internal debt was added by issuing bonds, the amount would grow 18.8%, and it would imply that the budget has a 27.2% deficit, which would be equivalent to the total amount of the public debt (U$696,721,230). An there is more, if the donations, which represent a 0.6% of the expense, were added the amount would add up to a 27.8%.

    It should not seem odd, then, that the public debt service has increased its participation in the nation's general budget so suddenly.  It will go from absorbing a 15.15% from the 2001 total budget, to absorb only an 18.52% in 2002. An increase that clearly contrasts with the reductions experimented by the education and health branches' participation levels. In absolute terms, the budget destined to the debt service increased over $128 million; instead, the education and health branches together only received a little more than $47 million as an increase.

    There is no doubt that the public debt issue and the public finances management are definitively real economic problems, and that is clearly reflected in the income's composition. As it was mentioned before, a 27.8% will come from donations and loans, while from the taxes it is expected to obtain a 68% of the necessary income to finance the budget (U$1,702.3 million). The other 4.8% basically comes from services, sales, and the financial products. This means that the government can only guarantee a 72.8% of the total necessary income for the 2002 budget.

    In this context, it is worth to consider two issues: the immediate need to increase the states revenue and, the danger to fall into untenable debt levels. The taxes' insufficiency to finance the state's expenses is the most important issue that must be discussed through the fiscal policy, bot not through taxes such as the road's fund or the reforms made to eliminate the income tax exemption from the micro business companies. These taxes will barely allow to collect a little more than a hundred million dollars, when the fiscal debt is seven times higher than that amount.  A real support for the battered public finances could come from a tax increase on the large business companies; these companies have managed their way to pay only half of what they paid in the early nineties.

    If this compromise is not assumed, the private business companies and the workers will see how the economy and the Salvadoran society sink deeper into a crisis, not only because of the pressures of the debt service and, therefore for allowing an already battered economic model.
 

Source: this chart was elaborated by this publication, based on the Internal Revenue Service Ministry's information (www.mh.gob.sv)
(1) For 2002, The Justice and Public Safety budget was integrated into the Internal Affairs branch.