Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI)
E-mail: cidai@cidai.uca.edu.sv

Central American University (UCA)
Apdo. Postal 01-168, Boulevard Los Próceres
San Salvador, El Salvador, Centro América
Tel: +(503) 210-6600 ext. 407
Fax: +(503) 210-6655
 

     Proceso is published weekly in Spanish by the Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI) of the Central American University (UCA) of El Salvador. Portions are sent in English to the *reg.elsalvador* conference of PeaceNet in the USA and may be forwarded or copied to other networks and electronic mailing lists. Please make sure to mention Proceso when quoting from this publication.

     Subscriptions to Proceso in Spanish can be obtained by sending a check for US$50.00 (Americas) or $75.00 (Europe) made out to 'Universidad Centroamericana' and sent to the above address. Or read it partially on the UCA’s Web Page: http://www.uca.edu.sv
     For the ones who are interested in sending donations, these would be welcome at Proceso. Apdo. Postal 01-168, San Salvador, El Salvador.

Proceso 979
December 5, 2001
ISSN 0259-9864
 
 
 
 
 

INDEX

Editorial:  A new crisis inside the public transportation system
Economy:  The crisis and the perspectives of the coffee market
Communications:  The journalists and the Nicaraguan elections
 
 
 
 
 

EDITORIAL

    The public transportation system's critical situation is something that cannot be hidden away any longer. Abuse, the lack of safety, awful service and pollution are some of the difficulties that the Salvadorans have to face every day, without the authorities’ intervention to efficiently resolve these problems. It seems as if this time the Francisco Flores' administration has decided to face this situation with the implementation of a new system of public transportation. Only isolated aspects (mostly governmental decisions) about this new system have been revealed during the last few weeks. By the reaction of the most powerful bus company owners  —who convoked for an indefinite strike—, everything seems to indicate that the governments’ measures had a deep impact on those who thought that they had an exclusive space to do whatever they wanted on the account of the users' safety.

    The issue about the fuel's subsidy is, obviously, one of the most difficult subjects involved in the controversy that the bus company's owners and the government authorities presently face. Actually, the subsidy is not the problem itself; on the contrary, it is a distribution mechanism that, if properly administrated, can contribute to make less expensive the lives of the Salvadorans, without putting the citizens' lives in danger or without using units that do not meet the minimum hygiene and comfort standards. The subsidy was a heavy load that until a few days ago the particular vehicle owners had to pay for, without the users enjoying the safety and the comfort benefits —an obligation of the bus owners, in exchange for the subsidy.

    Apart from the relatively low service fares, the citizenry's experience —for users, drivers and pedestrians— with the public transportation system has been a nightmare. The fact that the bus company owners have not realized this is frankly a shame, mostly because now they ask for support. The fact that there are political sectors that defend the bus owners' interests only to contradict the government is totally absurd, since the public transportation system has played a negative role by deteriorating the social harmony among the Salvadorans.

    Another tense issue between the governmental authorities and the bus owners is the removal of obsolete units and its replacement for new ones. Again, the problem is not easy to resolve, since even if it is true that with very old units the citizenry's safety is at a higher risk  -as the different accidents caused by mechanical difficulties reveal-, it is also true that the purchase of new unities will not be at the reach of many bus owners who presently only count with one or two units.

    Then again, if the dilemma were between civilian safety and business survival, the option can be no other than the first one, because the death of forty people and other thirty more injured cannot be justified just because the owner of the bus cannot replace it for another one with better conditions. However, the intermediate solutions can be suitable; for instance, the reparation, the improvement, and the permanent check ups of the units that, although they might not be recent models, they can still render a good service.

    The question that must be asked is if the public transportation businessmen are willing —in case that an intermediate solution, such as the one mentioned before in this article, is implemented— to subject themselves to a control of that nature and accept the recommendations that are derived from it —whether if it is about the reparation or the removal of certain units. To judge by the behavior of the public transportation businessmen throughout the last few years, it is not very probable that they are willing to subject themselves to a control that might involve a reduction of their profits.

    On the other hand, there is the perception that they have of themselves, as untouchable and absolutely free people to do whatever they want. Precisely, ever since a while ago, the usual call to be a part of the strike has been their favorite weapon; they have yielded the will of different people and they also have obtained privileges. Therefore, by the way they have been shaping this situation, a dialogue would be an almost impossible consideration, unless if it was about granting them boundless concessions on the people's account.

    Something drastic had to be done to resolve a problem that adds more tension to the Salvadoran coexistence. It is not clear, however, how far is the government ready to go to confront the problems that the public transportation system has been nesting. These problems have been present throughout the different ARENA administrations. The disorders and the corruption that has prevailed in this sector have not been the exclusive responsibility of the bus owners and their associations, they have counted with the approval of high rank officials who were also benefited by that disorder and that corruption. As always, not all of the responsible ones will pay for the public transportation's debacle, but those who can easily be affected.

    The public transportation system's crisis cannot be resolved only by eliminating the fuel's subsidy, nor by replacing old units. It involves more than that. For instance, the control of the bus fare, the population's needs, the schedules, the location of the different institutions, the roads' system, the assignation of routes, and the competition with micro-buses and taxis. These are issues that have not been formally discussed. In summary, the micro-buses’ case deserves special attention, since they are not only part of the public transportation system, but they also promote the lack of safety and the chaos in this sector. To let the micro-buses working just like that, would be to continue with the same problems, even if a new system is implemented.

    For the moment, in the strength test in which the government and the bus owners are involved, time is on the side of the government -the end of the strike speaks by itself. There are only very few people who think that the demands of the bus owners have a doses of legitimacy. That does not mean that the governmental project should not be subjected to a permanent control by the citizenry.

    After the coffee exportation installment’s system —created under the shadow of the International Organization of Coffee (OIC)— disappeared back in 1989, the coffee market has experimented different situations that have driven it to chaotic levels. The present situation reminds us about the 1930's crisis, when the United State's stock market made the coffee prices collapse, and so did the coffee-growers’ income, the peasants work opportunities at the coffee fields, and the rural employment level (in El Salvador, this situation was the cause of a severe social crisis in the beginning of 1932). By the end of 2001, the prices have reached extremely low levels (they went from $130 per hundredweight in 1998, to $50 per hundredweight), and it has obliged them to reduce the demand for workers at the coffee-growing sector and, with it, to reduce the present minimum legal salary for the recollection of coffee.

    Fortunately, ever since a while ago, coffee had stopped being the economy’s spine, and the present price crisis has not turned into an uncontrollable social discontent thanks to the existence of other sectors that generate employment and income —such as the maquila and the family remittances— which contribute to alleviate the crisis. However, this does not mean that there has not been a significant impact because of the coffee international prices’ collapse: in several occasions the government’s economic support has been necessary for the coffee-growing sector, some reductions in the cultivated areas of coffee have also been experimented (specially in the urban periphery) and there have also been reductions in the employment and the salaries, just as it was mentioned before.

    In 1992, when the prices felt close to $60 per hundredweight, a first development program takes place in the coffee growing sector.  It consisted in the granting of a $45 million advance that would later have to be replaced by the coffee-growers, once the price levels were recuperated.  To this date, this amount should be paid (at least in theory), since the prices improved for a while.  However, the conditions that originated the already mentioned “governmental help” (the international crisis of coffee) are already even more critical.  After nine years, ups and downs have been reported in the prices of coffee, this situation has allowed the sector to continue existing (in 1998 the prices reach $130 per hundredweight), however in the beginning of the 21st century the situation has not been improved, just like it is explained further in this article.

    During the present governmental administration, appeasement measures for the coffee have also been adopted: plans to renovate “the coffee park” have been announced, plans to support the coffee growing sector at the post earthquake stage, and a contingence and financing program to recollect the harvest that might go up to $15 per hundredweight.  In many cases, the governmental offer has not been welcomed by the farmers, since many of them say that if they accept the governmental programs they would get into deeper levels of debt without giving a solution to the actual problems of the sector.  This can be true, but it is also true that the coffee crisis’ solution is not in the hands of the Salvadoran government, nor in the hands of any other government from any coffee-growing country.

    The coffee crisis emerges with the rupture of the OIC’s agreement, and it is aggravated with the immeasurable increase of the grains world offer.  The extension of the cultivated areas and the world production have led the market to an excessive offer situation, which in conditions of “free competition” —and stability in the demand— rapidly pressures towards a price reduction, as is has actually happened.  In this sense, to come up with a solution it would be necessary to reduce the cultivated areas and the grain’s world offer, something that cannot be achieved with the participation of just one country or a region’s (such as Central America) unilateral decision to retain or destroy part of its production.  By all means, the point is not trying to change the world’s market situation, mostly it is about looking for ways to adapt the situation to the market’s conditions.

    At the moment, some coffee-growers have already taken spontaneous adaptation measures, such as the conversion of a part of their haciendas or the employment and the minimum legal salaries’ reduction. Although, according to official information, the coffee cultivated areas have not varied much during the nineties; the truth is that, since the nineties, the tendency to transform the old coffee haciendas into urbanizations (of a relative importance, such as San Salvador and Santa Ana) has been clear.

    However, the situation for the agricultural year 2000-2001 is even more alarming than it has ever been before during the nineties.  The international price has reached levels inferior to $50, which –according to the coffee-growers- is not even enough to pay for the grain’s recollection.  This situation is already palpable through different signals: a reduction of the employment’s demand for the coffee fields’ up-keeping, a reduction of 18.3% in the value of the salaries paid for the recollection and even for the adoption of the “goods’” payment mechanisms.

    Just like the president of the coffee association acknowledges it, Rafael Inclán, before the recollection, previous activities were not performed at the haciendas because “at the coffee areas the population has a low income”.  He added that some coffee-growers are offering 5.00 colones per arroba (Spanish unit of measurement) of recollected coffee, when the minimum legal wage is 6.12 colones, which —according to him— has driven into a relative lack of workers.  In other cases the coffee-growers offer the workers a payment in “goods”: in exchange for work, they allowed them to cut and keep what they manage to collect after the journey is over.

    The reduction of the minimum wage of the coffee recollection motivated The Minister of Work, Jorge Nieto, to state that he understands and he is sorry for the sector’s problems, “but we cannot throw it back to the workers”.  He added that his ministry would start the necessary verification process of the minimum wage payment established for the coffee recollection (something that is not showing any results yet).

    Despite the swinging moods of the coffee’s international prices, it had never before felt into a situation such as the present one, where the grains recollection is in danger, and even employment and the rural populations income as well.  Without a doubt, the situation is already reaching unbearable levels, and it requires a more logical governmental intervention, articulated and decisive, which does not necessarily mean to abandon coffee to its own luck.

    It cannot be denied that the highest bet of the governmental programs for the agricultural reactivation is presently sitting on the loser’s chair.  Coffee can be an excellent provider of environmental services, but that does not hide the fact that, historically, it has demonstrated not to be an option to overcome rural poverty and; as if it was not enough, now it does not even offer the economic profitability that usually offered to the farmers.  This last problem can be resolved through adaptation mechanisms that guarantee the survival of the cultivation, such as: The introduction of inorganic coffee, the entrance to “fair trade” markets, the relation with agricultural and industrial process, and the improvement of quality, among other elements.

    However, the most important challenge is to define and promote the development of new agricultural activities that generate employment and income. For instance, 150 years ago, the loss of profitability of the indigo cultivation drove the governments to convert the agricultural sector into a coffee-growing one; now the coffee crisis seems to find itself before the presence of less visionary governments, accustomed to live from the income generated by the family remittances and the “seagull” investments of the textile maquila.

    Neither the dry season nor the starvation that affected Nicaragua during this year had altogether as much power as the elections to attract the attention of the rest of world’s eyes to this country.  The “Daniel Ortega” factor attracted the international attention, among other things because the news media and the most important international networks installed in Nicaragua their staff and equipment.  That was a logical answer, given the world’s expectation that was created before the possibility that the Frente Sandinista of National Liberation (FSLN) would comeback to the Executive.

    La Prensa Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy both sent reporters to this country to inform about the November 4th event. The importance acknowledged to Nicaragua was obvious not only for the correspondents, but for the number of pages assigned to the elections’ issue.  Honduras did not received even half of that attention, despite that their elections took place only three weeks later.  La Prensa Grafica, different from El Diario de Hoy, did not even bother to send journalists to Tegucigalpa.

    In a slight inspection of the Nacion of Costa Rica through the internet, two issues prevailed: the actual power will remain in the hands of Arnoldo Aleman and Daniel Ortega after they enter the parliament of their country; and the security display before an election that was announced be a not very peaceful one.

    In the newspaper El País from Spain, the Nicaraguan issue received plenty of attention (compared with regular times), as it was confirmed in its electronic version.  The emphasis of this Spanish newspaper was not in the elections itself, but in other affairs such as the challenges the new president would have in a country with high levels of poverty, and with serious reports of corruption against Aleman and Ortega.  An article named “A presidential fortune under suspicion” includes the declarations of an economist and a former official of the Aleman’s administration, Leonel Teller, who assured that Aleman had accumulated a considerable fortune during his administration (10.11).  Generally, the news published by El País have a context and are well balanced.  Even a reader unfamiliar with the Nicaraguan situation could get some general ideas about its political condition, and its present social and economic situation.

    On the other hand, the Washington Post insisted on one issue (specially before the Bolaños’ triumph was revealed): the fears of The United States for an eventual victory of Daniel Ortega.  “The United States turned itself active again in the Nicaraguan political issues, a poor Central American country that worked as a battle field during both the Reagan and Bush administration.  The members of the present Bush administration support Bolaños and criticize Ortega at discourses and private lobby efforts from Washington to Managua” (20.10), as a story in this American newspapers told.  This newspaper also mentioned different sources of information from The United States that had pronounced themselves against Ortega, and the efforts that the Bush administration had made to avoid a return to the Sandinismo.

    The Washington Post coverage was wider, and the reporters did not skimp on details about the electoral campaign:  “a political advertisement through television has been showing Osama bin Laden with his AK47 riffle and a narrator that says:  ‘if he could vote in Nicaragua, he would vote for commander Daniel Ortega’ “ (20.10).  As a result of this kind of propaganda The Washington Post quoted the opinions of the citizens who expressed:  “look what they (The United States) are doing in Afghanistan.  If the United States do not agree with you, they know how to hurt you” (06.11).

    The balance of this information was made with Ortega’s declarations, and the ones of the people who saw in this kind of propaganda “a fear campaign”.  According to this American newspaper, after the September 11th attacks against New York and Washington, high rank official of that country had mentioned Ortega’s relation with Fidel Castro, Hugo Chávez from Venezuela, and the Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi (05.11).  In the meantime, the American ambassador at Managua, Oliver Garza, was being photographed with Bolaños during the food aid delivery (04.11).  Although with a certain unbalanced, not favorable at all for the Sandinistas, The Washington Post mentioned the critics made against Aleman and Bolaños, both of them from the Constitutionalist Liberal Party, the one that finally won the elections.

    To this point, the emphasis of the three newspaper’s analysis was very different, and that is understandable given the geographic location and the interest of those counties in the Central America region.  Some desirable features in the international coverage, however, were clearly observed by the reporters who covered the elections: the context, a balance of sources, “hard” information, analysis and interpretation (without falling into opinion articles).  La Nacion, El País, and The Washington Post, satisfactorily reached those professional requirements.  In El Salvador the journalistic coverage was very superficial and had plenty of biased information.

    La Prensa Gráfica gathered cold and trivial information that did not required of a trip of any journalist to Managua (the environment of the electoral campaign, the cost of the elections, the invitations to vote in peace, the Election Day, and the results, among other issues).  The international agencies compiled those and other pieces of information that are much more complete through its representatives, and the efforts that surely come from its main locations in special situations, such as the elections.

    Out of the two largest local morning papers, El Diario de Hoy was the one that put in evidence in El Salvador those fears that The United States expressed because of Ortega’s possible triumph.  Differently from The Washington Post, El Diario de Hoy’s correspondent, a born Nicaraguan, wrote articles closer to opinion texts against Ortega, than a balanced information about the elections.  It is not necessary to be a part of the Sandinistas to realize that.  He tried to give a negative connotation to the fact that Ortega once said that The United States was “the enemy of humankind”, and that now he says that “love is stronger than hate”.  In these terms, it is not very wise to describe the Sandinista candidate as a tyrant with second intentions.  This reporter could have used serious studies about Ortegas administration to evaluated his performance or his tendencies, but the way he wrote his articles it seemed as if he was talking about a cartoon villain.

    In El Diario de Hoy, the articles that appeared about Bolaños electoral triumph, instead of news they seem to be advertising texts.  In one of the newspaper covers, for instance, headlines such as “Bolaños’ overwhelming triumph” (06.11) appeared when he only was ahead of Ortega by less than a 10%.  It is not necessary to be an expert on statistics to realize that it was not an  “overwhelming triumph”.  Specially when the calculations were made based only on a 13.03% of the total amount of votes.

    In the inside pages of the same edition, the reporter asserted that with Bolaños’ triumph “the Nicaraguans gave a total rejection to the Sandinistas, and they hold on to democracy and the respect for freedom” (06.11).  Democracy and the respect for freedom are difficult factors to measure by anyone.  The special correspondent, who is also the general director of the MAS newspaper, would have had to use a source for that phrase, so that it would not sound as opinion, and so that someone would have provided him of numbers that described his words.  It would have been interesting to know information about the democracy’s improvement level in that country by the intervention of Bolaños, who is the vice-president in the present Aleman’s administration.  These were only some of the most evident omissions of El Diario de Hoy in this coverage.

    The headlines of November 6th also made a reference about an open support of this reporter to the PLC (Bolaños defeats the Sandinistas, To walk with eagerness, A freedom fighter, The United States compliments democracy’s advance…).  At the same time, his rejection to Ortega can be noticed when he says:  “the electoral result, around which the people made a civic party, are interpreted by the analysts as a rejection to those who do not guarantee the respect for freedom”.  He does not even mention to what analysts he is referring to, nor to what did they specifically said.  This is a frequently used resort that ascribes to the sources something that the journalists wants to say, but the journalist must really know how to use it so that his subjectivities do not show through.

    Other articles, such as “President Arnoldo Aleman: Ortega is finished” or “The Sandinista regime left Nicaragua in an economic ruin” should have been published along the editorial pages. On the one hand, because they are not news (they do not have any new information), and on the other hand, because by a simple inspection, an opinion and an advertising style can be perceived. To make publicity, a lot of creativity is required. It is not enough to tirelessly say good things about a party, or say bad things about another one. Different pieces of information, indices, and examples that strengthen the article have to be used.

    Neither El Diario de Hoy, nor La Prensa Grafica made any efforts to put the information into context. The most important omissions were the shadow of corruption that chases the Aleman administration; and Nicaragua’s political, social and economic situation. The lack of depth could be blamed on the daily publication demands, time, and the communication of the special correspondents from Managua to San Salvador. However, a journalist who goes to another country has the duty to inform himself or herself very well before and during the trip, and later he must write the information keeping a discreet distance and with the highest professional standards possible.