Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI)
E-mail: cidai@cidai.uca.edu.sv

Central American University (UCA)
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     Proceso is published weekly in Spanish by the Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI) of the Central American University (UCA) of El Salvador. Portions are sent in English to the *reg.elsalvador* conference of PeaceNet in the USA and may be forwarded or copied to other networks and electronic mailing lists. Please make sure to mention Proceso when quoting from this publication.

     Subscriptions to Proceso in Spanish can be obtained by sending a check for US$50.00 (Americas) or $75.00 (Europe) made out to 'Universidad Centroamericana' and sent to the above address. Or read it partially on the UCA’s Web Page: http://www.uca.edu.sv
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INDEX

EDITORIAL

    The tenth year anniversary celebration of the Peace Agreements starts on January 16th, with a celebration that will last three months, in order to count with the presence of the United Nations’ General Secretary. He is expected to declare the end of the international verification about the country, as well as to officially declare that the agreements were accomplished. It will be three months of an intense advertising campaign that will aim to insist on the accomplishments of the agreements, and, if they do not come up with any better ideas, we will probably hear once again that El Salvador is a country in constant progress, with a guaranteed development and, therefore, the place for great opportunities. The government will take advantage of the occasion to cover up the hostile reality with the propaganda about the Peace Agreements.

    The armed conflict ended and, in this sense, the agreements were positive. However, there is no unanimous agreement about the impact that such event had in the lives of the Salvadoran along these past ten years. More than half of the population acknowledges that the country is better now than it was before, but only because the war is over. However, other sectors of the population think that the country is still the same or that it remains in a bad shape, not improving at all, because there is violence and crime, because the economic situation has gotten worse, because there is more unemployment and more poverty, and because life is even more expensive now than it was before. It is clear that the Peace Agreements cannot be blamed, at least not directly, for the precarious social and economic situation of most of the population. We have to remember that the negotiators decided not to deal with this thorny issue, but to leave it to the government officially elected by a universal and free vote. Instead, they did agree to establish a forum in order to deal with these issues, but this mechanism was short lived.

    The Peace Agreements created enormous expectations among the population. Some people even talked about returning to the Salvadoran state, others talked about a new El Salvador. The modest ones insisted that 1992 was the beginning of a transition that promised, at least in an implicit way, welfare and safety. Ten years later, these ideas can hardly be sustained. Technically, for most of the population, the Peace Agreements did not actually mean an improvement in their lives, because the transition process has not delivered the announced results. It is impossible to forget that, back then, it was said that the bad economic situation was due to the war and, they were right in more than a way; however, ten years later, the population knows that to end the war was something positive just by itself.

    The agreements are the result of a negotiation between two military confronted elites. There was the promise of political reforms for the insurgency, which would allow them to participate in the public life. In exchange, they were asked to moderate their economic and social demands. In the meantime, the government compromise itself to accept that participation only if it was able to continue with its economic project. It should not seem odd then if the Peace Agreements were not understood by the society, or that, ten years later, this one took distance from its immediate rewards. In fact, the Peace anniversaries have never been massively commemorated. A tribute has never been rendered to the thousands of victims involved in the conflict. The end of the conflict itself owes more to its victims than to its negotiators or to the politicians who signed the agreement.

    While those elites privilege the democratic stability and the economic growth as the most important social values, most of the population puts an emphasis on social and economic justice, the respect for the human rights and the public safety. This contradiction grows when it is evident that, for most of the people, democracy has worked very little. One of the explicit purposes of the Peace Agreements was to encourage a democratization process. It is true that most people consider that democracy is better than any other sort of government; however, more than one third says that it does not really matter to them whether or not the regime is democratic, and that the authoritarian regimen is better. Most people prefer that the problems are resolved through participation, although another considerable number of people claims for an iron fist. This devaluated version of democracy can be confirmed with the generalized distrust in the national institutions. Those who generate less trust are those who should be promoting it, looking after it, and practicing it: the central government, the Attorney General’s Office, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Legislative Assembly, and the political parties.

    The population understands by democracy three aspects that are somehow related: the exercise of their rights and political freedom, social welfare, and the participation at public affairs. Out of those three aspects, just one has been actually around –and only partially- during the last ten years. It could be objected that this conception of democracy is too pragmatic. However, this objection cannot be sustained in a time when pragmatism is considered a very important feature of the society, and mostly because democracy is not an abstract value, one must always ask: democracy for what and for whom? Even if it is assumed that the exercise of the rights and freedoms is universal at El Salvador, the same cannot be said about the social welfare, nor about the participation in the decisions related with the public affairs.

    The Salvadoran society has many divisions. The most important one is the difference between the group who receives the highest income and the ones who do not. It is a difference that, instead of becoming less important, it grows everyday. All kinds of social differences are derived from this situation, and all kinds of perspectives and opinions as well. Therefore, it is not only about putting the Salvadoran society in a common vision about its past and the human rights’ violations that took place in it, it is about overcoming an even more difficult obstacle.

    Many people would object this analysis saying that the Peace Agreements cannot be demanded to perform every single task. That would be true if they were expected to do something that was not contemplated among the agreements’ duties. However, the Geneva agreement, the first one of the series, establishes the four purposes of the political negotiation, which were gathered by the Peace Agreement, signed in Mexico: put an end to the armed conflict, encourage democratization, guarantee the respect for the human rights, and unify the Salvadoran society. Ten years later, the reality delivered by the transition did not meet its goals. The Peace Agreements have been reduced to one aspect: the end of the civil war. To say more is to lie, its demagogy.
 

    It is no secret that the January and the February (2001) earthquakes caused an enormous economic loss, besides shaking the Salvadoran society as a whole. Hundreds of families lost their relatives, and thousands saw their belongings disappear in one of the most overwhelming disasters of the century for this country. A year later, in the context of the Peace Agreements tenth anniversary celebration, it is important to examine the situation of thousand of affected ones.

    It is important to discuss that problem because one of the purposes of the process of peace was to initiate the construction of a new society where the political and economic violence were for once and for all terminated. It is clear that, ever since the Peace Agreements were signed –and when a new phase of democracy got started- the country inserted itself in a social and political activity, which would try to become an answer to the new challenges of the national reality. At this point, it is important to ask about the measures that have been taken to go on with the plans made ten years ago.

    Since there are no reliable official statistics about this issue, the public opinion polls become a very useful tool. And, they have revealed that the Salvadoran population, a year after the earthquake, perceive the deterioration of their life standards; they do not believe that democracy, the main purpose after the end of the armed conflict, has a place in this country. Both the social and the economic violence remain, together with a political class incapable of facing the main national problems.

    In that context, a year after the earthquakes, and ten years after the signature of the Peace Agreements, to accomplish the people’s welfare constitutes the main challenge that the political class has to face. That is why it is not odd to say that 2002 is a difficult year for this country. The beginning of the year already brought news about the desperation of a good number of Salvadorans who are willing to abandon the country, this time with destination to Sweden.

    It is not a new fact that many compatriots are ready to leave all behind, in search of a more decent and safe life abroad. It is no secret –the opinion polls have revealed it more than once- that the only hope of a good part of the Salvadoran youth is to find a chance to go to the United States. It is not about being fooled by the ones who illegally transport people there. Mostly it is about the harsh reality that they face in this country that pushes them to seek for better opportunities in another land.

    It is important to examine the case of those who have chosen to travel to Sweden. To judge by the news, they come, mostly, from the middle class sector. The seriousness of this situation is indicated by the families who have been able to gather an amount of money that the newspapers reveal, and that, despite of that fact, are desperate enough to abandon the country.

    In this sense, although it is important that the political authorities publicly condemned the disappointment suffered by these families, it is convenient, however, to stop and analyze this matter thoroughly. This problem is the reflection of a deeper reality: the Salvadorans’ lack of confidence in the country’s future. The opinion polls have revealed this more than once. After the earthquakes, the social situation of the Salvadorans has been deteriorated, and most of the population does not trust in the capability of the political institutions to resolve the society’s problems.

    That is why it is important to point out that, a year after the earthquakes and in the tenth anniversary of the Peace Agreements’ signature, many problems are still intact. In addition, the poor performance of the politicians has contributed, in a good part, to make the situation worst. The feeling of a social helplessness has grown among the citizenry. The economic decisions have not been the most accurate ones, and the generalized state of corruption has contributed to enhance the negative perception about the country’s direction.

    In this context of peace celebrations, the social perspectives are more than disturbing. The Salvadorans have no hope for important improvements in their lives. In any case, this sensation will go on while the institutions responsible for resolving the most urgent social problems keep acting the way they do. The social deterioration is given in a very hostile international context. The September 11th terrorist attacks against the United States, and the war that was later developed have affected the world’s economy. This becomes an additional factor to encourage the generalized opinion according to which, in El Salvador, the economic and social crisis keep growing.

    Another important international issue for El Salvador is the social, economic, and political crisis that Argentina lives, one of the most economically powerful countries in Latin America. The new Argentinean president, Eduardo Duhalde –the fifth one in two weeks- has officially declared the country’s bankruptcy. The local currency has been devaluated, breaking up with the parity with the United States’ currency, established almost over a decade ago. The reaction of the country’s most important actors in the economic and the political fields about this issue can give an idea about how the situation will be handled in the South American country.

    Because of the critics about the dollarization that took effect a year ago in El Salvador (which imply that it can contribute to reduce the country’s capability to face the international economic context), the official discourse rushes to deny any connections with the Argentinean experience. On the contrary, against the evidence, there are those who from the government’s side do not get tired of talking about the improvements in the country’s economic performance.
The divorce between the civilian perception about the social situation and the official discourse does not contribute to find a way to face the present crisis. The justifications that the politicians make about the economic situation do not contribute to generate the citizenry’s trust.

    In summary, it can be sustained that the country’s complicated situation, and the lack of hope of the Salvadorans has an explanation, mostly, in the political leaders’ attitude. They do everything they can to exclude the citizenry from any kind of social participation. From this perspective, it can be said that the consignation of peace achieved ten years ago must encourage the politicians to consider the society’s demands, in order that their political achievements can be evaluated comparing them with the reconciliation level among the Salvadorans.
 

    Without the intention to deny the evident advances in the achievement of the Peace Agreements, an examination of them from an economic perspective raises serious doubts about their contents. The establishment of a Social and Economic Settlement Forum (FES, in Spanish), and the structural adjustment measures’ compensation of their negative impact are two clear examples of irresponsibility. The intensification of the adjustment measures implemented over the last weeks (and the ones that will be implemented next), such as the reduction of the subsidy for the electrical energy consumption, the elimination of the public transportation’s fee subsidy, the elimination of the water subsidy, the lay off of 8,400 employees from the public sector, and the increase on the social security rates illustrate this situation.

    The economic and social agreements contemplated four important areas: the agricultural problem; the transference of the state’s lands at conflictive zones and occupied lands; credit for the agricultural sector, and for the micro and the small business; measures to alleviate the structural adjustment’s cost; the encouragement of the external cooperation for the community’s development; the FES installation; and the execution of the National Reconstruction Plan (PRN).

    The solution for the agricultural problem was defined based on the transference of pieces of     lands larger than 245 hectares, of the state’s lands, and the formulation of a new legislation (specially an agricultural code). It is not clear up to what point the transference of these lands was completed, but it can be said that the new legislation, agriculturally speaking, is one of the unaccomplished tasks in this area. For the state’s land transference located at formerly conflictive zones and occupied lands, the process followed a long and winding road that, despite of it all, it seemed to satisfy both sides.

    The credit for the agricultural sector and the micro and small business is an area that still requires of new encouragements, not only because it has been one of the aspects comprehended in the Peace Agreements, but because it is a fundamental requirement for the promotion of the economic growth, the rural development, and the informal sector’s profits increase. Since 1992 up to this date, very little has been done, especially because the financial sector acts accordingly to its own criteria –which generally does not consider a priority the credit for the agricultural field, or the micro and the small business. In addition, the technical assistance contemplated in the agreements has not yet arrived; on the contrary, the present government is dedicated to dismantle the Ministry of Agriculture and Cattle Raising.

    In 1992, some 3,383 millions of colones were granted as a credit for the agricultural sector, among which 22.5 millions of colones were contemplated for the corn cultivation. These represented a 21% and a 0.14% respectively, out of the total credit granted by the commercial banks. For 2000, the amounts granted by these banks and the financial companies have increased up to $323.7 million, but they have relatively lost importance, since they only represent 6.8% from the total credit granted. For the cultivation of corn, $1.1 million were dedicated, which not only reflects a fall back in terms of absolute value, but also a virtual disappearance of this sector as credit worthy: it received 0.02% from the total amount.

    The participation of the Agricultural Encouragement Bank (BFA, in Spanish) in the assignation of the credit during this period has been present, but it has had very little consideration: $564 million in 1994, and $700 in 2000, a 2.9% and a 1.6% from the total credit granted by the bank in the same years, respectively. In a context like this one, the recession of the agricultural sector, observed during most of the last decade, should not seem odd.
 
    The evaluation of the credit for the micro and the small business is difficult to calculate for the 1992-2001 period; however, in numerous occasions, the representatives of the of the gremials that gather that sector have said that the absence of credits and the absence of an encouraging banking system are two of the largest gaps of the governmental policy.

    Among the relief measures were: the consumer’s protection, privatization, and help for the extreme poverty. As far as the first issue is concerned, it can be said that the government did present the first project of the consumer’s protection law –which was later approved by the legislative Assembly- and with the creation of the Consumer’s Protection General Direction (although in the agreements another kind of institution was contemplated for this task). As for the privatization issue, it was agreed to promote social participation in the property of the private business companies and avoid the monopoly like behavior. However, the truth is that the privatization of the banking system, the telecommunication companies, the electrical distribution, and the pension funds’ administration companies what have actually made easier is a conversion of the Salvadoran assets, and a deeper penetration of the large transnational enterprises.

    The combat against the extreme poverty continues to be a challenge of enormous dimensions, especially when it faces the permanent impact of the natural and social disasters. Only because of the January and February 2001 earthquakes it is estimated that the extreme poverty increased in 2.2% in a national level. In fact, the most relevant anti-poverty actions are the family remittances. In fact, with these family remittances as a part of the income used to calculate the poverty level back in 1993, the official numbers started to reflect a gradual reduction of poverty.

    The performance of the international cooperation for the community development has been a working field full of non-governmental organizations and the Development Program of the United Nations (PNUD, in Spanish), mainly. Technically, the government seems to be more interested to obtain more cooperation from the Salvadoran immigrants. In a certain amount, this obeys to the fact that the international cooperation has worked almost through inertia, fist, thanks to the spontaneous support of the National Reconstruction Program (PRN, in Spanish), and then because of the post-Mitch and the earthquakes’ reconstruction programs.

    The FES had a mayfly life, due to the practical impossibility of reaching an agreement between the government, the private business companies, and the work unions (in the case of the minimum wage amount, for instance). The truth is that the private companies do not have a spokes person, and they have dedicated themselves to generate proposals that only include their perspective.

    The execution of the PRN was developed with a relatively fast rhythm, and it was accomplished in a large proportion, but when it comes to face the disasters caused by last year’s earthquakes, the need for a new PRN turns more than evident now and –just as the President has accepted it- represents the most crucial challenge of the present government.

    In summary, it can be said that when it comes to the economic and the social fields the government still has a debt with the accomplishment of the following agreements: the formulation of an agricultural code; credit and technical assistance for the farming sector, the micro, and the small business; the promotion of the social participation at the privatized companies; the healing of the extreme poverty; and the promotion of a dialogue to install once again the FES.

    Even if the attitude of those who say that the Peace Agreements are accomplished, the common sense suggests that the implementation of programs such as the recently mentioned ones is still a permanent need. To this it has to be added, for instance, the necessity of measures that guarantee the existence of subsidies for the most vulnerable sectors, and the examination of the public administration’s personnel reduction policies.
 
 
 
 

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